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THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

IN the year which ended in December, 1943, the *expenses* of the Society were £120 more than the revenue.

In the year which ended in December, 1944, the *income* of the Society was £113 *greater* than the expenses.

The REASON was that we received £129 from the Inland Revenue as the result of members having signed covenants to pay their nominal subscriptions for seven years. This increase in revenue has cost members NOTHING.

So far we have received just over 200 covenants out of a membership of over 1,500—that is, *under 15 per cent*.

The expenses of the Society are bound to increase after the war: the Journal will again be published four times a year, lectures will increase in number and the dinner club will be revived. More important still, our staff must be adequately remunerated.

This can ONLY be done if we increase our membership *and* if more members will sign covenants. REMEMBER that this does NOT cost you anything but it DOES help the Society's funds.

The Council again appeal for your help in the matter.

DEED OF COVENANT

I

of

hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of

Address of Witness to your signature

Occupation of Witness

NOTICES

THE Society has been fortunate in securing as secretary Miss R. O. Wingate. Miss Wingate has not only travelled widely but has full knowledge of the Society's work; she acted as secretary to the Dinner Club for some years until she was enrolled in the Ministry of Information at the commencement of the war. The Members will be glad to have a secretary with such experience as she has had.

The Council wish to thank Mr. Iain Gordon-Campbell for a generous gift of Turkish books, including parts of the Turkish Encyclopædia. A full list is given at the end of this number of the Journal.

Members and contributors only are responsible for their statements in the Journal, with the exception of the two papers where it is otherwise stated.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

*being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend ^{him}_{her} for membership.*

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His
Her connection with Asia is :

SIR ERIC TEICHMAN, G.C.M.G., C.I.E.

APPRECIATIONS BY SIR JOHN PRATT, K.B.E., C.M.G., AND THE
RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT CLIVE, P.C., G.C.M.G.

THE tragic death of Sir Eric Teichman, which came as such a shock to his many friends in many lands, is a grievous loss to his country, for never was there a greater need than now of his specialized knowledge, his ripe experience, cool judgment and wisdom in council. Teichman had an unrivalled knowledge of the vast region lying between the confines of China Proper, India, Persia and Siberia. From the most ancient times this region, despite progressive desiccation and the forbidding character of most of its surface, has been the scene of much local traffic and a corridor for trade and intercourse between the Far East and the Mediterranean world. In the twentieth century, however, owing to the growing rivalries of Japan, Russia, China, India—*i.e.*, the Indian bureaucracy—and England, all these lands were gradually shut off more and more from intercourse with the outside world. Access to Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang has become more difficult, the searchlight of public criticism has been switched off and it is not easy to discern the true meaning of political movements—all of which are signs that in this region of conflicting ideologies the seeds of another great struggle may be in process of being sown. A considerable part of Teichman's career was devoted to studying, residing in or journeying through this region, and it is a disaster that his advice will no longer be available to guide British policy through the dangerous times ahead.

Teichman entered the Consular Service and came out to China from Charterhouse and Cambridge in 1907. He was then twenty-three, but already he gave the impression of a great personality with strongly marked characteristics and a maturity of judgment beyond his years. He was a great sportsman, fond of shooting and especially of riding. His first love was undoubtedly the China pony, the gallant little animal bred on the Mongolian steppes which has provided such splendid sport for lovers of racing, polo and cross-country riding in the Treaty Ports of China. In all of these Teichman excelled, and this was the more remarkable, for when he first arrived as a student interpreter in the old British Legation in Peking he was already a sufferer from arthritis, and his disability became much worse as the result of a riding accident a few years later. Most ordinary men would have abjured an active life, but Teichman did not allow it to deter him from the arduous journeys he made in Tibet and Turkestan.

During the thirty years that he was a member of the China Consular Service, Teichman never filled a post, senior or subordinate, in any of the Treaty Ports. He thus never had the experience of dealing direct with Treaty Port communities or problems, and this may have been a handicap in his work in the Foreign Office or as Chinese Counsellor in Peking; but this handicap, if such it was, was more than counterbalanced by the advantage of dealing with large questions and broad issues of high policy. His talents also found more scope in Mongolia and Tibet than in the

Treaty Ports. In 1921 he published *Travels of a Consular Officer in North-West China*, and in the following year *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*. These books contain much that is of extraordinary interest and value, but it was characteristic of Teichman that he refused to dress up his experiences in a guise that would be attractive to the ordinary reader and only allowed his learning to appear in stray sentences in footnotes. This was in accordance with his peculiarly sardonic philosophy of life; it amused him deliberately to abstain from cultivating the graces which normally make men attractive, and for that very reason he was an unusually attractive character. He spoke Chinese, as he spoke English, without a trace of tone, rhythm or accent, but no one ever failed to grasp his meaning. His despatches and official memoranda were stripped of all adornment, but they were models of sound sense and lucid exposition. It is these qualities that make his book *Affairs of China*, published in 1938, so valuable to the student of Far Eastern politics. A friend once laughingly remarked about his books of travel, "Old Tai blows all the dust of the Gobi over everything he writes"; but this was done deliberately in order to achieve the end he aimed at. In 1918, when Teichman was stationed in Tibet, one of the Chinese military swashbucklers who flourished at that epoch was responsible for breaking the truce that reigned on the Sino-Tibetan border as a result of the Simla Conference of 1913. Teichman succeeded in stopping the fighting and re-establishing the truce, thereby rendering a service of inestimable value to China, Tibet and Great Britain. It would interest students of psychology to read how little he makes of this incident in his book and how he plays down his share in it. The Government, however, recognized the value of his services during this period by the award of the C.I.E. in 1919.

In 1935 Teichman returned to England and seized the opportunity to travel from Peking via Kansu, Kashgâr and India. This involved crossing the Himalayas in midwinter over the Gilgit Pass at a height of 15,000 feet. The journey, which ranks high in the annals of Asiatic travel, is described in *Journey to Turkestan*, published in 1937.

In 1936 Teichman retired to Honingham Hall in Norfolk, where, in spite of increasing disability, he was able to enjoy good sport. In 1942 he was asked to return as Chinese Adviser to our Embassy in Chungking. With indomitable courage he agreed to go out for one year, and when the year was up he characteristically elected to return through Central Asia. He travelled by motor-truck from Chungking to Lanchow and thence to Tihua, capital of Chinese Turkestan. Here he visited Tunhuang on the old Silk Road from Cathay to Rome, and inspected the famous Cave of the Thousand Buddhas where Aurel Stein found the treasure of ancient manuscripts forty years ago. From Tihua, travelling by truck, train and airplane, he went to Kuldja, then crossed into Soviet Kazakstan, whose chief city is Alma Ata, which being interpreted means "Father of Apples"; then on to Tashkent, the capital of Usbekistan, Askabad, Bajgiram (in Persia), Meshed, Zabidan, and then to Quetta and Karachi, which is six thousand miles from Chungking. This journey, which took three months, was also a remarkable feat, but no detailed account of it exists except in the confidential files of Government departments.

In 1921 Teichman married Ellen Cecilia, widow of Major D. S. Niven and daughter of Mr. M. J. Teesdale of Walton-on-Thames.

Teichman received many honours, including the Murchison Grant by the Royal Geographical Society in 1925 and the G.C.M.G., conferred on him in the last Birthday Honours List. He became an Honorary Vice-President of the Royal Central Asian Society in 1944.

The Right Hon. Sir ROBERT CLIVE writes :

Sir Eric Teichman—known to his friends as “Tai”—was a distinguished traveller and a great sportsman, who for fourteen years, from 1922 to 1936, was Chinese Secretary at the British Legation—later Embassy—in Peking. Chinese Secretary is a key position, for he is the expert adviser of the Ambassador. “Tai” was a very interesting character. Underlying the brusqueness of his manner was an instinctive shrewdness and understanding of human nature. He was always direct and very outspoken, but blessed with a saving sense of humour. To the latter quality he attached great importance. “If you can make the Chinese laugh,” he said to me once, “you will be all right. That is the great difference between the Chinese and Japanese.” And again, “The Chinese are always ready to compromise if face can be saved.” During the civil war that raged round Peking in 1922 Chinese troops had occupied the racecourse. This was in August, and training for the autumn races was due to begin. So, at his own suggestion and with the approval of the stewards, he went out under a white flag to parley with the Chinese General. After long discussion the General agreed to evacuate the racecourse provided some of his men could sleep in the grand stand. An invitation to attend the October meeting with a party of his officers as guests of the Race Club was accepted with pleasure. Training then started and a very successful meeting was held.

Without being a profound Chinese scholar, Teichman had just the right qualifications for getting on with the Chinese. He never lost his temper. He knew his own mind but could see their point of view, and realized that there must be some give as well as take in *all* negotiations with Chinese.

He was much criticized by the British community in Shanghai for recommending in 1927 that the British concession in Hankow should be given up. In spite of a masterful character he was no last-ditcher, and was not to be deterred from what he believed to be a wise policy by any regard for a course of action that might be more popular.

Only a man of his toughness and iron will could have accomplished those two remarkable journeys across Central Asia, crippled as he was as the result of a riding accident.

His death is a great loss to the Society, of which only this year he was elected to be an Honorary Vice-President. He probably knew as much about modern China as any Englishman, for, though he retired from the Service eight years ago, with great devotion to duty he went to Chungking in 1942 to act as adviser to our newly appointed Ambassador.

A few months ago he gave a lecture at a private meeting of the Society, when he drew a lucid picture of the complicated position in the remote province of Sinkiang, which he had recently crossed on his last journey across Central Asia. R.I.P.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1939 AND IN 1944

By HAROLD BEELEY

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 4, 1944. Chairman: The Rt. Hon Sir Robert Clive, P.C., G.C.M.G.

MY subject is the impact of the second world war on the countries of the Near and Middle East. Although Turkey belongs geographically to this area, I shall confine my remarks to Egypt, the Arab countries in Asia together with the Jewish National Home, and Persia. There, as elsewhere, the conditions of war have created a new sense of urgency in the treatment of peace-time problems. To some extent the war will be found to have changed the very nature of these problems, or some of them, and perhaps even to have assisted directly in their solution, but its principal effect has been to stimulate the feeling that they must be grappled with in the future with a greater sense of urgency than in the past.

The problems that I have in mind are three: the social problem, the constitutional problem, and the problem of external relations. Each of these, the first and second no less than the third, is a product of contact between Oriental social systems and Western influences. This, the fundamental process, is usually spoken of as "Westernization," a word which is, in my view, dangerous, because it implies that the West is the only active partner in the relationship and that the final goal is the assimilation of Western Asia and North Africa to Europe. It is enough to consider for a moment the depth and firmness of the foundations laid by the history of Islam, and also the complex origins of our own Western civilization, to see at once the arrogance and the historical improbability of this assumption that the destiny of the Near and Middle East is absorption into Europe. Nevertheless, the most important factor in the present phase of this region's history is unquestionably its exposure to Western influences.

The study of this contact between two civilizations is one of the functions of the Royal Central Asian Society, and there are many in my audience who understand it far better than I do. Happily it is not my task this afternoon to delve into its profounder and more elusive aspects, and I shall confine myself only to some of its relatively superficial consequences.

The influence of one society upon another is exercised, in its early

NOTE.—The first five lectures reported in this Journal attempt to give some idea of the effect of the past five years, when war has raged in Europe, on Asiatic countries. Three are notes only of informal addresses of members home on short leave who have been good enough to speak. The Far East and Netherlands East Indies have been left for a later date, when fact can take the place of conjecture. Of the five given here, the authors of three have spent the whole five years in the countries on which they speak, while the other two have been in very close touch with them throughout.

stages at any rate, through certain limited and specialized groups in the latter. Among such groups in the Near East I would draw attention to three. In the first place, there are the larger landowners and merchants, whose wealth enables them to acquire the material comforts and make use of the technical achievements of the West. But since a transformation in the material way of life is bound to bring in its train changes of outlook and interest, the effect of this kind of external approximation to the West is to increase the tensions in Eastern society. The rich become more remote from the poor, are felt to be more alien, and so are viewed with a more critical eye.

Therefore there occurs a loosening in the texture of society, which opens the way to economic and social discontents of a modern and Western character. At the same time, other groups are emerging with the capacity to express and exploit these discontents. And these groups, which may in time threaten the privileges of the wealthy, have largely been created on their initiative. A Western education for the sons of a family is, after all, along with luxurious cars and well-appointed houses, one of the new advantages that money can buy in the modern world. But a Western education produces, in small though growing numbers, critics of extreme disparities of wealth and advocates of social reforms which would involve an appreciable redistribution of income. Their reformist tendency is strengthened by nationalistic motives, for they feel that their countries cannot claim equality with the West unless they are prepared to sweep away social habits and structures which the West has long ago condemned. The wealthy classes, with the increasing complexity of their economic demand and their ambition to satisfy it so far as possible by building factories at home instead of by imports, have also helped in the formation of a characteristically modern proletariat, small and scattered hitherto but already a portent.

There is a possibility that these two groups, the reformist intellectuals and the embryonic proletariat, may in time form the nucleus of a revolutionary social movement, which would attain its objectives by rousing the peasant masses from their inertia and leading them against the ruling powers. This is what happened in Russia as the result of contact with ideas, institutions and techniques coming from the West. I think, though one must not press the analogy too far, there is some parallel between the situation in Russia fifty years ago and the situation in the Middle East to-day. In both you find an urban population, relatively small but growing, and underneath that a great peasant mass. The people are predominantly devoted to agricultural pursuits, and not only agricultural but pastoral pursuits as well: a great peasant mass, and behind that again in the scale of economic evolution a large nomadic population. The social structure of the Middle East to-day is not so very different, therefore, from the social structure of Russia half a century ago.

But we must be cautious in applying analogies drawn from Europe to the very different conditions of the Near and Middle East. It is still too early to assert dogmatically that these Eastern societies will be disintegrated to the same extent that Russian society was before they crystallize into their new forms. In addition to the universal conservative forces—

established interests, dislike of change, persistence of traditional relationships and allegiances—we have to take into account others which may not operate in a wholly conservative way but which are at least hostile to change along Western lines. There is a tendency to react against the West and to reject its ideas as alien and unassimilable. This tendency finds expression on the one hand (more particularly in Syria and Palestine) in a nostalgic regret for the greater stability and familiarity of Ottoman days, on the other hand (particularly in Egypt) in equally vague hopes that revolution may take a specifically Eastern and Moslem form. Given the importance of Western influences in the pattern of social change which the Russian analogy seems to indicate, this emotional xenophobia must be regarded as a powerful cross-current, making prediction hazardous.

There can be no doubt, however, that the immediate effect of the present war has been to enlarge the penetration of Western social concepts into the Near East, and to stimulate the desire both for economic development and for radical reform. The most obvious element in the impact of war on the social life and economy of this area has been the presence of Allied troops. Not only have British and Imperial forces been there in greater numbers than ever before, but there have also been Polish, French, Greek, American and other contingents of varying sizes, widely scattered over the area. The result has been an immense extension of the range and diversity of social contacts, continuing over a long period of time and therefore not to be dismissed as ephemeral in its effects.

Furthermore, the Allied troops have spent large sums of money both individually and through military contracts—sums which in 1942 and 1943 exceeded, in some countries greatly exceeded, the figures of the national budgets. A great part of this additional currency has found its way into the pockets of shopkeepers, merchants and landowners both large and small. The last have been further enriched by the curtailment of supplies from overseas and the consequent necessity both of enlarging the local production of foodstuffs and of offering high prices to bring it on to the market. On the whole, the beneficiaries of this flow of new wealth have preferred to use it for the purchase of commodities or other solid advantages rather than to hoard it in the form of currency. Many small proprietors have freed themselves from debt, and there has been a significant widening of the market for imported articles of various kinds which symbolize a rising standard of living. This in turn has accelerated the rise in prices and brought still further wealth to a restricted class of merchants.

The other side of this picture is the hardship which other classes have suffered through high prices and shortages of goods. All those social groups whose incomes are relatively fixed—wage-earners not in military employment, landless peasants, civil servants and other salary-earners—have been impoverished by the fall in the value of money. The Governments have tried, through control of the distribution of foodstuffs and in some cases through price subsidies, to prevent actual starvation, and have succeeded in the main, though the recent epidemic of malaria in Upper Egypt seems to have been largely caused by the prevalence of serious malnutrition. These measures, however, have not been comprehensive or effective enough to counteract the tendency for extremes of wealth and

poverty to be more sharply observed and resented than at any previous time.

Labour troubles in the form of strikes and demonstrations have been unimportant except in Persia, but there have been numerous industrial disputes in Palestine, and trade unionism in Egypt is evidently regarded as an ally worth courting by the country's political leaders. Everywhere the conscience of the intelligentsia has become more sensitive to the claims of social justice. It is clear from the accounts of well-informed observers returning to this country that social problems are arousing unprecedented interest, in Egypt and Persia especially. The articulate opinion of the Northern Arab countries is absorbed to a greater degree in the issues of political nationalism, but there too the stirring of social unrest is evident.

Closely connected with these social developments are the purely economic consequences of the war. While in one sense, through the presence of large Allied forces and the multiplication of official contacts between the major Allies and the local governments, the war has increased the range of the Middle East's relationships with the outside world, it has at the same time thrown the area back upon its own economic resources. Trade routes have been cut, foreign sources of supply lost, overseas markets closed; there is a large measure of enforced regional autarchy. But it is a fact of great importance that the reaction to this abrupt and isolating break in the continuity of economic life has not been a wholly indigenous one. The necessary adjustments have been guided and coordinated by a regional organization under Anglo-American direction—the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo.

This organization was established in the first instance to ensure that the limited amount of United National tonnage which could be spared for the shipment of supplies for the civilian populations of the area was used in the most rational and generally beneficial way. But control of imports could not be divorced from consideration of the best use of local resources, and M.E.S.C. has therefore acted as a stimulus to the expansion of production and to new departures and experiments.

These activities cover so wide a field that I can only mention, in passing, one or two examples—the extension in suitable areas of mechanized agriculture, the adoption of regional measures for the control of locusts, the local manufacture of farmers' requirements which were previously imported (such as superphosphates and jute sacks), and the exploitation of Lebanese deposits of lignite. Meanwhile the Centre has also smoothed the way, so far as its help was necessary, for a considerable variety of local industrial enterprises, particularly in Egypt and in the Jewish sector of Palestine. And at the same time the Allied military authorities have, in the course of their professional activity, made certain permanent additions to the economic equipment of the region, of which the most notable is the new railway from Haifa to Tripoli, linking the standard-gauge systems in Egypt and Palestine with the great trunk line from Baghdad to Europe. The combined effect of these developments has been to increase the economic efficiency of the area and to widen the range of its products, both agricultural and industrial.

Over and above its contribution to these specific war-time achievements,

the Middle East Supply Centre has enlarged the economic vision of many influential groups in the Middle East. Its work has encouraged belief in the practicability of plans for raising the standard of living; it has demonstrated the value of regional collaboration; and it has helped to focus attention on the future prospects for large-scale capital investment—in irrigation, for example.

Some at least of the Near and Middle Eastern Governments should be in a position to finance works of this kind from their own resources. For, in common with other countries which as a result of the war have imported less while supplying the Allies with goods and services, they have become international creditors. Egypt, to take the most striking example, now owns sterling balances amounting to more than £250,000,000, and the Minister of Finance has recently suggested that this figure may eventually rise to £400,000,000. Iraq and Persia also have assets of the same kind though in smaller volume. These balances could be used, not only to augment the capital equipment of the countries which possess them, but at the same time to avoid serious economic dislocation during the transition from war to peace. This will be a critical period for the Middle East. The incomes of large classes, including farmers and workers on military contracts, are bound to fall, and, unless great care is taken to avoid it, there will be a good deal of unemployment. These conditions might bring to a head the social unrest which the war itself has stimulated. The strain which will inevitably be imposed on the social fabric by the process of returning from an inflationary war-time situation to more normal price and wage levels could be relieved by the immediate undertaking of large-scale capital developments, for which in many cases plans are ready. That this precautionary measure will in fact be taken with sufficient speed and imagination seems, however, unlikely for two reasons: the social composition of the local Governments and Parliaments, and the strong desire of the wealthy classes to be rid of irksome restrictions on their economic activity.

These restrictions would have been resented in any case. But the fact that they have been imposed after consultation with British and later with Anglo-American authorities, and that their ultimate sanction is the almost absolute control over world shipping exercised on behalf of the United Nations, enables the interests affected by them to appeal to nationalist sentiment. As soon as a moderate tonnage of free shipping is again available, we must expect a strong demand for the full recovery, by the independent States of the Near and Middle East, of autonomy in their economic life. That this is a reasonable and indeed necessary aim can hardly be disputed, but it is to be hoped that the transfer of responsibility will not be carried out so impatiently as to sweep away all the machinery of M.E.S.C. along with its present title and constitution. It is here, perhaps, that the undercurrent of xenophobia will have its most damaging effects.

To summarize the impact of the war in the economic and social fields: it has been a period of expanding and more efficient production, accompanied by a clearer vision of future possibilities which may in the long run lead to a more satisfactory standard of living for that great majority of the

population which is engaged in pastoral and agricultural work; meanwhile, however, the contrast of wealth and poverty has been more nakedly revealed, and the war years may be followed by a period of exceptional social fluidity and maladjustment; these changes have been accompanied by a noteworthy increase in the range and intimacy of contact between the Middle Eastern populations and representatives of a Western outlook. How Middle Eastern society will settle down after this jolt will depend to a considerable extent on political developments, and to these we must now turn.

What I have called the constitutional problem may be divided into two—the problem of forms of government in the existing States, and the problem of the relationship of the Arab States with one another.

In the light of experience between the two wars, it is evident that the attempt to transplant Western constitutional forms into the Near and Middle Eastern environment has not been an unqualified success. The influence of Britain and France in this area, and the prestige which Parliamentary democracy derived from the result of the first world war, led to the adoption of that system in Egypt (where, however, it was not entirely new), in Iraq, in Lebanon and in Syria. But the lack of adjustment between constitutional forms borrowed from Europe and indigenous social habits and traditions quickly made itself felt, producing unanticipated difficulties. Except in Egypt, where the Wafd was already a power when the Constitution of 1923 came into operation, strong party organizations have not emerged. Governments have therefore been chronically unstable, and Ministers have been compelled to devote more energy to keeping rivals out of their offices than to working in them themselves. There were seventeen new Governments in Iraq between 1924 and 1935. This constant procession of ephemeral Ministries was a serious impediment to the initiation of and perseverance in positive policies. On the other hand, the necessary minimum of continuity in the administration of the State was supplied, not in Iraq only but elsewhere, by the social homogeneity of successive Ministries and of their Parliamentary supporters. Of the present Persian Majlis, for example, more than half the members are landowners, and a high proportion of the remainder are either large merchants or lawyers and other dependants of the landowning and commercial groups. And if the composition of elected chambers in neighbouring countries were examined, I think the results would not be very different. In short, the system has produced Governments without adequate authority, representing a restricted section of the community and exposed to an increasing volume of criticism which tends to be directed against Parliamentary democracy as such. When war broke out in 1939, the democratic experiment in the Near East may well have been on the verge of a collapse similar to those which had swallowed it up in other parts of the world.

During the last five years, however, the prestige of democracy has again revived. The one dictatorship which had been successfully established, that of Reza'Shah in Persia, has disappeared. The Iraqi army, which had been trying with increasing boldness to fill the vacuum of authority in Baghdad, made its most ambitious *coup d'état* in co-operation with Rashid

Ali three years ago and succeeded in discrediting itself as a political force. In Egypt the situation is less simple. The Wafd has held office for a longer period than ever before, and the Wafd can reasonably claim to be the most democratic force in Egyptian politics. On the other hand, its rule during the last two and a half years has shown some of the characteristics of government in a one-party State, and it does not appear to be certain that it will emerge from the war with enhanced prestige or that the new respect for democracy will advance its interests.

What the war has given to democracy in these countries is, I would suggest, no more than a breathing space. If this breathing space is not used to adjust the Parliamentary system more closely to local needs and possibilities, it will again be confronted, after a short interval, with a rising tide of dissatisfaction and a demand for short cuts to reform and to a sense of national vitality. At the moment there is an evident desire, in many Arab and Persian circles, to make democracy work, coupled with a healthy readiness to criticize its existing forms. I take, more or less at random, a recent extract from an Iraqi newspaper, according to which there is now "a general awareness in the country that things are not going here as they should in a Parliamentary democracy." In this critical time, the writer adds, "it is the duty of every loyal Iraqi to serve his people through an efficient political system," and he suggests as a basic reform the organization of stable parties with clearly defined programmes and membership. Similar comment is current in Persia, and in Egypt there is some awareness of the need for an effective Parliamentary counterweight to the Wafd.

So much has been written lately on the background of the movement for Arab union that I need say only a few words by way of introduction. The liberation of the Arab peoples in Asia from Ottoman rule occurred at too early a stage in the history of their *risorgimento* to be followed by their political unification in a single independent State or Federation. And in some ways the inter-war years have added to the number of obstacles hindering the advance towards this objective. The new States of Arab Asia, and still more Egypt with her longer national tradition, have developed attitudes to their neighbours and general external policies which are rooted in their individual needs and interests. The concept of Arab unity, therefore, presents a different aspect to each of the interested Governments, which accordingly work for its realization with a variety of motives and along lines which sometimes conflict. Consideration of these divergences should not be permitted to obscure the underlying realities of a common language, common historical memories and the consciousness of corporate life which is manifested by the sensitivity of the whole Arab world to events in any part of it. This sensitivity was shown by the reactions of Arab opinion to successive crises in Palestine between the two wars, and more recently to events in Lebanon. We should be surprised neither by the vehemence of these reactions on the one hand, nor on the other by the fact that the approaches made by the various Governments to the problem of their mutual relationships do not always converge.

It does not seem to me that the balance between these contrasting

tendencies—the tendency to national consolidation within existing frontiers and the tendency towards organization on pan-Arab lines—has been upset in the course of the present war. Partial economic isolation from the outer world did not produce, as many people hoped that it would, a greater disposition to co-operate in regional exchanges, but rather a tighter and more exclusive organization of the separate economies. And the change in the status of Syria and Lebanon has added to the number of independent centres of power and influence. On the other hand the war, by emphasizing in so startling a way the military helplessness of small States, has indicated the desirability of their coalition into larger blocs even where there is not, as there is in the Arab East, a historical and cultural foundation for such formations. Furthermore, this line of thought among Arab statesmen has been encouraged by the two declarations of sympathy with it which Mr. Eden has made on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

Even now a preliminary conference is meeting in Alexandria, attended by delegations from seven Arab States, together with an observer to represent the views of the Palestinian Arabs. Its task is to prepare the agenda for a future congress, at which, according to the plan, decisions will be taken about the future relations of the Arab States with one another. The information so far available about the deliberations at Alexandria is insufficient for an accurate estimate of the progress made or likely to be made, but the field which they are probably covering can be inferred from reports of the inter-Governmental conversations which preceded them and from the comments of the Arabic Press.

There will be little support, outside the delegations from Iraq and Transjordan, for the establishment of any form of federal government. Federation may be the final goal, but it will not be reached without a long period of collaboration for limited purposes, during which the necessary foundations of habit, confidence and mutual dependence can be laid down. This and the subsequent conference would be rightly regarded as successful if they did no more than inaugurate this period of practical co-operation. Much might be done in the cultural field, by bringing educational curricula into line with one another and by exchanges of teachers and students. The standardization of legal codes, of nationality laws and passport regulations would remove fruitful causes of misunderstanding and friction.

On the economic side, the possibilities are more momentous. Already the Middle East Supply Centre has called into being one organization which, being dependent not on the Centre but on the local governments, might form a model for additional institutions of a similar kind. This is the Middle East Council of Agriculture, the function of which is to provide a forum for discussion of the technical problems connected with agricultural development. Industrial development might be assisted in the same way, so that all national policies of economic expansion could be initiated with a full knowledge of their bearing on the economy of the area as a whole. A more ambitious step would be the formation of a regional development board, examining and initiating projects for irrigation, power transmission and the like without regard to political boundaries. Tariffs and currencies offer a more obvious field for common agreements.

Another problem, social and political as much as economic, which would gain from unified treatment, is that of the desert or semi-desert lands—particularly the central area enclosed by the Fertile Crescent—and their Beduin populations.

Politically, there is a good deal of support for the co-ordination of external policies by means of periodic meetings of Foreign Ministers. A decision to adopt this device might indeed be more popular than any other outcome of the conferences, since it would indicate the desire of the Arab Governments to present a united front on some at least of the issues which are thought likely to arise during the post-war negotiations affecting the Middle East. Combined arrangements for defence may also be proposed, though this subject cannot perhaps be dealt with adequately until it is known what contribution to the post-war defensive plans of the United Nations will be asked from the States of the Middle East.

The scope and character of such inter-State agreements as may be arrived at within the region will depend to some extent on the future character of the links between its component States and other members of the United Nations. It is already clear that the war has vitally affected these relations, and with them the international status of certain of the Arab countries. Disappointment with the last peace settlement, for which Britain and France were held responsible, the continuing presence of these two Powers in the Near East as mandatories, and differences of opinion over the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, led to deep cleavages in Arab opinion during the early stages of the war. Saudi Arabia, it is true, followed the lead of its King, whose unswerving support of Great Britain and her Allies was an immense moral influence throughout the Arab world. The Amir Abdullah of Transjordan has also supported the Allied cause unhesitatingly from the beginning. The doubts of some Egyptian politicians as to the right course for their country to pursue were never of sufficient weight to deflect Egypt's rulers from the fulfilment of her obligations as a non-belligerent ally. But in Syria and Lebanon, among the Arabs of Palestine, and in Iraq, where there was widespread sympathy with the grievances of the Arab populations under mandatory rule, attitudes were more complicated and Axis propaganda more fruitful.

The same was true of Persia, where fear of Britain and Russia had sunk deep into the national outlook. The change of feeling in these countries since 1941 has been cynically but inadequately explained as a consequence of Germany's declining military prospects. There were other reasons: the proclamations of Syrian and Lebanese independence; our immediate restoration of friendly relations with the constitutional authorities in Iraq after the defeat of the revolutionary and anti-British Government in the spring of 1941; and the relief of the Persians at the collapse of Reza Shah's dictatorship on the entry of British and Russian troops. The improvement in relations is not merely a dividend of victory, but is also an indication of an increased confidence in the justice and future intentions of the United Nations.

The extent of this growth in confidence, however, should not be exaggerated or misunderstood. It is not so much a tacit vote of confidence

in individual Powers as a rather tentative and precarious belief that the major Allies as a group intend to establish an international order in which the Near and Middle East can find freedom, security and well-being.

This hope has been strengthened as a result of the noteworthy growth of interest in the Near and Middle East on the part of both the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government has for the first time established diplomatic relations with Arab Governments—Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The United States have participated in the work of the Middle East Supply Centre, sent an important agricultural mission into Saudi Arabia, supplied advisers to the Persian Government, brought the greater part of the area within the scope of lease-lend, and recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon. There is no need to stress, before this audience, the interest of many American citizens in the future of Palestine and of their Government in the petroleum fields of Arabia.

Largely as a result of these more intimate contacts with the two great Powers which before 1939 appeared to be only remotely interested in the affairs of the Near East, the relationships between the local States and the outer world have become appreciably more complex. This change can be seen most clearly in Syria and Lebanon, to whose Governments representatives of Powers other than France are now accredited. Finding themselves in this new international situation, the two Republics would evidently prefer to obtain guarantees of their future security from the Great Powers in concert rather than from France alone. Similar inclinations clearly exist in Egypt, where the Press has recently been showing considerable interest in a proposal that the country should be neutralized and placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers. The Persian Press, likewise, was enthusiastic in its welcome of the American signature to a tripartite declaration issued after the Teheran conference, in which the assurances already given to the Persian Government by Britain and Russia were solemnly reaffirmed. The same point was made by a Zionist leader in an article published two months ago. "The essential point at issue," Mr. Shertok wrote, "is whether the decision [on the future of Palestine] is to be a British one or an international one. . . . It is our duty to insist on the international character of our demands and to work for them by approaching every Power that is concerned with the question . . . particularly the Big Three."

These are natural symptoms of the fuller and more direct participation of the Middle East in international affairs. Already two of the conferences convened for the discussion of problems of post-war reconstruction have been attended by delegations from Egypt, Iraq and Persia—the Food Conference at Hot Springs in May, 1943, and the Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in July, 1944. The succession of similar gatherings, to which we may presumably look forward in the next few years, will help to launch these States, and perhaps some of their neighbours, into the main stream of world politics.

This new situation is not wholly free from danger. No longer insulated, as it were, from the full force of power politics by the mediating influence of either Britain or France, the Arab countries, and with them Persia,

might in certain circumstances be tempted to fall into the unhappy condition of the Balkan States before 1914, each seeking to advance its interests by encouraging the competition of Great Powers for its favour. In fact, there will be little chance of avoiding Balkanization in this sense of the word if the four interested Powers—Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France—are themselves not working harmoniously together. The tranquillity and stability of the Near and Middle East, therefore, must in future depend on the mutual confidence and collaboration of these Powers both in their general policy and in relation to their particular Middle Eastern interests.

As far as Great Britain is concerned, the events of the war have emphatically confirmed the view that the security of this region is a fundamental requirement of imperial strategy, and that its internal stability and welfare are therefore not only desirable in themselves, but also among the essentials of British policy. Accepting this as axiomatic, and observing the tendencies I have just mentioned, I am led to hope for the establishment of some specialized machinery to which the future international authority would delegate its responsibilities in the Middle East. This would at once accord with the present inclinations of responsible opinion in the area, so long as it allowed for the effective partnership of the local States, and at the same time provide a framework within which Britain's interests and obligations could be harmonized with those of her allies.

The war has not only brought home to us the reality of British interests in Egypt, Arab Asia and the Persian Gulf. It has also increased British prestige in this region, as a result not only of the achievements of British arms but also of the many occasions which have arisen for practical demonstration of Britain's care for the welfare of its peoples. It is a fact of more than sentimental importance that, not only during the war but for many years past, Britain has sunk a great moral capital in the Middle East, in the shape of the advice, co-operation, understanding and friendship for its peoples of individual Britishers engaged there in a variety of occupations, official and unofficial. An investment of this kind soon becomes a wasting asset if it is not replenished; but there can be little doubt that some of those to whom the war has given an introduction to the Middle East and an interest in its intricate and fascinating problems will return there later.

In this connection, one last change may be noted, though it is not strictly a part of the war's impact on the Arab and Persian lands. On the contrary, it arises from the direct impact of the Middle East on a limited but appreciable proportion of the British electorate—the troops and officials who have been stationed there. It may be objected that the same thing happened last time, without producing any noticeable enlightenment of public opinion; but the Middle Eastern scene was so radically transformed between 1918 and 1922 that the brief experiences of the war years offered little guidance to its subsequent problems. It is unlikely that this will happen again, and therefore I think it not unreasonable to expect that public opinion in this country may be influenced to a greater extent than previously by just and sympathetic views on the Middle East, and may have a more sensitive appreciation of its past and future importance.

Finally, one situation to which the war has made no essential difference

is that of Palestine. So long as this problem continues to be a source of inflammation, the relationship of Great Britain with the Middle East can never be altogether healthy.

I have tried to indicate, from a somewhat distant and abstract point of view, the direction in which the peoples of the Near and Middle East have travelled during the past five years. They have reached the early stages of an economic revolution which will lead to the diversification of their agriculture, the development of light industries, the fuller exploitation of mineral resources, the improvement of internal transport and a greater complexity of commercial exchanges, both internally and with other countries. This process cannot fail to modify the structure of their society and thereby affect the forms of political organization, though the exact nature of these changes is not yet predictable.

As a consequence both of this internal evolution and of an important external factor in the situation—the growing interest of our major allies in this region—the independent Arab States are beginning to find their feet as active participants in international politics. At first sight paradoxically, the war has at once intensified their desire to lead a less sheltered diplomatic life and demonstrated the inability of small States anywhere to ensure their own security. They are feeling for a solution of this contradiction along two lines. In the first place, they hope by means of a developing mutual association to create a Middle Eastern bloc which will not be an entirely negligible factor in the international distribution of power. Secondly, the more far-sighted among their leaders hope that the Great Powers will not lend themselves to a process of diplomatic Balkanization, but will reach agreement on measures for the security of the region calculated to reduce friction between them to a minimum. This second hope is shared, from their different points of view, by the Persians and the Zionists.

Against this background, there would seem to be a good prospect for the maintenance of friendly relations between the British people and the peoples of the Middle East, and even for a growing intimacy in their various fields of contact. Much will depend on what happens in Palestine after the war. But if that nettle were once resolutely grasped, the basic interdependence of the interests of the British Empire and of the Middle East as a whole would make itself felt with growing effect, and the two partners would be drawn steadily together. The future is strewn with hazards, no doubt, but also it is rich in opportunities.

The CHAIRMAN : Mr. Beeley in his lecture certainly gave us a great deal to think about. I should now like to invite Members to express their views or ask any questions.

A MEMBER : About seven or eight years ago in Palestine there was a certain amount of disturbance from the Arabs. I gather that the disturbance now comes from the Jewish revolutionary movement. Can you tell us anything about that?

Mr. BEELEY : The reason, I think, why the disturbances now come from the Jewish rather than the Arab side is that the last statement of policy made by H.M. Government on the subject of Palestine—in May, 1939—

was regarded by the Arabs as fairly though not wholly satisfactory, and by the Jews as wholly unsatisfactory. They hope (when I say "they" I must explain a little further: the present disturbances in Palestine are the work not of the Jewish Agency but of small extremist bodies, the extreme nationalistic wing of the Zionists)—they hope to convince H.M. Government, by taking action of this kind, that unless they reverse their policy in Palestine they will be in for very serious trouble when the war ends.

A MEMBER: Do you consider, with regard to the action taken by the Iraqi army, that the responsibility is on the Iraqi army or on certain politicians who misled this army and are responsible for the action?

Mr. BEELEY: I think it will be impossible, until the history of these events is written, to assign responsibility among individuals. When I spoke of the army as attempting to become a political force in Iraq, I spoke, of course, of a part of the army's leadership only and not of the army in general. Certain ambitious generals or others in the higher ranks of the army had political ambitions and used the army, which tends to follow them, as an instrument of their purposes; whether those generals captured and made use of Rashid Ali and other politicians, or whether the politicians made use of the generals, is a question I would not like to try to answer on the evidence we now have.

Sir PERCY SYKES congratulated the lecturer. "As regards the countries I am particularly interested in, the outlook has changed enormously in various ways. For instance, the Qashgais, whose head man fought us so violently; I think the Shah put him out of the way, but his sons are now the chiefs, and entertained my son in most luxurious tents. The New Order in that way has certainly come. The very nice thing was that, though I had in the course of duty killed a considerable number of the troops, they showed my son the greatest friendship and expressed the opinion that they had not the least ill-will against me."

Admiral Sir HOWARD KELLY: I would like to second what Sir Percy Sykes has said about the interest of this lecture. It is particularly interesting to me as I have just come back from four years in that part of the world.

This question of the immense riches that have been acquired by these countries in the Middle East, and the immense amount of land put under cultivation, and the way that everybody could sell anything, it did not matter what—that is all very well as long as the war lasts; but the economic confusion out there will be desperate unless we can get some extraordinary programme of works to get rid of all these surpluses that they have acquired.

Another thing the lecturer said, which has always struck me very much, is the distance that separates the educated classes and the peasants in all those countries in the Middle East. The black-coated classes have absolutely no contact at all with the peasants in any of those countries. That is the foundation of the social revolution. It may come about gradually by a process of Acts of Parliament, but you cannot go on having this immense remoteness of the black-coated politicians, a great many of whom know nothing about the actual life of the peasants in the various parts of the country. That is another very great problem.

As regards Palestine, I think from what I have heard there in the last

month or so that we are in for a terrible time. No one can control these violent extremists.

A MEMBER: I gather that you rather deplore the fact that in the legislatures the senators and so on come almost exclusively from the landowning and the commercial classes. It is not very clear to me from what other classes they can come, conditions being such as they are. You may say that one could have senators and deputies from the professional classes. But the reputation of owning land is such that practically everyone wishes to be an owner of land, and you will find very often important professional men, such as would make good legislators, are in their spare time also landowners and interested in the working of land.

Therefore, if I take you correctly, that you deplore that landowners and commercial interests have the majority of seats in this Parliament, I should be glad to know from what other source you would replace them.

Mr. BEELEY: You have put your finger on an almost unanswerable question. It is fair, I think, to deplore a thing without necessarily suggesting any method of reforming it. The only thing I can think of as an immediate measure is the nomination in those countries which have senates (and the formation of senates for this purpose in those countries which have not) of a certain proportion of senators representing classes which do not come to the front by ordinary electoral processes. You might have a proportion of the senate in each country chosen from certain social groups, so that at any rate they can express their views and have some influence on the legislative process, even if the amount of power they thus acquire is not very great.

Education sufficiently widespread to create an effective check on the political power of the landowning class can only come as a result of a long process of social change.

A MEMBER: With regard to the flow of wealth into the pockets of shopkeepers, merchants and landowners, can you say whether or not that wealth has flowed on into the purchase of land by those classes, or has the money that has come into the pockets of other classes flowed into the purchase of land, so that there has come about a dispossession of small landowners?

Mr. BEELEY: I have no figures with which to supply a really accurate answer to that question. Increased wealth among any classes in Middle Eastern countries almost inevitably leads to an increase in the price of land, land being the most obvious form of investment. But although that has no doubt been going on, I am pretty sure it has not resulted in the expropriation of small landowners.

It is the landless peasant who has suffered from the rise in prices, but the small landed proprietor has, certainly in Palestine and Syria, been able to free himself from a large burden of debt as a result of his enrichment during the war and has probably acquired more land. There has not been a shift at all from large to small landowning as a result of this development.

Mr. MUSTAPHA WAHBA: How do you think the Zionists will view a future Arab union?

Mr. BEELEY: I do not know. The usual Zionist view, I think, on Arab union is that they welcome it so long as their own position within it or

alongside it is one which satisfies them. Their political aims remain the same whether the Arab countries are united or not, and they do not feel bound to oppose Arab union because of their own political aspirations.

Mr. WAHBA : Would it, in your opinion, be possible to make an Arab union without the inclusion of Palestine?

Mr. BEELEY : Yes. It would not be so satisfactory a union.

Captain SCHAEFFER : The lecturer referred to the importance of the impression gained in these countries as the result of contact with the different Allied armies. I have travelled in most of these countries, also in the interior, and came across people who were in contact with different Allied troops. The prestige of this great country in the Near East has had an enormous increase in the judgment of the people as a result of contact with British troops.

I also have seen the immense work done by the Middle East Supply Centre, and I must say that it is probably thanks to that organization that in some places at least starvation was prevented. The people there all agreed too that this organization was a success.

I think the lecturer said there is a danger that such a mechanism, once created and running, would be neglected after the war, and there would be again great disorder in economic affairs. That may be, but if these countries develop disinterested leaders and political figures the Supply Centre could continue and would then certainly be able to play in peace-time the rôle it has played during the war. It is to be hoped that they will introduce in time people from Syria, Palestine, Iraq and so on. To train them in responsibility would be a precaution against disorder after the war.

A MEMBER : I have just come from India, and one of the things in which we have been interested is the very genuine enthusiasm amongst the student class and other people for Communism. They are willing to work for it. I would like to ask the lecturer whether, as a result of the war, there is a corresponding enthusiasm for Communism among that particular class in the countries of which he has been speaking?

Mr. BEELEY : Yes, undoubtedly there is an increase of what is called loosely Communism in parts of Syria and Lebanon. Perhaps in Lebanon you would expect it because you have a large and vigorous student intelligentsia there.

I think Communism is a rather inaccurate word for their aspirations. The programmes of these movements in black and white are very similar to the programmes of the older movements led by the older generation. The difference is rather one of mood. They pursue the same objectives in a more radical spirit, and there is a larger infusion of social reform into their basically nationalistic aims, but they call it Communism.

A MEMBER : In India it is Trade Unionism and Socialism rather than Communism.

A MEMBER : Would it be correct to say that the problems which the Russian Revolution solved are the problems which await solution in the East and Middle East?

Mr. BEELEY : I think there is an analogy between the Russian situation before 1917 and the situation now presented in the Middle East. One must remember, in justice to the Russians, that Russia was at war in 1917,

and that the revolutionary process was very greatly complicated by that factor. We hope that these changes will take place in the Middle East during a period of international peace.

A MEMBER: I did not hear any mention of the attitude to events in India or in Turkey.

Mr. BEELEY: I am not competent to say anything about India. So far as Turkey is concerned, there was a great deal of suspicion of Turkey after the last war because the Turks had been the rulers of the Arab world, and there were anti-Turkish feelings left over from the years before 1918. There was a sort of spiritual isolation from Turkey as a result of that. The fear and suspicion of Turkey were revived in the Arab countries just before the present war by the transfer of sovereignty over Alexandretta and Antioch. But I think that is weakening to some extent now, and there has been a good deal of interest, in Iraq particularly, but I think elsewhere too, in the efforts made by Turkey to tackle her internal problems.

TRANSJORDAN AND THE WAR *

Notes on an informal talk given by Brigadier J. B. Glubb, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., on October 9, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

In opening his lecture, Brigadier Glubb said: Please note that any views which I express are my own, and that His Majesty's Government undertakes no responsibility for my fancies.

BEFORE starting to talk about what Transjordan has done in this war, I should like in a very few minutes to remind you of the origin of Transjordan. You have all probably listened to various speeches and counter-speeches made during the last war, the gist of which was that the Mediterranean would be a first-class mandate, whereas what is now Syria and Transjordan would be second-class mandates, where there would be Arab States in which we would give any necessary assistance. For a short time Syria and Transjordan formed one country under the government of the Emir Feisal in Damascus, but before very long a clash took place, with the result that the French invaded Syria and Syria became directly administered by the French.

This left Transjordan an odd piece, with nobody in particular to look after it, and it so remained for the best part of a year. It was not until 1920 that the Emir Abdullah, the son of King Hussein, arrived from the Hedjaz, and then an agreement was reached, by which he took over the sovereignty of this piece of country. When he did so he proceeded to form an army and a police force. The army was called the Arab Legion, or in Arabic the Arab army, in order to commemorate the army of Feisal which had fought in the Great War.

It was not until 1926 that the position of Transjordan *vis-à-vis* His Majesty's Government was regularized, but when an agreement was drawn up it was laid down that the British Government undertook responsibility for the external defence of Transjordan and that His Highness need not maintain any military forces. As a result of that agreement the Arab Legion became the police and gendarmerie of Transjordan only.

The years from 1926 to 1930 passed quietly. In 1930 Transjordan, in common with a number of Arab Governments, decided to take over control of its desert, which was a policy which had never been carried out by the Turks. The Turks made no attempt to govern anything except the settled areas, and the desert was left to look after itself. As a result, in 1930 a new branch of the Arab Legion was formed, enlisted from desert troops, with the object of administering that desert and ensuring security there.

The last disturbance in Transjordan took place in 1932, after which we again had four more or less quiet years, until in 1936 the disturbances took place in Palestine. Although the inhabitants of Transjordan were very

* As Brigadier Glubb had left the country before seeing this report, it must be understood that he is not responsible for any mistakes or misstatements.

deeply moved by the Arab-Jewish hostility, no disturbances of any kind took place inside Transjordan itself. Towards the end of the disturbances, the rebels in Palestine attempted to create trouble across the Jordan in the hope that British troops would have to be sent over to restore order. In actual practice the Arab Legion itself coped with all such attempts. No British soldier entered Transjordan during the period of the disturbances from 1936 to 1939.

Just before the outbreak of war a modification to the Transjordan-British agreement was made, by which His Highness was once more authorized to maintain purely military forces. When the war began, the Emir Abdullah immediately informed H.M. Government that he was prepared to offer every assistance that he could, and this his forces would be at the disposal of the British Government for hostilities. When in the early stages of the war His Highness made this offer, H.M. Government replied that the war would be fought out in Europe and that the Middle East would not be involved. It was not until the fall of France in the beginning of 1940 that Transjordan was suddenly faced with the position of having an enemy on her frontiers. As a result, during the summer of 1940, His Highness's original offer of armed assistance was accepted and an agreement was made with the British Army to raise one regiment, which was to be completely mechanized.

It was not until April, 1941, that we actually reached the bottom of the trough. In that month you will remember Rommel was carrying out his first offensive against Egypt. Greece had gone. Crete was about to go. At this critical moment a pro-German faction appeared in Iraq and declared war on the British Government. Our first regiment was at that time not completely equipped. Although it was almost entirely enlisted it was only very partially trained.

In addition to that, there can be no doubt that at that time almost every Arab, and I should think a large part of the world, was quite convinced that the British were finished and that it was only a question of days before the Germans arrived and occupied the greater part of the Arab countries.

Furthermore, during the first days of the Baghdad *coup d'état* we were in an exceedingly weak position because we had no broadcasting station on which the Arabs relied and which could speak in Arabic, with the exception of Jerusalem (which they suspected was not purely Arab) and the London B.B.C. But the B.B.C. was not near enough to get across quick and immediate rejoinders to the exceedingly exciting and passionate propaganda which was put out by the Baghdad radio for the first few days.

Almost every Arab, as I have said, if not every Arab, was convinced that these were just the last stages before the British collapse; a fact which makes it all the more remarkable that His Highness took this opportunity to renew his offer of assistance, and that, whereas almost every other force which we had enlisted in Arabia was either trembling or applying in large numbers to resign, the Arab Legion was one of the first which made a voluntary offer to accompany any British force which took part in the operations. (Applause.)

When our cantonment at Habanniya on the Euphrates was besieged, a small column of British troops left Palestine in order to drive across the

desert to relieve it. The first regiment of the Arab Legion accompanied that column. It is interesting to think that as far as we know in history the desert had only once before been crossed by an army—namely, by one of the first Moslem armies, I suppose about A.D. 630. In those days the Moslems from the Hedjaz had an army in Syria and an army in Iraq.

The Arab Legion proved itself quite useful in the course of the desert crossing; for instance, in finding ways by which the column could enter Habanniya and in guiding and reconnaissance duties.

Having relieved Habanniya, it was decided that the column should go forward and take a chance of attacking Baghdad at once, but an inevitable delay took place owing to the fact that the enemy had broken the banks of the Euphrates and had flooded all the country along the road to Baghdad. The Arab Legion, however, occupied the days of waiting by crossing the Euphrates and moving on to the Tigris, and on several occasions they cut the road and railway between Mosul and Baghdad. At that time the Germans in Syria were attempting to send trainloads of munitions via Mosul to Baghdad to assist the enemy there, so that the cutting of that railway was a useful little job.

After Baghdad fell we discovered that this particular excursion had been very much more valuable than we knew. When the final advance on Baghdad took place the Arab Legion led a column across so as to attack Baghdad from the north at the same time as the main column was attacking it from the west. It was merely meant as a small diversion, but it transpired afterwards that Rashid Ali and his assistants had worked out that if the place got too hot for them they would retire to Mosul and so to Turkey. The information (which was sent) that our forces were arriving on their road made them nervous about their get-away. So much so that after the first cutting of the railway the Governor of Baghdad himself was sent up to inquire, because the Iraq Government refused to believe that the British had succeeded in crossing the Euphrates and in driving across the desert to the Tigris. While the Governor was carrying out his inquiry our column came across. It was driving down this road towards Baghdad when the Governor arrived in his car, plus his notes, and ran into the back of the column. We took him prisoner and unfortunately he was wounded, but the next day we wrapped him up and put him on a boat and let him float down to the city of Baghdad, like Moses in the bulrushes, but without his notes.

As soon as the appearance of the column was confirmed, Rashid Ali and his party got very nervous, because a British army had already landed at Basra. Our arrival was accompanied by rumours that we had crossed the Tigris. It was not so, but it made them nervous that their last get-away route would shortly be cut also. It appeared likely that that was one of the principal reasons which persuaded them to throw their hand in, although they still had eight or ten men to our one advancing on Baghdad.

As soon as this operation was over the British army decided to occupy Syria, and our first Transjordanian regiment once more accompanied a British column which cut across the desert into Palmyra, thereby turning the left flank of the army which was facing the British. On this occasion the Arab Legion had a nice little battle of its own, because it ran into a

Vichy-French column which arrived from Dair az-Zor to reinforce Palmyra, and as a result eighty prisoners were taken, with five armoured cars and twelve trucks; twelve of the enemy were killed and only one member of the Arab Legion.

One result of these operations was rather unfortunate, because it was decided to expand the Arab Legion very considerably. This, of course, put them back for a year or more to allow for training and equipment, with the result that at the time of Alamein they were still not ready. Actually a small advance party was sent to Egypt, which had an officer killed; but the battle of Alamein then followed, and before anything more could be done the enemy had unfortunately retired to Tunis.

Although the Arab Legion has not been in action since those days in 1941, it has very greatly increased since then, and is to-day holding large numbers of garrisons and doing guard duties in various parts of the Middle East.

So much for the military action of Transjordan. From the economic point of view no friction has ever occurred, and under the controlling organization of the Middle East Supply Centre all the grain surplus of Transjordan is handed over to the British authorities for the use of other countries in the Middle East, for whom shipping would otherwise be required. In addition to their military and agricultural efforts, many thousands of labourers have been provided, especially in the years 1940-41 and the first part of 1942, for the construction of defences and roads.

In order to give you some idea of the military effort of Transjordan I would like to rough out some very elastic figures. If we calculate the British population of the British Empire to be 70,000,000 and the armed forces to be, say, 6,000,000 or 7,000,000, we get 1 person in 10 as being in the Services. If we say that the United States population is 120,000,000—I have no idea what their Forces are, but I suppose they are 8,000,000 or 9,000,000, which means again something like 1 in 14. If, on the other hand, we go to India, we are told in the Press that a population of 340,000,000 has produced 2,000,000, which would be 1 in 170. Transjordan, of course, has not got conscription, but to the best of my calculations it seems that by a voluntary system she has enlisted about 1 person in 35, which is slightly less than half as good as the United States, which has done it by conscription, but on the other hand is four or five times as much as India, which also has a voluntary system.

Not only that, but the Arab Legion has in this process turned away many thousands of recruits owing to difficulties in equipment and the varying demands of the British Army. So that I have very little doubt that, if we had been pressed, we could have enlisted, say, 1 in 2 in the armed forces as against what appears to be about 1 in 10 or 1 in 14 in Great Britain or the United States; this being done, of course, by voluntary enlistment and not by conscription.

Transjordan has one or two claims to distinction, of which the first and perhaps the most distinctive of all in Arabia is that for the last twenty years there has not been a rebellion. No other Arab country can make this claim. One must not think that Arabs only rebel against the British, for the worst Arab rebellion in those twenty years was against Ibn Saud.

Transjordan is also the only country which is not directly British administered the troops of which have actually fought for the United Nations, the only country in the Middle East from Libya to the Indian borders. She is also, as far as I can make out, the only country whose troops are serving at this moment outside their native country. At this moment when I am speaking, every single military unit raised by Transjordan is serving outside Transjordan.

That is a very brief account of what Transjordan has done in the last five years. But the interesting part, and the one from which we may perhaps benefit, is to try to think out what are the reasons why Transjordan may claim to have been a success.

Personally, I am inclined to put as the first reason the fact that she has a Constitution which is more suitable to her population than that of any other country in that part of the world. Somebody said to me the other day that the British have created men in their own image, and I think there is something to be said for that when you consider that wherever we have gone in the East we always tend to produce an imitation Westminster Constitution. The British Constitution to-day is entirely founded on elections. Without going into this question too deeply, it is enough to say that where the great majority of the people cannot read or write an effective election is quite impossible.

The Constitution of Transjordan includes a legislative assembly, which is elected; but this assembly has no right to initiate measures, nor can it by passing a vote of no confidence cause the Cabinet to resign. The Cabinet is appointed solely by His Highness, who orders somebody to take office or orders him to leave it, and whether or not the legislative assembly approves is not very relevant. The Government is pledged to submit all legislation to a vote in the assembly, and if the assembly rejects it the measure has to be amended. But the legislative assembly cannot initiate. This limited amount of control is not without value. There is no doubt that there is a big difference between the Government being able to issue orders in council of its own and its having to submit all its measures to public debate. The fact, however, that office does not depend on a man being a popular demagogue but on appointment by the Emir does keep the system on lines which appear to be more suitable to the present development of the population.

I never understand myself why, when we think that the Arabs should have representative government, we do not start on the lower level of municipalities or rural councils instead of putting on the roof before we have laid the foundations. Actually it is curious to note that during these last years municipal elections or the appointment of mayors, which used to be the result of election, have in many cases now become a matter of Government appointment.

The second thing which I think has been of great assistance to Transjordan is that population is almost entirely rural, and there is, or was, no such thing as either class distinctions or big differences in wealth, such as you find in Egypt.

It is one of the ironies of our presence in these countries that at a time when class distinctions are meeting the bitterest criticism in England and

are rapidly being eliminated, they are just beginning to appear in the various countries where we have exercised influence in the Middle East. There is no doubt, as a result of the difference in education between a small number of persons who have received a semi-European education and the bulk of the ordinary people, and also to some extent of the increases of wealth which have taken place since the beginning of the war, that class distinctions are now beginning to appear; but in Transjordan at least they have not yet reached a limit which would cause ill-feeling between different branches of the population. Incidentally, where class distinctions are acute in the Middle East, the only influence which seems possible to moderate their bitterness is either that of a ruling house or of British or other European officials. I think both His Highness and the British officials in Transjordan are fully aware of this danger and are doing all they can to prevent a schism between various classes of the people.

One of the biggest assets that Transjordan enjoys is undoubtedly the privilege of the Emir himself. We always imagine that an autocracy is a place where everybody is oppressed, whereas a democracy is a place where everybody gets a fair deal. As a matter of fact that does not go without saying at all, and the ancient Arab tradition is that of a single Governor, who in former days always sat in a public place for a certain period every day and was accessible to every single person amongst his subjects. Although this complete accessibility to everybody is a little difficult when the Government works in a more machine-like manner, yet there is no doubt that the very great accessibility of His Highness provides one of the best safety valves against any discontent in the country.

Nearly two hundred years ago a British official in India said that government in the East is less a matter of framing Constitutions than of establishing personal contacts, and it is rather sad to think that two hundred years later we are still framing Constitutions, whereas the great way to control these people is always through personal relations.

Some years ago, before I took command of the Arab Legion, when I was in charge only of the desert, I had the very good idea; I would, I thought, introduce a little democracy. So we collected the Sheikhs of all the tribes and I made a little speech, in which I said I had no desire to continue issuing orders to everybody, and I suggested that the Sheikhs should get together and have a meeting now and again and themselves introduce all the reforms they thought necessary. But at the end of my speech one of them said: "But will you still draw your salary if we have to do all the work?" I think that we are perhaps a little patronizing when we think we are going to introduce freedom to the Arabs.

I am sorry that all my authorities seem to be so old, but in the introduction to one of the chapters of the *Decline and Fall* Gibbon summed up the Arabs in his day. Amongst other things, he said, "The citizens of European nations may exult in their national independence, but the Arab is personally free," and there is certainly a very great deal to be said for that. So much depends on the spirit with which any Constitution is carried out. If you take our famous British Constitution—when applied in France the result is very different from what it is when applied in England; when applied in Germany, Greece, the United States, wherever it is, in each

country the answer comes out quite different from the original at Westminster. I think the same applies equally to the rule of Arab princes, and it would be a great error to think that the rule of one man necessarily means the loss of the independence of the individual subject.

In trying to work out the reasons for Transjordan's success I do not want to omit the British, and I should attribute the British influence in Transjordan to two things. First of all, to the fact that there is absolute equality throughout the Transjordan Government between the British and the Arab officials. We have been fortunate perhaps in avoiding the system known as dyarchy, by which every executive official is double-banked by a fellow whose only job is to tell him when he has done it wrong. All the British in Transjordan are themselves executives and fit in at different levels of the administration. They are by no means always at the top. In the Arab Legion, British and Arab officers are intermingled, by no means in succession of rank. If a commander happens to be British, the next three senior after him may all be Arabs, and after that there comes one British, and so on.

Another very important point is that Transjordan is such a forgotten place that any British officer who gets there never gets out of it. We become patriarchs. It is one of the most remarkable changes, I think, that in recent years of British administration in most places the "patriarch" no longer exists. We have made all our services very regular and officials do about three years at one place and then pass on to a different type of job, so that it is difficult in most countries for any British officer to take local roots. But in Transjordan it is different. The fact that Sir Henry Cox, or Colonel Peake, or Mr. Kirkbride, the British Resident, have served for many years in the country means that they themselves have become, I might say, Transjordanized to such a degree that they possess far more influence and are in a position to put the Transjordan case far better than if they had only three years there and then served in some part of the Empire.

In saying what Transjordan's rôle is to be in the post-war world, I hope you do not expect me to expound what will be the future political settlement of the Middle East. All I can say is that I believe that Transjordan is now in a strong position to exercise a stabilizing influence, whatever may be our future in the way of disturbances or rebellions. But what is a little distressing is the fact that Transjordan, which, as I have told you, was born out of due time and did not really come to fruition until 1926, has always been, we feel, a Cinderella who was introduced to do the tidying-up when her bigger sisters, like Egypt, Iraq and Saudi-Arabia, were going to the parties and enjoying the publicity. The fact that Transjordan has been a success does not seem to have led us in any way to analyse whether there is anything that we can learn from her and apply in other countries.

Twenty years ago the great cry was independence and self-determination. But surely in the twenty-five years that have elapsed we had the opportunity to try this out, and now we should be in a position to make any necessary adjustments. The result which has followed from this infatuation for independence is what I think I might call fragmentation—*i.e.*, a tendency to get down to smaller and smaller units. Not only was

the whole of Arabia part of the Turkish Empire before the war, but Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and the Lebanon were one bloc. Not only have these now been broken up, but we have even heard cries of independence for the Druses or the Alawis or any other small body you like.

I cannot help feeling that this continued fragmentation is in exact opposition to what should be the result of modern methods of communications. When I went to Iraq in 1920, it took me a month to get to Jerusalem when I wanted to pay a visit there. It took me five weeks to get from England to Basra. Nowadays it takes about twelve hours from Jerusalem to Baghdad, as against nearly a month the first time I went over.

When I was in Iraq in 1924 I took an Iraqi with me to Jerusalem. He looked upon the place as if he had been in China and said he wanted to go home, as he could not understand what they were all saying. But anybody who has been to the Middle East lately will know that every step, every incident of the political situation in Palestine is followed in Baghdad and in Damascus. So we have these two conflicting movements at the same time: this excessive devotion to independence, without any limit, which has been leading in one direction to smaller and smaller units, and on the other hand there is the progress in communications which must inevitably tend to lead to larger and larger units.

Another thing which must lead to larger units, I presume, is the needs of defence. In Turkish times the troops that were stationed in Northern Arabia marched on their flat feet or rode on mules. In 1914-18 there was a British army in Palestine and one in Iraq, but they had no means of getting together. Nowadays not only vehicles but whole formations cross the desert in a few hours. With the progress of technical advance in war, particularly airborne armies, these microscopic little parcels become more and more impossible if you are going to interpret complete independence literally.

We hear a certain amount about Arab unity, which I am sure is a step in the right direction; but even Arab unity does not either provide a bloc which is strong enough to defend itself or offer commercial reasons to start itself without being tied in to an even bigger bloc.

It seems to me that the only way out of this *impasse* is to realize that our mistake is in treating sovereignty as one thing. On the one hand there is no doubt that the great success of Transjordan has been largely due to its smallness, with the result that every subject of Transjordan has access to His Highness and can make himself known. But on the other hand it has enormous disadvantages. It is surrounded with customs barriers. No Transjordanian can get out without a passport and a visa, and its future is altogether too small for the many educated and enterprising young men who are now growing up in Transjordan and feel that there is no field for them to find a career. So that I cannot help feeling that one of the first lessons we get from Transjordan for the future is that of a country which runs its own internal affairs entirely, but which has the benefit of, or has taken advantage of its membership of, a larger bloc. I would very much prefer seeing more careers for Arabs opened under British auspices in other parts of the world to seeing all these young men shut up in these tiny countries.

We must, however, remember that, while co-operation with the British Empire offers the Arabs such enormous advantages, the Arabs are not prepared to form part of an empire in which they will occupy a subservient position. They look upon themselves as the heirs of a race which in its day controlled an empire as big as our own, and we have to face the fact that we must deal with them on terms of personal equality. I must stress the term *personal* equality, for it is obvious that a country like Transjordan cannot aspire to deal with the British Empire on terms of actual equality. Perhaps a simile will explain what I mean. If you take, for example, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man—I understand that they make their own taxes and have a considerable amount of independence as far as the administration is concerned, but I assume that they will hardly ask for an equal voice in the Government in Westminster. But on the other hand, when we meet a man from the Channel Islands we do not treat him with any less respect because he belongs to an island which is smaller than Great Britain itself.

The Arabs themselves are realists, and they realize that their numbers are such that, of course, they cannot hope to exercise a controlling voice in the policy of the British Government, but they do insist and always will insist as individuals on being treated on exactly equal terms with any British subject.

At the same time, I think there is one point which we should always remember, and that is that the Arabs, while often individually exceedingly brilliant—a fact which is proved when they mingle with other races—on the whole are lacking in civic spirit inside their own country. They are too great and too strong individualists, and it seems to me that the best way in which we can assist to change this failing in a race which is itself so proud, and has itself such a long history, is by exercising the greatest care in the selection of the British officials who go to serve in Arab countries. The gratuitous offer of advice is not a way to make yourself always popular, and the easiest and most effective manner of encouraging public spirit is by making perfectly certain that every British officer who serves in the Middle East will set a personal example of public spirit about which there can be no doubt.

I am afraid I am already exceeding my time, so I will try to summarize the one or two points which I have made up till now.

I think the success of Transjordan may first of all be attributed to its suitable Constitution, which allows a certain scope for public debate but has not gone so far as to be a copy of the Constitution of Great Britain.

The next point to observe is, I think, what I have called divided sovereignty—*i.e.*, the enormous advantage there is in small countries administering themselves, where every man can feel that he exercises influence and has an outlet for his complaints. Especially is this the case in the Eastern countries, which are more used to government by individuals than by elected bodies.

But this small union is unpractical from the point of view of either defence, commerce, passports or even careers for the intelligent and educated young men who are now rising. So you have to divide your sovereignty and have small units for your internal administration with some

tie-up to a very much larger bloc. In other words, as I have said, not fragmentation but coagulation.

But we must always remember that the Arabs look upon themselves as the heirs of an empire as great as our own, and it is quite impossible to treat them as subordinates, nor will they ever consent to be in a subservient position.

Their principal shortcoming in public affairs is too great an individualism, too great a devotion to personal freedom, and I think the best way to overcome that, if we really wish them well, is not by continually offering advice but by making sure that we always set them the very highest example through our own representatives.

This question of our own relations with the various races in the Middle East, and in India, is perhaps after this war the most important with which we shall be faced. Transjordan is a microscopic country with a very small population and an even smaller revenue; but I think perhaps that if we can study the reasons why Transjordan has been a success she may have justified her existence, however small she may be, if we can deduce from her any lessons which we can apply with benefit in a larger sphere.

IRAN: 1939-1944

By THE RIGHT REV. BISHOP W. J. THOMPSON

Notes of a lecture given at a Members' meeting on November 8, 1944, Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., in the Chair.

I T is with considerable trepidation that I stand here to-day to address you. Many of you must know as much as and more than I do of the country of Iran. Besides this, you have lately had such able and interesting lectures about that country that there is not much left to say. I think particularly of that by Miss Lambton in September last year.

But my rôle to-day is a simpler one—very much less ambitious. She gave you a masterly analysis of the history of Persia from ancient times. I shall try and give you a few impressions of the latest developments and tendencies—the New Order in Iran—and so fill in a few points as a foreground to that lecture. I shall do so as one who loves Iran and its people and who has spent most of the last thirty years out in that land.

“New Orders” do not appear suddenly out of the sky, so to speak. There is no real break in the continuity of human history, but there are times, more or less defined, in which great movements in the lives of men, nations and races germinate, develop and bear fruit. And we are living to-day in what has been rightly called one of the great “fruiting seasons” in the world’s history. History seems to be being made with great rapidity; and the changes to-day are more extensive and intensive and more revolutionary than they have ever been in the past.

It has been my privilege to witness Iran passing out of medievalism into the full stream of modern twentieth-century Western civilization. She is passing out of feudalism into an age of industrialization and capitalism, with all the problems which that entails. She has passed out of her comparative isolation of centuries into the vortex of current political and social change. The last few years have seen a great increase in the rate and range of these changes.

I think it is true to say that since the early years of this century the centre of interest in Iran has been shifting from the Shah to the people. This is true in spite of the way the ex-Shah Reza Pahlevi caught the imagination and engaged the attention of everyone. In fact, the New Order may fundamentally be thought of as the period in which the people have been waking up and making themselves felt; it is not quite fanciful to compare it to the historic struggle between King and Commons in this country. The final struggle in Iran is still in the balance, but the drama was to be seen at its height during the reign of Reza Shah. While he occupied the centre of the stage himself and ruled the country as a pure dictator, yet he never destroyed the form of democratic government which he found in existence in the shape of the Constitution and the Parliament, which is at least nominally elected by the people, and by his reforms he laid the foundations on which the New Order could be built. True to the character of the people there has been no spectacular and dramatic moment which could be pointed to as its inauguration; there has been no five-year

plan or similar action taken. The changes have been brought about in a more haphazard fashion, but when they are taken as a whole they are none the less effective in the long run.

As we have seen in the case of other dictators, Reza Shah gained his position of undisputed power largely through the improved conditions which he brought to his people. The first and most spectacular of all was the rapid and successful way in which he brought security and order to a country weary of disorder and banditry. He made the central authority of the Government felt rapidly throughout the country. The State or Government (thought of in the minds of the people as Reza Shah himself) became all-pervasive. The State—or the Shah—decided what you should wear, what you should do and where you should go; even the very details of your life were under control. Certainly while the Shah lasted he held the reins, but it still remains to be seen whether the State will swallow the people or the people control the Government.

Although during the first few years of his reign the ex-Shah encouraged or carried through himself successfully many great reforms, some of which are proving to be of immense value and revolutionary effect, towards the end his thought and energy seemed more and more to centre on personal gain and ambition and his outlook became warped and cynical. By that time, however, there was no one who had the courage to stand up to him. He had “liquidated” most of those who showed any independence, and had around him a group of men who dared not tell him the truth.

I shall not say much about Reza Shah's foreign or political policy. You probably know about this, and it has had less direct and immediate influence and effect on the life of the people than some of his other reforms; and, of course, I do not myself have such personal knowledge of that side.

I will only say that Reza Shah adopted a realistic policy as far as his relations with other countries went. His inclination would have been, I think, to take a course of isolation and to keep to his own unrestricted freedom. But by July, 1937, he had concluded the Treaty of Saadabad with his neighbours—Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan. He also laid the foundation for a close friendship with Egypt by the marriage of the Crown Prince (now H.I.M. Shah) with Princess Fawsich. By these moves he, no doubt, hoped to off-set some of the policies and ambitions of the Western Powers and to strengthen his hand in dealing with Britain and Russia. Germany took advantage of our policy of *laissez-faire* and the suspicions of the Shah to forward her own interests and sow the seeds of future trouble. She managed to infiltrate herself into the country and gradually occupied strategic positions; she gave specious promises and was ready to accommodate herself to the economic needs of the country; a German was appointed head of the new National Bank and Germany imported much of the industrial machinery needed by Iran on a system of barter, and so on. In all this Germany had an easy hand to play in fanning the latent suspicions of the Shah and Government of Iran against Britain and Russia.

As regards home policy, the Shah seems to have tried to combine two rather contrary aims. He encouraged the adoption and adaptation of Western ideas and discoveries and Western methods for the benefit of his

country, while at the same time trying to preserve its independence and prevent interference from foreign Powers. These aims led him on the one hand to try and seal off his subjects from intercourse with all foreigners so as to reduce their influence and so foster a national spirit. In consequence foreign officials and, in fact, all foreigners found themselves cut off from friendly relations with Iranis, who were afraid to draw attention and trouble to themselves by having anything more than the minimum of relations with us. This was very distasteful to many, yet none dared to disregard the policy dictated.

On the other hand, he pursued the policy of suppressing Islam and destroying the power and influence of the Mullahs as the conservative element which might oppose his programme of change.

To those of us who had lived through the old régime the sudden appearance of Government control was surprising, and must have been much more so for Iranis who were not used to such regimentation as we have come to think normal in this country. Identity cards for all. Family names to be chosen and brought into use. Permits to travel; permits for radios, bicycles, cameras; permits to practise medicine. Registration of births and deaths. Forms and returns for all and sundry. Income tax and other levies imposed to help meet the growing expenditure. Even the frills of etiquette were changed to order. The form of official letters was regulated, and if the wrong word or form of address was used no action would be taken. Invitations to official receptions had the instructions added that one must appear in "frock and cylinder," which, being interpreted, means in tail coat and top hat.

But these were only superficial changes. Other more radical and revolutionary changes were also taking place. The decision to build the railway was a big undertaking, opening up new and easy communications with the outside world and likely to develop the country in various ways; and the decision to do this without involving the country by asking for a loan from any foreign country was in line with the general policy. As a matter of fact, the construction of this railway has had the most far-reaching results for ourselves and Russia as well as for Iran. For it has been the life-line to Russia, whereby vast masses of supplies have been sent to our ally, supplies which may perhaps be seen to have been one of the decisive factors of the war. This railway and the presence of the great oil-fields have combined to the more rapid development of the western part of the country at the expense of the rest.

The attack on the predominant power and influence of the Mullahs and the existing religious customs and beliefs was undertaken in stages. This was not an open attack on religion as such, and Islam is still the recognized religion of the country. But it has inevitably affected its influence and weakened its hold on the people. First came the change of hats for men. This was done in two stages—first the "pahlevi hat" and then the ordinary Western headgear, with, at the same time, the suppression of the turban (the sign of the Mullahs) except for those who should qualify for this by passing an examination. This was a definite attack on religion, for it interfered with the correct Moslem ritual of prayer.

Then came the really revolutionary step of abolishing the veil. The

fact that it was done without any serious disturbance was an indication of the Shah's authority. The way in which it was done was original and clever. The Queen and Princesses took the lead by appearing unveiled at a school function, the Shah himself making a speech in which he encouraged the girls and stated that by the abolition of the veil he had given them their freedom and had at one stroke doubled the population of the country. This was true in the sense that up to that time women had never been included in any census taken of the people.

Some of the Mullahs tried hard, unconvincingly, to prove that the new freedom was in accordance with Moslem teaching, but undoubtedly this one reform has been a very great blow to the strength and prestige of Islam in Iran. The officials in each centre were instructed to arrange an official reception, to which each one was ordered to appear in company with his wife. This was a severe test of loyalty, but such was the power of the Shah that everywhere the command was complied with. In one centre the unfortunate ladies had to run the gauntlet of the public, which turned out in force to see them walk down the main avenue of the town, the police calling out their names as they went so that all should know them. Naturally some funny situations took place as the women responded to the new situation, but on the whole they have very quickly adapted themselves to their new-found freedom and the new Western clothing, to which they have taken kindly and which seems to suit them well. From the very first they have quite naturally taken their place in the home and very graciously entertain their guests. All this has had its serious effect on the men as well. For instance, it has meant a serious increase in the family budget, for it costs much more to dress in Western attire than in the ancient veil. The change has also had a direct influence in reducing polygamy, since men do not like to take more than one wife about with them. Child marriage is also much reduced; the new law, in fact, makes it illegal. No marriage is now legal under sixteen years for girls and eighteen for men. Since the abdication of the ex-Shah it is sad to see some return to the old custom of child marriage. This was perhaps inevitable, but we hope it is only a temporary setback. The veil also has tended to return, though I do not think it can ever again become the rule in Iran. There were many older women who never came out of their houses after the order to discard the veil was given who are now feeling freer to do so, and their influence is strong among the less educated section of the community.

But not only socially have the women come to take their rightful place in their homes and in society; they are beginning to exert their influence, to change and improve the conditions they find prevailing in their country. In Shiraz, for example, some of the ladies have started a society for the prevention of cruelty to children and also run an orphanage and refuge for discarded babies. This is largely the work of former students of our former mission school and under the inspiration of the principal, one of our former missionaries and a national of the country. In Isfahan the old students of our former mission school have formed a union to prevent the return of the veil and other retrograde customs. The women's section of the "Red Lion and Sun" are also doing valuable social work. One of

the former students of our school in Isfahan (now working in the National Bank) is publishing a book of her own poems—the first thing of its kind in Iran. This is only a beginning, but it indicates the healthy influence which this new freedom for women may bring into society. It is the younger women, I think, who seem up to the present to have appreciated most the change which has come over the country, and are seeking to lead it into channels which may be profitable and progressive.

There are other ways in which religion has been attacked; the great religious processions and the customs associated with them have been suppressed. The Muharram procession perhaps exerted the greatest influence, for it came directly into the lives of the people and appealed to their emotions. There has been a slight return to these customs during the last two years, but they can never again regain the hold they once had on the people. The fact also that the great mosques have been thrown open to the public and that these great places of Moslem worship have been secularized has been a great blow to the power and influence of Islam, and in fact of all religion in the country. I was told that the Mullahs were not even allowed to preach without first submitting their notes for censorship. Islam as a religious influence has received a great blow; it has been changed into a platform for the dissemination of Government and nationalistic ideas.

Education was a tool which the Government (as in other countries) has been quick to realize has enormous possibilities for good or ill. It can be a tremendous power in the hands of those who control it. "In the long run ideas and ideals, not material force, are the greatest creative or corrosive influences in the life of men and of nations." In this country we usually think of education as a great conservative force—an instrument for the maintaining of continuity, to pass on its heritage of culture; but in Iran it must be considered rather as a great instrument of change.

The first breath of the new interest of the Government in the schools came in 1928, when a general order for the unification of the syllabus of all schools was issued. This rather naturally had in mind only Moslem schools and did not take into account the foreign and Christian schools, but on representations by the Americans and ourselves we managed to arrive at a *modus vivendi*. This was carried on till in 1931 the primary schools were all nationalized and all foreign influences excluded from them. The mission could, however, still carry on middle schools, though more and more pressure was brought to bear on them to conform to the national school type (one mould and one colour). These demands became more and more exacting until it became a question in the minds of some if they could continue to give any effective contribution of their own. However, these considerations were decided for us by the Government in 1939, when they decided that all foreign schools should be closed and that they would buy our school properties from us. They first settled up with the Americans and then our turn came, and we finally handed over our C.M.S. schools to the Government in July, 1940.

I consider that this move of the Government was one of the most disastrous that could have been devised for the country, for it dried up at one stroke the stream of new ideas and ideals which for years had refreshed the life of the nation. I think that it is freely admitted on all sides that the

most progressive and trustworthy elements in the country were the old students of these foreign institutions. They stand out in the Government and throughout the country both in character and ability from the rest of their contemporaries. The reason for this unfortunate decision must be looked for in the political field, and was the price paid to prevent other and, to the Shah's mind, more sinister influences getting any hold on the people.

I still hope that this policy of excluding all outside influence from the educational field may be reversed, as I believe it would be very enthusiastically welcomed by the great majority, otherwise the flow of liberalizing and Christian ideals will be greatly slowed down; but I suppose it is not very likely that any Irani Government will in the present period of uncertainty take any very definite step to correct matters.

Very fortunately three ladies of the C.M.S. mission staff, who were principals of the three mission girls' schools, are also nationals of the country. One of them bought her school property herself and carries the school on as a private venture with a grant from the Government. The other two were invited by the Education Department to continue to carry on as principals of their schools, which had now become Government institutions. In this way they have been able to give a very valuable contribution to the girls' education in the three centres—Isfahan, Yezd and Shiraz.

The great and rapid increase in education in the country during the last twenty years is impressive, and indicates perhaps the greatest single influence which is moulding the life of the people and is likely to be of supreme importance for its future development. Statistics show that in 1922 there were only 612 schools, and these only in a few centres. In 1940 there were 8,237, with a total enrolment of practically half a million students (496,960) and 13,646 teachers; while the University in Teheran had grown from practically nothing and was graduating over 400 students annually. During this period, also, the expenditure for education rose from less than £100,000 per annum to between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000. Adult education also in 1940 showed a total of 157,197 students in over 2,000 classes.

This last year a law has been passed in favour of universal primary education. This will, of course, take years to be realized, but it indicates the trend of things. The country is rapidly becoming literate in place of the 95 per cent. illiteracy of a few years ago. What new possibilities and responsibilities this one fact presents in the matter of the supply of suitable reading matter for this growing public!

Another change altering the whole fabric of society is the trend towards mechanization and industrialism. In most of the larger centres large factories have been built and employ hundreds of workers, while in Isfahan and some other places there are many factories employing in all thousands of workers. It puts the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few, and there is on the other hand the beginnings of a labour movement to safeguard the workers' interests. This latter has already made itself felt, and may be of great importance in the near future.

The unfortunate thing is that the old feudal system, in which the

master took a personal interest in those dependent on him, is giving place to the less ideal conditions where factory owners live away from their workers and take little interest in the conditions under which they work. Such a state of affairs contains all the elements of trouble in the future, unless there is wisdom and consideration shown by both sides in trying to adjust matters so that all get a fair deal. Unfortunately, the most obvious effect of the factory system is to produce a kind of rough hooligan type of person who is a danger to society. This problem calls for very serious thought and for some kind of social welfare and education of the workers to influence and soften this difficult element in the social life of Iran to-day. Education of a right kind is needed to give these workers a new ideal and outlook and an outlet for their energies and social life. While the size of the Christian Church which is growing up in Iran to-day may not yet be impressive in its numbers, I believe that within this body is to be found a leavening influence which may help to bring the country through the difficult period of adjustment to the new order which has come. The dissemination of Christian truth and ideals, which has been spreading throughout the country for the last sixty years or more through the influence of hospitals, schools and the circulation of the Bible in the vernacular, is much greater than appears on the surface at present. The new influences—the “acids of modernity,” as they have been called—which have been flooding and disintegrating the country of late have resulted in the breakdown of the old sanctions and the baneful spread of secularism and materialism, against which the majority find they have no effective resistance to offer. The seeds of a vast change in the whole life of Iran have been sown, so that the late Mr. Wendell Willkie may be right when he says in his book *One World* that the next ten years in Iran and the Middle East will see more changes than the last ten centuries have done.

A great change came over the country a couple of years ago when the British and Russian forces entered. The decision of Iran to throw in her lot with the Allied cause and the cause of freedom against the Axis powers may well prove to have been a turning point in her history. The first results of the new régime may appear disappointing. A feeling of disillusionment certainly has followed the feeling of relief at the change of Government, because the sudden expectation of freedom proved to be less satisfying in reality than it had done in anticipation. It is hardly surprising that the new Government should not be able or desire immediately to take a very strong line while three Great Powers occupy a large part of the country. It has to be learnt that the blessings of freedom cannot be realized without a struggle—they so easily degenerate into licence; but we may hope that the forces of liberty and freedom may be given a chance to grow. The new influences, some of which we have been tracing, have stirred the country, even if it can hardly yet be said to be wide awake. They will develop, but we shall have to wait and see how they will take shape. Let us hope for the steady growth of an enlightened, educated public opinion.

Much will depend upon how the Allies, by their words and actions, commend the free democratic way of life. A healthy turn in the British propaganda is to be welcomed in the desire to make the people familiar with the British way of life through the activities of the British Council.

We should do all we can to assist Iran at this critical period in her history. We can perhaps to-day more easily sympathize with her as we ourselves face the task of rebuilding our own national life.

MISS CARSON : What is the position of the Bahais?

BISHOP THOMPSON : Their influence is not growing as it was, but it is considerable. They are a large community.

GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA : I asked a Persian the other day what the attitude of the Persians towards foreigners was, and the answer, given with a smile, was : " They hate the English, but dread the Russians, and they have got a lingering, latent affection for the Germans." Is there any truth in that statement?

BISHOP THOMPSON : There is a certain amount of truth in it, I think. They like Germans because the Germans are far enough away; they can promise anything without any fear of their having to implement their promises. I think that is one reason.

Secondly, for centuries Iran has been afraid of Russia, and for a long time they have been suspicious of us too. Any alternative to that will almost naturally be considered out there.

As far as the people are concerned, as apart from the Government, I think they are extremely friendly. They have no dislike of the British as such, but they do often very much resent our policy. They are very suspicious of what we are doing in the country and what we expect to do or get through Iran, and not altogether without reason. But as individuals they are extremely friendly, and especially friendly with the British.

Russia is rather a different question. They have not forgotten the acts of Russia in the last war, though in this war the Russian soldier has been very exemplary—more so perhaps than either the American or our own. There seems to be a party growing up which is friendly to Russia. Russian Communistic ideas naturally appeal to those who are finding life extremely difficult. That is undoubtedly proving an inducement for people to take a different line with the Russians.

In the north the Russians have practically taken over the country. Any foreigner going into the northern part of Iran has to get a Russian permit. That is very disconcerting. The future is very uncertain.

GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA : I understand that Reza Shah, when he built up his army, inculcated them quite definitely with the idea that they were the finest army in the world. Then, later on, when they might have had an opportunity of fighting with somebody, they were told they must not fight. Has that particular occurrence had any effect at all on public opinion, or is it only considered to have been rather detrimental among the officer class?

BISHOP THOMPSON : Undoubtedly the Shah raised the morale of the army, which was a better army for his influence. But it was impossible for him to do it almost single-handed, and it was rather a tragedy that they should have attempted to resist the occupation for five days. Naturally they had nothing to fight with compared to the Allies who came into their country.

A MEMBER : Could the Bishop say a little more about the increasing

industrialization of the country? He mentioned the factories in Isfahan. Can he say what they are mainly manufacturing, and whether there are factories in other districts, and can he tell us anything about the Toodeh party?

Bishop THOMPSON : Factories are not only in Isfahan, though Isfahan is called the Manchester of Iran. We have something like sixteen factories now in Isfahan, but in most towns you will find a factory which employs a large number of people. This is gradually tending to draw the people away from the villages into the town—exactly what happened with us a hundred and fifty years ago. The factories are for spinning and weaving cotton and wool, and the cloths made are very good, and very expensive because many of the factory owners think of little but profits and do not really allow for deterioration and so on. Some of them have realized 100 per cent. profit in one year, and many of these factory owners have become rich and take little interest in their workers.

If it were not for the Workers' Union, especially in Isfahan, conditions would be much worse than they are. The whole problem of owner-worker relationships is going to be a serious one in the future.

All kinds of factories are in being or proposed. There was a paper factory which was started to be built in Isfahan, but was changed to the north. There is a big iron and steel factory being planned outside Teheran.

A MEMBER : The Bishop mentioned the influence of the Mission Schools and the types produced from them. I have just returned from Persia, and in Teheran we had to engage a Persian staff. I would like to say, of that staff we engaged there, those who came from the Mission Schools were excellent types as regards character and training. One of my men was from the Stuart Memorial College, and he was one of the most reliable men we had.

A MEMBER : May I ask three questions?

(1) What is the outlook of the Persians towards the Americans? You dealt with the Germans and British.

(2) Does this anti-foreign feeling you referred to extend to the Missions, or do they welcome foreigners teaching religion? You did mention the circulation of the Bible in the vernacular. That, of course, is probably the easiest literature to produce for them. I wondered whether there was any prohibition of the circulation of the Bible or other literature produced by the missionary societies?

(3) About this economic development, which you suggest has been wrongly developed, will they welcome at all foreigners coming in and starting industries in the country?

Bishop THOMPSON : (1) America, I think, started like the Germans as an unknown quantity, but closer association has not improved matters. I think they are more popular than the British because the Persians know that they are farther away and less likely to have political designs on their country.

(2) As regards the missionary worker, it amazes me the extraordinary freedom we have in the country and the reception which we have everywhere. About the Bible Society, all our Bibles and portions of the Bible are now printed by the Government in Teheran. So that in selling it to the people you can say, "This has come from the Iran Government Press."

Under Reza Shah himself there was a great tendency to prevent the circulation in certain places of Bibles, which were confiscated, but that was really against the influence of foreigners rather than against the Bible as such. That has entirely gone since the Shah abdicated. There is remarkable freedom in the country. The fact that two missionaries of long standing should be invited to be Principals of Government schools and be given almost the same conditions that they enjoyed when they were Mission schools is to me very significant. They have permission to teach Christian ethics throughout the school; they are free to influence the students. That, to me, is a very liberal attitude on the part of the Government, so I feel our situation is at present a very happy one out there.

(3) They are not very fond of people who go in to show them how to run their own country, and even if they do invite them to come in they seldom give them very much freedom to do anything constructive.

Mr. BYRT: We have heard from the Bishop about the influence exerted by Christian Missions and about the freedom they enjoy. We have heard about the decline of Islam. What has been found in India is that the worst index of the Christian Missions is in the numbers of converts whom they baptize. Their influence has resulted in an appreciation of the ethical value and in accepting British nationalism, particularly among Hindus, who discover the ethical precepts of Christianity to be written in their own scriptures. So that there has been a tremendous brushing up of Hinduism to bring it in accord with Christian ideals. One effect of that must be that it will bring the two religions more or less parallel with one another.

Bishop THOMPSON: That is a very interesting point. Undoubtedly Christianity, wherever it goes, is a revolutionary force and does have the effect of making people consider their own faith—a very healthy effect. We do find amongst those who wish to study Christianity their first reaction is to study their own religion. But I think what we are really up against is secularism, which is the trouble all over the world to-day. Islam has been very seriously weakened as the religious basis of the nation, with the result that materialism is taking its place. And for those who are not rich the terribly difficult economic situation is causing them to forget that they have anything else but bodies to feed. I do not think there is likely to be any great revival of Islam as a religious force, but I can quite foresee that Islam may try to be a great political force. It is still a social force, and any Government is likely to try and make Islam a rallying-point for the country. It is still a Moslem country nominally, but its religious force is not as great as it used to be. I think the Mullah's influence is gone.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we ought to allow the Bishop to rest now.

I think we ought to show our deep appreciation of the wonderful treat we have had. I must say, as the oldest inhabitant or traveller in Persia here present, probably no one appreciates it more fully than I. We are most grateful to the lecturer.

The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation, after which the Chairman declared the meeting closed.

SOUTH OF CASPIAN

THE rains have finished, and will not return
 Until next winter. Soon the sun will burn,
 And we shall pant with heat, and swear, and sweat—
 Nor wonder why our father Adam let
 Himself and Eve go wandering in the nude
 In Eden's Garden! There they must have stewed
 Throughout the summer! Or perhaps the word
 About the Angel with the Flaming Sword
 Means that the flaming month of May had come,
 And they, well knowing that the place would hum
 Soon with mosquitoes, scorch with heat and drought,
 Judged that the only thing was to go out,
 And, like the duck and snipe, fly further North.

And so, in fig leaves clad, they sallied forth,
 As do, indeed, the tribesmen to this day,
 Seeking fresh pastures where the hills are gay
 With hollyhocks, anemones and grass that still
 Is green. And here their flocks can eat their fill,
 And drink throughout the year at crystal streams
 Gushing from mountain-sides—although it seems
 That even here the curse on Adam rests,
 For the anopheles these vales infests,
 And spleens are bulging in the rugged hills
 Of Persia; where through this and other ills,
 The people are not what they used to be,
 But love to sit about and drink their tea
 In the *chai khana* on a wooden seat.

There all the village gossips come to meet,
 And chatter like the yokel in a pub—
 Or the exalted in a London Club,
 Discussing with the traveller the men
 Of other lands, beyond their local ken.
 There have I seen the lorries clustering,
 Carrying Poles from lands where blustering
 Gestapo agents earn such bitter hate
 As years—and centuries—shall not abate.
 Women and children, and an Army sworn
 To vengeance! They were thin and tired and worn,
 From bitter hardship and anxiety;
 Plundered, bereaved, but still with spirit free.
 Fed, clothed, and armed by Britain, they will fight,
 Adding to the United Nations' might!

In the *chai khana*, too, the drivers meet
 Of U.K.C.C. lorries in the street,
 And jeeps and trucks made in the U.S.A.,
 With Russian drivers, going Tiflis way.

Through all these changes, brought about by war,
 The tea is brewed the same way as before.

REX.

March, 1943.

LAHORE: 1939-1944

By K. H. HENDERSON, I.C.S.

Short notes on an informal address given at a Members' meeting, with General Sir Dashwood Strettell, K.C.B., in the Chair.

[It must be understood that as Mr. Henderson left for India before he could see the report of the meeting he is in no way responsible for any mistakes or misstatements in these notes.]

IN giving you a very informal talk about what has been happening in Lahore in the last five years I am really outlining my impression of what has been happening in the whole of the Province of the Punjab, which in this war, as in the last, has lived up to its reputation as the sword arm of India. It is not only that one district is very much like another, but you may say of Lahore that what Lahore thinks to-day the Punjab thinks to-morrow. It is the second largest city in the Punjab, and pretty well every political party has its headquarters there. In Lahore are some of the most intelligent and civilized people in the Punjab. Ten miles outside it is still possible for a man to cut off his enemy's head, tie the body to a horse, and no one will give evidence against him because they are afraid.

In talking about Lahore and the Punjab in war-time, I think I had better start with economic conditions, because economic conditions have affected our war effort very largely, and have also affected politics and political conditions. In the language of the boxing ring, it has been a fight between Government and inflation. The first year, 1940, started off quietly. In 1941-42 Government took a very bad pasting. Towards the end of 1943 Government rallied a little, but I am afraid the history of the Punjab in the war, and indeed the story through the whole of India, has been the story of inflation.

What happened was this: At the start of the war there was an idea in India that this was going to be a "phoney" war; neither many men nor many goods would be needed, and so very little was done in 1940 in the industrial line. But after the loss of France, and after Italy joined the Axis, goods began to get short. There was an immediate shortage, and clever people, who combined very much quicker than Government could counteract their combining, began to make artificial shortages.

The fighting forces very naturally did not much mind what they paid as long as they got the material they needed, and, as in most cases in India, there was a good deal of corruption. All this has tended to force up prices, create real and bogus shortages, and a number of people have grown suddenly extremely rich. Some, too, were getting very high pay; ordinary labourers had their pay doubled and trebled; but poor people in the cities have had a very bad time indeed, because to them it does not much matter if there is a shortage of silk stockings or if you have to pay £5 for a bottle of black market whiskey. What matters to them is the appalling price of the ordinary commodities of life—wheat, flour, firewood, vegetables and meat.

In Lahore, as in other large cities, when Government suddenly realized they had to expand the army, various industries shot up. India was

more and more left to provide what she could for herself. Mushroom industries have grown to a most amazing extent. Large factories are employing five, ten and twenty thousand men. Munitions, army clothing and equipment had to be produced, factory after factory was started, and the result is that Lahore began the war with a population of half a million and 200,000 people have drifted into it from other provinces.

The effect of this mushroom industry may be very disastrous, because, when peace is declared, a good many of these businesses, which are working with only antiquated machinery, will close down and a vast number of people who now just manage to live will be thrown out of employment. There is no doubt to my mind that the first trouble will come from places like Lahore, there will be a large population thrown out of employment.

In the rural area, on the whole, inflation has been a gain, because the high prices of wheat have helped the cultivator. What happened was that when prices began to creep up towards the end of 1940, Government thought, "Well, we must do something for the zemindar," and, as there were many landowners in the Government, fixed the price of wheat at Rs. 4.6. Wheat did not come in as rapidly as they expected, and Government, instead of trying to stick it out, raised the price to Rs. 5. The zemindar may be thick-headed, but he is not as thick-headed as all that, and he said, "If Government can change its mind, after having said definitely we are going to stick to Rs. 4.6, there is no reason why we should not get more than Rs. 5." So by the end of 1941 the wheat war was on. The Government did not realize, either in controlling urban commodities or, much more essential, in controlling food, the rapid power of combination among the peasants, nor did they realize that you cannot fix a price of any article unless you control the major part of that commodity. It is no good fixing any price if you do not know where your supplies are. That was our position in 1941 when we found the zemindar was holding up wheat, and we did not know how we were going to feed the population.

Luckily in Lahore I had heard rumours of this and, through the co-operation of some traders, built up in godowns about a month's supply for half the population of Lahore. That was in November, 1941. But wheat began to get more and more scarce. By January, 1942, we were in such a position that at one time there was only three days' food supply for the whole of that city.

In not realizing this power of combination, all the Government had done was to give officers the powers under the Defence of India Rule to control prices; but there had been no co-operation and no central policy. The result was that every District Magistrate, every Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab suddenly found himself locally short. Then there followed what was really a wheat war between Government officials, which was most disastrous. I got the bad end of it myself, because my district was a big consumer. I could not feed my people out of my own district. My agents would buy up wheat, and before I could get it moved into Lahore the District Magistrate of the district where it was bought would promptly step up and say he wanted it for his own people. By the time telegrams had gone to the Government he had got his people to eat all that

wheat. About February, 1942, I remember having to tell the Chief Secretary that I was going into the next district with a few hundred police to get the wheat out that we had bought.

The result of this very disastrous lack of cohesion, which went on all through the cold weather of 1941-42, was that the Government called off any attempt to control wheat prices, and at once they shot up from Rs. 4.6 to Rs. 7, and then to Rs. 11 or more, which was 400 per cent. the peacetime price. The zemindars were of course very pleased, and having done it with wheat the zemindar realized he could do it with anything else, so the price of vegetables, meat and firewood ran up to a tremendous extent, and the unfortunate man living on Rs. 40 a month had to pay Rs. 8 for a house, Rs. 7 for firewood, and so on, and had nothing left for either clothes or any other expenses, and many of them have been getting badly into debt.

By the summer of 1943 Government at last woke up and agreed to fix the price of wheat at Rs. 10. That suited the zemindar, who was quite happy. But Government did something more. They decided to bring in rationing, and bought up a very large stock of wheat with which they could ration the towns. That stopped the panic. Rationing is just coming into force now. It means that people will not try to hoard. In 1941-42 the natural reaction of any citizen was to buy as hard as he could and get in more stocks of wheat than he needed and hide them away in some godown. Now there will be no fear, no panic and no hoarding. But it has taken Government all this time to realize that.

And so it was with many other commodities. Naturally Deputy Commissioners, particularly of consuming towns, found that there were many imports into their towns which they could not possibly control. I tried it myself, and found I could not control supplies of milk. The shortage of milk and the high prices were so bad that I remember one day our milk seller poured out a large amount of so-called milk, which was 40 per cent. water, and out of the can jumped a frog. The customer said, "A frog is a bit thick!" All the milkman said was, "Well, you don't expect a fish for the price, do you?" Later on some Hindu merchants paid poor milk sellers to throw away their milk rather than put it on the market. There was an outcry in the papers, "No milk in Lahore." That was another instance of the obvious fact that if you cannot control your supply it is no good fixing prices.

The zemindar has done very well economically. He has got good prices for his wheat and cotton and is saving some money. After the last war it was thrown away on dancing girls and so on. In this war the zemindar is saving a little more. There has been a big campaign for war savings and he is putting his money into redeeming mortgages. A vast amount of land is mortgaged to other people, and the zemindar is using his money to get his land back. After all, he is self-contained. Iron and steel may be expensive, but he does not need iron and steel very often. He gets a new plough once in five or six years. Shoe leather may be expensive, but he does not buy shoes every day. Food he grows himself, whereas the wretched townsman has got to pay every day for it. On the whole, the zemindar has come off best in inflation and it has done him some good.

Naturally this extraordinary inflation has had an effect on the war effort. Where people have been poorest, they have recruited best; where people have been richest, recruiting has not been quite so good.

There is a good deal of confusion about the Indian army of to-day. Mr. Gandhi says it is mercenary. Members of the House of Commons get up and say it is voluntary. It is betwixt and between. It is voluntary in the sense that it is not a conscript army. In some respects you might call it mercenary, in that nine-tenths do not know what they are fighting about. The recruiting officers go round and recruit the men if they are physically fit. They are recruited by local influence, the influence of the leading local zemindars and owners of land. Some hope for very definite and substantial rewards; in some cases Khan Bahadurships.

The fighting men of the traditional army are recruited mostly from the north, where living conditions have always been poor. If you go to Rawalpindi you will not find any man left of fighting age. In Lahore, where we have very rich land, we have 30,000 recruits in the army, which is not so bad, but recruiting is much more difficult because people are more comfortably off, and there is not the army tradition which you find up in the farther north-west.

We have tried to put a stop to the payment of recruits, and have tried to educate the recruit and tell him something about what he is fighting for, but the men do occasionally get into a muddle. After a series of twelve lectures one sepoy was asked, "Can you tell me who the enemies of the British Raj are?" He replied, "Oh yes; French, Germans, Japanese and spies."

But there is another side to it. When you think of two million in the Indian army, you must not think that only the peasantry are recruited. For the first time there is a vast number of educated city people recruited, not so much for the fighting regiments, but every fighting regiment needs a vast amount of supply services, and clerks and ground staff for the Air Force. So in that way the Indian army to-day does contain far more educated people than ever it did before; also, I dare say, after the war, if we disband too quickly, and have economic troubles, more inflammable material.

Another thing one must think about in recruiting is the natural difficulties of any young peasant lad who is going to join the army, particularly in Lahore. In the martial areas everyone is in the army, and also I think the people are more disciplined and more peaceable. In Lahore you have a most turbulent population. You have to be quite certain that your own family can hold their own if you go away and join the army. In most Sikh villages the would-be soldier has many hereditary enemies, and has to decide whether his father can hold them, or whether his cows will be stolen or his wife. So it is quite a serious undertaking for any young villager to join the army, knowing he will be away for a few years.

We have attempted to help all serving soldiers by a form of military petitions. Any soldier, if he hears things are not going well at home, can apply to his colonel or some other officer, who will write the whole thing out and send it to his District Officer, when it will be investigated and, if

possible, settled. All the old soldiers go round the villages trying to settle the troubles of soldiers serving in the army. At first there were about 100 petitions a month. In Lahore they are now getting 1,000 a month. The soldier has discovered that it is very useful. If he joins the army he can write a few complaints about his enemies in the village, and he hopes the local authorities will help him. The result is that 70 per cent. of the petitions we get are bogus, but we have to go in and examine every one of them, because 30 per cent. are really true, and for the sake of that 30 or 20 per cent. it does make a lot of difference if we can write back and say, "Your mother is all right. Your father is all right. Your wife has not been stolen, or, if she was, we have got her back. Your land has not been stolen." I think that the prompt answers we send have helped a great deal to keep up the morale of the army. One of the most pathetic petitions I got was from a woman in the village, who said, "My husband has been serving for four years. I have two daughters and must have a son. Can you give him leave?" I hope the C.O. gave him leave.

Apart from the main job of trying to see that the soldiers are happy about their homes, we have tried to do a little for the British troops. Not much, I am afraid. It has not always been possible. We have arranged hospital dances, but not half enough, and when the British soldier comes back from India he will think it is a ghastly place, and "if Gandhi wants to have it, let him!"

Probably the most difficult thing has been our propaganda, and on the whole that has been rotten. There are constant rumours, and we always catch up with them too late. We have very distinguished and good civil servants, but you need a certain type of man, and not necessarily a civil servant, to deal with propaganda, and we have not done it very well; we have been too slow. This slowness is part of red tape. We do try to catch up slowly, and sooner or later, though generally later, people discover that these rumours are untrue.

As against this economic background, and this effort to help the soldiers, look after the army and counteract any extraordinary rumours that pass through these Indian cities, there has been the constant political background.

That started off quite quietly in 1939. There was an extraordinary effort by a man who modelled himself on Hitler and wanted to rule the Punjab with his army, a man who called himself "The Light of the East." He raised an army of people armed in the Hitler style, but with shovels. I think he really wanted to capture the Punjab. Naturally the Hindus objected strongly and he and his followers were banned. That led to the last bloody outbreak Lahore has had for some time. Two or three thousand people from the frontier came down to help. They had sharpened their swords, and two or three police were killed and over a hundred people. After that the Central Government locked up the leader, and the movement was dead.

Towards the end of 1940 we had Gandhi's effort to preach "no recruiting." That did not go down very well in the Punjab.

By the end of 1941 we had a strike of all the traders. They had been getting more and more antagonized by the landowning Ministry. Various

Bills had been passed, when suddenly the whole of the traders boiled up over a sales tax and closed their shops for five weeks. In the middle of the wheat season, from January to February, 1942, all the Hindu shops were closed throughout the Punjab, people were circulating round vociferating against the Government, until finally there was a mass disturbance on the Mall. We arrested a lot of Congress M.L.A.s, who were so anxious to attend the Assembly that they called the strike off. It was a most extraordinary fight of the traders; semi-economic, but chiefly political; the trading classes trying to put people to so much trouble that they would turn against Government. Luckily people turned against the traders rather than against Government.

Towards the summer of 1942 it was fairly quiet, and then we had, as an aftermath of the Cripps mission, Gandhi. There we were very lucky indeed. The Punjab is not very strongly pro-Congress. Except for a little rather annoying cutting of the telegraph wires and burning of pillar-boxes we had practically no trouble.

In 1943 the Punjab was politically extremely quiet.

In 1944 we had Mr. Jinnah attempting to further Pakistan. As you know, he cannot succeed without the Punjab. He came to Lahore in May and tried to insist that the Punjab Unionist Ministry should become a Moslem League Ministry. That would not have suited the Punjab at all. The Prime Minister was naturally very worried, but he stood firm. The defeat of Jinnah in the Punjab means that Pakistan is not practical politics. Economically he has never said how Pakistan is to run. But if the propagandists get at the villager and give him an idea that Hindus are going to dominate him for the rest of his life there could be trouble.

That is a very brief account of what has been happening in politics and economics in the Punjab. We officials have been Jacks-of-all-trades, and at the end of the war we shall be a lot of very tired men coping with some very big problems.

In order to cope with the future situation we will have to remember very clearly that educated India—and that is the India that matters—does expect its freedom, or at least its Dominion status. The greatest friend we have ever had in the Punjab definitely told his people they were fighting this war for their own freedom, and he meant it. We must stand by our word. If we take the attitude, which so many people take, that Indians cannot run themselves, we are doing no good. Indians say they can run themselves. The result may not be completely efficient, but not less efficient than in many Balkan states.

Where we have gone wrong is in thinking that we have settled the matter when we said, "As soon as you can come to an agreement among yourselves you can have your freedom." That is all right as a debating point, but we cannot stand still at that. We have gone into India and we are responsible. It is rather like the master of an unruly form who says, "Now teach yourselves." It does not divest him of his responsibility.

Everyone has his own ideas about how we might settle things. My own idea is that possibly we are trying to be too perfect and too academic and produce a constitution absolutely perfect, under which no minority over a whole vast sub-continent will get into trouble. People have got to suffer

if they are to have their political freedom. We did. We cannot wet-nurse every minority and see that everyone is protected.

Secondly, we may be trying to swallow too much at once. There is one remark I jotted down, written by Bacon : "The mind of man is more refreshed and cheered by profiting in small things than by standing at stay in great." Why not try, as we have often done, small beginnings in India by giving freedom to one part? If we could settle the Punjab, get the Sikhs and Moslems to work together, we might at any rate produce one region and at the same time say to other people, "If you can make the economic unit, come in and join as a region."

There are powers we can still give which are certainly wider than those they have to-day, while retaining the present centre until it is not wanted any more or they have a full federal centre.

I think that could be done, starting in a small way, but first of all we have to convince the Indian that we do mean business. We have, for the first time since our connection with the Punjab, lost the confidence of the political classes. We have to regain that somehow or other; that is our major problem.

I do hope that you all will try and help here. There is not very much known about India. People are not very interested, and if we have to go through some bad years, as I think we shall have to do in the next five or ten years, it will help a great deal if some interest in the country can be worked up in England. I think it was Disraeli who said, "The key to India is in London," and that is as true to-day as in his time.

When he was winding up the discussion, the CHAIRMAN said: We have had a most interesting talk. It is the District Officers who know what is going on, and Mr. Henderson has given us an extraordinarily good description of the difficulties they have had to deal with. I do not know how they manage to cope with their work.

The petitions have done an enormous amount of good. They must add a great deal of worry to the already overburdened officials, but they have helped the soldier.

May I support him in what he says, that we must let the Indians know that we are going to do business; it is this shilly-shallying which has created so many of our difficulties in India.

NOTE.—In answer to a question asked in the discussion, Mr. HENDERSON said: I consider your good Indian magistrates extraordinarily good; we could not get through without them. They are first class.

THE BURMAN: 1939-1944

By PROFESSOR B. R. PEARN

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 6, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

In opening the meeting the CHAIRMAN said: Professor Pearn, who has been twenty years in Burma, eighteen of which he spent in the Rangoon University, has come to talk to us on "The Burman, 1939-1944." The views which he will express are entirely his own and not in any sense official; he wishes me to stress that, but I cannot help feeling, with respect to the great, that his views possibly will be all the more interesting. I now invite Professor Pearn to address us.

YOU have asked me to talk to-day about the changes which have taken place in Burma since the outbreak of the European war in 1939, especially with reference to changes in political opinion among the Burmese people. Generalizing about the opinions of sixteen or seventeen million people is not easy, for it involves drawing on one's general impressions and not basing one's statements on concrete evidence. Whatever one may say is, therefore, liable to contradiction by others who are equally competent, and probably more so, to form impressions and who may have derived impressions different from one's own. However, I will do the best I can.

In 1939 Burma enjoyed a wide measure of self-government. The details of the Constitution set up under the Government of Burma Act, 1935, need not concern us; suffice it that in effect a House of Representatives, elected on a wide franchise, and a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to that House, had control in matters of domestic government. It is true that the Governor held emergency powers which enabled him to override Legislature and Ministry in certain cases, but these powers were rarely exercised; the Governor played the part of a constitutional monarch, advising and influencing rather than controlling. Excepted from this autonomy were the hill areas of the perimeter of Burma, which remained directly under the Governor's control. Excepted also was the control of external relations and of defence. Otherwise it is not a rash generalization to say that the Legislature and Ministers had a free hand in the domestic government of Burma proper. Even in regard to external affairs, moreover, the Ministry enjoyed in practice a very considerable voice.

The political situation was, however, in some ways not too healthy. For one thing, there had been a failure to develop a well-defined party system. The Burman members of the House of Representatives fell into a number of groups whose members were the personal followers of particular leaders rather than adherents to particular political principles, and there was little to distinguish the political views of one group from those of another, except in the case of the small party of *Thakins* to whom I will refer later. All groups wanted reform of the agrarian situation, all wanted measures taken to restrict Indian immigration, all wanted an increase in self-government, though few apart from the *Thakins* envisaged complete

independence from the British connection. There was thus a certain unreality about the debates and divisions in the House; principles were rarely involved, the issues were often personal, and politics became little more than a struggle for power between group leaders. Every Ministry was perforce a coalition, for no one group ever had a clear majority; and every coalition was precarious, for no group leader admitted any obligation of loyalty to his Premier, but might desert him if to do so seemed likely to be personally advantageous. It was commonly said, too, that votes in the House could be influenced by monetary considerations. The effect was a lack of stability in administration and a general lowering of the tone of politics.

I mentioned that all groups demanded an increase in autonomy. Actually, Burma enjoyed a greater degree of self-government than any other dependency of a Great Power with the exception of the Philippines; but the view publicly expressed by the political leaders was that this autonomy was imaginary rather than real. Certainly, the people at large failed to realize the extent to which power had been entrusted to their elected representatives, and their elected representatives made little effort to enlighten their constituents on the matter—for, if it were inconvenient or impossible to achieve some end desired by the constituency, then of course the blame lay with the British, while if the end were achieved, then the greater the praise due to the member for overcoming British obstruction! The politicians knew well enough the extent of their power, and at least two of them seemed, so far as one could judge, to perceive the achievement of dictatorship within their grasp, but to the mass of people the Government was still the British Government. The prevailing failure on the part of the general public to realize the extent of self-government which Burma enjoyed is, however, not really surprising, for the maintenance of the old system of the hierarchy of commissioners, district officers, etc., was altogether incongruous with the establishment of the parliamentary system of government, and as the officials often tended to be more prominent in local life than did the Legislature, the average man can be forgiven for not realizing that his vote meant very much.

I must not, however, draw too depressing a picture of the political scene. Politics in all countries, I suppose, have a dubious side, and in a country like Burma everything is public which in other countries might be kept behind the scenes. And, after all, the enjoyment of real power was new to Burmese politicians, and things might have settled down quite satisfactorily given a continuance of normal conditions. It is significant that the system continued to function although a not dissimilar system broke down badly in some of the provinces of India.

I mentioned the *Thakins*. They were a party of the younger generation. Many, though not all, were students or former students of the Rangoon University. All, I think, had some pretensions to education, even though they might not have gone as far as the University. With a few exceptions, it was a party of what at home we should call the "white-collar class." Their views were communistic, though I had the impression from talking to some of them that latterly a few at least were tending towards a Fascist outlook. In either case, they were a revolutionary party

whose aim was to establish the complete independence of Burma by violent means; hence they stirred up agrarian agitation and labour unrest. They were the type in which, in Germany and Italy, the Nazis and Fascists found their main support and recruiting-ground—educated, but in general lacking adequate opportunity to use their education. As a rule, they were not in the first flight of intellect; the best of their generation were absorbed in Government service; they were, very often, the second best, who had hoped but failed to enter Government service, or who had hoped but failed to get into the University. There, I think, lies perhaps the explanation of their attitude. They suffered from a sense of frustration. They were not by any means all evil-minded; some, I agree, were and are thorough rascals; but the rank and file of the group were, so far as I could judge, not morally weak nor self-seeking above the average. The *Thakins* felt themselves worthy of greater responsibilities than they were able to exercise, felt themselves capable of service to their country which their circumstances did not permit them to give and, no doubt, thought themselves deserving of better-paid jobs than they were able to get. Not unintelligent, with some measure of education, they found no opening for their energies in the existing régime, and therefore sought to establish a new one. I sometimes think that they could have been made more use of; opportunities could, I suspect, have been found for them in local self-government and social service to a greater extent than was done; and many of them might have done valuable work in these fields. As for their revolutionary outlook, well, that is not uncommon when we are young; it is the advance of middle age that turns us into sober, conservative citizens. We might, perhaps, have learnt a lesson from the enemy. The Japanese, I believe, when communism spread among the educated youth of Japan, took good care not simply to repress it but to find suitable employment for its disciples.

As regards the extent of the influence of the *Thakins*, they first entered the Legislature after the general election of 1936, which was the only general election held under the Government of Burma Act, 1935. They secured only three seats, but their influence was much wider than that number would suggest. They were well organized; they had, I believe, a hierarchy parallel to the hierarchy of our own administrative system, down to the lowest unit—the village. They enjoyed the respect which a modern education brings among a population which in general lacks modern education. They had their own press.

The vernacular press had a considerable circulation in Burma. Although the actual number of copies of any particular newspaper might be only a few thousand, yet it was widely distributed and one copy would be read by a considerable number of people. Burma is a country where pretty well every man and quite a number of women can read; the influence of the press is therefore great, the more so because of the paucity of other reading-matter available. The vernacular press tended to be strongly nationalist; even, one might say, anti-British. It was also exceedingly unscrupulous, having little regard for simple truth. Its misrepresentations, to call them nothing worse, were hard to cope with. The principle of freedom of the press rendered it undesirable for official action to be taken, and the

circumstance that the newspapers were owned by men of straw with no financial resources rendered it useless for the private individual to take legal action, for he could not hope to recover even his costs, however gross the libel. The press therefore went its own way, unchecked, and did a good deal of mischief—as, for example, in helping to stir up the anti-Indian riots of 1938.

How far were the mass of people really interested in these affairs of politics? It is not easy to say. With some trepidation I would suggest that in Burma politics tended to be what one might call “railway-line politics”; that is to say, there was real interest in politics in the towns along the main lines of communications, but off the beaten track, in the more remote villages, what was going on in the House of Representatives in Rangoon seemed very far away and unreal. I think that that suggestion is supported by a consideration which I mentioned earlier: that there was little realization of the extent of power which rested with the Legislature and Ministry.

To turn to the effect of the war on opinion: the primary factor is that events in Europe were essentially remote from Burma. There had been a war in Europe twenty odd years before, and its effect on Burma had been slight. On the whole, Burma had benefited from the war of 1914, as trade had flourished in that period. Otherwise, it had had little direct effect. There was no apparent reason why the war of 1939 should be different. The British Empire was strong, its protection unflinching. As for any ideological considerations, to the great majority Nazism and Fascism were meaningless terms; the fate of Poland was of no interest at all. Even the disasters of 1940 brought very little change in the local point of view. To some, indeed, it seemed that Great Britain was finished and that the future, so far as Burma was concerned, lay with Japan; but those who adopted this attitude were a small minority. To the mass of people life went on much as before; to the political groups the situation merely gave an opportunity for trying to extract from His Majesty's Government an extension of self-government. As early as February, 1940, a resolution was carried through the House of Representatives declaring that Burma's willing participation in the war effort was dependent on immediate acceptance of Burma's claim to be “recognized as an independent nation entitled to frame her own constitution,” and this claim was advanced again by the Ministry during the succeeding months. His Majesty's Government, however, was not prepared to do more than reiterate that while the ultimate objective was Dominion status for Burma, discussion of the matter should be postponed till after the war. This answer, of course, satisfied no one. The *Thakins* and a few of the older politicians sought to remedy the situation by force, and they, with the former Premier of Burma, Dr. Ba Maw, combined in 1940 to form a “Freedom Bloc,” until Dr. Ba Maw's violent speeches led to his conviction and imprisonment for sedition. But the great majority of politicians looked askance at the activities of the Left-wing elements and preferred to pursue constitutional means for attaining their aim.

So far as foreign relations were concerned, the principal point of interest lay not in the war but in the Burma Road. This route had been

formally declared open in January, 1939, as a substitute for the routes into the interior of China from the China coast and for the route through French Indo-China which was, compared with the Burma route, vulnerable. A railway to link the Burmese and Chinese railway systems was also under contemplation. These developments aroused apprehension in some quarters in Burma. It was feared that there would now be an influx of Chinese immigrants, seeking refuge from the war-stricken provinces of China, and the ever-present fear that Burma would be crushed between her two powerful neighbours, China and India, and that the Burmese people would be submerged, was now strengthened. Actually, there seems to have been little immigration from China. Employees of transportation concerns entered the country to add, by their disorderly habits and their wild methods of driving, to the worries of the Burma Police; but, apart from this floating population, immigration did not markedly increase. Nevertheless, the apprehension remained. Formerly a good deal of sympathy with the Chinese had been expressed, and a "goodwill mission" had gone to Chungking to intimate the moral support of Burma in the struggle against Japan; but once the Burma Road was functioning there was a change of attitude. This showed itself clearly in the action of the Ministry in regard to customs dues on lease-lend goods passing through Burma to China. American and Chinese opinion naturally took the view that transit goods of this nature should be exempt from taxation since they were designed to further what was really a common war-effort, but no amount of argument would move the Ministry, who perceived the vast benefit which the revenues of Burma were deriving from this source. The details of the matter need not concern us. The situation was that, under the Government of Burma Act, 1935, this was a matter in which the Ministry of Burma had the final say, and there was no means of overriding their decision. In the end, the British Treasury, or, in other words, the long-suffering British taxpayer, added this to its numerous burdens and undertook to bear the cost of these customs dues. The incident shows clearly how little sympathy there was in 1940 and 1941 for China's war-effort among the highest quarters of Burmese opinion.

The closing of the Burma Road for three months in 1940 under Japanese pressure aroused surprisingly little excitement in Burma, doubtless because of the aforementioned lack of sympathy for the Chinese.

In regard to the impact of Japanese influence on Burmese opinion, there is no doubt that a good deal had been done by the Japanese to create trouble in Burma. From 1939 onwards Tokyo was issuing broadcasts in Burmese of an anti-British nature. Even before that, Japanese propaganda had been at work. A number of prominent Burmans had been encouraged to visit Japan. Thus U Saw, who later became Premier of Burma, had gone to Japan in 1935, and on his return he had the wherewithal to start his own newspaper. Anti-British articles in the vernacular press were subsidized by the Japanese Consul, and his hand was suspected by some—though I believe this was never proved—in the anti-Indian riots of 1938-39. In general, Japanese influence was suspected also by some behind much of the unrest among labour and among students in these years. Japanese contacts with some of the *Thakins* were certainly estab-

ished, and in 1940 one of the most prominent *Thakins*, named Aung San, effected his escape from Burma, where the police were after him, and made his way to Japan. The opposition to the Burma Road also owed a certain amount to Japanese inspiration.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to lay too much emphasis on the practical importance of Japanese influence in Burma before December, 1941. Japan, after all, seemed almost as remote from Burma as did Europe, interest in events in the Pacific was very small indeed, and the prospect that Japan could seriously affect the fortunes of Burma seemed to most to be negligible. Few could believe that, if it came to the point, the Japanese could be a really serious danger. True that in 1940 the Japanese occupied French Indo-China and so brought themselves to the borders of Burma : but faith in the efficacy of British protection was strong and, anyway, from the course of events in China it looked as if Japan was playing only a gigantic game of bluff. Our own propaganda was largely responsible for the general failure to perceive the gravity of the danger. It was undesirable, in 1940 and 1941, to take any step which might precipitate a conflict. Great Britain had her hands full in Europe, and could not afford to enter into war in the East as well. Therefore, any propaganda designed to reveal the extent of Japanese plans and to emphasize the danger in which Burma stood had to be eschewed. Propaganda to aid the war-effort had to concentrate on the Nazis, and the Nazis were a matter of indifference to Burma. Thus our propaganda was hamstrung from the outset. It could deal only with issues which interested no one, and had to avoid the issue which, for Burma, was important. In so far as propaganda did touch on Eastern affairs, it was designed mainly to indicate how strong our defences were : one remembers only too painfully the propaganda about the impregnability of Singapore and so on. Actually, the only people who were deceived by this were ourselves : the enemy undoubtedly knew what the situation was.

However, a certain amount was done to stimulate war-mindedness among the Burmese by encouraging enlistment in the armed forces. Formerly the very meagre Burma forces, consisting of four battalions of the Burma Rifles and scarcely anything more, had been recruited from amongst Kachins, Chins and Karens only; now recruitment was thrown open to Burmans. A volunteer naval reserve for coastal patrol work and a volunteer air unit were also raised. These measures were greeted with enthusiasm, but rather as an indication of the recognition of Burmese national status than as measures preliminary to war. Efforts were also made to organize civil defence services, but it was difficult to convince the Ministry, or anyone else, of the necessity and urgency of such measures. Indeed, it is not easy for the civil population of any country to prepare itself for war unless the imminence of war is apparent and, as has been said, it was not possible to point out in Burma how close war was. Thus the civil population of Burma remained mentally unprepared for war, and convinced that, if war should by any chance occur, British protection would not fail them.

The *Thakins* and a few of the older politicians indeed had other views. So far as the *Thakins* were concerned, they were inclined to accept Japan-

ese claims to be the champions of the independence of Asiatic nations; they certainly had no desire to bring Burma under Japanese control. Why should they? But some of them hoped that Japan might prove an instrument by which the independence of Burma could be achieved. There appears to have been a division of opinion on this matter. Some *Thakins* desired the active intervention of Japanese arms in Burma, others hoped that Japanese pressure applied elsewhere might suffice to expel the British from Eastern Asia and so enable Burma to achieve her own independence. Of the former group, some thirty managed, in 1941, to make their way out of Burma to receive military training at Japanese hands. The entry of Russia into the European war as the ally of Great Britain somewhat disconcerted the *Thakins*, in view of their inclination to the communist creed; but, curiously enough, they seem to have managed more or less to convince themselves that the best way in which they could aid Russia was to assist in the downfall of Great Britain; but such evidence as is available suggests that their minds were uneasy. They had already organized a private "army" of their own, an unarmed force which existed on paper rather than in reality, and it is perhaps significant of the difficulty in which they were now placed that when the Japanese invasion did occur this "army" failed to rise to the occasion. It did precisely nothing and, in fact, ceased to exist.

The situation in 1941 was, then, that with no overt enemy nearer than Libya, few believed that Burma was likely to be involved in hostilities and interest continued to be devoted to domestic issues. The agrarian problem, for example, was most pressing, and endeavours were made to cope with this by legislation which, as it happened, had not become effective by the time hostilities commenced. The Indian problem was also very pressing, and political interest was much absorbed in the negotiations, undertaken in 1941, between the Governments of Burma and of India for an agreement on the subject of Indian immigration into Burma. An agreement was arrived at which placed severe and, in Indian opinion, humiliating restrictions on immigration into Burma, but the agreement had not been fully implemented at the time of the invasion. Equally important was the question of an increase in the degree of self-government to be enjoyed by Burma. U Saw, Premier from September, 1940, felt that his only chance of retaining office after the next general election was to secure a spectacular constitutional advance, which alone could offset his intense unpopularity arising from his unscrupulous and dictatorial methods. So in October, 1941, he came to England to see what could be done; but H.M. Government adhered to its position that it was not feasible during the war to take any steps in the direction he desired. While U Saw was away from Burma the Japanese war began, and on his way back he was arrested and interned because he had rashly resumed his contacts with the enemy.

When hostilities began, Burma remained quiet. U Saw's arrest aroused scarcely any interest; the course of the war was far more important. The aggression of the Japanese was universally condemned, and even the ultra-nationalist elements joined in public condemnation of the invasion. But the disasters which ensued were a tremendous shock to the people of Burma. The seemingly impossible happened, and Burma was

not only invaded but in a few months overrun by the enemy. British protection had failed, despite all the desperate efforts of the outnumbered and ill-equipped Burma Army. There has been much controversy about the attitude of the people of Burma at this time. My personal experiences, of course, were limited and not necessarily similar to the experiences of others, but so far as my own evidence is of value, it is this: at no time did I experience any hostility from any Burman. I travelled about the country a good deal towards the end of the campaign, and never had the slightest trouble. On the contrary, at the very end, when our fortunes were at their lowest ebb, and I was in a particularly precarious situation, I received every kindness and assistance; and I look back with feelings of the deepest gratitude to the kindly people of the Chindwin valley who fed me, gave me lodging, and helped me on my way at a time when, accompanied by only one man, I was in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy and, for a few hours, on the wrong side of their position.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that some Burmans did actively assist the enemy. When the invasion began the enemy was accompanied by the thirty young men who had left Burma to receive military training; these formed the nucleus of the Burma Independence Army. As the enemy advanced across the country, this nucleus was joined by more and more recruits. Some of these were *Thakins*, though not all the *Thakins* joined them. On the contrary, many remained quiet: the "army" which the *Thakins* had earlier formed did nothing; its organization was not used; the organization of the Burma Independence Army was distinct and separate. Others who joined were members of the criminal class, who found a glorious opportunity in the disturbed conditions which necessarily accompany invasion. It is estimated that at the maximum the number of Burmans under arms against us was some thirty thousand. Others, again, gave information to the enemy. Others withheld information from our own troops. This last-mentioned feature was not necessarily due to ill-will; rather to fear. Our own record being what it is, no one was likely to come to much harm if he failed to give us information, whereas the vengeance of the Japanese and the Independence Army would fall with dreadful severity on anyone who did assist us. Naturally, as the symptoms of the enemy's success developed, the disinclination to incur the wrath of the victor was accentuated.

Members of the criminal class, again, made attacks on stragglers, and the murder of officers and men cut off from their units unquestionably occurred in some cases. There were also cases of attacks on Indian refugees making their way out of the country, though such instances were few and were offset by many more cases of practical sympathy and aid. It may also be mentioned that there was little sabotage behind our lines, though looting of railway trains occurred at times; trains were also derailed on two or three occasions, but those were forms of "amusement" which were by no means unknown in times of peace. But there was no instance of armed resistance behind our lines, and it is significant that civil officers went about their duties, safely and unarmed, to the very end.

Active resistance to the enemy on the part of the Burmese civil population did not, indeed, occur; it could not occur, for the civil population had

no arms. Whereas arms are commonly owned among the hill peoples of Burma, they are exceptional among the Burmans of the plains. Resistance was no more possible for the civil population of Burma proper than it had been for the civil populations of Poland, of Denmark, of Norway, of Holland, of Belgium, of France in 1939 and 1940, or than it was for the civil populations of the Philippines, of Malaya, of the Netherlands Indies in 1942.

The situation was, then, that a small minority actively aided the enemy, but that the vast majority was helpless, aghast at the catastrophe which had occurred, and could do nothing but seek refuge in jungle villages as remote as possible from the actual scene of operations.

When the enemy established himself in the country, civil administration was at first entrusted to the Independence Army, but the results were so unfortunate that this force was disbanded by the Japanese and a new military force was raised in its place, while the civil government was entrusted to Dr. Ba Maw, formerly Premier of Burma, who had been in prison at the time of the invasion. Later, in August, 1943, a declaration of the independence of Burma was issued by Dr. Ba Maw, and formal recognition of Burma's independent status was given by Japan and her satellites. At the same time, a new system of government, with Dr. Ba Maw as dictator, was set up. In his administration he is aided by a Cabinet of Ministers and a Privy Council; but the principle of election has been entirely abandoned, and all power rests in name with the dictator. There is no elective element anywhere in the Constitution. Of course, behind the façade of "independence" lies the reality of Japanese control, exercised through the "advisers" whom the Japanese have appointed to the various departments of Government. Burma's "independence" has about the same degree of reality as that of Manchuria. The new "independent" Government has declared war on Great Britain and her allies, with the exception of Russia, and so is, I presume, a rebel Government.

The new régime has had to face acute difficulties. The economic system has been completely disrupted: Burma's prosperity was bound up with the rice trade, but Burma has lost her normal markets, which were principally in India, and cannot find new ones, nor could the Japanese provide the shipping to export the rice even if markets could be found. Equally, consumer goods cannot be imported. Prices have rocketed, and attempts to control them have failed. The transport systems, wrecked by our own scorched-earth policy in 1942, have not been restored, and rice, the staple food of the country, cannot be taken to those districts in Upper Burma which are deficient in that commodity. What with the loss of both internal and external markets, large areas of rice land in Lower Burma have gone out of cultivation. Rinderpest has spread among the cattle and the means of combating it do not exist. Medical supplies for human use are also short. A system of forced labour has been introduced, and the Japanese pay for such labour in notes, printed on the spot, which have no backing.

To consider the effect of the situation on Burmese opinion: after Dr. Ba Maw assumed office in 1942 he required all officials to return to their posts. This order was in general obeyed and, as the former administrative

system has largely been maintained, it follows that civil administration is very much in the hands of the men who exercised it in pre-war times, for, of course, the civil services had been largely Burmanized by 1941. The officers who have thus resumed their posts are, however, receiving much reduced rates of pay; and in the districts their activities are watched by a system of *gauleiter* whom Dr. Ba Maw has appointed. It is true that, owing to the reduction of the strength of the services by the exodus of European officers, many Burmans have received accelerated promotion, but their situation is not very pleasant and there are indications that the Japanese do not trust the official class. It may be borne in mind that, provided they do not give assistance in the enemy's war effort but confine themselves to their normal duties, we have, so far as I a layman in these matters can see, no grievance against these officers: they are only doing their duty if they try to maintain normal life and act as a buffer between the people and the occupying Power. Indeed, they are only doing what European officers would have done if the enemy would have allowed them: the original invasion-instructions required all civil officers to remain at their posts, but it was found that the only result was the internment of European officers, and so the instructions were modified. The official class is, I imagine, not having a very pleasant time, and would probably welcome a return to the settled and stable conditions they formerly knew.

It is, however, also the case that Dr. Ba Maw's Cabinet and Privy Council contain, besides some revolutionary elements, a number of men who used to be regarded as sensible and steadfast men; some of these are politicians, some retired officials of high standing. These are men who, though nationalist, formerly pursued the constitutional road towards Burma's complete self-government within the British Empire. It is, indeed, unfortunate that these should have identified themselves with the Japanese controlled régime. Their case is not that of the official performing his normal duties, for the tasks they have undertaken are abnormal, and the Government of which they are members is a rebel Government. We may, however, bear in mind that they have to live, that considerable pressure might be brought to bear on them and, perhaps most important of all, that the events of 1942 are fresh in their minds and their trust in the efficacy of British protection has been shattered. If we could have returned to Burma within a few months it would not have mattered so much, but it is now getting on for three years since we left the country, and until very recently we showed few signs of returning. It is scarcely surprising that the faith of some should have faltered and that they should have identified themselves with the enemy. And in these matters Burma's record is no worse than that of any other country in Asia or in Europe that has been invaded and occupied in the present war. All the same, it is unfortunate that the influence of such men should be cast in the scales against us, as it now inevitably must be.

The *Thakins*, I fear, are almost certainly opposed to us. Disillusioned as many must be with the effects of the alliance with the Japanese, I am afraid the record of most of them is such that they dare not do anything but oppose the British.

But what of the ordinary man, the cultivator? To him the Japanese

invasion has brought no promotion to high office, no increase in self-government, no increase in prosperity. On the contrary, it has produced a complete disruption of the economic system, and there is ample evidence that the people of Burma, one of the richest countries in the world, are suffering from acute want and even, in some parts, from starvation. Their normal life is disturbed by the imposition of forced labour, and peace of mind is shattered by the constant air attacks of the Allied forces and by the fear that their country will again before long be made the battleground of opposing armies. Where, however, the enemy has scored is in the declaration of independence. It is generally agreed that the spirit of nationalism is strong among the Burmese, and that spirit must have been highly gratified by the recognition of Burma as an independent national state. Obvious as it must be that the so-called "independence" is a sham, nevertheless this is a matter of sentiment not of reason, and it would be foolish to underestimate the effect of sentiment on men's attitudes. It may further be suggested that the sight of our exodus in 1942 must have struck a blow at British prestige. I would not give overmuch weight to this last consideration, however, except in one particular. I do not think that the Burman, as a rule, ever had any illusion that the European was a superman; on the contrary, the Burman always had a pretty good opinion of himself, and thought himself as good as the next man. Why should he not? The point is rather the destruction of faith in the power of Great Britain to protect Burma, and one may almost doubt whether that faith can ever be really restored.

As against these considerations we have the economic catastrophe, the disruption of ordered life, the normal brutality of the Japanese, and the general weariness with war. Among some, too, the system of dictatorship must compare sadly with the democratic system which formerly prevailed. All evidence goes to show that in those parts of Burma to which our forces have penetrated, they have been very well received, and that hopes for the return of a British administration have been generally expressed. Of course, feeling may vary in different parts of the country. So far we have been operating in remote parts of Upper Burma where interest in politics was always comparatively slight, and it may be that in more accessible parts a different view is taken. For example, Lower Burma was always more active in politics than any part of Upper Burma and anti-British feeling was more likely to be met in Lower than in Upper Burma. But even in Lower Burma the collapse of the rice trade, the shortage of imported goods and all the other factors that make up the present economic situation in Burma have produced a state of affairs in which nominal independence can be put poor compensation for the acute want which prevails. Admittedly, if the "independent" administration had been able to expropriate the Indian landlords in Lower Burma so that the return of the British might imply the return of the alien landowner, then indeed the Ba Maw régime would have a strong hold on Lower Burma; but there is no evidence that this has been done, nor is it likely that the Japanese would permit it. On the whole, then, I should expect feeling in Lower Burma to be not dissimilar from that in Upper Burma.

We must not, of course, overlook the effect of enemy propaganda.

There has been no free press in Burma since the Japanese came, and the newspapers, the wireless, the educational system, have all been devoted to Japanese propaganda. We have endeavoured to counter this by our own broadcasts, which, however, can reach few, if any, as listening-in to any but the local station is prohibited. More effective will have been our leaflets dropped from the air, though obviously these have a limited and fortuitous public. Thus very little accurate news of events outside Burma can have reached the people, but this, in the end, may prove to be a factor in our favour, for when the enemy is really on the run the effect will be all the more spectacular.

I would, then, imagine that the mass of people are thoroughly disgusted with the present situation and will welcome a return of the British with their tradition of peace and order, and that the elements which will oppose us are few. I also imagine that when order has at last been resolved out of chaos, there will be a stronger demand than ever for an increased degree of self-government, but I am not altogether sure that, in view of all that has happened, the demand will be for self-government within the framework of the British Empire, for the strongest argument with which we used to meet demands for complete independence—namely, that Burma needed the protection of the British Empire—has been sadly weakened. When the Japanese have been removed from the scene, and normal conditions have been restored, there may be a widespread feeling that Burma might as well stand on her own feet.

I have not referred to the minority communities in Burma; to say much would take too long; but the steadfast loyalty displayed by the Kachins, for example, speaks for itself. Short of arms and ammunition, short often of food, they have maintained their guerilla warfare against the enemy with a devotion beyond praise. To the hill peoples of Northern Burma we owe a very great debt.

I have exhausted my time and your patience. I have omitted much that might have been said and said much that may arouse disagreement. I can only plead in extenuation that I have endeavoured to give an honest account of a theme which must be, to a great extent, a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have indeed had a most instructive, entertaining and lucid account of Burma in those fateful years, but I would like to say here and now that the lecturer made a gross mistake when he diffidently said he would be boring us. I am certain you all have in your mind the feeling I had when listening to him: we wished he would continue. You will, I feel sure, agree with me that as part of a series of lectures on the Middle East and India, 1939-44, Burma in those same years, and then going on to the Dutch East Indies and, I hope, farther east, the lecture to which we have just listened will indeed hold a high place. I would now like to throw the meeting open for discussion, and perhaps Sir Charles Innes would make a few remarks.

Sir CHARLES INNES: I take it that I have been called upon to speak because in the remote past I was for some time Governor of Burma, but it is twelve years since I left the country and there is no doubt that in these days one soon becomes out of date in regard to Eastern affairs. Indeed,

I am reminded of the story of a friend of mine. About the beginning of the present century, when he was a very junior officer in the Geological Survey of India, he was called upon to give evidence before an India Office Committee presided over by a distinguished member of the India Council. In the course of his evidence he took occasion to give vent to an aphorism. He said: "Anyone who speaks with an air of authority about India and the East two years after he has left India and the East is just a fool; but anyone who does so ten years after he has left the East is a public danger." When he had said that he discovered, to his horror, that the member of the Indian Council who was presiding had left India just ten years before. I myself left Burma twelve years ago. Apart from this, I have only just heard the lecture, and I confess that I feel rather overwhelmed. As the Chairman has said, it was an extraordinarily interesting lecture. Mr. Pearn has done us the compliment of saying frankly what is in his mind, and I make bold to say that he has given us all a great deal to think about. I will not attempt to follow him in all the points he has raised, but I would like to add one or two.

Firstly, looking at the matter in a practical way, the first thing we have to do is to get the Japs out of Burma as quickly as ever we can. I think we can leave that to Lord Louis Mountbatten and the Fourteenth Army. When we have got the Japanese out of Burma my belief is that we shall be warmly welcomed by the Burmans. They have undoubtedly had a very bad time during the last three years. As the lecturer pointed out, they have lost their markets. They have not been able to import those little luxuries to which they attach so much importance, and they have not been able to sell their rice. Also they have been badly treated by the Japanese. I believe the name of the Japanese, and also the names of those Burmans who supported them, will not be popular names in Burma after the war. I think the Burmans want the British back, especially if, as the Governor of Burma said not long ago, we go back not with platoons of infantry but with lorry loads of consumer goods.

Secondly, when we have turned the Japanese out of Burma there will have to be a period during which we will be rehabilitating the country. Enormous damage has been done in the war; railways are out of order, bridges down, towns destroyed, houses, public buildings and warehouses demolished. There will be an enormous job of restoration to be done, and I hope and believe that for some years the Burman and European will work together to rehabilitate the country. I hope also that H.M. Government and the Treasury will play their part in assisting that rehabilitation. After all, we who served in Burma and we who love it cannot help feeling that we British have let the Burman down. The main thing we did for Burma was to provide peace, justice and protection from external aggression. In this last we have failed. I hold that it is a debt of honour upon the British taxpayer and the British Government that they should assist this little country which we have let down to rehabilitate herself.

When that period of rehabilitation has passed there will be the question of constitutional advance. The first point to remember in that connection is that we are bound by certain pledges to Burma. We shall have to carry out those pledges. It is true that, to some extent, the omens are not very

favourable, but it has to be remembered that we British have worked our passage to our form of democratic government through long centuries of experience. The Eastern peoples have not had that same experience of democratic government. I do not attach too much importance to the instances of irresponsibility referred to by the lecturer. Incomplete self-government is always the most difficult form of government. It may be, as the lecturer said, that we gave to Burma a greater measure of independence than any tropical appendage of a great empire ever had before, excepting the Philippines. That, I believe, was originally said by an independent American observer. But, however great the advance, it was not complete, and, as Professor Ramsay Muir once said, incomplete self-government is always striving for its own fulfilment; it is always a difficult form of government. To that I attribute very largely those instances of irresponsibility to which the lecturer referred. I hope and believe that when the Burmese do get responsibility their government will improve. I personally am a moderate optimist in regard to Burma. It is a country which all who have lived and worked in have the greatest affection for. We also have a great affection for the Burman; he has his faults; he is a gambler to his finger-tips, but he is an extraordinarily likeable and attractive person with an enormous zest for life and *joie de vivre*. I am sure that all we who have listened to this very interesting lecture will wish all prosperity to this little country in the future.

Colonel BARKER : Sir Charles Innes has said a great deal of what there is to be said to the lecturer about his lecture, but in the lecture itself Professor Pearn stated that the *Thakins* had really a desire to do something for the good of their country. I was nearly always in the districts in Burma and little in Rangoon, and it struck me that the vast majority of local self-government politicians were not out to do what they could for their country or their district but out to do what they could for themselves. It seems that until one can get unity of purpose into the local politicians and up higher into the provincial politicians it will be difficult for the Burmans to have the self-government they deserve.

At the same time, I would like to say that I happened to spend a night at a *dak* bungalow with a young Burmese engineer who had lately left Rangoon University. When telling me of some of the difficulties he had, he said his parents and relations were always asking him why he did not take money from contractors as other engineers did. I appreciated how difficult it was for him to make a stand against the opinion of his own family, so I asked him why he did not accept money. He replied : "As a matter of fact, the reason is that in the University we came into contact with the professors. We got to like them and to admire and appreciate their principles. I for one am trying to be a little like the men I admire." I wonder whether Professor Pearn can tell us of any other solid seeds we have sown in Burma which may bear fruit in the near future?

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right road in that respect. One should also bear in mind, as Colonel Barker intimated, the extreme difficulty which any young man has in adhering to his good resolutions in that particular. The pressure to accept a gratification can be very considerable. Among the youngsters who were entering Government service there was a pretty good morale; their ideas were right and very sound. Where we did go wrong, as I suggested in the lecture, was with the youngsters for whom there was no very attractive employment. We have in Burma the problem which has grown up in some European countries in the last twenty years, the educated unemployed. In Burma it was a problem by no means so serious as in India, for example; but the problem did exist. With that type I fear we have not done much good. But to those for whom there was adequate employment available the education we had given them had done a great deal of good.

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There are other points to which I should like to have referred, but I have exceeded my time. I should only like to add that I have listened to Professor Pearn with the greatest interest and have got a better grasp of the whole situation from him. I hope others have profited equally.

I am reminded of the story of a friend of mine. About the beginning of the present century, when he was a very junior officer in the Geological Survey of India, he was called upon to give evidence before an India Office Committee presided over by a distinguished member of the India Council. In the course of his evidence he took occasion to give vent to an aphorism. He said: "Anyone who speaks with an air of authority about India and the East two years after he has left India and the East is just a fool; but anyone who does so ten years after he has left the East is a public danger." When he had said that he discovered, to his horror, that the member of the Indian Council who was presiding had left India just ten years before. I myself left Burma twelve years ago. Apart from this, I have only just heard the lecture, and I confess that I feel rather overwhelmed. As the Chairman has said, it was an extraordinarily interesting lecture. Mr. Pearn has done us the compliment of saying frankly what is in his mind, and I make bold to say that he has given us all a great deal to think about. I will not attempt to follow him in all the points he has raised, but I would like to add one or two.

Firstly, looking at the matter in a practical way, the first thing we have to do is to get the Japs out of Burma as quickly as ever we can. I think we can leave that to Lord Louis Mountbatten and the Fourteenth Army. When we have got the Japanese out of Burma my belief is that we shall be warmly welcomed by the Burmans. They have undoubtedly had a very bad time during the last three years. As the lecturer pointed out, they have lost their markets. They have not been able to import those little luxuries to which they attach so much importance, and they have not been able to sell their rice. Also they have been badly treated by the Japanese. I believe the name of the Japanese, and also the names of those Burmans who supported them, will not be popular names in Burma after the war. I think the Burmans want the British back, especially if, as the Governor of Burma said not long ago, we go back not with platoons of infantry but with lorry loads of consumer goods.

Secondly, when we have turned the Japanese out of Burma there will have to be a period during which we will be rehabilitating the country. Enormous damage has been done in the war; railways are out of order, bridges down, towns destroyed, houses, public buildings and warehouses demolished. There will be an enormous job of restoration to be done, and I hope and believe that for some years the Burman and European will work together to rehabilitate the country. I hope also that H.M. Government and the Treasury will play their part in assisting that rehabilitation. After all, we who served in Burma and we who love it cannot help feeling that we British have let the Burman down. The main thing we did for Burma was to provide peace, justice and protection from external aggression. In this last we have failed. I hold that it is a debt of honour upon the British taxpayer and the British Government that they should assist this little country which we have let down to rehabilitate herself.

When that period of rehabilitation has passed there will be the question of constitutional advance. The first point to remember in that connection is that we are bound by certain pledges to Burma. We shall have to carry out those pledges. It is true that, to some extent, the omens are not very

favourable, but it has to be remembered that we British have worked our passage to our form of democratic government through long centuries of experience. The Eastern peoples have not had that same experience of democratic government. I do not attach too much importance to the instances of irresponsibility referred to by the lecturer. Incomplete self-government is always the most difficult form of government. It may be, as the lecturer said, that we gave to Burma a greater measure of independence than any tropical appendage of a great empire ever had before, excepting the Philippines. That, I believe, was originally said by an independent American observer. But, however great the advance, it was not complete, and, as Professor Ramsay Muir once said, incomplete self-government is always striving for its own fulfilment; it is always a difficult form of government. To that I attribute very largely those instances of irresponsibility to which the lecturer referred. I hope and believe that when the Burmese do get responsibility their government will improve. I personally am a moderate optimist in regard to Burma. It is a country which all who have lived and worked in have the greatest affection for. We also have a great affection for the Burman; he has his faults; he is a gambler to his finger-tips, but he is an extraordinarily likeable and attractive person with an enormous zest for life and *joie de vivre*. I am sure that all we who have listened to this very interesting lecture will wish all prosperity to this little country in the future.

Colonel BARKER: Sir Charles Innes has said a great deal of what there is to be said to the lecturer about his lecture, but in the lecture itself Professor Pearn stated that the *Thakins* had really a desire to do something for the good of their country. I was nearly always in the districts in Burma and little in Rangoon, and it struck me that the vast majority of local self-government politicians were not out to do what they could for their country or their district but out to do what they could for themselves. It seems that until one can get unity of purpose into the local politicians and up higher into the provincial politicians it will be difficult for the Burmans to have the self-government they deserve.

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THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY

By COMMODORE J. T. S. HALL, C.I.E., R.I.N.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 22, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

THE subject of my lecture this afternoon is the Royal Indian Navy. I should like to give you a short description of what it has done and what it is doing.

Before talking about present-day developments I should like to give you a brief historical survey.

As you are probably aware, Queen Elizabeth granted a Royal Charter to the Honourable Company of Merchants Trading to the East Indies on December 31, 1600. The first two voyages of the Company's ships were to the East Indies; on the third voyage the *Hector*, Captain Hawkins, went to Surat.

Captain Hawkins went to Agra, arriving there on April 16, 1609, bearing a letter from King James to the Emperor Jehangir requesting permission to trade. Jehangir promised trading facilities, but the Portuguese, who were by that date well established in India, made it clear that they would resist any encroachment on what they considered their special preserves, and the Company's ships on their subsequent voyages to India were prevented from trading by the presence of the Portuguese in all the principal ports and the Portuguese fleet at Surat.

As a counter-measure the Company sent a squadron of four vessels—*Dragon*, *Hoseander*, *James* and *Soloman*—under the command of Captain Thomas Best, which arrived off Surat on September 16, 1612. This may be regarded as the foundation of the Indian Navy.

Best obtained a "firman" confirming Jehangir's permission to trade, and on September 29 the Indian Marine engaged in its first action with the Portuguese fleet, which had arrived to challenge their right to trade. A battle of several days' duration ensued, which, though not decisive, nevertheless left the British masters of the situation, and the Company's first "factory" was established at Surat.

Best remained on the west coast of India for three months without further challenge from the Portuguese and then sailed for Sumatra; the Indian Marine was then established, the Company having received permission to open other "factories" and to maintain a fleet of small craft known as "grabs" and "galivats" to protect the Company's commerce from the Portuguese and the pirates of the west coast.

Grabs were craft of about 300 tons mounting up to six nine- or twelve-pounder guns; galivats were smaller craft of up to 70 tons mounting six two- and four-pounders. They were manned by volunteer officers from

NOTE.—An acknowledgment is due to Commander G. E. Walker, R.I.N.V.R., from whose booklet, *Historical Background of the Royal Indian Navy*, I have quoted freely in the early part of this paper.

the Company's ships and Konkani fishermen, the first Indian employees of the Company.

Four of the Company's ships under Captain Downton arrived at Surat in 1614, and these ships, together with the grabs and galivats, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Portuguese fleet. The Emperor Jehangir was well pleased with the result of this action, for the Portuguese had been endeavouring to force him to break off relations with the English, and though powerful on shore Jehangir had no navy, and had therefore been at the mercy of the Portuguese at sea.

The Indian Navy has continued in existence ever since the arrival of Thomas Best's squadron in India. During the 330 years that have elapsed it has operated under various titles, and though at times it has been reduced to small proportions it has invariably been found necessary to maintain a sea service.

From 1612 till 1686 it was known as the Honourable East India Company's Marine; from then until 1830 it was the Bombay Marine; from 1830 to 1863 the Indian Navy; thence until 1877 again the Bombay Marine; from 1877 until 1892 His Majesty's Indian Marine; from 1892 till 1934 it was the Royal Indian Marine; and from 1934 onwards the Royal Indian Navy.

Almost continuous warfare was waged against the Portuguese from 1612 until 1630, when, following their defeat at Ormuz in the Persian Gulf in 1627, the Portuguese were again defeated at the third battle of Swally. Four years later a truce was declared, followed by a formal convention under which a limited number of the Company's ships were admitted to Portuguese ports.

On the marriage of Charles II to the Infanta Catherine of Braganza, the Portuguese ceded to Charles "the Port and Island of Bombay" as part of Catherine's dowry. In 1668 Bombay was leased by the Crown to the Company at a yearly rental of £10. Bombay was far superior to Surat as a port and soon replaced the latter as the Company's headquarters.

After settling its differences with the Portuguese the Marine turned its attention to the pirates. By this time the west coast of India and the Persian Gulf were happy hunting grounds for these gentlemen of fortune, and the rich "Indiamen" proved a lucrative source of profit. Among the most notorious were Captains Kidd, Avory and Chivers; they operated under British colours, which naturally led to misunderstanding.

Aurangzeb demanded indemnity from the Company for the depredations of the pirates, and when Avory took a Mogul ship with a cargo valued at 26 lakhs of rupees the Emperor threw the president and 63 of the Company's servants into prison. Thus encouraged, the Company took active steps against the pirates, both renegade British and native.

The most formidable of the west coast pirates were the Mahrattas, of whom the Angria clan was notorious. They held sway over the whole coastline and had no hesitation in attacking the Company's ships. The first outstanding success against the Angria pirates was won by Commander (afterwards Commodore Sir William) James when a convoy from Bombay to Tellicherry under his command was attacked by the pirates, who were repulsed with heavy loss.

Subsequently, in 1755, James, in conjunction with the Peshwa, attacked the Angria stronghold of Severndrug and reduced it. The following year a squadron of the Royal Navy under Admiral Watson arrived at Bombay, and the opportunity was taken to attack Gheria (Viziadug), the main base of the pirates. After a personal close reconnaissance by Commodore James, a combined Royal Navy, Bombay Marine and Mahratta force, with 1,400 infantry under Lieut.-Colonel Clive, carried out the attack, in conjunction with a Mahrattan army operating from landward, and reduced the fort, which had until then been considered as strong as Gibraltar and regarded as impregnable.

During the protracted wars with the French in the latter half of the eighteenth century Marine ships, serving with the Royal Navy under Admirals Boscawen and Pocock, fought in many engagements; they also took part in successful actions against Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas who were operating with the French. There were constant actions against French privateers, and when Holland was absorbed into the new republic the Marine assisted at the capture of Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies. Five of the Company's ships took part in the capture of Mauritius and eight in the reduction of Java in 1811.

The Marine next turned its attention to the Joasmi pirates, a powerful Arab tribe who had established themselves in the Persian Gulf with their headquarters at Ras-el-Khaima. At first the Company, in an endeavour to avoid hostilities, issued instructions to captains that they were not to attack the Joasmis but only to act in self-defence. The pirates soon took advantage of this state of affairs, and, sending a fleet to Sind and the Gulf of Kutch, captured twenty Indian ships. The Captain of the *Fury*, having beaten off a strong attack, was reprimanded for disobeying the Company's instructions not to "molest the unoffending Arabs." At last the depredations of the pirates compelled the Company to take action against them. Their force by this time comprised thirty-six large ships and eight hundred odd small ones manned by 19,000 men.

In 1809 a fleet of two of His Majesty's ships with ten Marine ships and four transports was sent to the Persian Gulf. This fleet cleared up Ras-el-Khaima, went on to Lingeh and carried out a cruise round the Gulf, destroying the pirate ships wherever they could be found and reducing fortifications.

In 1816 the Joasmis again became troublesome, and after the Company had suffered loss of merchandise worth well over 10 lakhs of rupees, a second expedition was despatched against them in 1819. This force consisted of three of His Majesty's ships and six of the Company's ships, together with eighteen transports, in which 1,600 British and 1,400 Indian troops were embarked. They were joined in the Gulf by three more of the Company's ships and a Muscat force of two frigates and 600 troops, while 2,000 Muscati troops operated from shoreward. This force destroyed Ras-el-Khaima, and the fleet then visited other Joasmi strongholds and reduced them all. Early in January, 1820, a treaty was concluded with the maritime Arab tribes, which was faithfully observed.

In 1824 war broke out in Burma in which the Company's ships played a prominent part. The main force comprised four of His Majesty's ships.

six of the Company's ships and twenty-three transports. There were also on the Arakan coast three of the Company's ships, eighteen brigs and schooners and twenty row-boats under Commodore John Hayes. The Company's paddle steamer *Diana*, the first steam vessel in Eastern waters (built at Kidderpore the previous year), was also present. The senior British naval officer was Captain Frederick Marryat.

In 1830 the title was changed to the Indian Navy; under the new title the Company's ships took part in the capture of Aden in 1839, the war with China in 1840 and operations against the Maori chiefs in New Zealand in 1845-46. In the second Burma War, 1851-53, a force of six Indian naval ships took part.

The Indian Navy next saw active service in the Persian Gulf in 1852-53, the naval side being provided entirely by the Indian Service. After preliminary operations to capture Bushire the force proceeded up the Shatt-el-Arab to attack the fortifications at Mohammerah. Here the Indian Navy distinguished itself conspicuously. Sir James Outram, the Commander-in-Chief, describing the action, wrote: "The gentlemen in blue had it all to themselves and left us naught to do."

About a century and a half ago many fine vessels were built in India, both for the Company's Marine and for the Royal Navy.

In 1670 Warwick Pett (a descendant of the great Elizabethan ship-builder Phineas Pett) arrived in India to build two ships and two brigantines for the Bombay Squadron of the Marine, and shipbuilding at Bombay started. Larger vessels were mostly built at Surat until 1735, when the Master Attendant persuaded a Parsee shipwright, Nusserwanjee Wadia, to go to Bombay, where a building yard had been established on the site of the present dockyard.

In 1754 the first dry dock was constructed, and shortly afterwards a wet basin was added. In 1775 Abraham Parsons wrote of Bombay: "It boasts such a dry dock as perhaps is not to be seen in any part of Europe, either for size or convenient situation. It has three divisions and three pairs of strong gates, so as to be capable of receiving and repairing three ships of the line at the same or separate times. . . ."

"Ships built at Bombay are not only as strong but as handsome and as well-finished as ships built in any part of Europe; the timber and plank of which they are built so far exceeds any in Europe for durability that it is usual for ships to last fifty or sixty years."

Another authority remarked: "It is universally admitted that a Bombay teak-built ship is 50 per cent. superior to vessels built in Europe."

In 1823 the first steamship, the Honourable Company's paddle steamer *Diana*, was built at Kidderpore, and in 1829 the steamer *Hugh Lindsay* was launched at Bombay. The latter made the first steamer passage from Bombay to Suez in 1830.

In 1830 a steam sloop of 705 tons and 250 horse-power was launched at Bombay, and in 1840 a steam frigate of 946 tons, 220 horse-power, mounting six eight-inch guns, was built, a second frigate being completed two years later.

In a little over a hundred years 115 men-of-war and 144 merchant vessels were built in the dockyard; these included four 84's and five 74's

for the Royal Navy, of which His Majesty's Ship *Ganges*, built in 1821, was still in use as a training ship well into the present century, and the *Asia*, launched in 1824, carried Sir Edward Codrington's flag at Navarino.

Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm wrote: "Tell my old friend Nowrojee what a glorious part the *Asia* sustained in the battle of Navarino and how proud I am of his success as a builder."

Nowrojee Jamshedjee Wadia, the head of the Parsee shipbuilding firm, died in 1860; as a mark of respect the dockyard was closed and vessels in the harbour half-masted their colours.

The last ship built by the Wadias was the *Navigator*, launched in 1881.

When the Indian Mutiny broke out in 1857 the Indian Navy formed a Naval Brigade of seventy-eight officers and seventeen hundred odd men. In these operations the Indian Navy won its highest awards—two V.C.s, one to Mr. Midshipman Mayo and the other to Mr. Acting-Master Chicken. Mayo's V.C. was subsequently presented to the Service, and is in the R.I.N. Mess at Bombay.

The Indian Navy's last active service was in the China War of 1860, in which eight of its ships were employed. After the Mutiny the Government of India was taken over by the Crown, and in 1863 the Honourable Company's Indian Navy was abolished, and a reduced service was re-formed as the Bombay Marine.

This period of eclipse lasted for fourteen years, after which Admiral Bythesea, V.C., reorganized it as His Majesty's Indian Marine. It was divided into Western and Eastern Divisions, with dockyards at Bombay and Kidderpore. Its duties were transport of troops and stores; maintenance of station ships at Aden, the Andamans, on the Burma stations and in the Persian Gulf; maintenance of gunboats on the Irrawadi and Euphrates; the Marine Survey and various miscellaneous duties, including the maintenance of Government vessels and launches.

In 1871 the Government purchased two coast defence vessels, the *Magdala* and *Abyssinia*, and in 1889 seven torpedo-boats were added to the strength; three years later two torpedo-gunboats were acquired. This force was manned by personnel partly from the Royal Navy and partly from the Indian Marine, and was commanded by a Captain of the Royal Navy.

The Indian Marine took part in the Abyssinian War of 1871, the Egyptian Campaigns of 1882 and 1885, the third Burma War of 1885 and the Chin-Lushai Expedition in Burma in 1889.

Its services were recognized when in 1892 Queen Victoria authorized its style to be changed to the Royal Indian Marine. Under this title it took part in the Suakin Expedition of 1896, the Expedition to Mkwelo (East Africa) in 1897, the Boer War, the Boxer War in 1900, and the Somaliland Expedition in 1902-04.

The Royal Indian Marine's next spell of active service was in the suppression of gun-running in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman in conjunction with the Royal Navy during the period 1909-14. The Naval General Service Medal was awarded for these operations.

The Royal Indian Marine took part in the first world war, 1914-18.

The three troopers *Dufferin*, *Hardinge* and *Northbrook* were converted into auxiliary cruisers and the station ships were employed as patrol vessels. *Hardinge* and *Dufferin* took part in the search for the *Koenigsberg* and *Emden* after the latter had bombarded Madras, and *Hardinge* was later in action in the Suez Canal when the Turks made their attack on Toosoum. The Royal Indian Marine was also represented at Dar-es-Salaam and in the operations in German East Africa.

Many ships and small craft were requisitioned or built, and the Service was represented in every Indian expeditionary force throughout the war. The largest of these was the Indian Expeditionary Force "D" to Mesopotamia, in which at one time as many as 500 officers and 13,000 ratings of the Royal Indian Marine were serving. This force distinguished itself at the Battle of Kurna, known as "Townshend's Regatta."

In the retreat from Ctesiphon the R.I.M.S. *Comet* and H.M.S. *Firefly* were detailed to cover the rear of the army; after a gallant fight both were severely damaged and had to be abandoned. The *Comet* was the only Royal Indian Marine vessel lost by enemy action during the war.

After the Great War, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe visited India and made recommendations concerning the reorganization of the Royal Indian Marine; a Flag Officer of the Royal Navy was appointed to command the Service and all appeared to be set fair. The next turn of the wheel of fortune, however, brought a severe reverse.

As a result of the Inchcape Committee in 1923 the Service reached its lowest ebb. The three troopships were sold out and the station ships were practically reduced to lighthouse tenders.

Failing to obtain what he considered a reasonable hearing from the Government, Rear-Admiral Mawby made the strongest protest a serving officer can make—he resigned his appointment as Director of the Royal Indian Marine and went home.

This strong line of action was followed by the appointment of a committee headed by Lord Rawlinson, then Commander-in-Chief in India, to re-examine the whole question. The naval members of this committee were Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, and Captain Headlam, Director of the Royal Indian Marine. There were also two civilian representatives of the Government.

The Rawlinson Committee recommended the complete reorganization of the Service as a combatant force, and an Indian Navy (Discipline) Bill was introduced for the new Service. The Bill was defeated in the Legislative Assembly by a single vote, not because the Legislature objected to a navy, but as a protest against the Government's policy towards the Indian coastal shipping question. The work of reorganization was nevertheless started in 1928 and the White Ensign was hoisted on board all Royal Indian Marine ships. The Bill on reintroduction six years later was passed, it received the Governor-General's assent on September 8, 1934, and the Royal Indian Navy came into being.

Unfortunately the following decade was a period of financial stringency due to the world economic depression, and in consequence all new measures were seriously delayed by restrictions on expenditure. Six of the eight trawlers built during the Great War were sold out of the Service and

little progress was made with the provision of new equipment which was so badly needed.

Two sloops were built during this period, His Majesty's Indian ships *Hindustan* and *Indus*, in 1930 and 1935 respectively. The former visited Australia to take part in the Victoria Centenary celebrations in 1934, and the latter remained in the United Kingdom to represent the Royal Indian Navy at the Jubilee Review. The *Indus* subsequently took the King's Colour out to India. The King's Colour was formally presented in India by the late Lord Brabourne, then Governor of Bombay.

H.M.I.S. *Indus* also represented the Service at the Coronation two years later.

In 1938 the headquarters of the Flag Officer Commanding the Royal Indian Navy was moved to Delhi, to be in close touch with the Government and the headquarters of the other two Services. Originally Naval headquarters returned to Bombay for the hot weather season; the move to Delhi was discontinued during the first two years of the war owing to lack of communication facilities, but in 1941 Naval headquarters was again transferred to the seat of Government, and this time the move was permanent.

There is now a well-organized headquarters staff equal to all foreseen demands. The command is exercised through a Flag Officer at Bombay, responsible for the west coast of India, and a Commodore Bay of Bengal for the east coast, and Naval Officers in charge at the major ports.

In 1938 the Commission headed by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield arrived in India to make recommendations concerning the three Services. Virtually all measures proposed for the Royal Indian Navy were accepted; formation of the reserves, which had been outstanding for many years, was started; the supply of essential equipment from the United Kingdom was agreed; and the construction of modern ships was authorized—all this on the eve of hostilities.

The situation at the outbreak of war was by no means satisfactory; expansion measures had barely been started and the Service was feeling the effects of the lean years. The Royal Indian Navy comprised five sloops, one surveying vessel (which was converted to a sloop) and two patrol vessels. The strength of personnel was approximately 2,000.

During the war the strength has been increased to about fifteen times the original figure, and now includes a number of modern sloops as well as many smaller ships designed for convoy-escort work, minesweeping and anti-submarine patrol; there are also a number of auxiliary vessels, coastal craft and landing craft.

The sloops were built in the United Kingdom, some of the fleet minesweepers were built in Australia, some in the United Kingdom and others in India. Most of the smaller vessels were built in India.

Of the officer personnel, about half are European and half Indian; ratings are 100 per cent. Indian. Recruitment is on an all-India basis, and men are drawn from all sections of the community.

The initial training of officers of the Royal Indian Navy is carried out in Royal Naval ships and establishments on exactly the same lines as the training of officers for the Royal Navy. On completion of their courses

for the rank of lieutenant the officers proceed to India, where they are required to qualify in Urdu. Subsequently, officers selected for specialist courses return to the United Kingdom and qualify in the appropriate naval establishments. Officers are also lent to His Majesty's ships for training from time to time to keep themselves fully acquainted with modern developments and practice.

The Royal Indian Navy, like other Services, expanded very rapidly in the early years of the war, and in consequence has suffered from a relatively low proportion of fully trained and experienced personnel. Every endeavour is being made to improve the standard of training and to overtake the deficiencies of the earlier war-years.

Training establishments for ratings have been brought up to date and fitted with modern equipment. New establishments have been opened to meet increased demands, and training is now on a firm basis.

There are two boys' training establishments at Karachi, where boy recruits are entered at 15½ to 16½ years of age, and undergo eighteen months' training ashore before going to sea to complete their "boys' time."

At Bombay there is a seamen's training establishment for special service seamen on entry and for advancement courses for higher ratings, and a mechanical training establishment where artificer and artisan apprentices are trained and engine-room ratings undertake courses of instruction. There are also separate gunnery, communications, torpedo and anti-submarine schools, where ratings are given specialized training for the various branches of the Service.

Coastal Force and Combined Operation Training centres have been set up to train the personnel of these sections, the latter in conjunction with the Army and Royal Air Force. Altogether there are sixteen establishments which accommodate about 4,000 naval ratings undergoing instructional courses.

Certain training facilities are also available for ratings of the Royal Navy serving in Indian waters.

All this expansion could only have been done with the goodwill and support of the Admiralty, and the Royal Indian Navy acknowledges a debt of gratitude to the Royal Navy for assistance in expert advice, help in training and the loan of qualified instructors in all branches of the Service. A number of experienced officers of the Royal Navy and Women's Royal Naval Service have been lent by the Admiralty for service at Naval headquarters, in the training establishments and at the bases.

I should like to say a few words about the Royal Indian Navy's activities in the present hostilities. It will be appreciated that 90 per cent. of naval service is monotonous routine patrol or escort duties without any high lights, and certain activities for obvious reasons cannot be mentioned, so it is not surprising that the part played by the smaller units of the Empire naval force does not get much publicity.

Nevertheless, His Majesty's Indian ships have served in most theatres of war other than the Pacific. They took part with the Royal Navy in the reduction of Mussolini's African Empire and had plenty of minesweeping in the Red Sea; one of His Majesty's Indian ships was first to enter Massawa.

Ships of the Royal Indian Navy took part in the capture of the Axis vessel at Bandar Shapur and other operations in the Persian Gulf; they have served in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, where two sloops took part in the invasion of Sicily.

His Majesty's Indian Ships *Jumna* and *Sutlej* were serving in Eastern waters when Japan entered the war. Both ships had plenty of thrills, and *Jumna* is believed to have been the last Allied ship to leave Batavia.

The Royal Indian Navy's most spectacular engagement was fought by one of the minesweepers when on her maiden voyage from Australia in company with the Dutch tanker *Ondina* in November, 1942. They were attacked by two Japanese raiders of 8,000 to 10,000 tons armed with a relatively heavy broadside of four five-inch guns. The spirited action which followed resulted in the sinking of the larger raider; the second, after torpedoing the *Ondina* and shooting her up, sheered off. The tanker, though severely damaged, managed to make port under her own steam, and H.M.I.S. *Bengal*, despite the odds, got off remarkably lightly.

These are only some of the notable exploits, but, as I have said, the vast majority of the work of His Majesty's Indian ships has been more or less uneventful convoy escort duty in the Indian Ocean, where in the early part of this year the Royal Indian Navy was providing about half the total escort force.

The coastal forces, including units of the landing craft wing, have been actively employed in conjunction with military forces ever since the Japanese occupation of Burma. They have carried out harassing operations on the enemy's lines of communication and fought many successful local actions.

Another branch of the Service which has put in a lot of useful work is the Signal Branch; it has built up a network of W/T communications in India and forms the Indian link in the Admiralty's world-wide system.

His Majesty's Indian Dockyard at Bombay has been greatly extended since the outbreak of war, and has worked throughout at high pressure repairing Royal Naval, Royal Indian Naval and Allied warships.

Mention must also be made of the Naval Wing of the Women's Auxiliary Corps, India. The members of the branch are doing excellent work in communications offices, secretarial duties and in the training establishments; anywhere, in fact, where they can release men for service afloat.

The war services of the Royal Indian Navy were recognized and a great honour accorded when His Majesty the King visited the sloop *Godavari* while she was attached to the Home Fleet. Another measure of recognition also much appreciated by the Service was the promotion recently of the first Royal Indian Naval officer to Flag rank.

On October 21 India celebrated its first Navy Day. General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief India, broadcast a tribute to the Royal Indian Navy. I should like to quote four brief passages from his broadcast. He said :

“The foundations of the Royal Indian Navy were laid three hundred and thirty-three years ago. . . .

“Since 1939 His Majesty’s Indian ships have been in action all over the Seven Seas. . . .

“I should like to see India becoming navy-conscious and sea-minded, as befits a great nation with a great length of coastline. . . .

“This matter of sea-power is all-important to the India of the future, and I hope this Navy Day will focus attention upon it. . . .”

These words very aptly sum up my paper and point out the future.

In concluding I should like to express the sincere hope that the Royal Indian Navy will never again be subjected to the short-sighted policy of disproportionate reduction in peace and hurried build-up in war. What is required, I suggest, is a small, well-balanced naval force of which India can justly be proud and which will form a useful and efficient unit of the naval forces of the Empire.

Lord HAILEY : It has been no less interesting to be reminded of the long history of the Indian Navy, under the various phases and vicissitudes to which it has been subject, than to learn at first hand of the position which it occupies since its recent reconstitution as the Royal Indian Navy and of the part it has taken in the present war. Its history recalls to us one of the predominant characteristics of the formation of our own Empire. Some others of the Great Powers have deliberately sought to extend their sphere of economic or political authority by an extension of their land frontiers. As a small but highly industrialized island people, we have been compelled to seek an expansion of our resources by overseas trade, and it has been the expansion of trade, rather than the extension of jurisdiction or political control, which has throughout been our first objective. That this has in the course of time involved us in the acquisition of overseas territories has been due rather to the force of circumstances than to any definite policy on our part; again and again, the acquisition of territory has been hesitating and reluctant, and there have been periods of our history when opportunities for acquiring new territory have been deliberately rejected as contrary to public policy.

But this scheme of things has only been possible on one condition—that we held predominance at sea, both in the provision of a mercantile marine and in the strength of our Navy. In turn, our naval predominance has had consequences which extended far beyond the safeguarding of our overseas trade. Since we did not utilize it primarily for aggressive purposes and did not, under the régime of Free Trade, even seek to secure by it an undue preference for our own commerce, it was for a long period one of the principal factors in guaranteeing world peace.

Now things have changed. We have failed to persuade the world of the value of a general régime of Free Trade; we no longer have the same supremacy at sea; and sea-power itself has found the need of a new ally in air-power. To-day the first problem in all our minds is security from aggression. But, as this war has shown us, sea-power is still a very important factor in achieving security, and it is this which gives significance to the growing attention which India is giving to the problems of naval defence. There was a time when for her the problem of defence centred

mainly on the security of her north-western frontier, and that tradition led her to develop a military force of whose record she and we can be justly proud. But if she is to occupy the position at which her rising spirit of national pride aims, then she must now develop an adequate naval strength. Here, as we have heard to-day, she has made a serious and a notable beginning; let us hope that it is the first stage in a process which will assist her not only to take her due place as a full partner in the Commonwealth but to make her own contribution to the maintenance of world order.

Admiral Sir HOWARD KELLY said that there was a strong reciprocal feeling of gratitude in the Navy for the valuable work done by the Royal Indian Navy; for their co-operation in the past in the Indian Ocean; for valuable surveys; and for their contribution in the present war in port defence and convoy work, minesweeping and other services which have lightened the burden of the Royal Navy in these waters.

The Commodore spoke of his hopes that the Royal Indian Navy would never again be allowed to fall below the necessary standard, but he must remember that from the close association of his Service with the Royal Navy he must expect to suffer from the old complaint of the Napoleonic wars :

“ God and the sailor we alike adore
When danger threatens, not before;
The danger past both are alike requited,
God is forgotten and the sailor slighted.”

Sir JOHN SHEA asked if the recruitment for officers for the Royal Indian Navy corresponded in any way to the recruitment and training of officers for the Army. He also asked about their training.

The LECTURER replied : Recruitment of subordinate officers of the Royal Indian Navy is carried out in India and in the United Kingdom. In India candidates are entered by the Federal Public Services Commission and in the United Kingdom through the Special Entrance Examination conducted by the Civil Service Commissioners. Recruits from both entrance examinations are trained in ships and establishments of the Royal Navy in exactly the same way as officers for the Royal Navy, and only return, or proceed, to India after they have completed their courses and passed for lieutenant.

This is not on the same lines as Army recruitment in India; in their case the entrance examination for officers has been suspended during the war.

Lord HAILEY asked if the recruitment for the Navy was on the all-India basis, and if it was possible to make men who had never seen a river, let alone the sea, into good sailors. Neither they nor their ancestors could have had any connection with sea-going people. What was the present composition of the Navy?

The LECTURER replied : Yes. Recruits are drawn from all sections of the community and from all parts of India. The only stipulation made by the recruiting authorities is that they must be prepared to conform to naval practice and mess from common galleys. Obviously in warships it is impossible to cater for different communities separately, and the men

have to live and mess together. Up to date this has worked quite satisfactorily.

It is perfectly true that many of the recruits have never seen the sea when they are recruited; nevertheless, they take to it quite readily and after completing their boys' training make first-class seamen. Men recruited under the special service entry scheme (a short-term measure to make good shortages occasioned by war expansion) are imperfectly trained on first proceeding to sea, but very soon shake down.

Mr. BYRT remarked that Jats from north of the Punjab were noted as pirates in the eighteenth century.

The LECTURER said that a large proportion of the recruits came from the Punjab, but no great number from farther north.

Mr. SHUTTLEWORTH remarked that he had been surprised to find a large number of Cutch Pathans as stokers on the liners. He asked how the pay in the Royal Indian Navy compared with that of merchant seamen both in peace-time and in war.

The LECTURER replied that the rate of pay in the Navy was below that in the Merchant Navy, especially in war-time, when merchant seamen are paid a large bonus. Certain allowances are paid to Service men to reduce the difference, but the result is still in favour of the Merchant Navy.

Colonel ELPHINSTON asked what proportion of Indians held commissions and what chance they had of rising to important commands and the Flag appointment mentioned in the lecture.

The LECTURER replied: The proportion of Indian to European officers is approximately fifty-fifty. Indian officers are now in command of the smaller ships, and have every prospect of reaching Flag rank when sufficiently experienced officers become available. Promotions to commissioned rank from the lower deck are now being made.

Sir JOHN SHEA asked if the Indian Naval officers were selected, if there was a competitive examination, and how long was their training with the Royal Navy.

The LECTURER replied: Yes, the entrance examination is competitive. Regular officers are trained up to the time of passing for lieutenant. The period varies, but is approximately three and a half years.

Captain BOWEN asked if Sikhs were allowed to wear their puggarees.

The LECTURER replied: Sikhs, both officers and ratings, are permitted to wear puggarees, but I must again emphasize that they use the same messes as other classes. This applies equally to the ratings' messes and the wardroom.

The CHAIRMAN regretted that there was no time for more questions and said that the Royal Indian Navy must never be allowed to slip back, and he thanked the Lecturer for making known the great progress which had been made during these last years of war.

THE FRONTIER PROBLEM: A SUGGESTED SOLUTION

Attention is drawn to the notice which states that contributors only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

WHAT, briefly, is the problem of the North-West Frontier Province of India? In as few words as possible, it is the problem of assimilating into one civilization a people who are alien to it in manners, custom, speech, and in everything else which distinguishes one civilization from another. Not only that, but the people in question live in a locality whose geography, in the broadest sense of the word, is utterly different from that of the land in which this alien civilization sprang up.

It may be necessary to justify some of these statements, not for those who know the Frontier Province—to them they are axiomatic—but for those who do not. The Pathans belong, in general, to a different branch of the Indo-European stock from most, if not all, other peoples in India. They are themselves a fairly obvious mixture of peoples, containing as they do the strongly Semitic type as well as the typically Caucasian. Their manners and customs are their own, undoubtedly influenced by other nomadic tribes with whom directly or indirectly they have come into contact in Central Asia. Their manners bear resemblances, often strong, to those of the wilder Persian tribes and of the Kurds. Their religion is their own easygoing variant of Islam. They are not fanatical on behalf of their religion, since they belong to Islam and have done so as far back as they can remember. In this they differ strongly from other Muslims in India, who, being converted to the faith any time in the last five hundred years, are consequently the more vigorously assertive on its behalf. This is true generally of all converts. To such an extent are Pathans easygoing in their religion that no ordinary stir was caused amongst them a few years back when the then Congress Ministry introduced the shariat as the basis of the law of inheritance instead of "riwaj." This, welcomed at first, caused much heartburning when it was found that under shariat women did have rights to inherit property!

The language of the Pathans, Pashto, is quite different from any of the other multitudinous languages spoken in the Indian Empire. This point is sufficiently brought out in Grierson's linguistic survey of the Indian Empire. It is worth while emphasizing here that Pashto, though only spoken in very small areas within the Indian Empire outside the North-West Frontier Province—and those areas adjoining the North-West Frontier Province—is not only the language of some millions in Afghanistan, but is now the national language of that country.

From the geographical aspect of the matter, the North-West Frontier Province is the outer fringe—the eastern and south-eastern fringe, one may say—of the Central Asian tableland which stretches northwards to the Oxus and westwards to the Mesopotamian plains; or if you take it on through Anatolia perhaps it would be true to say that it does not end till

the Balkans. Geologically, the formations on the Frontier bear marked resemblances to those in Iran and Afghanistan. Climatically, also, the Frontier differs from India. The monsoon itself never, or very rarely, reaches the Frontier, though its effects often do; Frontier weather is controlled much more by the winds which blow out of Central Asia and from even farther west, for it is an accepted fact that climatic influences generated in the Atlantic are often only extinguished after passage over the Mediterranean, the Near East and Iran, on the Frontier Province itself.

From all that has gone before, it will be seen that the Frontier Province in reality has its back to India—or if it can be said to face India at all it does so because it is easier to repel a thing by facing it. But every conceivable influence which affects men on this earth comes from the west in the case of the Frontier Province.

As was said at the start, the problem is how to make the Frontier Province face about, for that in so many words is the policy which has been followed on the Frontier Province in the last hundred years. Those responsible for it deny it vigorously, and will do so if they are, even if unconsciously, friends of Pathans. If they do, all they will be doing will be to deny that that was ever consciously their aim or ever consciously the aim of Government. But a survey of the past hundred years must show them that that has been the result. And of late years, nebulous and vague though policy has appeared, it seems to have been the avowed aim. In fact, since British influence entered the Frontier Province, there can only have been two periods when the contrary was averred—at the start by Edwardes and some sixty years later by Lord Curzon; but then all his good work has been undone by smaller men with an inability to grasp the noble vision he had. For Curzon looked west from the Frontier. Curzon, in establishing a separate Frontier Province under the direct supervision of the Government of India with a chosen band of administrators, was but starting to repair the damage to British interests caused some twenty years before over the Panjdeh incident.

It would be impolitic indeed at this time to suggest that Britain should now absorb an independent and friendly neutral neighbour. But there is plenty of room for an improvement in British relations and influence in Afghanistan. If Britain were to show to the Afghans, as she has in the Near East to the Arabs, that she can be a great and generous friend, is it unreasonable to suppose that Afghanistan herself might not once more wish to re-enter the British realm? Other countries, or parts of countries, in other parts of the world have considered such a step seriously at various times in our history, and even within the last forty years.

But Curzon's vision can never be attained so long as there is pressure, intended or unintended, apparent or hidden, put upon the blood brothers of the Afghans to enter a completely alien civilization. (In the same way, it may be remarked, is Britain's great prestige lowered in the Near East by, as Arabs consider it, her attempts to put Arabs in Palestine under an alien, non-British rule.) It is necessary, therefore, that the geographical and human facts be faced. The North-West Frontier Province must be administered under an entirely different set of concepts. No longer should it be thought of as part of India, as the Frontier Province of India, but

rather as British Central Asia. Politically the Frontier Province must be separated from India and the responsibility for its administration removed from the India Office. For reasons which will be made clear in what follows, it is suggested that the Colonial Office should henceforth be responsible. This would have to be done, since so long as India entered into Frontier Province affairs, so long would attempts be made to bring the Frontier back within India's complete control.

The form of administration suggested for the Frontier Province is that practised in many Colonial territories: Lord Lugard's gospel of indirect rule so warmly praised by Lord Hailey, himself a notable administrator in India. Indirect rule is, however, practised nowhere in India save in a halting and uncertain fashion in certain tribal areas, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere. And yet the whole structure of organization that the Pathans themselves have, or had, cries out aloud for it. Tribal consciousness is still strong on the Frontier, though unfortunately not so strong as it was, particularly in the administered areas. There is still, however, time to revive and strengthen it in those areas. Administration would then be on a strictly tribal basis; the larger tribes would deal through their *jirgas* and head men with Political Officers; sections of tribes and smaller tribes correspondingly with Assistant Political Officers; subsections and very small tribes with deputies. Tribes would be responsible entirely for law and order within their tribal areas and would maintain it by means of a semi-permanent militia force, organized on similar but perhaps less irregular lines to the existing militia scouts or Frontier Constabulary. Each tribal militia would be commanded by a commandant and several junior officers. The commandant would be responsible to the Political Officer. The Political Officer would be not only the local representative of the British Government (through a colonial administration centred at Peshawar, which will be described later) but would be the chief tribal executive officer. There is no reason why the two functions should ever be more than very occasionally irreconcilable. The local administration of Education, Justice, Health, Public Works, and so on would be the responsibility of the tribes themselves, but the local executive officials in those departments would be subordinates of the Political Officer in his capacity as chief tribal executive officer.

The colonial administration in Peshawar would be a small technical secretariat designed to spare individual tribes the labour and expense of each maintaining large technical and research staffs. It would also handle communications between the Colonial Office and individual Political Officers.

No word has yet been said of the composition of the administrative services. The educational, judicial, and technical services would be provincial services; recruitment would be from all Pathans as well as from British subjects in the United Kingdom. The service responsible for providing Political and Militia Officers would be a unified service, officers being interchangeable, and would be recruited from the Pathans and from the United Kingdom, but with as high a proportion of Pathans as the quality of Pathan candidates coming forward would be able to offer. The conditions of service would be similar to, it is hoped better than, the

existing Indian Political Service on the Frontier. Recruitment would take place for Pathans in Peshawar and for British subjects in the United Kingdom, and every endeavour would be made to obtain as high a standard of officer as possible.

The secretariat would be manned by this service and by the various technical services. The only officer in the secretariat who would not be, or have to have been, a member of a Frontier service would be the Chief Political Officer or Governor. But it is recommended that until there is a decent leavening of Pathans in the administration as a whole, it would be advisable to appoint a senior Political Officer as Governor.

Three important matters have not yet been considered. They are (1) of the non-Pathan minorities, (2) the defence of India, (3) finance.

The non-Pathan minorities would be encouraged to return to the land whence they came, for the greater part of these minorities consists of money-seeking immigrants from India. Those that elected to stay would have to submit to full tribal discipline. It is appreciated that there are also homogeneous non-Pathan populations within the Frontier as at present constituted—and likewise Pathan populations without. No difficulties whatever are presented by boundary alterations along quite obvious lines, and in one or two cases an exchange of population might be advisable. For example, the non-Pathan population of Hazara might well be moved out, for Hazara is an integral part of the Frontier Province from a geographical point of view. Here the position of Swat and Chitral may be mentioned. The first two are largely Pathan states and will obviously fit consistently into the scheme of things. Chitral is not a Pathan state, but has such affinities with the Frontier Province in all other respects—certainly far more than it has with India—that it should continue to form a part of the Province. It is recommended also that the Gilgit Agency should also enter the Frontier Province, which would be rounded off in the south by the loss of parts of the D.I.K. district and the addition of the Zhob and Loralai Agency of Baluchistan.

The defence of India has hitherto relied upon advanced strong-posts in the North-West Frontier Province. It is submitted that attack from the north-west is in effect a bogey that by this time ought to be dismissed from the minds of sensible people. If ever attack on anything more than a tribal scale is to develop against India, surely modern equipment rules the North-West Frontier Province effectually out as a way of entry. And if attack be on a tribal scale it can be countered by efficient tribal militias. But if the danger is still considered real, it is suggested that the existing Pathan units of the Indian Army be formed into a small regular force to be maintained by His Majesty's Government in the existing advanced posts, officered by Britons and Pathans. A contribution would of course be payable to His Majesty's Government by the Government of India equivalent to the cost of troops saved by the latter Government, reckoning it in peace-time terms at roughly an army corps.

The last thorny problem is finance. Some reference has been made to this in the preceding paragraph, and it can be appreciated that His Majesty's Government is likely to be the winner on the deal there mentioned. Generally speaking, the North-West Frontier Province would be in a state

of permanent deficit for some years to come. This was recognized, of course, in the Government of India Act of 1935 and appears to have been considered as no bar to its existence as a separate Province, for under that Act there is a subvention of one crore of rupees from the Government of India for the administered territories alone; it must be very much greater, probably twice as great, considering the Province as a whole. It would be right for the Government of India to continue to pay at least part of this in order to be quit of its responsibility, but in addition there is the comparatively new Colonial Development Act. No longer must a colony balance its budget; at last it has been recognized that some colonies never will be able to, within any foreseeable period, and at the same time be able to develop their resources and provide their people with a decent standard of living.

It is suggested that a Frontier Province in the hands of Pathans and Pathan-loving administrators would have its resources developed to a far greater extent than formerly. For instance, oil; there are probably more curious stories about oil than about any other commodity, but there is at least one which alleges that the interests holding the concession in the North-West Frontier Province do not develop it, despite the known existence of oil, on the grounds that another field elsewhere is more efficient than the North-West Frontier Province field is likely to be. That is understandable as things are at present and taking the merely commercial point of view, but once the Frontier Province is a separate entity the oil resources will be developed for the benefit of the Pathans themselves. There are other subjects too: merino rams have been suggested as the ideal herd for the Waziristan hills; Major Sir Benjamin Bromhead has suggested the damming of the *nala* for irrigation purposes, or the employment of Pathans on clearing out the accumulated silt every few years, instead of on the useless blackmail of khassadari. And, finally, there is reforestation. Many writings and the memories of old men tell of the destruction wrought upon the trees on the Frontier hills since the coming of the British.

All these matters can form the subjects of development on a big scale, and there are good grounds for assuming that before a generation has passed the Frontier Province would find itself largely self-supporting on the basis of an improved Pathan standard of living (not of course on a European standard—but is that ideal?).

In all this the Pathan would work as an equal with his British colleagues. From the point of view of character we have nothing to teach him now; it is in technical and other matters that he lags behind.

That is the problem answered and the solution found. It is no new solution; merely new in its application in this area.

UNDER THE BORDER

BY REX

HAVE you seen?

Patches of green
down in the valleys—and terraced on slopes;
brown water, pierced with tenderest shoots;
sad oxen, ploughing chocolate strips.

Tongas full-laden; gipsies in camp;
tea-shops and dogs, villagers, flies;
District Board Hospital;
sheep, donkeys, cattle—lean as a lath;
camels and goats.

Camping-ground. Airfield.
Scrub on the hills; boulders and razor-backs;
peasants on donkeys; peasants on foot.
Blockhouses.

Rough-hewn headstones;
rags fluttering above the graves.
Milestones in white.
Hairpin bends; buses stalled on the hill;
convoy of lorries, fifteen to the mile;
camels, with timber loads spanning the road.
Telephone wires, purposeful, straight.

Women, head-burdened, fresh from the well.
Youth sitting piping, watching the flock.
Flocks by the rain-pond; hut thatched with mud.
Torrent and stream-bed; steel bridge—and stone.

Distant blue mountains; wind fresh and clean.
Police on a hillock, shade-roofed by grass.
Meandering tarmac, fringed with white stones.
Stunted acacia; flat-roofed serai.

Vista from hill-top, wide-spread but drab.
Stream winding back 'neath the road.
Tonga abandoned—horseless, forlorn.
Red flags and road-gangs.
A straight for a mile.
Avenued shade.

Rain-channelled humps of red Devon soil;
strata up-ended; grey jagged rocks.
Tribesmen, with rifles slung on their backs.

Down from the barren pass. Bush-dotted plain.
 Glimpses of snow—how far away?
 Torrent-carved fissures, writhing like snakes.
 Twenty to Bannu; sixty Kohat.

Towers in a village, telling of pillage and feud.
 Ochre red-scarred, on hillside and cliff.
 Wide sandy river-bed, patchy with damp;
 mud and a water-splash.
 Poles set in concrete, four-stayed, long-spanned;
 two wires departing to village unseen.

Two men on bicycles—soldiers on leave?
 Water-cart standing empty, unused,
 while women fill pots, zinc pots, from the mud.
 Road-block, diversion, bridge shored for repair.
 Stones lying, idly left on the road—
 wheel chocks, or child's play?—nobody knows.

R.A.F. convoy, clouded in dust.
 Four-square mud-fortress; barbed wire and police.
 Trees hacked and gnarled, o'er-shading the road.
 Thorn-bushes, sedges, seas of green grain.

Women in colours; women in drab.
 Date-palms and trees; pink blossoms and white.
 A Bren gun, carrier-borne;
 mules, troops and horses, both sides of the road.

Camels with logs, with long trailing rushes
 sweeping the ground, and fat loads of *bhussa*
 and brushwood. Old man with an axe.
 Sugar-cane; bullock-cart—first in two hours!
 Then streets—a cantonment—bungalows—flowers!

THE VILLAGE WELFARE SERVICE IN LEBANON, SYRIA AND PALESTINE

By DR. STUART C. DODD

(Professor of Sociology at the American University, Beirut.)

THE Village Welfare Service was started at the American University of Beirut in the early nineteen-thirties. While many factors contributed, as always in social movements, to the development of this service, a few influences were outstanding. As the result of the survey of the Near East Relief in 1926, published in the volume *The Near East and American Philanthropy*, the Near East Foundation was formed to bring scientific methods to bear upon the rural districts of the Near East. The Foundation set up in 1930 at the University of Beirut an Institute of Rural Life, one of whose projects was to co-operate with the Department of Education of the Government of Palestine in training village schoolmasters in leadership for all-round village progress, as described below. Another project was to loan professionally trained leaders to the Village Welfare Service as it got into its stride.

For several years before the Village Welfare Service was organized as a society, the Department of Sociology at the University had been taking groups of students to the villages during the vacations to make surveys and to conduct controlled experiments.*

In the summer of 1933 two teams of students worked in the Ramallah and Safad districts of Palestine. In 1934 a camp at Jibrail in Northern Lebanon was established, and the next year a permanent rural centre in the Beka'a was started. A flourishing camp near Aleppo and another in a village near Damascus followed. The Damascus camp was notable for being conducted entirely by Damascenes, both men and women; wives and sisters of the men volunteered, at first returning to the city every night, but before the end of the summer camping in tents in one community. Although almost entirely Moslem, this camp, which was visited by members of the Syrian Cabinet and large numbers of other national leaders, received nothing but praise, and no word of criticism for this pioneer project in co-education.

By the summer of 1940 a group in Palestine were organizing their own camps; the Transjordan students, with the blessing of the Amir, had organized a camp near Amman; and there were two camps planned for Syria and two for the Lebanon. Unfortunately, the fall of France and the tightening of war restrictions throughout the area necessitated the cancelling of most of these camps; only that in the Beka'a has continued with its full vigour throughout the war.

The Village Welfare Service had a twofold purpose. The first was to contribute to all-round rural development—in better health, in increased income through agricultural improvements, in higher status for women,

* A full description can be found in *A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in Syria*, by Stuart C. Dodd: Social Science Series, American University of Beirut, 1934.

in education and in recreation. The second purpose was to inspire the educated *élite* in the Arab world to take the responsibility and leadership in this rural progress on behalf of the backward and depressed 80 per cent. of the population living in the villages.

The programme of the Village Welfare Service was built largely at first round vacation camps in the villages. Each camp would enlist a group of volunteers from the students and professionally trained leaders in medical, agricultural, educational and domestic professions. The students would work under the direction of a doctor and nurses upon whatever health problems were most urgent and accessible in the villages near the camp. It might be trachoma treatment, or purifying the village water supply, or installing latrines, or controlling malarial-mosquito breeding if this did not require elaborate engineering effort. Other students would work under the agricultural specialist in teaching how to spray against some insect pest, or how to make beehives, or how to prune and tend the orchard. The women students would hold classes for mothers and girls, demonstrate how to bathe and care for the baby and organize contests to increase various domestic crafts. A campaign against illiteracy, with a specially prepared primer for adults, backed by standardized tests to measure increasing proficiency in reading, would be undertaken by other students. The boys of the village would be assembled for boy scout training, and for organizing volley-ball and other sports involving team work. The team work was consciously used as a uniting technique in the village by getting members of different feudal factions, or Moslems and Christians, or previously irreconcilable elements to play together in the same team. In more than one village a volley-ball game against a neighbouring village team brought together on speaking terms for the first time in many years the two factions in one village, who joined in common enthusiasm in applauding the team of their village comprising the children of both factions.

The usual programme included getting the village together to adopt some project for its own improvement on which the students could work with the villagers. Thus one village chose to install a long-needed road, and students and villagers joined in digging it. Another village elected to plant an olive grove on its common land; another, to free itself from malaria; another, to organize a marketing co-operative; another, to establish a night school towards eliminating illiteracy. The aim was to leave the village with a committee of its own leaders continuing to work upon some project chosen by the villagers themselves, without the inveterate independence on government initiative which is so deep-rooted in the East.

At the camps men and women students would study in organized classes the problems of the villages, and the methods which had been found successful in solving similar problems in Denmark or India or elsewhere. In the afternoons they engaged in field-work, going out in teams to neighbouring villages on foot or by bicycle or car. In the evenings when there was not a *sahra* (social meeting) or mass meeting of the village for pictures, talks and general stirring-up of community spirit, the students would invite a visiting lecturer for discussion on one of a series of village problems round the camp-fire.

Towards cultivating rural leadership among the college students, the preparation for these camps was put in the hands of the students: during the academic year money had to be raised for the camps, programmes planned, volunteers enlisted and trained, equipment collected and local contacts made. Part of the work was to secure Government co-operation, and to arrange visits from Cabinet Ministers, newspaper reporters and others who, by catching the vision, could spread the movement more widely and deeply through the Arab public.

A good example of what the Village Welfare Service was sometimes able to achieve is shown in the following anecdote. Afif Tanus, who had received special training for this service at the American University of Beirut, was seconded for some years to the Government Department of Education in Palestine, and it was largely owing to the initiative and energy of this able young Lebanese that the Village Welfare Service in Palestine advanced so rapidly.

The District Officer of Beisan, in Northern Palestine, had a problem. He had brought several thousand olive trees from the Department of Agriculture to the village to be planted on part of the public land. The villagers wanted olive groves on their treeless hills, and also badly needed the income that would accrue therefrom; but they refused to plant the seedlings. The District Officer had tried persuasion, he had even tried the police; but all to no avail. Then someone suggested borrowing Afif Tanus from the Department of Education, as he was acquiring a reputation for stirring villagers into unaccustomed activities for their own betterment.

Tanus accordingly came and talked with village leaders and Government officers, and very soon realized that the difficulty was neither ignorance nor lethargy, but an ancient village feud whereby each of the two factions was afraid to plant the seedlings until they were sure the other faction would not get control of the project. So Tanus called a meeting of all the village property owners and leaders at the local guest-house. Over tobacco and coffee the project was presented to the villagers in glowing terms, but in reply they made excuses that olive trees would never grow in their district, or Allah would have planted them long ago; that they knew little about cultivating olives, and in any case the olives might be wormy.

By midnight Tanus realized that something dramatic must be done to break the deadlock. He decided to risk an appeal to Arab traditions in a somewhat novel form. He rose in the council, wrapping his *abba* about him to signify the meeting was at an end. As impressively as possible he summarized the discussion with the statement that he and the other Government officers had come to the village as guests trusting the traditions of Arab hospitality, and bringing with them from the Government the gift of these olive seedlings and future wealth. Now the village had rejected the gift of their guests and had thus violated the ancient honour of the Arabs. He would therefore pronounce a curse upon the village! Hereafter its people and their children, and their children's children, should be known throughout the length and breadth of the land as the face-blackeners who had blackened the faces of their guests by refusing their gifts. Wherever anyone from the village went abroad, all would point the finger

of scorn at him, as if branded with the brand of Cain, as belonging to the village that was unworthy in the sight of all Arabs. As soon as he (Tanus) and his colleagues should have shaken the dust of the village from off their feet on leaving it, forthwith this curse would descend upon the village! Immediately the meeting was in an uproar with dismay and consternation on all sides. They implored him not to leave them and bring the curse on them. He replied that early in the morning he would leave the village, and left the room.

Before the meeting Tanus had arranged with the village schoolmaster to mobilize before dawn all the boys carrying their picks and shovels, together with the town-crier. The crier went through the village announcing that no one was to do his normal work in the village that day. No man was to go to the fields, no woman was to bake bread, no child was to go to school. Let everyone assemble in the market square. Everyone assembled, led by a parade of the schoolboys with their teacher, Afif Tanus and the Government representatives. In the square the people expected further speech-making; instead, Tanus took up a pick, went off to the site chosen for the grove and started to dig. That an *effendi* from the Government, their guest, should do their manual work was unthinkable—a shame to the village. Accordingly the headman must needs take the pick from Tanus' hands, whereupon Tanus took another, and kept feeding picks out into the hands of the leading elders who thus, in spite of Arab custom, found themselves at work. Then he organized the affair, urging them to complete the planting before sundown, and assigning all on one side of a boundary line to one faction, and all on the other side to the other faction, and challenging each faction to be the first to get their quota planted. With the music of Arab tribes going forth to war being played by a couple of young men, all the village was presently busily at work planting olive seedlings, and Tanus departed to the next village on his daily business.

A check-up later showed that a high percentage of the seedlings had taken, and the village was greatly pleased with the project. But more significant still, the new spirit in the village was shown by such remarks as, "Now that the olives are planted, what shall we do next?" The above incident was one of many in the work done by Afif Tanus, a Lebanese village boy who graduated from the University with the ideal that rural progress must be the foundation of all Arab independence and development. He is perhaps one of the best examples of that part of the Arab youth who believe in the same ideal and express it in action through the **Village Welfare Service**.

CHILD NATIONS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PEOPLE OF PAPUA

By EVELYN CHEESMAN

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 8, 1944, the Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.M.G., in the Chair.

I MUST begin by correcting a wrong impression. I am not an anthropologist nor an ethnologist, nor even a psycho-analyst, and therefore I am not really qualified to speak on this subject at all. But I gather that I may expect some leniency from an audience which is willing to accept New Guinea as being in Central Asia! I want to touch on some points of everyday philosophy which I have adopted as a result of being among Papuan Melanesians when I was in New Guinea collecting specimens for the Natural History Museum.

First I want to give you an idea of the people themselves. They are of very many tribes and with quite different cultures, but it can be said that they are people either of the sea or of the mountains. The people themselves have this definition; it is to be found in their languages. In Netherlands New Guinea the Malay words are used, "the people of the sea" and "the people of the mountains," and in pidgin English, "man belong big water" and "man belong mountain."

When one is employing native labour one has to be very careful not to put the people of the sea together with the people of the mountain or the forest. They must be allowed to build their separate huts, otherwise there will probably be bloodshed before morning. The people of the sea come from small villages on the coast or over the water, where the village streets are just platforms between the houses. The people build all their huts from local materials and do not move far away from their localities. They have everything on the spot. In their building they do not use hammer and nails, but strips of bark. Some of these villages have only one track leading inland into a sago swamp; that is all they need in the way of roads.

In Netherlands New Guinea the sea people have a different way of building their houses, learned from the trading Malays. I went to one of these villages by water and asked for an empty house. They had one, but a number of piles had been left sticking out of the mud where an old house had fallen down, and my "boys" could not get a canoe near. The village people asked me to wait while they sent for all the strong men of the village; because we could not get the canoe to the house they pushed the house to the canoe, and I was able to enter it. This is an example of the type of building.

The children from infancy are taught the lore of their locality. They learn all about the living things to be found there and all the landmarks. The consensus of opinion among those who have observed them is that the Papuan can be taught until he is eight years old; after that it is more difficult for him to learn anything. But until the child is eight or nine he

is constantly being taught by his elders and is learning something new or practising the old lore every day. Not only do the children have to learn about their locality but also about the surrounding ghosts—which are the friendly ghosts and which are the hostile; the friendly ghosts belong to their own tribe or village and the others to hostile tribes. The result of all this education from babyhood is to give the child a knowledge of its surroundings and implant tribal superstitions. The people are not animists; their “ghosts” are always “revenants” of important mortals who have lived and died among them.

The highway of these people is the sea. Some of them hardly use the land at all, and as soon as the little boys learn anything at all they are taught to paddle. In some tribes it is strictly forbidden for women to get into a canoe unless it is entirely paddled by men. From the beginning these boys have to learn all they can about managing canoes, and in some of the tribes toy canoes are made for their small boys. From the age of four the children get into a canoe, in the shallows near the coast, and learn to manage it. They not only learn about canoes, but also the vagaries of wind and weather; they can read the sky and the seas and know what changes of weather are coming.

Even on this last trip of mine I was astonished by one exhibition of their knowledge. I had some very good canoe boys, and on one occasion I wanted to go down the coast a little way. But the boy asked me whether I would wait, because he wanted to sail, which is much less difficult than to paddle; although there was not a breeze that morning, if I waited a short time there would be a favourable wind. We waited about twenty minutes, and then he rowed directly out from the shore, waited a few more minutes, the wind got up, and put us where we wanted. I asked him how he knew that that particular wind would arise in a certain spot, whether it was anything in the sky, and his answer was “No.” I suggested that perhaps every day at that time the wind got up at that same place, but he said it blew differently every day. He was puzzled himself how he had made the observation; it was purely instinctive.

In some instances the women of the tribe are allowed to go fishing. At one place the women did all the fishing; they were very stalwart dames, and could manage the canoes alone. It was only when families had no womenfolk available that men were allowed to manage the canoes, and it was amusing to see the women chaffing them when their daily catch was small.

One is impressed by the entirely different conception which the white people have of a particular place from that which is entertained by the natives. Take, for example, the swamp. Looked at from above it is a beautiful piece of vegetation, but to the white person it is a most disagreeable place through which to pass, with its pools of liquid mud. Every step has to be sounded beforehand with a stick, for it may be ankle-deep or over one's head. Moreover, it smells horribly, is full of mosquitoes, not to speak of other beasts like crocodiles and snakes. But for the natives it is full of interest. The women go there to find material for the making of baskets, the children are interested in the crabs and fish only to be found in those swamps. To the native the swamp is a source of very rich

material, and their conception of it is entirely different from that of white people, who will avoid the swamp if there is any other way round.

The children of the sea tribes know all the creatures that can be found in the water, and they have names for every fish and mollusc as well as for every plant and tree. I was very much struck not long ago by what I was told by an Australian scientist. He thought he knew all about the fishes in this part of the world, because most of the fish off the New Guinea coast are the same as those of Australia. He had in particular studied one species and had declared that the male fish was blue and the female brown. The people of New Guinea, on the other hand, declared that the blue fish had a red wife. All the time that he was living there he disputed this, because he was going by the anatomy of the fish and looked upon their knowledge as superficial. But when he got back to his laboratory and was revising his group he discovered some character which he had ignored before and which proved that the blue fish had a red wife, as the Papuans had said. He had been confusing two species. Whenever we use natives for hunting and collecting we do well to listen very carefully to what they have to say, because very often they can give quite good information on points like these.

On the coral reef in the pools there are myriads of sea anemones and little fish and crabs. The people of the sea get as much pleasure in going through the pools and seeing what they contain as our own people get in going to Woolworth's, only this is better than Woolworth's because every turn of the tide brings in flotsam and jetsam to these pools, which therefore have a greater variety of stock than any shop can ever boast.

These people of the sea have names for every little rock, every inlet and bay. Not only are they familiar with all the features of their own locality, but they are themselves interwoven with those features in a manner which we westerners find it difficult to understand. They react to these things and depend upon them in a way which we may be able to realize but which we have never experienced. If the people of the sea are taken inland and placed in quite different surroundings some of them are terrified. They are afraid of the unfamiliar. A few adventurous spirits will get over it, but others will mope for their ordinary surroundings, and may do so to such an extent that they fall ill and even die. They have been transplanted into some quite new surroundings and are unable to survive the transplantation. If some hired boys are not doing well, not interested in their work, and appear to be slack, then, supposing they are quite healthy and have not got fever, it is much better to send them back at once to their own village in case they fall ill and die.

We come now to the people of the forest who live in little communities. A community of which I am able to show photographs started with just one pair and has reached three generations. They were very much afraid of me, and it was some time before the men could persuade the women to come out and join them in the group for the photograph. These people are as versed in forest lore as the people of the sea in their own lore. In the larger mountain villages there may sometimes be a thousand people. One such community, a hunting tribe, was the healthiest tribe I have ever come across, and busy all day long. Every time they went into the

forest they found something new to interest them. But on one occasion they were sent down to the coast, and as they approached the sea they were quite miserable. They did not stay near where they had to work by the sea, but would go a long journey inland and camp among the trees, and every Sunday when they came home they were like children released from school.

The hunting lore of these men was quite interesting. One man would know when grass had been disturbed by the passage of a kangaroo. He was wonderfully in touch with all the various creatures that lived in his locality. But, of course, for these people the forest was densely inhabited by ghosts. They may hear noises in the trees which can readily be explained by natural causes, but they will tell you that it is the talking of ghosts. On one occasion I pointed out that the noise was made by two boughs which were creaking every time the wind blew, and they could see this for themselves, but considered that a hostile ghost was using this means to make its voice heard.

These people know all the very great variety of trees by name, all about the different timbers, and can tell which are useful for building, for firewood and for various other purposes. Sometimes when I wanted particular leaves to rear caterpillars I would tell them to go into the forest and bring some more leaves from that same tree. Very rarely indeed did they make any mistake. If a mistake was made the rest of the tribe would laugh at the boy who made it.

In one part of the forest, reputed to be haunted by certain supernatural beings, women always go about three together. There were no hostile people among the villagers, and there was no danger as distinct from fancied dangers, but children went about in crowds and even men would not move without their spears for protection. I found that it was the best policy for me to believe in ghosts as well. If you say to them, "This is nonsense; white people know better," they will shrug their shoulders and seem to agree, but will say no more. But if you encourage them to talk about these things, then you are made aware as soon as anything is going wrong. A boy may become ill, and if the others talk freely to you they may confide in you that he is the victim of a feudal quarrel with the ghosts of some other tribe which happen to haunt that locality. It will be well if you send that boy home, lest a worse complication arise. Occasionally my boys will say, "This is a very bad place. Many bad ghosts here. Now we shall have to walk on tiptoe. We must not rustle the leaves or crack the twigs." I say to them, "Very well, go ahead," and do as they suggest. But if I were to snub them I should hear no more and then the next time something went wrong I should not have been informed of what had occurred.

In my camps on high ground, men from the neighbouring villages would bring their small children to have a geography lesson. From one camp we had a very good view of two or three lakes and of country extending over a distance of sixteen or seventeen miles. I learned a great deal myself on these occasions from what the men taught these youngsters about the mountains. I learned more than the names of the physical features. Every mountain had some mythical monster living there, all

these monsters had names, and the children had to learn of their existence.

In this lore of the forest as well as in the lore of the sea we find that the people are not only familiar with everything in the landscape, but they are actually in contact with those things in a way which we cannot understand. Just as the sea people are miserably taken up into the mountains, so these mountain people may fall ill and die if they are taken to the sea. When they are transplanted the change in their condition is so sudden and complete that it seems to have cut off all their interest in life, and their joy when they come back again to their surroundings is unmistakable. It is true that there are some more adventurous spirits who like exploring, but it is necessary to watch over them all the time.

From their babyhood the children are instructed in fear—fear of the supernatural, fear of things which do not exist. One can detect the fear in the faces of these children, the signs of apprehension; the little wrinkled faces make them look like old people. They do not play; they look around and listen; they grow up with this fear as part of their lives. We cannot eradicate these superstitions. The life of the native is bound up with them. The tales which he has been told since he was a child are part of his mentality. He believes implicitly in supernatural powers.

An interesting episode was quoted by the late Governor of Papua, Sir Hubert Murray. He had before him a boy—of course, a full-grown man, probably about twenty-five years of age—who had murdered a sorcerer. Sir Hubert set himself to find out the cause of the murder. It was because the man imagined that the sorcerer had killed his little girl, who had fallen ill and died. He attributed this to the sorcerer and considered that he must have cast an evil eye upon the child or have said some of his incantations over her. There are no natural causes of death according to the Papuan, except perhaps old age. Directly anyone is ill or dies the misfortune is attributed to some supernatural agency, and nothing will eradicate this belief. Sir Hubert Murray said to this man, "But you have been with the missionaries the whole of your life. How can you say such a thing as this? You know that there is no evil power which this man you murdered could have possessed." The man replied, "I would like to think like that, but what could I do? My child died!" That was to him the proof that some supernatural agency had been at work, and nothing that the white man could tell him impressed him when he was up against such a stark reality as his child's death. It is upon this that it is so difficult to make any impression. One Papuan I knew actually died of fright because he thought he had seen a ghost.

New Guinea is 1,300 miles long and the British Isles would fit into it three times over. A good half of it, which at present, of course, is overrun by the Japanese, belongs to the Dutch. The remainder is our responsibility. Nobody knows exactly what the population is, for there are still unexplored parts of New Guinea. The Papuan is extremely primitive. We describe him as having the Stone Age mentality. He learns chiefly by mimicry. It is of no use trying to explain things to him. For example, such a very small thing as tightening or loosening a screw cannot be taught them by words; the only way to make them understand is to let them imitate you. I discovered that they had words for the left

hand and the right hand in their own language and took the trouble to learn the words, and told them, "Remember, if you turn the screw towards the right you are making it tight, and if you are turning it to the left you are making it loose." It was of no use; they said that they could not do two things at once. But after they have watched a few times they will learn to do it and will not forget. Some of the boys are very intelligent. One boy I knew was running a store for his master, who was a miner and was away for weeks on end. This boy would add up the accounts every night in English and order things when needed. But if you examine how that boy learned at first you realize that it was only by mimicry. The people have an excellent memory and they enjoy doing some of their work.

An interesting thing about the Papuans is that there is no record of a single case of insanity. It is true that they sometimes run amok during a hysterical attack. They do not usually attack white people, so they know what they are doing. Somebody will be suddenly told, "Your boy had gone crazy and has killed So-and-so." What the miners and planters do under these circumstances is to follow him up and say severely, "Give me your knife," or axe, or whatever the weapon may be which he has in his hand. He gives it up quite meekly and the mood is over. But natives can work themselves up into violent fits of temper. One interesting case I had the last time I was in Dutch territory. A Papuan was being trained among Javanese police and they were teasing him, telling him he was a barbarian. One day he got a gun and let it off, which led to a great scene, everybody running away screaming. The boy was caught and brought before the court, and all this story came out. It was simply due to the fact that he had been teased by the Javanese. What was interesting about it was that when this Papuan saw the people screaming and running away he was quite satisfied. His prestige, which had been hurt, was now restored. He had reached a point where he could not bear any more, but it completely satisfied him to have made this demonstration. He was not vindictive, not even interested when they told him that he was not blame-worthy but that the other men who had teased him were to be punished. He kept repeating, "They all ran away," which seemed to give him very great satisfaction.

There is one Government experiment which has met with very great success among these people—namely, the establishment of native constabulary. When we acquired the territory of Papua in 1884 a system of teaching the natives to be police was established. It is the first step towards their own government and has proved a great success. The late Governor, Sir Hubert Murray, brought it to perfection. The regular police are taught to do patrol work. They go out with the patrol officer and bring people to justice. They do all that they are told. Sometimes in a difficult position the officer has to tell them to fire in self-defence, but they are taught restraint and coolness in danger, and of course they have difficult tasks among the very wild natives.

The regular police wear a uniform consisting merely of a serge frock, of which they are very proud. They are given stripes for specially good conduct, and to see one of these men strutting about in his own village

with a stripe is a very interesting spectacle. There is nobody so proud on earth. They have had this police force for so many years that it has come to have a great significance for them. It was an admirable idea from the beginning and has been carried out very well indeed.

There are also village constables who are given three months' instruction, after which they are sent back to their own villages and made responsible for anything that happens there. It is their duty to let the Governor know if anything goes wrong. By this means a great deal of head-hunting and cannibalism, as well as fighting between tribes and what is known as black sorcery, has been stopped. When a case arises the Governor sends some of his officers to deal with the matter. If it is a first crime it is treated leniently. Afterwards they may be punished if it happens again.

The institution of the native police has proved very valuable. To the villagers of uncontrolled areas, who see the native police in contact with the first white people they have ever seen, it has been a great means of inspiring confidence. Very successful contacts are made and the people are administered under special laws. They have learned to look after their white masters and have shown self-sacrifice in doing so on many occasions. Some have even given their lives. The attempt to make Christians of these people has not been successful. It ought to be universally recognized that the figure of the Christ is not likely to make any appeal to the Papuan. Their own self-chosen leaders are people with big voices, braggarts and domineering. The Christian virtues such as meekness, self-renunciation, self-abnegation, kindness to others for kindness' sake and not for reward, are alien to the Papuan nature, and they do not seem to have been made to understand that unless they make an effort to change their nature they have no business to call themselves Christians. The village constables are of great service to white people travelling inland. I remember having to undertake a long journey of 100 miles, and a village constable got the carriers for me and accompanied me the whole way. He had the idea that he had responsibility towards me because I was white and because I was a woman, and he brought me down on that difficult journey from the coast without any serious mishap. But he knew, of course, that he would be rewarded when he got to his journey's end. The giving to these people of certain positions of responsibility, such as that of native police, is of great value both to the white man in New Guinea and to the further development of the territory, as well as a great step forward in the right direction in raising the ideology of these tribes.

REVIEWS

Middle East Agricultural Development Conference. Report issued by the Middle East Supply Centre (Agricultural Report No. 6) of a Conference held at Cairo, February 7 to 10, 1944. 9½" × 7". Pp. 520. Cairo.

This conference was a meeting of experts to consider, primarily from a technical standpoint, some of the major problems facing Middle East agriculture and the line of future agricultural development. It was realized that four days' discussion, even between experts, could not cover so wide and varied a field in any detail, so the main object was to have a free interchange of views and experience and to concentrate attention on broad lines of treatment and to encourage future co-operation.

The report, well produced, consists of 220 pages, which include 5 pages of photographs of the delegates, at work and otherwise occupied, and 7 pages of graphs, density and experimental charts on the subject of cotton, together with miscellaneous inset tables on various economic matters.

The subjects dealt with were five in number: irrigation problems; reclamation and development of new land; soil erosion and conservation; the improvement of agricultural technique through research and education; and some regional problems. Three appendices cover such varied subjects as the Institute of Rural Life in Beirut; manure from rubbish by the Boggiano-Pico process; and a list of trees and shrubs which have been found suitable for cultivation at Enshass.

No analysis of the detailed conclusions on so many subjects of so diverse a nature can be attempted in the compass of this notice. It is sufficient to say that fourteen resolutions were adopted by the Conference. In effect, they advocated the establishment of a Middle East Council of Agriculture to consider the regional technical problems which are common throughout the area; and that, until such Council is established, a Standing Committee of the Conference should be appointed to carry on the work of the Conference and to formulate a constitution for the Council when appointed. Further, that the Middle East Supply Centre should act as the secretariat of the Standing Committee for the interim period; and, finally, that the possibilities of establishing a Central Institute of Agricultural Development to serve the Middle East as a whole should be examined.

It was the conviction of the Conference that agricultural development in the Middle East must rest upon the constant interchange of agricultural knowledge both within the area and with other parts of the world.

I recommend anyone interested in any of the subjects dealt with to get this report and study the particular item. He will get the benefit of the considered view of the best experts present or represented and should profit thereby.

For some, and especially for the pioneers of the movement that brought the Middle East Supply Centre into being, there must be a particular satisfaction in seeing how far the activities of the Centre have developed and extended, and on what lines.

The Middle East Supply Centre was inaugurated in April, 1941, and at the first of its regular half-yearly meetings, held in November, 1941, at Cairo, the soldier-president said in his opening address:

"There is one more thing that the Centre has to do. It must have before it at all times the situation that will arise when the war is ended. One thing is certain—the years immediately after the war will be the most difficult. We must plan for them now, and the problems that will then arise must never be

absent from our thoughts. I know that the keynote of your labours will be prevision and provision, anticipation and co-operation."

It is good to see that this advice, given at a time when our circumstances were so different and so adverse, has been taken to heart and acted upon in so practical a manner.

Origins of the Balfour Declaration : Dr. Hertz's Contribution.

By Samuel Landman. Reprinted from *Essays Presented to J. H. Hertz*. Edward Goldston, London.

Britain Opens a Gateway. By S. S. Perry. 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. 96. Museum Press. 3s. 6d.

These two publications relate to the thorny problem of reconciling "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" with the stipulation that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." For the purpose of a review it is as well to quote the exact words in which the dual pledge was stated in the Balfour Declaration and repeated in the Palestine Mandate, and to dot the i's by adding that the non-Jewish communities amounted to something like 90 per cent. of the inhabitants.

It is easy to be wise after the event and to say now that the two pledges are mutually incompatible; it is going much too far to say that Lord Balfour and the War Cabinet realized this and were cynically indifferent to the future. In 1922 Lord Balfour himself, in speeches in the House of Lords and the Council of the League of Nations, emphasized the validity of these safeguards for the *political* interests of the Arab population. The truth is that the two pledges in the terms stated are not necessarily incompatible. What is incompatible is the interpretation placed upon them by Jews and Arabs alike. If the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine is interpreted as the conversion of Palestine into *the National Home* of the Jews, clearly the rights of the non-Jewish majority must be prejudiced. But, as the author of *Britain Opens the Gateway* is assiduous to explain, a national home for the Jews *as it exists at the moment*, so far from being prejudicial, is actually beneficial to the non-Jewish majority. How far this balancing of the rival interests, or, if you like, this adjustment of the dual pledge, can be developed in future circumstances is beyond the scope of this review.

Mr. Landman's paper, although it is concerned only with the part played by Dr. Hertz in the origin of the Balfour Declaration, is a footnote to history of dramatic interest. The "war aims" of the Declaration are well known—to win the support of World Jewry and in particular the powerful Jewish interests in America. "It is hardly credible, but nevertheless true," says the writer, "that the chief opposition at this time came from the Jews." In France the leading Jews and in England the upper classes of Anglo-Jewry "viewed with the gravest apprehension any pro-Zionist statement by Government." On the anti-Zionist side was all the wealth, culture and influence. On the Zionist side were a handful of foreign Zionist leaders and a small group of young intellectuals, and behind them the inarticulate Jewish masses. The War Cabinet might well hesitate. It was the action of Dr. Hertz, the Chief Rabbi, the spiritual head of British Jewry, in ranging himself definitely on the side of the Zionists, which turned the scale. In Mr. Landman's eyes, and according to his impartial and dramatic narrative, it was given to Dr. Hertz "to occupy the place of destiny at the moment of destiny."

In turning to the didactic optimism of Mr. Perry's book, it is well to be

reminded that many of the wisest and most respected heads in British Jewry viewed the principles of the Declaration "with the gravest apprehension." Mr. Perry is assailed by no such doubts, and assumes for his proposals a basis of moral rectitude and democratic principle which he implicitly denies to those who differ from him on such grounds as national patriotism, the sanctity of pledges, or the rights of the majority to a major say in the establishment and administration of a democratic state. A typical example of this attitude may be taken from page 45: "The interests of Britain unequivocally demand a safe Palestine, to be formed into a stronghold of democracy." This democracy is to be attained by disregarding altogether the wishes or the votes of the vast majority of the inhabitants (whose civil rights we are pledged to safeguard!). Again, one would have thought that the proposal to squeeze the Palestinian Arabs out of their homes because there are wider Arab lands for them to develop was based on expediency rather than on moral or even democratic grounds. In a word, the author never really faces up to the dual nature of the problem. It is idle to argue that the civil rights of a large majority would not be injuriously affected if they became a minority in an alien community, and it is no answer to say that they would thereby enjoy greater material prosperity or that there are other desirable places to which they could suitably transfer themselves. It is only fair to add that the author becomes much more effective when he descends to legitimate argument in his criticism of the White Paper of 1939 and gives a telling quotation from Mr. Churchill's speech in the Commons debate. A pleasing and unusual feature of the book is the handsome tribute paid to Great Britain for her services to the Jewish cause. Half a loaf may be better than no bread, but in political relations it seldom evokes gratitude.

N. G. D.

Hakim Al Ma'arra (Abuala al Ma'arri). By Omar Farrukh. In Arabic. Luzac and Company. 9s.

Mr. Farrukh's book, entitled *Hakim al Ma'arra*, being written in Arabic will appeal only to Arabic-speaking students of philosophy and poetry, and until an English translation is produced, its readers in this country will be limited to the very small circle of British Arabists. All those, however, who take the trouble to study the work will find therein much to charm and to inform.

Al Ma'arri died in 1057 A.D., at the age of 84. Some few years earlier there is reliable evidence to show that he had established a school at Ma'arra of some 200 students, acquired a position of considerable influence among the scholars of his day, and was widely appreciated.

The book gives a review, not only of the work of Ma'arri, but also of the era in which he lived, and the first chapter is a valuable, if brief, addition to historical writing. The remainder is a study by the author of the various aspects of Ma'arri's philosophy and its place in history, and there is a useful chapter dealing with the reactions of this philosophy on other Oriental writers; of special interest to Western readers will be the pages dealing with Omar Khayyám, Dante and Milton. His teaching is that of a sceptic and pessimist, and is highly critical of religion, marriage, state administration and other fundamental subjects. It is clear that Ma'arri's work is that of a genius, though perhaps he did not know himself as such. His writings were generations in advance of his time, and tended to destroy the established faith, but carried no message to replace it.

Ma'arri, while not a complete anti-religionist, attacked in detail both Islam

and Christianity, but in later years these views were somewhat modified, and his teaching took on some warmth and even affection.

This work can be well recommended to those wishing to study Arab literature of the period.

A. C. GALLOWAY.

The Tombs and Moon Temple of Hureidha (Hadhramaut). By Gertrude Caton-Thompson, F.S.A. Reports of the Research Committee of the Society of Antiquaries in London, No. XIII. Pp. 191. Plates lxxx. 10½" × 8¼". Oxford University Press. 1944.

This admirable publication of the Society of Antiquaries (Report No. XIII) contains the record of a unique expedition to Southern Arabia, sponsored mainly by Lord Wakefield and conducted entirely by three Englishwomen under the protection of another Englishwoman and her husband. Protection is not too strong a word to use in this connection, as Hadhramaut during the winter of 1937-8 was in tumult, partly as the result of my own gate-crashing visit in the autumn of 1936. The antediluvian equivalents of modern thunderbolts and lightnings brooded over the search for the Moon-god in his temple, while peace was being made on earth in this first year of the "eponymate" of Injiram, some of whose distant predecessors are now known to us by name from the inscriptions unearthed at Huraidha. Freya Stark has already given us a general view of the proceedings in her book, *A Winter in Arabia* (John Murray, 1940), while for the present volume Miss Caton-Thompson assumes over-all responsibility with due acknowledgments to her scientific partner—Part I is presumably in the main the work of Miss E. W. Gardner—and to other experts, including Professor G. Ryckmans of Louvain, who is responsible for Part VII, Epigraphy. The competence of all concerned is beyond question and writ large in the annals of science and literature. The result is a work of great distinction.

The ladies of the expedition have pleasant cracks at each other without breaking any heads or hearts. Their individual angularities and the surrounding turbulence of the country do not seem to have impaired their team-work in any way whatsoever. And, if we feel that the results of the expeditions were not as comprehensive or illuminating as those interested in the ancient history of Arabia had hoped for, we can put the blame fairly and squarely on the time-factor and its causes. Incidental and unavoidable waste of time is too familiar a thing in Arabian travel to need stressing; but indisposition was responsible for a surprising amount of involuntary absenteeism, though the exact number of woman-hours lost has not been recorded. The insalubrity of Shibam is singled out for a large share of the blame; but, whatever the cause, the total amount of time devoted to the "dig" was 71 days (December 23 to March 3) out of 135, excluding the journey from England to Aden and back. More than once Miss Caton-Thompson refers to work left undone or only partially attempted for want of time. By way of compensation the work that was done within the available time was done with a thoroughness which sets a standard for future archæological research in Arabia. The only comparable bit of work in that country is provided by the earlier (1928) archæological expedition of C. Rathjens and H. von Wissmann to Hajja in the Yaman (see *Südarabien-Reise*, Hamburg, 1932), while relatively amateurish excavations have taken place in Bahrain at intervals during the past half-century.

In these circumstances it is a pity, perhaps, that the Wakefield expedition lighted, through no fault of its own though one of its members was responsible for the choice, on what must now be regarded as a backwater of ancient South Arabian civilization. Miss Caton-Thompson herself tells us "that there is no reason to think that the Hureidha of antiquity—the Madâbum of our inscrip-

tions—was more important, less provincial than it now is.” Incidentally—a very minor point—her references to pp. xv, xvi and xvii in the index of names should be taken as referring to pp. xi, xii and xiii. Professor Ryckmans corrects the first letter of her Hureidha to H, which I take to be right, as it is self-explanatory: the modern village was named “the little ruin” (*cf.* Khirba, Khuraiba, etc.) in honour of the evidences of antiquity near which it was planted, while the name of the valley itself, Wadi ‘Amd, suggests very strongly that some of the temple columns were still visible above the silt barrow of the site when the newcomers intruded upon the scene and perhaps helped themselves to such visible masonry as they may have needed. Finally, the ancient name of the settlement—the word *Hajar* means any kind of settlement from a hamlet to a town, and Miss Caton-Thompson seems to have been unduly worried by the apparent (and actual) absence of anything which could be mistaken for a town—seems to provide an answer to the query raised in her note 1 on page 14. “A Qarif,” she says, “is an artificial pool; nothing seems to be known of its origin.” The name M \bar{D} B \bar{M} is obviously, as Professor Ryckmans shows in his translation of inscription No. 4 and in his remarks on the name (pp. 158-160, *cf.* also his *Noms Propres*, vol. i, p. 331, and Conti Rossini, *Chrestomathia*, p. 177), M \bar{D} B with the familiar mimation, or in full Ma \bar{d} āb (Madhāb). It does, however, seem a little strange that neither of these eminent authorities should have thought of a possible connection between this name and the word M \bar{D} AB (Ma \bar{d} āb or Madhāb) occurring in the tenth line of C.I.H. 540, based on several inscriptions procured by Eduard Glaser from the neighbourhood of the famous dam of Marib. The relevant passage reads: “. . . repaired the dam [or revetment-wall] from near Rahab until he came before ‘Abran, and repaired it with walls and buttresses [?] up to the coping from the bottom of the wadi of Tamhan and repaired the Ma \bar{d} āb from its bottom.” Glaser suggests “reservoir” or “aqueduct” as the meaning of the word in this context, while “dam” has also been proposed. Any of these meanings would fit the circumstances of H \bar{u} raidha, and the settlement of Madhāb may have derived its name from the dam, the canal or the reservoir, whose existence has been established by this expedition. I suspect that the “well” of Sha‘bat mentioned in this inscription is no other than the pond now known as Karif (not Qarif) ibn Thabit—Miss Caton-Thompson corrects Miss Stark’s name for this feature but commits an error of spelling in the process. If more time had been available, I have little doubt that the repaired “conduit and basin and steps” would have been found. Incidentally, with the well-established tendency to change *d* for *z*, or *vice versa*, the word Madhāb (Ma \bar{d} āb) is evidently the same as Arabic Mīzāb, meaning “aqueduct” or “reservoir” or “gutter.”

It is of interest to note that the Marib inscription above referred to was put up by a Jewish king about the middle of the fifth century A.D., long (150 years) after the kingdom of Hadhramaut had ceased to exist except as an appanage of the Kings of Sheba. This fact has no relevance to the dating of the Madhāb settlement, except in so far as the complete silence of the expedition’s eighty-three inscriptions on the subject of kings may indicate that there were no kings worth speaking of when they were made. But the fact remains, as Professor Ryckmans justly points out (p. 174), that neither the inscriptions nor the archaeological results of the expedition provide us with a single exact or even approximate date. Miss Caton-Thompson is very far from dogmatizing on the date of her Moon temple and its associated graves, but I cannot help feeling that the evidence is very slender which she arrays behind her suggestion of a date around 450 B.C. (the golden age of Greece) for the original foundation of the temple. It is not impossible, however, for we know of at least one king of Hadhramaut dating from about 685 B.C. (see Fr. Hommel in *Handbuch der*

Altarabischen Altertumskunde, p. 85) and of a small group of kings of a Minæan dynasty in that country possibly as far back as the twelfth century B.C. (Hommel, *op. cit.*, p. 68). But the golden age of Hadhramaut can scarcely have begun before 200 B.C., soon after which date (170 B.C. at the earliest) Shabwa was founded to be the capital of the realm in displacement of 'Armau (Wadi 'Arma = the valley of the dam!). If Miss Caton-Thompson's suggested dating is correct, the temple of Sin at Madhâb must have passed through all its three phases of existence before this era, though her cautious wording "later—possibly very considerably later—than 300 B.C." for Phase C or post-C does not rule out the possibility of some overlap into the Shabwa period with its temple of Sin, its walled city, its royal palace and its extensive system of irrigation.

The latter at least must be comparable—*minimis componere magna*—with that examined by the Huraidha expedition and must be contemporary with the city it served. It can therefore be dated to the second century B.C. with reasonable assurance; and, in any case, we know with certainty that irrigation was in full swing in Southern Arabia many centuries before that, whether it came from Persia (for which there is no evidence except the quite reasonable supposition that Southern Arabia had contacts with Persia and Babylonia) or was indigenous. Miss Caton-Thompson, indeed, makes surprisingly heavy weather over this question of dating the South Arabian irrigation; and she gets herself into dreadful trouble by misquoting Professor Hitti (p. 10, note 3) as saying: "The older portions of the [Marib] dam were constructed in the latter part of the Sabæan period." That would certainly mean the fifth or sixth century A.D., but what Professor Hitti actually did say (*History of the Arabs*, 1940, p. 55) was, "The older portions of the dam were constructed in the latter part of the *first* Sabæan period," and that, of course, means the seventh century B.C. Even these do not appear to be the *oldest* portions of the great dam; but, even so, the kings who built them were contemporaries of Sargon and Sennacherib, antedating Cyrus and the beginning of the Achæmenid dynasty in Persia by a century and a half!

None of this, of course, in any way vitiates the main and admirably marshalled argument of the book regarding the relative dating of the building sequences at Madhâb and the development of the temple from the austere rectangle of the first foundation to the elaborate structure of later times. I have neither the space nor the competence to discuss the technical matters (beads, pottery, seals and the like) dealt with by the expedition; but I would like in conclusion to break a lance with Miss Caton-Thompson on an issue which evidently causes her some concern. I cannot help feeling from odd remarks scattered about her book that she, as a scientific archæologist, is mildly contemptuous of the common or desert explorer. She may or may not have good reason to be so; but, with all due deference, I think she is quite unreasonable in scoffing at "a still hypothetical Incense Route, that seductive thoroughfare of speculation so zealously explored of recent years by ready writers regardless of the essential requirements of an archæological distribution map!" She is, I think, a trifle dogmatic in suggesting that the problem of this route is "unlikely to be resolved by anything less than severely practical archæology." At any rate, Miss Caton-Thompson has had the honour of presiding over the activities of the first "severely practical" archæological expedition in Hadhramaut with what must be regarded as negative results until her assumptions regarding the date of Madhâb are confirmed or confuted from other sources. She admits that, or seems to do so, while she does not claim, as she might well do, that her work has virtually proved that Wadi 'Amd at least is now out of the running as a candidate for Incense Route honours. On the other hand, it has meanwhile been satisfactorily demonstrated by another worker—a common explorer, in fact

—that, so far from being “still hypothetical,” the true alignment of the Incense Route from Bir ‘Ali (the ancient Qana) to Shabwa is now known beyond any reasonable doubt on the authority of a datable inscription recorded by no less a person than the royal founder of Shabwa. This was discovered by Mr. Ingrams in April, 1939, only a year after the departure of “the archæologist” from Arabia. I would add that all we know so far of the history of ancient Southern Arabia is the fruit of the travail of common explorers during the past century. The labourer is worthy of his hire before dismissal as a no longer necessary nuisance.

H. StJ. B. PHILBY.

The Story of Irish Orientalism. By M. Mansoor, Ph.D. Pp. 68. Ten illustrations. Longmans, Green and Co. 5s.

This little book, to which Professor R. M. Gwynn contributes an appreciatory preface, has been written by an Arab who has graduated at Trinity College, Dublin. It is an able and interesting summary of Ireland’s contribution to the study of Eastern languages and literature. The author has cast his net widely, and of the fifty scholars dealt with several owe their inclusion to their connection with the Oriental Department of Trinity College, though not Irishmen by birth; but no reader is likely to object to this.

W. F.

Desert Warrior. By Patrick Hore-Ruthven. London: John Murray. 3s.

Major Patrick Hore-Ruthven, son of Lord Gowrie, was killed far behind the Italian lines in North Africa in 1942. He was on one of those expeditions—long-range desert duties—which he called real soldiering. How eagerly he imbibed, and expressed, the spirit of the Parachute Corps, which he chose in preference to staff work, can adequately be known only by his comrades. To them he has left a memory which can die only with their own lives: to what should be a larger company, impersonally admiring, he has left this slim but very fragrant volume of verse.

After Eton and Cambridge, this poet joined the Rifle Brigade in 1935. With them he served in India, and on the outbreak of war went to Palestine, and thence to North Africa. Wherever he was in the East his sensitive, finely tempered mind reacted to its environment. There is space to give but one example of his peace-time, and one of his war-time, verse. He wrote the following at Ganeskhind in September, 1938:

The night is star-slung and immaculate,
 The moon rides low behind the foreign trees.
 The crickets sing it; inarticulate,
 Man trembles at the beauties that he sees.
 Trembles and strikes a chord, but all in vain;
 He cannot join in cricket melodies,
 Nor chorus their refrain.

And this, on Syria, he wrote in Palestine in July, 1941:

High summer found your winter loneliness
 By this new-risen, unaccustomed fear
 Disturbed; through danger’s adamant stress,
 Heady with quick red wine which men call war;

And we marched gaily out from Palestine
 In answer to your cry. Though ill-prepared,
 Responding to the warmth of this strong wine,
 We dared what God's own Prophets never dared.

That this young soldier-poet was in love with life is evident from his every line; it is equally evident, from between the lines, that he was prepared for death. His spiritual qualities, his delight in words, in harmonies, and in rhythms, might have taken him far on what for him would have certainly been an adventurous road of literature.

This book that is a burgeon is made less slight by a foreword and a preface by General Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson and by Lady Gowrie. K. W.

Gypsy in the Sun. By Rosita Forbes. Cassell and Co. 1944.

In this work Rosita Forbes gives an epitome of her amazingly full life in many continents from 1920 to 1935—a period crowded with exploration and adventure.

It starts, in 1920, with her greatest and most important journey from the coast of the Mediterranean across unexplored desert to the fanatical centre of Kufra. This venture was only made possible by the co-operation of an Egyptian official, Hassanein Bey, who, in 1916, had served as Secretary to the Italo-British Mission to Sayyid Idris, the head of the religious order of the Senussi.

To return to the journey, the distance to be crossed on camels was 400 miles of sandy desert, which was inhabited by raiding Arabs, while the water supply was scanty. All, however, went well and, in spite of threats by the fanatical tribesmen on the borders of the oasis, the explorers were welcomed by the representatives of Sayyid Idris.

Rosita Forbes returned by a different route across the desert to the chief centre of the Senussi at Jaghabub, where they were welcomed by the Senussi leaders. They then travelled to the Siwa Oasis, being met on the way by a British patrol. Thus ended, with complete success, a journey of exploration which was undoubtedly of first-class importance.

Rosita Forbes had no intention of resting on her laurels, and, some two years later, she chartered a *dhow* at Port Sudan to take her to the port of Tizan in unexplored Asir. The voyagers met with stormy weather and only escaped a raiding *dhow* by shooting the steersman and some members of the pirate crew and then skimming over the reef, which was impassable to the loaded craft of the raider.

Landing at the port of Tizan, the explorer rode inland to the capital at Sabya. There she was courteously received by the Idrisi Amir, who presented his guest with a handful of pearls wrapped in gold-embroidered silk. In addition to being mobbed by a hostile crowd and only saved by being pulled into a harem, the intrepid Englishwoman underwent the unpleasant experience caused by the non-arrival of the leaves of the narcotic *kat*. To quote: "With glazed eyes and foam dripping from their mouths, the great men—merchants, sheikhs and religious leaders—stood stiff and tense. The lower people cried and howled, incoherent as animals."

The above expeditions represent the greatest feats of exploration to the credit of Rosita Forbes, but her visit to el Raisuli, "brigand, warrior, prophet and politician" of the Atlas, was equally successful. Her journey round Persia, during the course of which she was received by the late Shah, was of some interest, but was eclipsed by a visit paid to the Kurds, who were gallantly but

unsuccessfully attempting to repel the Turks in the fastnesses of Mount Ararat. Actually almost all their men were killed, and British travellers reported that until the boys reached puberty and for many years afterwards there was no chance of the tribe recovering from this dreadful massacre.

To conclude, this review does not touch on one-tenth of her journeys, but I have given enough evidence to show that Rosita Forbes stands very high indeed as an explorer who, for many years, has supplied a stream of valuable information to the readers of her interesting books. P. M. SYKES.

Verdict on India. By Beverley Nichols. Cape. 12s. 6d.

“What went ye out for to see?”

Mr. Beverley Nichols writes: “There is something very irritating to the trained reporter in the suggestion that it is necessary to live in a country for twenty years before one is qualified to express an opinion about it.”

There is another side to this statement: to those who have lived long years in India, and who, as many of us do, have learned to love her, it is more than irritating, it is exasperating, to read a book with such forthright judgments and such egotism, a book which in its very title “Verdict” betrays a self-satisfied attitude. Let us, however, get back to our text. Mr. Nichols says he came to India with high hopes and ideals. It would be useful to know what these were, because rarely does any expression of these hopes and ideals transpire, but generally only a long tirade of abuse and adverse criticism; not only of the British in India but more especially of Indians, their art, literature, music, medicine, journalism and religion.

Mr. Nichols, being an expert in all these aspects, is of course in a position to proclaim his “Verdict.” Whatever he expected to see he failed to see much good. With what object, then, was this book written? We are in a very critical position as regards India, and any word, spoken or written, on this complex subject by anyone posing as an authority should be weighed carefully, because of its effect not only on the outside world but more especially on India itself.

Mr. Beverley Nichols is a well-known author, and as such should have been more than careful as to what he wrote. This book will hurt the feelings of many, not only of the British, the majority of whom do not deserve the sarcastic floggings of the author, but they can stand it, but still more of the Indians themselves, particularly the Hindus. The self-exculpatory remarks of Mr. Nichols in his foreword do not excuse him from his bad taste. There is, no doubt, much in the Hindu religion, as it exists to-day, which is bad; but the author should have remembered that there is no subject on which mankind is more touchy than religion, and his wholesale abuse of Hinduism is certain to create very embittered feelings in circles where affection for the British is already at a low ebb.

Orientalism is religious by nature and sentiment and, even if justification existed, there seems to be little value in this onslaught, and this is how it must be judged.

Imagine the feelings among Christians in England if a Hindu wrote insulting and sarcastic remarks about the Immaculate Conception! There is nothing to be gained by such writing. Again, the criticism of Ayurvedic medicine, based on the scanty knowledge shown by Mr. Nichols, can do little good. After all, many in the United Kingdom have doubts as to the value of homœopathic treatment, but for a layman to set about abusing this system, as Mr. Nichols has the indigenous Indian system, would only infuriate people.

The tone of this book is, as a whole, unnecessarily provocative and the de-

ductions often incorrect, due mainly to an insufficient study of facts, but *it does convey an impression of the dimension of the problem that has to be solved*. It is unfortunate that Mr. Nichols did not meet Mr. Gandhi. Many, doubtless, will agree with Mr. Nichols' exposure of the inconsistencies and futility of Mr. Gandhi's policy, but his remarks would have had more value if they had not been based on hearsay and on statements made by Gandhi's opponents.

To the reviewer, once an admirer of Mr. Gandhi, his supreme characteristics appear to be his vanity and his cunning. As an ex-Viceroy once said to the reviewer, Mr. Gandhi cannot bear to be defeated in argument, as he thinks it shows intellectual inferiority; if, in the course of a discussion, this appears likely to happen, he immediately shifts his ground entirely so as to avoid defeat! As Mr. Nichols writes, Mr. Gandhi's reputation for truth can be disputed, while his policy is Fascist both in principle and practice.

What stands out in the book is how Mr. Nichols is influenced by personality, *vide* his wholesale appreciation of Mr. Jinnah, with which many will not agree, and of the Wali of Swat, with which the reviewer, anyhow, heartily agrees. This being so, it is all the more unfortunate that Mr. Nichols did not meet the Mahatma, about whose personality there is no doubt. If he had done so might he have written a different book?

There are many inexactitudes in this book, both major and minor. I only quote a few to show that Mr. Nichols is not the unchallengeable authority he poses to be. "They [the British in India] never say thank you"! Mr. Nichols must have been unfortunate in the British he met, or unobservant of their way of treating Indians. The word "Urdu" does not mean "Army," as Mr. Nichols obviously misquotes an Indian gentleman saying; it means "Camp," and is the name given to the mixed language of Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit which grew up around the camps of the Muhammadan conquerors. It corresponds to the lingua franca of the Crusades. The attitude of Indians towards allowing their womenfolk to mix with Europeans is rapidly changing. Mr. Nichols is out of date. I wish he had had the fortune to meet the officers of an Indianized regiment and seen how their wives mixed with Europeans.

Mr. Nichol's statement that "in the whole country there is not a single factory capable of producing anything but a few spare parts for one or two primitive war machines" is so *fantastically* incorrect that it makes one think he did not want to see anything good in India. It is a pity he did not visit Tatanagar or some of the ordnance factories.

The author's outspoken admiration of Mr. Jinnah makes him rather over-value this leader's authority. Mr. Jinnah is as much a dictator over the Muslim League as Gandhi is over the Congress, but, despite the figures quoted by Mr. Nichols, by no means all the Muhammadans belong to the League. This was shown by the distinct rebuff Jinnah got when, a short time ago, he attempted to intimidate the Unionist Cabinet of the Punjab into becoming a Muslim League Government.

Again, Mr. Nichols' comments on the Bengal famine are not wholly correct; a famine in Bengal was inevitable, as he points out, but much of the horrors would have been avoided if the Central Government had intervened earlier. It is all "poppy-cock" to say that there would have been an outcry if such intervention had taken place. Under the Defence of India Act there was ample opportunity for the Government of India to intervene; indeed, many of us in India at the time could not understand the policy of the "jelly-fish," as it was called. Anyhow, the results were amply justified when the arrival of Lord Wavell galvanized the Government of India into life.

My space is coming to an end. I will therefore conclude by picking out some special paragraphs which I think are valuable. The chapter "Below the Bottom Rung" is well worth reading, and the words of Dr. Ambedkar, quoted by Mr. Nichols, are full of truth and omen: "We are as staunchly national as any of the Congress, but we don't want the British to quit India till our rights are safeguarded. If they do our fate will be more terrible than the fate of the oppressed peoples of Europe."

Part 2: Chapter viii, "Gaol Bird," para. 4, may enlighten some whose misplaced sympathies went to the detainees. Part 3: "Gandhi is no more India to them [the Muslims] than Laval is France to the Free French."

The last chapter in the book deserves attention, and with much of it we can agree, but Pakistan, ill-defined as it is, cannot be an economic proposal and therefore is not, without further definition, practical.

The suggestion, made by some, that the defence of the Frontier would be an Imperial problem does not fit in with the Independent India of any kind. One solution appears to lie in some sort of federation of the more important Princes, the Provinces, taking Pakistan as one of them, all largely autonomous, but a Central Government with control over such matters as Foreign Affairs, Defence, Customs, Finance, etc. The composition of the Central Government must be arranged so that minorities could be safeguarded, either on the system of the U.S.A. Senate as regards representation or by enacting that on questions involving the Provinces a two-thirds majority would be necessary. We *cannot* "Divide and Quit"; the tragic case of the Bengal famine proves the interdependence of the Provinces: still more we cannot stay.

Let us give up this cry of "Indians must decide among themselves a reasonable Constitution and in the meantime we can sit back." Such policy is infamous; we must get going and help Indians to make such a decision and thereby show that "*we mean business.*"

D. S. (PYEN DUA).

Bombay Coastwise. (The Minnow Liners.) Devennon, Cochin. 1944.

This book tells of the "oddities and crudities" of small passenger and ferry craft on the Bombay coast from the last days of the East India Company to the present day. The author relates anecdotes concerning such various vessels as s.s. *Courland* from the Baltic, converted minesweepers and barges, and the small ship which Livingstone used on his African explorations.

"Oddities" might well be used to describe some of the shore and sea-going personnel of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company, ranging from Goanese stowaways to members of Cochin Dutch families fallen on evil days, who claimed relationship with the Royal Houses of Europe.

Though claiming no great literary merit, this book might be read as a supplement to Boyd Cable's *History of the P. & O.* by those interested in ships and shipping in out-of-the-way places.

M. W. B.

Wingate's Raiders. By Charles J. Rolo. George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd. 8s. 6d.

This book, with an excellent foreword by Lord Wavell, gives the full details of the late General Wingate's incursion into Burma with his long-range penetration groups in the spring of 1943, and a somewhat more perfunctory account

of his more extensive air landing operations of the present year, in the course of which Wingate met his untimely death. The book also gives us a detailed and intimate picture of one of the most colourful characters of the present war.

The story of both the above operations is known generally all over the world, but that does not in any way detract from the value of the book or from its intense interest to the reader. It is quite as exciting as any novel.

Many people picture Wingate as a visionary figure ready to undertake desperate ventures against hopeless odds. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as this book very well brings out. He was certainly a dreamer—but by no means a vague dreamer. He dreamt dreams which could be put into practice. He was eccentric both in dress and in manner, and he was very far removed from the ordinary type of regular soldier. He had tremendous drive, complete confidence in himself, unlimited courage and phenomenal powers of endurance of mind and body. But he was no mere visionary, and he refused always to undertake any operation without the most complete preparation and the best equipment that could possibly be made available. His strength was not so much in the invention of new methods of warfare as in assimilating correctly the lessons of the old—and then putting them to practical use. His long-range penetration groups were modelled on the small self-contained Japanese columns which proved so successful in Burma in 1942, but with air supply to take the place of the ability of the Japanese to live on the country. There was nothing new about supply by air, but it had never been done in the jungle either by the Japanese or ourselves before Wingate instituted it. Similarly, there was nothing new about dropping troops by air, but Wingate was the first man to see its possibilities in jungle war.

Wingate has often been compared with Lawrence of Arabia, and he is so compared in this book. I think that there was considerable similarity between them, and that they were both born guerrilla leaders. The author himself describes Wingate as “a natural-born guerrilla leader.” Why then did Wingate not adopt in Burma in 1943 the guerrilla tactics he carried out so successfully in Ethiopia in 1941? For the long-range penetration groups were *not* guerrillas—as Wingate himself declared most emphatically. Had Wingate known the Burmans and their language his plan, I feel sure, would have been to lead guerrilla bands of local inhabitants from inside Burma rather than to have inserted from outside non-rice-eating troops with no knowledge of the country. But he did not arrive on the scene until Burma had been lost, so that alternative was no longer open to him. The answer evolved by Wingate was the long-range penetration groups—especially trained columns of British and Gurkha regular troops with a few Burma riflemen attached for intelligence purposes.

The author is not at his happiest in the first chapter of the book, “Not Pukka War,” when he infers that our Burma Army of 1942 adopted “conventional methods” of supply and communications from choice. The 17th Division, which took the first shock of the Japanese invasion of Burma, was trained and equipped for operations in the Middle East. It was diverted to Burma at the eleventh hour, complete with its mechanized transport and its lack of familiarity with jungle conditions—not because anyone considered that that was the ideal method of taking on the Japanese, but from dire necessity. There were no properly trained and equipped troops to send; there was practically no animal transport, no wireless, and few supporting aircraft. They had to do their best with what they had. It would be just as foolish to say that Lord Gort did not realize the value of tanks and aircraft because he took the British Expeditionary Force to the help of Belgium in May of 1940 to meet the most formidable mechanized army in the world, with practically no tanks and a very inadequate tactical air force.

These desperate ventures have frequently to be undertaken at the start of wars in which the British Army has been engaged. Wingate assimilated the lessons of the 1942 campaign with great rapidity and complete clarity. He was determined above all that his "Chindits" should not enter Burma until they had undergone a long and intensive training; General Wavell saw to it that he got the transport and equipment for which he asked, and the Allied Air Forces ensured for him complete air superiority over the area of his operations, which alone made possible the essential matter of supply by air. What was possible in February, 1943, had not existed in February, 1942. Even so, Wingate's 1943 operation was a bold and hazardous venture, involving great hardship and considerable losses. It would have been quite impossible without the inspired leadership and iron discipline of Wingate himself.

The greatest value of the expedition was that it proved beyond question what no one who knew the British and Indian soldier ever doubted—and that was that, properly trained and equipped and expertly led, they have no superior in the world.

Wingate was quick to assimilate the lessons of his own 1943 expedition and, as a result, he based his further plans for attacking Japanese communications on an ambitious project for dropping raiding formations from the air deep behind the Japanese lines. A number of people had thought of the same thing, but it took a Wingate to get the idea across in high places. This he did by his eloquence, his forcefulness of character, and his contagious confidence.

Once he had made a convert of no less a person than Mr. Winston Churchill the rest was comparatively simple. The support of General Marshall, the American Chief of Staff, followed, and with it the co-operation of the finest airborne unit the United States could provide.

The result was the extensive and successful airborne operation of the present year to the south of the Japanese advanced base of Myitkyna, which did so much to assist General Stilwell's capture of that important objective, and which revolutionized the future conduct of jungle operations.

General Wingate himself was killed in an air crash before he saw the full fruits of his labours. But his exploits captured the imagination of the world, and Mr. Rolo has done them and their inspiration full justice in his vividly written book.

J. G. SMYTH.

Burma Pamphlets: *Burma Background*, by B. R. Pearn. *Burma Setting*, by O. K. H. Spate. *Buddhism in Burma*, by G. Appleton. Longmans, Green and Co. 1s. each.

Burma is nearly three times the size of Great Britain, and its population in 1941 was 16,800,000. Yet it is fair to say that before the Japanese invasion it was little more than a name to the average man in this country. At the best of times this was not creditable, and now there are special reasons why British public opinion should be well informed on Burmese affairs. The task of ejecting the Japanese is still a formidable one, but things are beginning to move in the Far East, and it is legitimate to hope that the reoccupation of Burma may come sooner than at one time we dared to think. But when that time does come, the tasks that will confront the British Government will be almost equally formidable. The immediate task will be the mere physical reconstruction of the country, and it will be immense. We know already that enormous damage has been done to roads, railways, bridges, houses and public buildings all the country over, and we must expect that the Japanese will add to the damage before they are driven out. All this will be the responsibility of the

Government. It will be their business to restore with the least possible delay the conditions in which the economic life of the country can revive. But if money is poured into the country for reconstruction and if available stocks of consumer goods are either short or non-existent, there will be grave danger of inflation. Thus complementary to physical reconstruction will be the task of getting trade and industry going again. Here, again, enormous damage has been done, particularly to the rice mills and warehouses in Rangoon and to the oilfields and oil refineries. Most of the business houses will have to start again from scratch. Much of their working capital was locked up in stocks necessarily abandoned when the evacuation took place, and if they are to start again they must get compensation for their losses. But all this will cost money, big money. The resources of the Government of Burma are small, and at first the British taxpayer must foot the bill. The British Government have announced their intention of bearing their share of the burden of rehabilitating foreign countries devastated by the enemy. Are they going to be less generous towards devastated countries within the Empire? The question, of course, answers itself. These countries had a right to expect protection against aggression. We have failed to give them that protection, and it is a debt of honour not merely that we should eject the aggressor, but also that we should help the countries to regain their prosperity. The Government no doubt recognize their responsibility. Nevertheless, it is important that the pressure of instructed public opinion should be brought to bear on them.

This is one important reason why Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., are to be congratulated on their enterprise in publishing this timely and attractive series of twelve Burma pamphlets. If the three which have been issued and are the subject of this review can be taken as fair samples, they are short and easily read, and they should perform a useful function in spreading knowledge about Burma. Moreover, apart from the immediate problem of physical reconstruction, there are other long-term problems of a more fundamental nature on the right solution of which the future well-being of Burma will depend. This is a golden opportunity (of which the Burma Government is no doubt taking full advantage) of bringing such problems under review and of taking stock of the position in Burma after many generations of British rule. It is not suggested that these pamphlets contribute to the solution of these problems. That would be beyond their scope. But they do supply the background against which the problems must be studied.

Thus *Burma Background*, No. 1 in the series, a concise and objectively written sketch of the history of Burma, serves as an introduction to the first of all the fundamental problems of Burma—namely, that of its political future. The history of Burma is not very long—the Burmans did not make their appearance in the country till the ninth century—nor, it must be confessed, is the early history of any great interest except to the Burmans themselves. But the history of Burma in pre-British days does throw some light on a phenomenon which has always puzzled those who have learned to love the country—namely, the proneness of the Burman to violent crime. Great names flit through these pages, A-naw-ra-hta, A-laung-pa-ya and Bo-daw-pay-ya, strong kings who were able to enforce law and order; but for the most part the history of Burma is one of civil war and lawlessness in the outlying provinces. Of more interest to British readers is the plain matter-of-fact account of the three Anglo-Burmese wars. Great Britain is often accused of imperialism, but it was Burmese imperialism that led to the first war. It was a raid into Chittagong by one Burmese force and the invasion of Cachar by another that at last overcame the “extraordinary patience” of the Indian Government and led to a declaration of war in 1824. It is perhaps a legitimate criticism of the pamphlet that the

astonishing constitutional advance since 1920 is dismissed in a very few sentences, but the pamphlet does end up with a striking tribute from an American observer, "With the single exception of the Philippines, no tropical appendage of any Great Power enjoyed a larger degree of autonomy than did Burma." This, however, is not enough. All history shows that "incomplete self-government always strives after its own fulfilment," as Professor Ramsay Muir once put it. Moreover, the British Government is bound by pledges. Burma was promised that separation from India would not be allowed to prejudice constitutional development, and in 1941 a pledge was given that Burma would be helped to attain Dominion status "as speedily and as fully as possible." It is a moot point whether this question should be taken up as soon as Burma is reoccupied or whether there should be an agreed breathing space during which Burman and European should work together on the essential problem of physical reconstruction, but the fact remains that the pledges must be honoured. The problem is not so difficult as that of India. There is no Hindu-Muslim controversy and no "untouchable" problem, nor does the problem of the Indian States loom so large. But this last problem does exist in the Shan States and Karenni, and there is the serious difficulty of the frontier tribes in the Chin Hills, the Hukawng Valley and the Kachin Hills. These tribes have fought magnificently for us in the present war. They have never been brought under Burman rule and they would not relish being incorporated in a self-governing Burma. As in Assam, this is a major problem for which a just solution must be found.

The purpose of *Burma Setting*, which is admirably achieved, is not to describe the beauty of the scenery, which has to be seen to be believed, but rather to give an account of the physical characteristics of the country and to examine the strength and weakness of the economic position and the possibilities of development. Burma is relatively small and sparsely populated, and it is squeezed in between the two vast and thickly populated countries of India and China. It is a remarkable fact that the Burmans have been able to maintain their individuality as an independent nation for more than a thousand years. The explanation no doubt lies in the broad belts of roadless and difficult terrain which separate Burma proper from India on the west and China on the east. Military roads are now being driven in from India and on the east there is the Burma road, and the significance of these new developments may make itself felt in the future. There is no escape from the conclusion reached in the pamphlet that the prospects of industrial development on any very large scale are not bright and that Burma must continue to rely for its prosperity mainly on its primary products. Of these rice is the most important. In the proper season the Irawaddy delta is just a sea of paddy, and Burma is the main rice granary of the world. Here, as the pamphlet points out, lies one of the major problems. The economy of Burma is ill-balanced in that it depends too much on a single crop. Most of the troubles of the inter-war period were due to economic depression resulting from the disastrous fall in the world price of rice. It is difficult to see what the remedy is. The pamphlet is probably correct in saying that there is not much prospect of supplanting paddy by other crops in the delta, and the best hope of remedy would appear to lie in international action designed to maintain the price of rice at a level which will afford a reasonable return to the cultivator. In the delta, too, is another grave problem. It was money borrowed from the Indian moneylender that enabled the delta to be reclaimed from swamp to smiling paddy fields, and the loans were secured by mortgages on the land. But the Burman is an improvident optimistic person, and already in the early years of the present century the rate at which agricultural land was passing from the ownership of the Burman cultivator to

that of the Indian moneylender was beginning to cause alarm, and the process was greatly accelerated by the fall of rice prices, especially after 1929. In the Punjab this evil has been dealt with by legislation prohibiting the alienation of land from agricultural to non-agricultural tribes. In Burma there is no well-marked division between agricultural and non-agricultural tribes, and probably the right solution would have been boldly to prohibit the alienation of agricultural land from Burmans to Indians, but as long as Burma was a province of India this solution could not be applied. It is most desirable that this opportunity should be taken of tackling the problem, possibly on the lines suggested in the *Blue Print for Burma* just issued by the Conservative Imperial Affairs Committee. Nothing would conduce more to the happiness and contentment of Burma and to an improvement in the relations between Burmans and Indians.

Buddhism in Burma is a fascinating account of the Buddhist religion written with knowledge, insight and sympathy. No one can read the "Song of Blessing," quoted at length in the pamphlet, without being impressed by the noble ideals of the Buddhist religion, and yet one wonders whether it is not an ethic rather than a religion. Certainly, since there is no God in the teaching of the Buddha, it does not satisfy that "inner religious sense of dependence and need" which is innate in human nature, and it is no doubt for this reason that side by side with Buddhism in Burma there exists quite illogically a universal worship of the *nats* or spirits. However this may be, the Buddhist religion plays a very important part in the life of the people, and to it we owe the tolerance of the Burman and the complete absence of caste and class distinctions. It is a matter for regret, therefore, that there are signs that Buddhism is beginning to lose its hold on the people. Every Buddhist pays reverence to the three Gems, the injunctions that he should go for refuge to the Buddha, the Dhamma (Law) and the Sangha (Brotherhood of the Monks). But in recent years the reputation and respect in which the Sangha is held by the people has suffered a serious decline. There are still saintly monks of the type described in Fielding Hall's *Soul of a People*, but in too many monasteries the standards of discipline and moral life have declined, and too often the yellow robe has become merely a cloak for political agitation and even for crime. The pamphlet ascribes the growing disrepute of the Sangha in part at any rate to the neutrality of the British Government in religious matters and to the consequent lack of central control which in pre-British days used to be exercised over all monasteries by the *Thathanabaing* or Archbishop appointed by the king. It is important for Burma that the decline should be arrested, and when in due course Burma becomes a self-governing Dominion the evil should be grasped.

These three pamphlets make a good beginning, and if the others are of the same quality the series will be a valuable one.

C. A. I.

Britain and Malaya. By Sir Richard Winstedt. Longmans. 1s.

"Malaya's total trade in 1938 came to more than the total trade of New Zealand, more than all the trade of our seventeen African colonies together, more than half the trade of the Indian Empire." This is one example of the several significant and thought-provoking passages in this admirable booklet written by a leading authority on Malaya, who gives approximately equal space to the country's history on the one hand and to its administration, economic development, social life and services on the other.

This small book comes at an opportune moment when the British Colonial

Empire, the means by which its diverse territories were originally acquired, the ability, foresight and altruism with which they are governed, and their future development are under question and review from many quarters both at home and abroad. Despite the limits imposed upon him in a publication of only seventy-nine pages, Sir Richard has contrived in this short summary to supply much information on these topics and to enlarge upon many problems in a manner surprisingly complete and more than usually interesting.

The reader may be disappointed that in his last chapter the author holds out little hope of self-government for Malaya "within any time that can be foreseen," owing to the two grave domestic obstacles caused by "the aversion of the Malays from political union among themselves and the existence of a Palestinian rivalry between Malays and the immigrants into Malaya, especially the Chinese."

All those interested in the developments in the Far Eastern theatre of war and in Britain's record in Malaya, as well as those going out to that country for the first time, should read this booklet, and they will find comfort and encouragement in Sir Richard's opinion that "there is no reason to suppose that the Malay and the Straits-born Chinese, at any rate, will not welcome our return."

L. C. FINCH.

The International Development of China. By Sun Yat-sen. With 17 maps. Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers), Ltd. Pp. 176. 7s. 6d. net.

This book was first published in 1921. A second edition with a preface by Dr. Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen, who had died in 1925, was published in 1928. The present edition is published on behalf of the London office of the Chinese Ministry of Information.

In his preface the author, basing himself on the theory that China was "a prey of militaristic and capitalistic powers," expressed the hope that the root of war would be for ever exterminated so far as China was concerned if the vast resources of China were developed internationally. Not only would this be "for the good of the world in general," but it would also be for the good of "the Chinese in particular," since, as he explained in the opening chapter, China would require "machinery for her vast agriculture, machinery for her rich mines, machinery for the building of her innumerable factories, machinery for her extensive transportation systems and machinery for all her public utilities." China's needs are then discussed under the headings of six separate programmes which Dr. Sun modestly described as but "a rough sketch or a general policy produced from a layman's thought with very limited materials at his disposal."

Though the book was favourably received in some important quarters, it was pointed out by the then Secretary of the American Department of Commerce, Mr. William C. Redfield, that Dr. Sun's proposals were so complex and extensive that it would take many years to work them out in detail and billions of dollars to carry out even a small portion, while most of them would not be able to pay interest charges and expenses of operation for some years.

This criticism is still good today. Nevertheless, as a wide survey they were not without valuable and practicable features, and well may have been the inspiration, as Dr. Sun Fo seems to have anticipated in his preface to the second edition, of the *Academia Sinica* and other Government organs at Nanking, which in the years immediately before the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937 framed and launched many progressive projects. In many of these assistance was received from the League of Nations, not least in

connection with the improvement of methods of agriculture which forms the foundation of Chinese economy.

If space permitted it would be of interest to discuss some of Sun Yat-sen's ideas in relation to these later projects, but it is of greater interest perhaps to consider the significance of their republication at the present juncture at the instance of the Chinese Ministry of Information.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, now also President of China, is reported to be the author of a book published in China rather more than a year ago, a translation of which in English is not available. But such information in regard to it as has become available suggests a not too understanding outlook as regards foreign enterprise in China and a political view which is the antithesis of the principles for which the united nations are fighting.

In some Chinese quarters this may well have caused uneasiness. The republication, therefore, of the international proposals of the "Father of the Republic," which were first given to the world twenty-three years ago, may perhaps be interpreted as reflecting the element in Chinese Government thought which is more in line with the sentiment of the times outside Fascist countries.

It is interesting to note in connection with these two books that a third book was published by the John Day Company in New York early last year, of which the title is *China's Struggle for Railroad Development*. The author is Chang Kia-gnau, who was Minister of Communications from 1937 to 1942. He was also connected with railways and railway finance, first as banker and then as Minister of Railways, for many years previously. Although the book is disappointing in that there is a disposition to ignore the valuable help of foreigners, especially of Britons in the early days of railway enterprise in China, it is otherwise a valuable record of the railway position, and recognizes the need of foreign co-operation in the future. In conjunction with the fact that Sun Yat-sen advocated as a model for railway contracts with foreigners an agreement which he concluded in 1913 with Messrs. Pauling and Company, a copy of which is included in Appendix I of his book, it is not unreasonable to infer that opportunities for co-operation between China and her foreign friends on sound business lines will not be wanting. Anyone interested in forming some idea of the almost boundless possibilities for development of China on modern lines will find *The International Development of China* illuminating.

There is no doubt great scope for co-operation between our country and China in many fields. All that is required is the continued maintenance of China's credit, recognition of sound business principles and approach on both sides in the spirit of the new Treaty.

P. H. B. K.

POSTSCRIPT.—This note was intended for publication in the last number of the Journal, but was too late. It has since come to notice that Dr. H. H. Kung made a speech comparatively recently in Washington, while on a visit to the United States as head of the Chinese delegation to Bretton Woods, in which he refers to Dr. Sun's book and Dr. Sun's desire to develop China's resources by international co-operation. "His desire," said Dr. Kung, "is the wish of China to-day, and the National Government of China has pledged itself to put that programme into effect."—P. H. B. K.

Ten Years in Japan. By Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-42. Pp. 480. Hammand, Hammond. London. 15s.

Mr. Grew at the time this book was published had thirty-nine years' experience in the foreign service of the United States, having during his service worked his way up from a clerkship in the Consular Service to the highest diplomatic rank. He was for ten years Ambassador to Japan during the most critical period of that country's relations with the United States, and, as Sir Robert Craigie remarks in the foreword to this book, so long a period denotes the importance of the mission and the success of the incumbent. Under the American system of diplomacy such a record must be rare. During the tenure of his difficult post Mr. Grew was fortunate in one respect—he worked in complete harmony with the authorities in the State Department at Washington, and the change of Government brought about by the Presidential election made no difference to this. It is pleasant to learn also that the British and American Ambassadors worked "in close association and with a common objective," though there are few references to this in the book.

During his long service it had always been his practice to jot down daily the opinions, impressions and thoughts of the moment which, in many cases, needed complete future revision. This book is composed entirely of extracts from his diary, together with some copies of important official reports and documents. It reveals the Ambassador as alert, sympathetic and liberal-minded in his views. He liked Japan and the Japanese, enjoyed his life and work in Japan, and, in some respects, sympathized with Japanese aspirations while detesting the methods employed in attaining them. It is obvious that this book will provide an important contribution to the history of this momentous period. On the other hand, it must be confessed that his view of Japan is limited in outlook. Even allowing for the difficulties of language, habits and customs of the Japanese, and a certain veil which shrouds Japanese social life, the diary describes relations which were almost entirely of a high official nature. There are hardly any references to contacts with Japanese commercial, industrial, academic, and parliamentary circles, while the life, work, and thoughts of the common people of Japan have practically no place in this work. But it must be remembered that the material published in this book only represents a fraction of his writings.

Furthermore, it may be difficult for the general reader of this book to grasp some of the main features of the peculiar political system under which Japan functions. The House of Representatives: elected on the basis of manhood suffrage in which the political parties are discredited; it can attack the Government, but has little or no influence on events and no effective control of finance. The Cabinet: appointed by and responsible to the Emperor, consisting largely of non-party men. The Ministries of War and Navy: always held by a General and an Admiral, who have direct access to the Emperor and who often act quite independently of the Cabinet, together with the dominating power of the extremist military and naval elements who really conduct and control the foreign policy of Japan, and who, in recent years, have been strongly supported by the immensely wealthy commercial and industrial Trusts. Above all these the Emperor, venerated as a kind of human god, but, apparently, with no power to sway the destinies of his country, although Mr. Grew reports that there were rumours that he protested on one or two occasions, but with no effect. The Japanese political system thus defies classification; it has been termed a quasi-dictatorship, and it seems to be a dictatorship of groups without any dominating personalities. The instability of the Governments is shown by the constant changes recorded in this diary.

The first four years or so of his mission are described by Mr. Grew as "calm

before the storm," but the calm was only relative. The Japanese Government proceeded to recognize the Manchukuo puppet state and, shortly afterwards, to leave the League of Nations. By these measures Japan laid the foundation of a policy of unlimited expansion in China, which was afterwards extended to cover the whole of the Far East and the Pacific, and it was truly described by Mr. Grew as a "Monroe doctrine for the Far East." The Government of the United States stood firm for the principles of sanctity of treaties and the "open door" in China, but at that time the Japanese expansionists were still convinced that the United States would never proceed to extreme measures in defence of its Far Eastern interests. After these measures followed the denunciation by the Japanese of the Washington Naval Treaty and the expiration of the London Naval Treaty, while nearly half the Budget was appropriated to military and naval purposes. Relations with Great Britain, as Japan's main competitor in China, were growing steadily worse, and in November, 1936, the Japanese Government announced the Anti-Comintern pact with Germany, concluded, as Mr. Grew found out, between the military representatives of the two countries without reference to the Japanese Foreign Office! This pact naturally had a bad effect on Russo-Japanese relations. In February, 1936, the former Premier, Admiral Viscount Saito, and other Ministers were brutally murdered by young Fascist Japanese military officers in an abortive attempt at a Fascist revolution.

From July, 1937, when the war with China began, relations between the two countries became steadily worse. But, pursuing his policy of "constructive conciliation," Mr. Grew and the British Ambassador both sent identical telegrams suggesting that both Powers should try to promote peace by agreement. This proved to be indeed a forlorn hope. In spite of numerous protests from the United States Embassy and a serious personal warning from President Roosevelt, the Japanese perpetrated a long series of outrages on American property and nationals in China, together with discrimination against American interests in that country. On his return from leave in the United States, where he was able to gauge the rising anti-Japanese feeling, Mr. Grew delivered in October, 1939, a speech "straight from the horse's mouth" before the America-Japan Society, in which he clearly warned the Japanese people that the Government of the United States meant what it said. He also recorded in his diary that no amount of economic pressure and embargoes could deter the Japanese from pursuing their objectives in China—nothing except naval and military actions.

The appointment of Mr. Matsuoka as Foreign Minister in Prince Konoye's Government marked the beginning of the final period until the breakdown. Mr. Matsuoka—a talkative and bellicose personality—was the tool and mouth-piece of the militarists, who, in Mr. Grew's words, had become intoxicated with the German successes in the European war and had now determined to make a great drive southwards. The Japanese ultimatum to the Vichy Government and the subsequent occupation of bases in Indo-China ultimately became the *casus belli* between the two nations. In the meanwhile, Mr. Matsuoka, having put through the Tripartite Pact, whereby Japan became a full member of the Axis, went on his European tour, during which he received an assurance from Hitler that Germany would not attack Soviet Russia. In April, 1941, he was able to conclude with Stalin the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact, which, as Mr. Grew remarked, encouraged the southward drive by guaranteeing Soviet neutrality in case Japan was engaged in war with another Power such as the United States. Germany's attack on Russia, to quote from the diary, "placed Japan in a quandary as . . . she is pledged to the Axis and also pledged to neutrality *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Government." But he subsequently

learnt that, through the intervention of the German Ambassador, Japan had decided to stick to the Axis. In July, 1941, President Roosevelt ordered the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, and this was followed by an embargo on the export of oil to Japan.

Relations between the two countries had reached a state of deadlock. During the remaining period conversations were carried on simultaneously in Washington and Tokyo, and resulted in two proposals by the United States Government for the settlement of the Chinese question and counter-proposals by Admiral Toyoda, the new Foreign Minister in the Konoye Government. The Japanese Government issued vague peace proposals to China and a request for the meeting of the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on American soil, provided the economic sanctions against Japan were called off. As the Japanese continued to increase their stranglehold on Indo-China, these proposals naturally came to nothing. It is probable that they were never meant to materialize, but were put out merely to gain time until the military and naval authorities were ready to make their coup. In October, 1941, General Tojo, a serving General, became Prime Minister, and Mr. Grew sent his last despatch to the Secretary of State expressing his opinion that increased economic sanctions would never deter Japan from its inflexible determination to dominate the whole of the Far East, and concluding with the words: "An armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." Mr. Churchill's announcement on November 11, 1941, that "if the United States should be involved in a war with Japan a British declaration of war would follow within the hour," came as a ray of light during this period of gloom. The President's appeal to the Japanese Emperor, of course, went unheeded, and on December 7, 1941, the Japanese forces made their surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, about which Mr. Grew had given a clear warning nearly a year previously. For more than five months Mr. Grew and his staff remained as prisoners of war in the Embassy at Tokyo in unpleasant and sometimes humiliating circumstances.

Everyone can agree with the words used by Mr. Grew in his broadcast to the American people after his return, "that the Japanese military machine and military caste must be utterly crushed, their credit and predominance must be utterly broken." But what of the future? It can be presumed that the old gang who filled the Ministerial and other leading positions will disappear with the military and naval leaders. The elder statesmen and others of that status are either dead, murdered, or now too old to be of service in a new reformed Japan. Who are the Liberals and Moderates mentioned in general terms from time to time in Mr. Grew's diary, and what position and authority will they have in Japan after its defeat? If Mr. Grew or some other expert could shed some light on these subjects he would indeed be rendering great service.

D. B.-B.

Japan's Political Warfare. By Peter de Mendelssohn. Pp. 192. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

This book can be cordially recommended to all who are interested—and who is not?—in the future of East Asia and the Pacific. We have grown all too familiar in the past two years with the havoc caused by the Japanese fighting forces, but the public generally is only vaguely conscious of a more insidious form of warfare that the Japanese are waging—ideological or "thought warfare." This book, then, is timely.

The author himself disclaims any attempt to pose as an expert on Far Eastern affairs, but he has collected his material very thoroughly and he presents

his facts in a manner that carries conviction. No statement is made that is not supported by evidence—mainly from the mouth of the Japanese themselves—and in my opinion the book can be accepted as entirely reliable.

For details I must refer the reader to the book itself. Briefly, the author lays bare the machinery by means of which the Japanese Government controls and directs opinion in Japan itself and influences opinion abroad, particularly in those parts of Asia and the Pacific that she hopes to bring under her control. We are shown the manner in which the machine is operated and finally the aims and ends towards which Japan is striving.

In Japan itself success is complete. The Japanese individual has been so "conditioned" that his response to a hint from the Government is as automatic as that of a trained racehorse to a flick of the jockey's whip. Mention Great East Asia to a Japanese and he responds "co-prosperity sphere"; liberation of Asia and the answer is "down with the British and the Americans." In the eyes of every Japanese this is no war of aggression; it is a holy war. It may entail suffering, but that is not the fault of Japan; the responsibility is that of the "wicked" democracies whose selfish aim it is to enslave Asia. To us all this is preposterous, but to the Japanese it is as gospel truth.

Abroad, the Japanese Government cannot expect complete success, but it has evidently achieved considerable results. The author points out the skill with which Japan has adopted slogans calculated to attract the races of Asia. She represents herself as asking nothing for herself, anxious only for the liberation of Asia from the Anglo-American yoke. It is natural, then, that when she dangles the prize of independence before the eyes of the subject races she should expect them to "co-operate," and it is only a step further that they should accept the "guidance" of their first tottering steps towards that goal.

The picture that emerges is a disturbing one. We can and will defeat Japan on the field of battle. Can we convince the people of Japan that their whole attitude is wrong? I for one doubt it. Twenty years after she had gone down in utter defeat, Germany convinced herself that she had not, after all, lost the first European war. Let us not delude ourselves that when the war is ended Japan will suffer a change of heart.

What of the countries at present under the heel of Japan? We know little of conditions in these countries, but no one who witnessed Japanese treatment of Korea, Manchuria and Occupied China can doubt that all these people will welcome a release from the Japanese burden. As the instrument of their deliverance we shall no doubt be well received at the outset, but the Japanese have sown a seed that is likely to germinate. We cannot blame an Asiatic for dreaming of a time when he shall be entirely master in his own house. That, indeed, is an ideal to the attainment of which we have pledged ourselves. But freedom is not to be achieved by the waving of a wand. It lies at the end of a long and arduous road. Will the Asiatic who has been industriously taught that freedom is just round the corner be content to renounce this facile dream and sit down to work out patiently his own salvation?

OSWALD WHITE.

The Truth about Religion in Russia. Pp. 457. Published by the Patriarchate of Moscow. 1942. 50,000 copies.

This richly produced and illustrated book has been written with the collaboration of numerous members of the high dignitaries of the Orthodox Church, clergy and laymen. The Metropolitan of Moscow, Sergius, at that time the Deputy Guardian of the Patriarchal Throne, elected by the Sobor of Russian Bishops in Moscow on September 8, 1943, Patriarch of the Orthodox Church

of all the Russias, gives a clear definition of the book's aims in the preface: "This volume is more than anything else an answer to the Fascist 'crusade' carried out with the pretence of 'liberating' our people and our Orthodox Church from the Bolsheviks. But, at the same time, it answers the general question: Does our Church admit the fact of Bolshevik persecution and does she ask anyone to liberate her?"

Following these propositions, the book is divided into two unequal parts: the first part "The Russian Orthodox Church is Faithful to her Motherland" (304 pp.); the second part gives full documentation concerning the persecution of the Orthodox Church in the Russian territories occupied by the Germans. Since religion has been persecuted in all German-occupied countries, this second part has but a documentary value, necessarily incomplete as yet, and we shall leave it aside.

The contents of the first part exactly follow the chapter headings. Chapter I: "About the Freedom of Religious Confession in Russia." The preliminary article, written by the editorial committee, clearly asserts "... that the Soviet Constitution—which guarantees complete freedom of worship—in no way hinders the practice of religion amongst the faithful or the life of the Church in a general way." "If, after the October revolution, some religious trials took place in Russia, it was solely on account of certain priests who opposed actively the Soviet Government. There were purely political trials, having nothing to do with the spiritual life of the religious organizations." "The Orthodox Church herself condemned explicitly and absolutely those renegades who betrayed her loyal and honest line of conduct towards Soviet government." A little farther on we find there two articles written by members of the Orthodox clergy: "Our Church is Free" and "We freely profess our Faith in Jesus Christ our Lord." The three remaining chapters of this first part are chiefly concerned with the part played by the Russian Orthodox Church in organizing the resistance to the invader. Thus Chapter II is called "The Orthodox Church and the War," and mostly contains messages addressed to the faithful by Church dignitaries, exhorting them to do everything in their power to contribute to victory. Chapter III describes the patriotic spirit of the faithful and of the clergy. Chapter IV speaks of the attitude towards Fascism of various dignitaries of the Orthodox Church abroad, especially of Oriental Patriarchs.

For all those who take an interest in the evolution of religious life in Russia the publication of this book certainly constitutes an event of great importance. We shall try to appreciate it as objectively as possible.

The authors of the present book are right when they deplore the state of religious affairs in Russia before 1917. The Orthodox Church was strictly dependent on the State: thus the profession of faith had become a sort of compulsory formality for laymen. Governed by a strongly centralized State, the Church lost control of her children following the spread of ideas of social reforms. Tolerance with regard to other religions, although it had been enlarged in 1905, did not extend to freedom of conscience; an Orthodox, for instance, could not practically embrace another religion. L. Tikhomiroff himself, one of the founders of the Russian Monarchical doctrine, uttered prophetic words before 1917, saying that if the separation of the Church from the State were not immediately effected he expected a revolution without delay.

After the 1917 revolution the Orthodox Church found herself in a reversed position; the power was in the hands of a party who proclaimed—at least for Russian consumption—that religion was "the opium of the people." It would take too much space to describe the evolution of the Orthodox Church in Russia since 1917. Had the state of religious affairs been normal in Russia on the eve

of the present war, would the solemn attestation made in this book by the highest dignitaries of the Orthodox Church have been necessary to declare that the Church "is not persecuted by the Bolshevists"? It must be pointed out that, to our knowledge, the present book is the first publication in Russia since 1926 which is not directed against the Orthodox religion, but does not speak about other religious faiths existing in Russia. The publication of such a book is not conceivable elsewhere—in America, for instance, where the Polish Ambassador had to make a declaration on religious tolerance in Russia in order to ensure the lease-lend agreement to that country. It is obvious that the increasing part played by the Orthodox Church in Russia since the beginning of the war, and especially the restoration of the Patriarchate—which by a strange coincidence happened ten days before the arrival in Moscow of the Archbishop of York—are a step towards the conciliation and traditional collaboration between the Church and the Government. These changes, as well as many others not to be mentioned in this notice, are they not sufficient proof that conditions of social life have not yet taken a stable form in Russia?

Journal of Moscow's Patriarchate, Nos. 1 and 2, September and October, 1943.

This monthly publication was started immediately after the re-establishment of the Patriarchate and is the first periodical since many years devoted to the Orthodox religion. Its aim is to publish "the official decisions of the Patriarch and of the Holy Synod and their messages, articles of a religious character and others concerned with the life of the Church." The first number is chiefly devoted to the re-establishment of the Patriarchate; the second number, apart from current affairs, describes the visit to Moscow of the Archbishop of York (September, 1943) and gives a review of the following book: *The Russian Orthodox Church and the Great Patristic War*, Ecclesiastical Documents, by A. P. Kuznetsky, pp. 100, published by the Patriarchate of Moscow, 1943.

L. B.

The Bugle. No. 31. May, 1944.

One of the famous London multiple stores once adopted as its slogan "The supply of any article from a white elephant to a mouse trap." *The Bugle* maintains something of this universal range of versatility, and the present number has, as in past numbers, drawn its interests from far-scattered sources, which is an admirable trait, for the magazine finds its readers in a wide field, and is published in many languages.

The agricultural article is well illustrated, but a fuller description would quite possibly have been welcomed by many readers, since sheep-rearing plays so large a part in agricultural life in the Middle East.

There are two articles illustrating ancient art in India and Afghanistan, and readers may be interested to compare the standard of art arrived at by the artists of India at the beginning of the Christian era with the work executed by artists of Afghanistan. The pictures of the present war are realistic and forcibly illustrate the arduous task of the sailors in maintaining aid to Russia by the northern route.

The glamour pictures are perhaps less exciting than usual; still, the magazine ends with a fine display of legs, painted, unpainted and in the process of being painted, and the reader who does not close the paper with a feeling of having received full value must indeed be hard to please.

A. C. G.

The following books in Turkish have been sent to the library by Mr. Iain Gordon Campbell. Turkish books in this country are scarce; the Council are very grateful to Mr. Campbell for his generous gift.

Tarih Vesikaları. Historical Documents. Vol. I., No. 3, October, 1941;

Vol. I., No. 4, December, 1941. Brought out by the Ministry of Education once in two months. Contents: Articles on historical documents and events (amongst them "Documents concerning the Küre Copper Mine").

La Société Anonyme. By M. Rachid Erer, late Head Inspector and Minister of Finance. Imprimerie Cumhuriyet, Istanbul, 1938. In French. A survey of the Limited Company, Big Industry, the Limited Company Mine, Foreign Limited Companies in Turkey, Eastern Railways. With Table of Chefs de Bureaux; Encyclopædia.

Islam-Türk Ansiklopedisi. Islamic-Turkish Encyclopædia. Nos. 43-50. A periodical of the Muhitul Maarif (Educational Club or Circle). A weekly scientific review at present appearing every fortnight. Contains articles on, and definitions of, religious matters (and rites), and general terms and names, in alphabetical order.

Islam Ansiklopedisi. Encyclopædia of Islam. Dictionary of the Islamic world; Geography; Ethnography; Biography. Translated, compiled and published by a committee set up by the Faculty of Literature, Istanbul University, by order of the Ministry of Education. Parts 1-5, 7: With the help of the Union of International Academics and the collaboration of renowned orientalists. Contributors: M. Th. Houtsma, T. W. Arnold, R. Basset, R. Hartmann, A. J. Weninck, W. Heffening, E. Lévi-Provençal, H. A. R. Gibb, and A. Schaade. Parts 8, 12, and 20: Translated and compiled in conformity with the Leyden system of printing, and published in an amended and completed form by a committee set up by the Faculty of Literature at the University of Istanbul by order of the Ministry of Education. Istanbul, Maarif Matbaası (Education Press), 1940. Preface in Part I., January, 1940.

Productive Forces of New Turkey. Orhan Karakose. 1941. Imprimerie Boisseau, Toulouse. (Does not include industry—natural products only.)

PALESTINE: THE SEVENTH DOMINION LEAGUE

In *The Times* of November 7, on the same day that the murder of Lord Moyne by two members of the "Stern gang" was reported, there was the following notice:

NEW JEWISH MOVEMENT: Lord Strabolgi, at a meeting held at the Savoy Hotel, London, yesterday, announced the formation of the Jewish Dominion of Palestine League.

The League's main object is the "transformation of Palestine into a self-governing Jewish State, on both sides of the Jordan, with dominion status within the British Empire." The League will also aim at "furthering friendship between the British and Jewish peoples, and encouraging co-operation between Palestine and the neighbouring Arab territory."

The Times was, however, mistaken in speaking of this as a *new* Jewish movement, for the first meeting was held in February, 1928, and although no report appeared in any English paper (English taken in the sense as not Jewish) it gained importance from the names of those who gave their support, more especially some forty Members of Parliament. The first meeting followed the publication of the late Colonel Josiah Wedgwood's book *The Seventh Dominion*, and the review of that book in the *Journal* for April, 1929, was so full of commonsense and can be so well applied in its general sense to the present that it is worth repeating:

The Seventh Dominion. By Josiah Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P. (London: Labour Publishing Co.) 1928.

This is a most difficult book to take seriously. It comes at the very moment when the Jewish leaders themselves have abandoned the old idea of a Jewish Palestine and are prosecuting a world-wide campaign for the new ideal of a Jewish cultural centre. In the second place, not even Colonel Wedgwood has ventured to assert that the Jews in Palestine or elsewhere share his aspirations; all that we are told is "that the Jews themselves cannot desire" to be excluded from the British Empire, and that they "would be fools if they did not want to enter." In addition to this, the book bears all too close a resemblance in tone to a political pamphlet, and invites the same fate. If only Colonel Wedgwood had kept to the method he proposed—"pick out all you dislike and hit as hard as possible"—it might have left a better impression. As it is, the many valuable criticisms and suggestions he has made are apt to be overlooked in the resentment which everyone with even the slightest knowledge of the Palestine Secretariat must feel at the insinuations which he has allowed himself to make against them.

But more than anything else it is the manner of treatment that gives the book such an air of unreality. The view is narrowly focused on certain features, with the result that everything else is distorted or omitted. The League of Nations is dismissed in one brief paragraph, and never again mentioned in connection with Palestine. On the contrary, many of Colonel Wedgwood's criticisms are based on the assumption that Palestine is a "colony," and on the contrasts between the administration of Palestine and those of "all other colonies." The same disregard, natural to the enthusiast, of the other fellow's case is seen in his references to the Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian. Their opposition is, in his eyes, mere obstinacy, which only requires a little firmness on the part of the Government to be overcome. A whole chapter is devoted to the contrast offered by the successful Greek colonization of Macedonia. Of course, in this case the non-Greeks were deported and the land expropriated, but "if the (Palestine) Secretariat earnestly desire to find land for Jewish colonization, they will find enough to go on with, some in Palestine and more in Transjordan. Governments can expropriate and compensate, at least in Eastern climes, with more equity and despatch than can private corporations." Thus the way is to be cleared for the "higher civilization"—at the expense of everything that constitutes its claim to be higher.

In itself, then, *The Seventh Dominion* would seem to call for no more than the brief notice usually given to political tracts. Its importance lies in its after-effects. Before me as I write is the report of the first meeting of the (Palestine) Dominion League—a body which owes a good deal to this book, and which aims at utilizing the Jews as an instrument of imperialist policy in the Middle East. With this aim Colonel Wedgwood is in full sympathy; as the quotation above shows, he has no intention of restricting the Seventh Dominion to Palestine. Needless to say, the Dominion League has already attracted notice in the East, and that it has not resulted as yet in an active counter-movement is to be put down to the conviction—not yet lost—of the fundamental good sense and political honesty of the British people. Those who have any illusions as to its possible reactions should consider (the history of the pre-war years). Well may the Jews—and the British Empire—pray to be delivered from their friends.

All that was said in this review has been reinforced in the fifteen years which have followed its publication. The White Paper of 1939 stands. The Atlantic Charter left no room for doubt. There seems a forgetfulness amongst the members of the "Jewish Dominion of Palestine (on both sides of the

Jordan) League" that the Jews have been flying from a Government which was based on a stern nationalism as nationalist as Zionists prescribe for a Jewish Palestine.

The *Geographical Review*, July, 1944, published by the Geographical Society of New York, has an informative article, "Water Resources in Saudi Arabia" by K. S. Twitchell. This article describes briefly the relief and meagre rainfall of the four states, Hejaz, Nejd, Asir and Hasa, and then the existing water supply of various towns and oases.

Interesting suggestions are given to improve and increase the water supply where possible and indicate what King Saud and his sons are now doing to increase the agricultural production of Saudi Arabia. Photographs of springs, wells and ancient dams are included.

"South-Western Arabia in Wartime," an address by Freya Stark, before the American Geographical Society, May 16, 1944, is with the same issue; a most interesting account of a political visit to the Yemen early in 1940.

OBITUARY

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY

The Air Ministry announced on November 17 that the aircraft in which Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Lady Leigh-Mallory were travelling to South-East Asia, and which left this country on November 14, did not arrive at its destination.

The Air Chief Marshal was on his way to take up his appointment as Air Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia Command.

Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, K.C.B., D.S.O., was born in July, 1892, at Mobberley, Cheshire, and was educated at Haileybury and Cambridge University, where he took honours in History and Law. The possibility of a legal career, however, was cut short by the outbreak of war in 1914. He immediately enlisted in the 10th Battalion of the Liverpool Regiment, and within a month was duly commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant in the Lancashire Fusiliers.

At that time he had not revealed any particular interest in flying, but after being wounded at Ypres he turned his attention to the air, and in 1916 was awarded his flying badge and seconded to the Royal Flying Corps.

For a time he was Squadron Commander in France, and during that period became deeply absorbed in this new scientific warfare.

When the war came to an end he was granted a permanent commission in the R.A.F. and began the detailed study of Army Co-operation as applied to air warfare.

From 1927 to 1931 he was Commandant of the Army Co-operation School. Army officers still recall how his tactical skill was demonstrated at field manœuvres in Britain in 1934. Once during an exercise the Fighter Wing he commanded so successfully protected the landing army and broke up enemy attacks that the exercise was reduced to a farce. He has always been a keen exponent of planned air fighting, contending that air warfare is highly scientific and not merely an affair where fighter aircraft are sent out to attack the enemy haphazardly. His systematic planning served Britain well during the Battle of Britain, when he commanded a Fighter Group which was responsible for the

destruction of a large number of enemy aircraft. Later, this time at Dieppe, his planning produced further successes. He provided the air umbrella over the ships and beaches before and during the landing. The Army themselves were the first to report on the complete success of these operations.

In 1932 he was appointed Deputy Director of Staff Duties at the Air Ministry, and in December, 1935, proceeded to Iraq as Senior Air Staff Officer. He returned to Britain about two years later to command No. 12 Fighter Group, which position he held at the outbreak of war. He was appointed A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter Command in November, 1942. At the end of 1943 he was appointed Air Commander-in-Chief to the Allied Expeditionary Air Force under General Eisenhower.

On October 15, 1944, he was released from this appointment to take up the post of Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia, on the relinquishment of the appointment by Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, K.C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMES ARTHUR ROBINSON, O.B.E.

JAMES ARTHUR ROBINSON, always known as "Robbie" and perhaps the best-known figure on the North-West Frontier of India, died at Quetta on March 25, 1944. He was born on February 17, 1893, and joined the Indian Army on June 29, 1916. He was appointed to the 6th Royal Battalion (Scinde) Frontier Force Rifles. He saw service with his regiment in the last war in Mesopotamia, and later served in the Tochi Scouts. He was for seven years Assistant Director of Intelligence under the Government of India. He was placed on special duty to study the Ghilzais, and later, since the present war began, he was employed on intelligence on the North-West Frontier of India.

The above are the barren details of a career which was devoted entirely to the examination and study of the Pathan tribesman. To this work "Robbie" brought an enthusiasm and a flair which have seldom if ever been equalled. Every Pathan interested him. The small external signs of difference which the casual observer would not note between the various tribesmen meant to him an exact description of what the man was. A figure on some ridge, a man strolling in the *bazar*, the bandit who was seized by the police, were all classified rapidly and correctly. There was no need for any interrogation of what the men were. It was seldom, too, that "Robbie" failed to make the tribesman tell the whole tale, or rather a fuller tale than the fellow would have otherwise offered to a less well-informed man. On one occasion, in the Peshawar *bazar*, "Robbie" was asked who the men in front were. A glance at the pyjamas of the men enabled him to place the wearers at once. The exact length of trouser identified the tribe. It takes many years of observation to use the trousers of a Pathan as a guide to origin.

His work on the Ghilzais is a classic—full, accurate, and singularly informing. It is no exaggeration to say that owing to Colonel Robinson's efforts and wonderful control and influence over the tribesmen the Frontier has not been disturbed in this war. For, be it noted, it is very easy to make trouble, and dangerous trouble, on the Frontier. The debt to this tireless and patient and accurate expert is indeed immense.

Colonel Robinson leaves a wife and son, to whom our deep sympathy is due. But the Frontier without "Robbie" will be a strange place; one of the rare specialists in an intricate and delicate problem has been taken away, and there is no one to succeed him. Long will his memory live amongst the strange men whom he understood.

CORRESPONDENCE

YORK HOUSE, PORTUGAL STREET,
LONDON, W.C. 2.

September 15, 1944.

TO THE EDITOR.

DEAR SIR,

The article entitled "Qanats," by Colonel E. Noel, in the May number of the JOURNAL, must have been of great interest to anyone who has been to Quetta, where the Qanat or Karez is such a prominent feature of the landscape.

It is said that this form of water supply was introduced into Asia by the Greek followers of Alexander, and the fact that an ancient Karez on a small scale was found at Chanak on the Dardanelles during the British occupation in 1922-23 gives support to this idea.

The field company R.E. which formed part of the garrison during that year opened up a number of ancient fountains which had fallen into disuse under the blight of Turkish rule; several of them were on the road at the edge of the shore between Chanak and Nagara, and in all except one, if I remember right, the water had been led straight out of the hillside in little earthenware pipes, which had become entirely blocked with the vegetation of centuries. In the one exception the water was supplied from a spring several hundred yards inland and flowed along a sloping gallery with vertical shafts at intervals, until it emerged into a fountain at the side of the road. It had obviously been constructed in the same way as a Karez.

The country in the immediate neighbourhood of Chanak was of great historical interest. Nagara, three miles north of Chanak Kale, was the site of the ancient city of Abydos, and it was from the hill called Mal Tepe that in 480 B.C. Xerxes watched the passage of his army over the two floating bridges constructed from Abydos to points on the European shore between Madytos (Maidos) and Sestos. The width of the Dardanelles in those days must have been considerably less than it is now. Herodotus states (VII, 35) that the distance from Abydos to the opposite shore is 7 *stadia*; in other words, about 1,400 yards. The shortest distance to the opposite shore at this part is now about 2,000 yards. Furthermore, when a well was being made in 1923 near the foot of Mal Tepe many remains of earthenware articles were found at a depth of about 20 feet, which must have been well below the present level of water in the straits.

The narrowest part of the Dardanelles, between Fort Chemenlik on the Asiatic and Kilid Bahr on the European side, is now about 1,500 yards in width. In the former place were lying three large bronze guns, of magnificent design, about 2 feet in bore, and alongside a number of spherical white marble cannon balls of corresponding size; it must have been one of such missiles, 770 lbs. in weight, which was fired by the Turks from the Castle of Sestos at the passage of the Dardanelles in 1807, entering the *Lion* of sixty-four guns, killing and wounding a great many men. The guns are supposed to have been used at the siege of Constantinople.

Yours faithfully,

A. H. BELL
(Colonel).

THE EDITOR,

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES,

July 25, 1944.

DEAR SIR,

At a meeting of the Society on July 12 the lecturer said that Islam and Christianity were practically the same religion. That statement cannot be left unchallenged. Christianity is quite different from Islam, for it says, "God so loved the world

that He sent His Son," whereas Islam affirms that God has no motives for His acts. Islam says that right is what God has commanded and wrong what He has forbidden; in other words, right and wrong are dependent on the existence and will of God. Christianity says that goodness and evil would still be right and wrong even if there were no God. No more is needed on this point.

The lecturer said that Islam was simple, and quoted the Koran in support. To be scientific in his method he should have compared the Islam of the Koran with the Christianity of the Gospels, which is as simple, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself." Theological Islam is as complicated as ecclesiastical Christianity, as is shown by the Muslim's criticism, "as abtruse as the 'acquisition' of al-Ash'ari." The doctrine of 'acquisition' is part of Muslim orthodoxy.

Yours sincerely,

A. S. TRITTON.

THE EDITOR,

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SIR,

I have read with interest the able exposition of the case of Islam in India by Sir Firozkhan Noon in the July-October number. I agree with the view that Islam does not differ fundamentally from Christianity. I always regarded both religions in this light. The suggestion made by Colonel Newcombe for the presentation of Islam to ordinary people of the West, as possessing no fundamental difference from Unitarianism, is, I believe, relevant and may go very far to eradicate the traditional belief amongst the masses of the West—a relic of Crusading days—namely, that the two great religions are by nature antagonistic. I do not propose to quarrel with those who claim a monopoly of moral principles, lofty ideals and ethical standards in life. Our answer to such folk is, "Leave them blind in their ignorance."

I should like, with your permission, to make use of this opportunity and take exception to a statement made by a "Member," who has chosen, for reasons better known to himself, not to disclose his personality. His statement ran as follows: "I am not at all certain that this backwardness" of Mohammedans in India "is not rather an inherent vice in Mohammedans, because the same thing occurs in Palestine" (*sic*). Why of all countries of Islam he has chosen Palestine is not difficult to guess. This I am afraid is a bold charge, and it cannot carry weight until the Member is prepared to come to the open and substantiate his statement, which is as much unfounded as it is contrary to facts and history. In justice to Islam and the million Moslems in Palestine he must hear our answer. After all, it was he who knocked at our door. Should he not be prepared to argue the point in the columns of your review his statement will remain a mere imputation.

We would like to refer the Member to the Bible, the Arab sources and the Crusaders' chronicles and ask him to compare to himself between Joshua's conquest of Palestine, the entry of 'Omar to Jerusalem, and the Crusaders' occupation of the Holy City. If he has visited Palestine or lived in it he must have seen that by far the noblest, the most majestic, the most beautiful buildings in the land are those built by Moslem rulers. In Jerusalem alone one can count not less than 120 institutions, such as schools, hospitals, hospices, etc., under Moslem rule in the Middle Ages. Modern architects will continue to learn for a long time from those lasting monuments. For the contribution of Islam to science, mathematics, mysticism, philosophy and medicine, he should consult books such as *The Legacy of Islam* and authors like Gibb, Nicholson, Hitti, Cresswell, Lanc-Poole.

Having talked and lived with thousands of Arab boys, and other descendants of all races and creeds now residing in the Near East, for the last quarter of a century, I must state here that I have not yet hit on the astonishing theory that I.Q.s (Intelligence Quotients) vary according to religion. Neither have I noticed any inherent vice nor any inherent good quality which is confined to members of a particular religion or race. On the contrary, my long experience with youth leads me to believe that human beings are much alike in their physical and psychological traits, and Moslems after all are normal human beings.

Jerusalem with its magnificent institutions, Cairo with its mosques and universities, Damascus with its mosques and bazaars, Baghdad with its universities and palaces, and lastly Amman, the newly constructed capital with its 50,000 inhabitants, were all built by Moslems. The thousand thriving villages in Palestine, with their 500,000 dunums of olive trees, 130,000 dunums of citrus trees, over 500,000 dunums of vines, fig trees, almonds and fruit trees, the wellnigh 600 schools in towns and villages, the hospitals, mosques, hospices, scattered all over the country could not have been set up and developed by an inherently backward people.

That Islam in Palestine, Syria and the Near East suffered a severe blow, after the downfall of Baghdad in the seventh century of the Heira, and has not kept pace in some aspects with the trend of modern civilization, is surely not the fault of religion, but is caused by the force of circumstances, mainly political and military.

Now that they are being given the opportunity to co-operate with their traditional friends the English they are proving their mettle. Thus we note the progress in education, social reconstruction and welfare, so noticeable in all the countries of the Near East. But progress is bound to be gradual.

The Member may be interested to know that Moslems in Palestine have about 80,000 boys and girls in public and private schools, some 400 studying in Beirut University and about the same number in Cairo and Alexandria Universities. Quite a good number of those who can afford education abroad frequent British, American and Continental universities. He may be further interested to hear that scores of Moslem youths who have matriculated in Palestine and were fortunate enough to complete their studies at Oxford, Cambridge, London, Exeter and Nottingham Universities, etc., have returned with honours degrees and distinguished careers. The winner of the Lubbock Prize for Mathematics in England for 1942, an old student of mine, is a Moslem from an Arab village in Palestine.

We Moslems are taught by our religion to respect others and their beliefs. Unfortunately we do not always find adherents of other religions than our own reciprocate this feeling. We find that even eminent men such as Palgrave, in his introduction to the Oxford edition of the Quran, lose their temper when writing about our Prophet. But Palgrave belongs to another age.

Such men as Palgrave and the Member forget that by the precepts of our religion the Christian and Jewish prophets are highly venerated. That is why charges against Islam and the Prophet are left unanswered and retaliation is impossible. Indeed, their attitude is most unchristian.

We are not at all certain that onesidedness, partiality, narrowmindedness, bigotry and fanaticism are not rather inherent vices in some of the adherents of other faiths than our own, because the same tune is played invariably whenever Islam or its Prophet makes a subject of discussion.

The sooner the world learns that all great religions have as much to take from others as to give them, the better for it and its inhabitants. May we live to see that age!

AHMAD SAMIH BIN SAYYID RAGHIB AL-KHALIDI.

JERUSALEM,

December 7, 1944.



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PART II.

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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

IN the year which ended in December, 1943, the *expenses* of the Society were £120 more than the revenue.

In the year which ended in December, 1944, the *income* of the Society was £113 *greater* than the expenses.

THE REASON was that we received £129 from the Inland Revenue as the result of members having signed covenants to pay their nominal subscriptions for seven years. This increase in revenue has cost members NOTHING.

So far we have received just over 300 covenants out of a membership of over 1,500—that is, *under 20 per cent.*

The expenses of the Society are bound to increase after the war: the Journal will again be published four times a year, lectures will increase in number and the dinner club will be revived. More important still, our staff must be adequately remunerated.

This can ONLY be done if we increase our membership *and* if more members will sign covenants. REMEMBER that this does NOT cost you anything but it DOES help the Society's funds.

The Council again appeal for your help in the matter.

DEED OF COVENANT

I
of
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of

Address of Witness to your signature

Occupation of Witness

NOTICES

THE principal object of the Royal Central Asian Society is to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or war service may now lie in one of the countries of Central and Western Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 5s. There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend *him*
her for membership.

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His connection with Asia is :
Her

NOTICES

THE Council are very grateful for the following accessions to the Library :

Iraq Irrigation Handbook, Part I, with Plates, presented by the Director-General of Irrigation, Iraq; *Papers of the Islam Society of Iran*, presented by Dr. M. K. Hikmat; *Highlands of Asiatic Turkey*, by Percy, presented by R. T. Leather, Esq.; *Highlands of Ethiopia*, by Harris, 3 vols., presented by R. T. Leather, Esq.; *Travels in East Africa, Zanzibar and Pemba*, by Fitzgerald, presented by R. T. Leather, Esq.; *The Mission to Menelik*, 1897, by Count Gleichen, presented by R. T. Leather, Esq.; *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, 1883-1941*, by Sir Robert Reid, presented by the author.

We have been asked to give the following information about the Turkish House in London :

British subjects interested in Turkish affairs may like to know that they are invited to become Associate Members of the Londra Turk Halkevi.

Associate Members are entitled to attend the monthly lectures and other functions and to use the library, but the main object of the Londra Turk Halkevi is to cement the good relations between the peoples of Turkey and Great Britain.

The annual subscription is one pound, and application should be made to the Secretary at 14, Fitzhardinge Street, London, W. 1.

Members and contributors only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

SIR CHARLES BELL, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., I.C.S.

APPRECIATION BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES,
K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

WITH the death of Sir Charles Bell at Victoria, British Columbia, there passes off the stage the greatest authority on Tibet. A scholar of Winchester and of New College, Oxford, he joined the Indian Civil Service and was first posted to Bengal. However, he soon undertook the work that has won him fame, upon being appointed to Sikkim in 1904. Later he visited Bhutan on an exploratory mission, which led to a second successful mission in 1910, by the terms of which the foreign relations of that State, which is inhabited by Tibetans, became the charge of the British.

But the culmination of his career was in Tibet. Taking part in the Tibet Conference with Great Britain and China in 1913-14, he followed this up by spending 1920-21 in that country, where he won high credit by his success as the leader of a diplomatic mission.

His charming personality and his many fine qualities won over the Dalai Lama, and substituted friendship for the dislike which had previously affected British relations with Tibet. Retiring in 1919, and created a K.C.I.E. in 1922—he was already a C.M.G.—Bell settled down to write *Tibet—Past and Present*, the standard work on the subject, and other valuable works. In 1937 he was awarded the Lawrence of Arabia medal, when it was laid down, among other statements, that “he has acquired a greater knowledge of the Tibetan language, literature, manners and customs than any other Englishman.”

To conclude, Bell's friendly and absolutely straightforward character made him the leading British figure in Tibet, where his successors undoubtedly benefit from the beneficent influence which he established.

The Council very deeply regret the death of the following members, killed in action :

Major F. Lennox Boyd.
Major J. A. Clarke, R.E.

SOUTH-WEST ARABIA: TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

By HAROLD INGRAMS, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on January 24, 1945, Lieut.-General H. G. Martin, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., in the Chair.

Introducing the lecturer the Chairman said that Mr. Ingrams had been intimately connected with affairs in South-West Arabia since he first went to Aden as a political officer in 1934. Later as British Resident Adviser at Mukalla, Mr. Ingrams, accompanied by his wife, carried out a series of journeys, which were not only of scientific value but which paved the way for a remarkably successful pacification of the tribes in the Hadhramaut, who were induced by peaceful persuasion to lay aside their hereditary blood feuds. It was in recognition of the part that Mrs. Ingrams played in helping to make this possible that the Lawrence Memorial Medal was awarded conjointly to Mr. and Mrs. Ingrams in 1939; an example that was followed by the Royal Geographical Society in the award of their Founder's Medal in 1940. Mr. Ingrams returned to this country from the Western Aden Protectorate at the end of 1944.

The lecturer opened with an account of a recent journey in the Yemen, and it is hoped that this will appear as a separate article in the next issue of the Journal.

OF late months there has been greater activity in the question of Arab unity. The conference at Alexandria was stimulated by the promise of His Majesty's Government to give full support to any scheme that will command general approval for strengthening the cultural, economic and political ties between the Arab countries. The conference was attended by representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, and there was an observer from Palestine. Talk in relation to Arab unity is generally concentrated on the more advanced areas in the north, but sooner or later the matter must affect the whole of the peninsula, and the people of Southern Arabia must be drawn into closer touch with their brethren in the north.

I thought, therefore, that it might be of interest if I tried to give you a short description of conditions in South-West Arabia as they have been during the last few years. One way or another during the last six years of absence from England I have had to do with all parts of this area, and though I do not claim to know them all equally well, I thought perhaps I knew enough from seeing them personally and dealing with their affairs to justify my giving you my own impressions of them as a slight contribution to the material for the study of the question of Arab unity in relation to all Arab countries, including the less well known. But I make no claim whatever to give a final or authoritative picture, so you must not regard what I say about them as more than a personal view.

I have called this lecture "South-West Arabia: To-day and To-morrow," but as regards to-morrow I merely want to indicate a possibility or two, more with the object of asking the question, What can we do to help this more backward part of the Arab world to fit itself to take a real part in the League of Arab States which may eventually be established?

South-West Arabia is to-day divisible into four distinct parts, and I propose to take each of these in turn, giving a sketch of how I see its

present condition. It is not easy to illustrate that with lantern slides, but I wanted to use the illustrations mainly to enable you to see some of the differences between each division, something of the nature of the country, the appearance of the people and, above all, the architecture.

THE DIVISIONS OF SOUTH-WEST ARABIA

From an Arab point of view, in geography and history South-West Arabia consists of two countries, the Yemen and the Hadhramaut, but actually to-day its four distinct areas are the Kingdom of the Yemen, the Western Aden Protectorate, the Hadhramaut or Eastern Aden Protectorate, and the Colony of Aden.

In Islamic times and until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Western Aden Protectorate and Aden were part of the Kingdom of the Yemen, but various governors and sheikhs of the Western Aden Protectorate only held an uneasy allegiance to the Yemen and broke away as practically independent units. They remained independent until they concluded treaties with His Majesty's Government, mostly last century. Thus the Aden Protectorate gradually grew up. What is now the Colony of Aden was captured from Lahej in 1839 or ceded at later dates. Towards the end of the nineteenth century treaties were made with the coastal chiefs of the Hadhramaut. In 1914 a British sphere of influence in South-West and South-East Arabia was arranged with the Turks. The Turks had twice occupied but never fully conquered the Yemen, and their insecure rule came to an end after the last war, when the Imam became independent.

In pre-Islamic times the Hadhramaut was for a period an independent kingdom. From the time of the Prophet's mission until the ninth century it submitted uneasily to the rule of the Caliphate, and then became independent again, though for periods during succeeding centuries—until the thirteenth century—it was claimed by the Yemen. There was a final short period of Yemeni domination at the end of the seventeenth century, but the Zeidis were finally turned out in 1704. The Hadhramaut remained independent until 1888, when the British Protectorate over the Qu'aiti started.

Down to 1937 the Aden Protectorate, often known as the Nine Cantons, and the Hadhramaut were treated as two ill-defined entities, but as the treaties with the chiefs of both were similar, the two were united as one protectorate by Order in Council that year. When, however, a forward policy in the Hadhramaut was started in that same year, they were again considered separate for administrative purposes, and the old Aden Protectorate was called the Western Protectorate and the Hadhramaut and Mahra country the Eastern.

There are such great differences between the Western Aden Protectorate and the Eastern Aden Protectorate that they should be considered separate areas when one is thinking of the divisions of South-West Arabia. Indeed, the Eastern Aden Protectorate could well be considered as two areas itself—the Hadhramaut in the west, and in the east, linked with Socotra, the Mahri country, much more primitive than the Hadhramaut and probably more primitive than the Western Aden Protectorate. It has

its own language, and in its trade, which is dhow-borne, unlike that of Mukalla, which is largely steamer-borne in normal times, it deals with Muscat, the Persian Gulf and India, and to some extent with East Africa, for the coastal Mahris are great seafarers. The Mahris, unlike the Hadhramis, do not settle abroad, so by reason of their habits and their speech they are an even more exclusive and secluded people than the Hadhramis. But in effect little is seen or heard of the Mahris, and their territory is considered part of the Eastern Aden Protectorate, and they have their contacts with His Majesty's Government through the Residency at Mukalla.

THE WESTERN ADEN PROTECTORATE

To me the outstanding features of the political set-up of the Western Protectorate are the position of His Highness the Sultan of Lahej, the large number of treaty chiefs, and the general tribal atmosphere of the country. A glance at the map will show why the Sultan of Lahej is the most important chief in the protectorate, for his territory stands at the door of Aden, and through it land traffic from the Yemen and from a great deal of the protectorate must pass. It is the transit dues on goods that have made Lahej the richest state of the Western Protectorate, and with the money His Highness has managed to develop Lahej territory as a sort of private estate, which pays because it grows so much fruit and vegetables which are consumed in Aden. For he has water, and a good deal of the spate of Yemen pass with the Wadi al Kabir and the Wadi as Saghir, which flow through his territory.

So that geography has played a great part in determining the part that Lahej should play in the protectorate. But much of the prestige that the Sultan enjoys to-day is due to his own wisdom. While strenuously guarding the internal affairs of his own Sultanate from external interference, His Highness has consistently given every possible help to His Majesty's Government in matters of defence and so on, and has also co-operated so wholeheartedly in the settling of disputes and political matters generally that he is almost universally accepted as an impartial arbitrator with no axe to grind. This personal achievement of Sultan 'Abdul Karim has made him the leader of the Western Protectorate, and it is really remarkable, as the general tendency of tribal chiefs in the protectorate is not to brook interference in their affairs from others.

There are in the Western Protectorate twenty chiefs in direct treaty relationship with His Majesty's Government, and seven others who have agreements. There are about thirty-five all told who correspond directly with Government. The "nine cantons" are the 'Abdali, the Amiri, the Haushabi, the Fadhli, the Yafa'i, the Subeihi, the 'Aqrabi, the 'Aulaqi, and the 'Alawi—the original tribes with whom treaties were made. The other tribes in the Western Protectorate—the Audhali and the Beihani—did not come into treaty relations until later. But the Yafa'i, the 'Aulaqi, and the Subeihi are divided. In the Upper Yafa'i confederation there are treaties with the Upper Yafa'i Sultan, the Naqibs of Mausatta, the Dhubi Sheikh, the Maflahi Sheikh, the Hadhrami Sheikh, and the Shaibi Sheikh. In Lower Yafa' there is only one treaty, with the Sultan. In 'Aulaqi there are treaties with the Upper 'Aulaqi Sultan, the Lower 'Aulaqi Sultan, and

the Upper 'Aulaqi Sheikh. Of the Subeihi Sheikhs, the Barahimi, the Atifi, and the Rifa'i have treaties. The reason for the large number of treaties was the desire to protect the land frontiers of Aden from incursion by foreign powers and from tribal assault. But the haphazard way in which the treaties were entered into has been responsible for a lot of confusion, because the policy has extended gradually from merely interest in the security of Aden to the welfare of the tribes themselves. When the treaties were made the country was largely unvisited. Chiefs came down to Aden, and on explaining their importance were given treaties. They were induced to do so by the fact that treaty chiefs were given stipends and presents and entertainment. But when the Government decided to stop giving treaties as freely as before, there were still a number of chiefs as important as those who had had treaties and the importance of many of the treaty chiefs declined. They died, and their successors were not men of the same personality. So that there is good reason for revising the treaties, and this is now often under consideration, though there is a good deal of difficulty about it.

All these treaty chiefs are juridically of the same status. On the plane of precedence the Sultan of Lahej comes first with a salute of eleven guns and the title of Highness, the Amir of Dhala, the Fadhli Sultan, and the Lower Yafa'i Sultan have nine-gun salutes. But, apart from Lahej, none of these kingdoms can be said to have a government and there are wide ranges of differences of authority between them. Indeed, some of them are totally without authority. Some have several thousands of tribesmen and subjects under their normal authority, some have perhaps no more than a few dozens. The main feature of the protectorate for the last century or so has been anarchy, and the population from Sultans downwards is to an overwhelming extent tribal. There are no mercantile centres of importance and no cultural centres at all. There are few Seiyids, comparatively speaking, and their standard of learning is much lower than in Aden or the Hadhramaut, from which latter they most of them originate. Apart from Lahej there is not a town in the protectorate of any great size or importance, and the make-up of the treaty chiefdoms outside the 'Abdali State does not lend itself to the building of governments at present, and few of them have the potential sources of sufficient revenue to do much in that way.

Historically, of course, the Western Protectorate was never a province of Arabia. The provinces of South Arabia were Yemen, Hadhramaut, Shihr (which meant the Mahra country), Dhofar, and 'Uman, and the Western Aden Protectorate is really part of the dusty skirt of the Yemen.

Politically, therefore, the set-up is not very promising. The best chance of making a country of the protectorate is by encouraging federation between different areas. It is probably not possible for it to become one country with the Sultan of Lahej as its leader, though his group will probably always tend to be the more important. He is already the suzerain of the Subeihis and the Haushabis, and has intervened successfully at times in the affairs of the Fadhli, the Amiri, the Yafa'is, and the Lower 'Aulaqis. The Amiris, with the Quteibis and Alawis, could, from a geographical point of view, naturally federate with his bloc, but the

Audhalis, 'Aulaqis, and Beihanis are too far away, and it is doubtful if any federation with them could be very real. The Yafa'is, though they are excellent outside their own mountains, are at present a very difficult problem from the point of view of good order and government in them. I had almost forgotten the 'Aqrabis, but as that kingdom consists in effect of only one village on the borders of Aden and Lahej they hardly constitute a problem. But it is possible that some day steps towards the federation of the protectorate by areas may come to pass.

If, however, the political outlook is not very promising, experience of recent years has shown that in potential agricultural resources the Western Protectorate is far better off than the Eastern. It is true that its total area is not much more than half that of the Eastern and that by far the greater proportion of it is barren mountains or arid desert, but none the less the cultivable acreage is greater than that of the Eastern and the people are on the whole better agriculturists. There are fewer beduin, and the tribesmen, unlike those of the Eastern Protectorate, are many of them tillers of the land on which they live, rather than employers or financiers of a peasant class with the idea that manual work is unbecoming to dignity. On the coastal area there are large and useful oases at Lahej, Abyan—by far the biggest—and Ahwar. These oases are sure of regular spates from the Yemen highlands behind, and can grow useful crops of grain, principally millet, and vegetables and fruits of the coarser tropical kinds. There are good patches of soil in the Dhala and Yafa'i mountains, and the latter grow the best coffee in Arabia, but at Mukeiras in Audhali country there is a really important fertile area at over 7,000 feet where temperate crops are grown and which is now producing in fair abundance European vegetables and fruits of excellent quality which include potatoes, tomatoes, lettuces and so on, apples, peaches, plums, and apricots. The main difficulty in disposing of these good things, for which a ready market exists in Aden for local consumption and for shipping, is communication and transport. The Audhali plateau is over a hundred miles from Aden and is cut off from the maritime plain and the foothills by a 4,000-foot, almost perpendicular bluff, the picturesque Kaur al Audilla. So road-making is difficult and expensive, and the bad tracks play havoc with the lorries used for transporting the produce to Aden from the foot of the bluff, down which it is transported on animals. If ever the Yemen is developed agriculturally it will have great advantages over Audhali country, for roads can be better made. The main agricultural produce that now comes by caravan and lorry from the Yemen is the highly perishable and iniquitous qat, and the qat traffic is probably centuries old. Better communication and better agriculture in the Yemen would therefore make it difficult for the Audhali country to be economically worth while. Beyond the Audhalis and descending towards the heat of the desert is Beihan country, which drains to the Rub'al Khali. Having high mountains behind it, it is reasonably watered, and millet cultivation is being extended there.

The present tendency in the improvement of conditions in the Western Aden Protectorate is to select an area where conditions are favourable and send a political officer to assist the chief to establish control over his people,

to advise him in his rule so as to establish confidence in him as a ruler, to help in agriculture, medical work, and schools. The work done so far has been of an experimental nature, but a measure of success has been achieved in the Beihan and Ahwar areas, and work in other areas, such as Shaibi country, has been started. I have not been in close touch with the work, but I believe the experiment is distinctly promising. If there is a weakness about it, it may be that there is not sufficient promise of continuity—that is to say, it may be it is too dependent on one man, the chief. The areas are small, there is no government establishment. If you have an establishment one man may fail and you can put another in, but the thing continues. If you have only one man, and he dies, there is no guarantee that his successor will be like him. Even if a political officer is permanently in the country he is dependent on there being a co-operative chief, unless he is to run the country himself.

The W.A.P. is almost entirely tribal, as I have said; there is therefore little culture. Indigenous schools are rare and there are none beyond the Quran school stage. Illiteracy is very general. But there is little doubt that schools, if provided, will be quickly filled. The main question is what will the newly educated do in their own countries? Certainly there is room for educated chiefs and for the comparatively few who are, or will be, required to help them in governing or providing social services. But the opportunities there will only absorb a few and there are no mercantile communities worth mentioning. There may be scope for some technical training and even agricultural training, but it is not easy to see how the tribesman already expert at the cultivation of oases, terrace cultivation in the comparatively few parts where agriculture is possible, is going to be given an education which will greatly assist him. There are few areas where over-education could cause more trouble with discontented literates than the protectorate. So that a question that to my mind still requires much thought is—what sort of education can be given which will help the advancement of the country and not upset it? And I don't think that a satisfactory answer is yet forthcoming as to what can be the future of the W.A.P. Until it is answered it is difficult to decide on the lines education should follow, for there is nothing old to build on.

THE EASTERN ADEN PROTECTORATE

So much for the W.A.P. The Eastern Aden Protectorate provides a great contrast. Perhaps it may be helpful to catalogue the contrasts briefly. In the first place, the area of the E.A.P. is between 70,000 and 80,000 square miles, while that of the W.A.P. is between 30,000 and 40,000. The estimated population of both is about 300,000, so that the E.A.P. is much more sparsely inhabited. But the bulk of the population lives on the coast and in the Wadis Du'an and Hadhramaut 100 to 150 miles inland. So that there are vast areas which are practically uninhabited. Therefore there are bigger distances to cover between communities. In the second place, as I have already said, the total acreage of cultivable land is very much less than the W.A.P., and the people who own it are much less agriculturally minded than the farmer-owners of the W.A.P. It is an essentially desert country, with the Rub'al Khali just

behind it, and not the high mountains of the Yemen. Its height above the sea-level nowhere exceeds 6,000 feet and is generally not more than 3,500. It has therefore no regular rainfall.

Then, as regards treaties, while the W.A.P. has a total of about thirty-five chiefs in direct relation with His Majesty's Government, the E.A.P. has only seven, of which one, the Kathiri, is comparatively recent. The reason is that in the E.A.P. all that was required was to keep foreign powers off the coast. All the six original treaties with E.A.P. rulers were with coastal chiefs. Starting from the west, 'Irqa and Haura are only small villages. The two Wahidi Sultans come next, then the Qu'aiti, the largest of them all, whose state to-day covers some 50,000 square miles, and then the Mahra, which includes Socotra Island. While the W.A.P. is historically part of the Yemen, and has now a new and natural capital in Aden which supplies it with all its requirements, the E.A.P. is historically and geographically detached and has a local commercial capital in Mukalla, but looks to India, Singapore, and Java for its cultural and social contacts.

The Hadhramaut is historically and geographically a country in itself, and consists of the Wahidi Sultanates, with the two little Sheikdoms of 'Irqa and Haura, which are really ports in the country of the Dhiyeibi tribe, who are a Wahidi tribe, and the Qu'aiti and Kathiri States. I propose not to say anything more of the Mahra country because as yet little is known about it, though in the last year or two more has been learnt of Socotra.

You will have gathered, I think, that, owing to its desert nature and lack of rainfall, the prospects of the development of agriculture in the Hadhramaut are not very promising, and as the various explorations that have taken place to date have not discovered any mineral resources, it does not look as though the economic future is very bright. The best agricultural areas are Gheil Ba Wazir, on the coast, where Hamumi tobacco is very successfully grown, and this brings in a revenue of about Rs. 200,000 a year to the state, and Meifa, in which conditions have been considerably improved in the last few years and where some further development is possible. It was hoped that the alluvial silt of the Wadi Hadhramaut would prove a fertile area for wide development if water could be found, but experiment has shown that it is largely brackish and, bearing in mind the desert surroundings, it is probable that any further supplies of water which boring might discover would not be sufficient to wash out the salt. It is unfortunate, too, that the bulk of the population, the seiyids and tribesmen, do not take to working on the land themselves, as do the tribesmen of the W.A.P., but rely on dhafa, a class of poor townsmen who are almost in the position of serfs. These dhafa lived by building the palaces of the rich and working their wells, but the fall of Singapore and Java cut off the supplies of money from the Far East so that the rich could no longer maintain them. The beduin had lived by carrying supplies from the coast to the interior, but with the falling off of imports they too suffered. On top of this catastrophe there was a seven-year drought from 1937 to 1944, which meant the loss of crops, flocks, and 50 per cent. of the working camels, so that between the difficulties of

getting food from abroad in war-time, the loss of money from the Far East, and the drought, famine ensued. I am thankful to say that owing to the generous help of His Majesty's Government and to the breaking of the drought, conditions are now much better, but from the point of view of this survey the thing to be remembered is that in all probability the produce of the country cannot sustain much more than a quarter of the population and that it is very largely dependent on money from abroad. Of old, the ancient Hadhramaut lived on the incense trade, so that the Mediterranean countries provided the cash. When the incense went by sea the Hadhramis learnt to emigrate, and the present Hadhramaut has drawn its cash from the Far East, East Africa, Egypt, the Sudan, Abyssinia—the countries to which the people migrate. One out of every three or four Hadhramis lives and works abroad. Emigration or means to earn money abroad is an absolute essential to the Hadhramaut, and there are grounds for fearing it is not going to be so easy in the future as it has been in the past.

So much for the gloomier side of the picture. In 1938 I described to the Royal Central Asian Society how a three-year peace embracing the whole of the Hadhramaut had been made and how the organization of government had started. To my mind the brightest thing about the Hadhramaut is the way the Government of the Qu'aiti State has advanced and developed social services, and, serious as the famine was, principally in part of the Inner Hadhramaut, out of it has grown a number of educational and medical developments which would probably not have matured if there had been no famine. The State Government had so far advanced by the time it came, that it was able to cope with difficulties and there developed a real spirit of service. It could not have managed on its own resources if His Majesty's Government had not helped so generously, but what the state could do in a financial way it did and the service its officials gave could not have been provided without it.

At the time when reorganization of the Government started about seven years ago the revenue was about Rs. 6,30,000, of which Rs. 3,10,000 were spent on Government services; Rs. 2,25,000 of that went to irregular soldiers and to slaves. This year the revenue is estimated at just under Rs. 15,00,000. On April 1, 1939, there was a general deficit of Rs. 40,000, because the late Sultan used to take all the cash he could to India. On April 1, 1944, there was a credit balance of Rs. 14,00,000. In this year the Government is preparing to spend Rs. 16,00,000, of which Rs. 4,00,000 goes to the maintenance of security forces. There are forts, with soldiers or gendarmerie, and garrison towns all round the country, so that security is very greatly improved. The Budget also includes, under various heads, about Rs. 300,000 for relief work direct and indirect. The amount paid on education has risen from Rs. 6,000 in 1934 to Rs. 154,000 in 1944. Only Rs. 5,550 was spent on medical work in 1934; in 1944 the sum was Rs. 74,000 for medical and sanitary services.

It seems to me that these figures indicate, more clearly than anything else can, progress and the will to progress. I cannot give many details of new developments, but I will mention some of them quite briefly. One of the most striking things is the growth of reciprocal confidence between

Government and beduin. Many beduin tribes who were inveterate foes of the Qu'aitis have now declared permanent peace with the Government and said they are "sons of government." The State Government has now a beduin affairs department staffed entirely by local tribesmen, and there is a system of tribal courts. There are many tribesmen in Government service, and the greater number of the soldiers and police are now tribesmen and beduin. In the old days, Hadhrami tribesmen were hardly ever employed in Government and there were very few in the forces. The only effective soldiers were Yafa'is, irregular mercenaries and slaves. Even the Government slaves have now disappeared. There is an African company in the regular army which consists of ex-slaves and Somalis and is employed on guarding an R.A.F. station, and others are employed as Government servants on the same footing as Arabs; the old slaves have been pensioned. All soldiers and police are taught to read and write, and by passing examinations in the military school can and do secure promotion. Enlistment is popular now because of the amenities provided and because a soldier can definitely expect to be more fitted for civil life when he leaves the forces. The status of a military life is very definitely advanced.

Another thing that attracts attention is the development in education. The coastal elementary schools have 1,700 boys in them instead of 300, and the education department is rapidly extending over the interior. There is an intermediate boarding school for 80 boys which opened last year. There is a boarding school attached to the Hadhrami Beduin Legion with 100 beduin boys in it, and another with 24 beduin girls. There are several town girls' schools, the biggest and best being in Mukalla with 150 girls, who learn not only to read and write, but to sew, embroider, wash, and cook. A most interesting experiment has lately been started with a whole village organized as a school, where 300 boys and girls of the serf class—a class which works hard but does very little thinking for itself—are being trained to run their own village and to learn various industries and crafts. Teachers of the Mukalla Government and other volunteers are also teaching adults of the serf class to read and write the language they speak and trying to induce in them some public health consciousness.

On the medical side a hospital is being built in Mukalla, and the sanitary state of the town—which may shortly have a municipality—has been greatly improved.

Of old, Government was mainly carried on by a handful of officials with a Sultan generally in India, but the present Sultan has spent most of his reign in his state and has a state council of officials and unofficials to help him. The executive work of Government is in charge of a state secretary and twenty organized departments.

In the Kathiri State progress has not been nearly so spectacular. The revenue is much smaller and the Wadi Hadhramaut is so divided by the jealousies of Sultans and tribesmen, and handicapped by the unwillingness or inability of the bulk of the seiyids to get together and co-operate, that the Government is not nearly so alive. There is, however, a state secretary at Seiyun and a good deal of the work of a government has been organized.

The Wahidi Sultanate of Balhaf asked for advisory arrangements in 1939 and that of Bir 'Ali in 1943. The former was making very reasonable progress on its modest means till the war upset its Customs receipts, and security forces and schools were established. Bir 'Ali has only just started, but the town has been cleaned up, the Customs organized, and a school and dispensary provided for.

Much extension of motorable tracks has been made, and all places of importance in Qu'aiti and Kathiri territory can now be reached by car. Bir 'Ali and Balhaf soon will be, as a motor road towards Aden had passed its most difficult stretch and was getting on towards the agricultural region of Meifa in June, 1944.

So that on the whole, despite the famine, the picture is one of progress rather more than one would at first sight expect of a rather unpromising country. For beyond the handicaps of nature have been the handicaps the inhabitants have made for themselves: the chronic insecurity, the everlasting divisions, and the unsound social system of the Inner Hadhramaut, with a number of classes so acutely separated as more to resemble the castes of India than social grades in the brotherhood of Islam. And there was, on the whole, so much desire for independence on the part of all—though almost all classes interpreted it differently—that it was difficult to see how a few foreigners could get over the suspicion and help the people to achieve something. But I think that now the Qu'aiti State, at least, could stand to some extent on its own legs and would be unlikely to collapse entirely if it was left to itself, for its stability does not entirely depend on its ruler alone, although he has been such a tower of strength in promoting progress. I think the thing that would be mostly lacking if it were left to itself would be initiative. The best thing that could happen to the Hadhramaut now would be a federation of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri States and the Wahidi Sultanates. I think this could be achieved, but it is not very easy. On the Qu'aiti side the objection is to spending money in Kathiri territory, although the old hatred between the two has died out, and in Kathiri territory the difficulty is the disunion between the various sections of the Wadi Hadhramaut. It is, however, fair that the Qu'aiti State should help in Kathiri territory, as much of its Customs revenue comes from goods imported by the Kathiri State, which has no ports. Between the Wahidi Sultanates there is still intense hatred, which was fanned up a couple of years ago by the murder of the Balhaf Regent in a plot hatched by the Bir 'Ali Sultans. But as the Bir 'Ali Sultans have now turned respectable and accepted advisory arrangements, some federation could probably be brought about. Bir 'Ali, having the better harbour, will have better revenue than Balhaf, which has a larger population to provide for. One would hope for a federation which left autonomy in local matters to the constituent parts of the country, but shared the cost of social services, communications, and so on. If the Hadhramis can emigrate and if they can govern themselves with a sound federal Government, they will have something to thank us for of lasting worth, and no doubt those abroad will give a good report of the British connection.

Buried under all the politics the Hadhramaut is a cultured country.

It has far more culture than the Western Aden Protectorate, and of indigenous Arab culture, more than Aden. The outlook of Mukalla and Shihr is commercial, but recent advances in education and the provision of clubs, the organization of public debates and so on, is spreading culture of a suitable kind. The driving force behind this movement is largely local, but great assistance has been given by the Sudan Government in the provision of teachers and by the British Council and His Majesty's Government in subsidizing the intermediate school. Arab culture flourishes at a fairly high level in the Wadi Hadhramaut itself, where there are religious academies of old standing and where, when you go to a dinner-party, poetry and philosophy are commonly talked. The Wahidi country and the other tribal areas have no culture to compare with this, though almost everywhere there are seiyids and mansabs who have kept alight the torch of learning since Ahmed bin Isa al Mohajir, the ancestor of all the seiyids, came to the Hadhramaut and started the work which his descendants have carried on for over 1,000 years.

THE COLONY OF ADEN

Lastly, Aden itself. No doubt many of you are familiar with its general appearance. Everybody who sees it is struck with its natural grandeur, which, however desolate and forbidding, forms a fitting setting for one of the great fortresses of our Eastern Empire. After a visit ashore one is left with a feeling of depression at the general shoddiness of man's handiwork, and the shoddiness is even more depressing when one realizes that it is entirely due to British work and influence. All over the Yemen and the two protectorates you find towns and villages that provide pictures worth photographing. Probably many of you have seen Miss Stark's book of pictures, *Seen in the Hadhramaut*, and if you know Aden will agree that it would be a waste of film to photograph it.

This was not always the case, and it is worth while reading descriptions of previous Adens.

As you probably know, Aden and Eden are the same word, but I won't try to persuade you that Aden was once the fairest garden of all. Nevertheless, the Eden mentioned by the prophet Ezekiel was no doubt our Aden and so in his time it may have been a fair city. Apostrophizing Tyre and Sidon, the prophet included it amongst the great marts of the then known world which traded with them :

“Haran and Canech and Eden, the merchants of Sheba,
Asshur and Chilmad were thy merchants.”

What the early Aden looked like we do not know. In the first century it had suffered destruction. The Periplus says :

“. . . there is Eudaemon Arabia, a village by the shore, also of the Kingdom of Charibael, and having convenient anchorages, and watering-places, sweeter and better than those at Ocelis; it lies at the entrance of a bay, and the land recedes from it. . . . But not long before our own time Charibael destroyed the place.”

But this did not prevent a new and worthy Aden arising. Ibn Batuta,

who visited it in the thirteenth century, does not describe it closely, but gives an idea of its importance in the following passage :

“It is enclosed by mountains, and you can enter by one side only. It is a large town, but has neither corn nor trees, nor fresh water, except from reservoirs made to catch the rain water; for other drinking water is at a great distance from the town. The Arabs often prevent the townspeople coming to fetch it until the latter have come to terms with them, and paid them a bribe in money or clothes. The heat at Aden is great. It is the port frequented by the people from India, and great ships come thither from Kunbayat, Tana, Kaulan, Fandaraina, Shaliat, Manjarur, Fakanur, Hinaur, Sindabur, etc. There are Indian merchants residing in the city, and Egyptian merchants as well.”

Being an Arab, perhaps its beauties did not strike him in the same way as they struck the Portuguese Duarte Barbosa in 1518 :

“. . . Passing by these we arrive at the populous and wealthy city of Aden, which belongs to the Moors and has its own King. This city has a right good haven and an exceeding great traffic in goods of importance. It is a fine town with lofty houses of stone and mortar, flat-roofed, with many tall windows; it is well laid out in streets and surrounded with walls, towers and bastions, with battlements after our fashion. This city is on a point between the mountains and the sea. The mountain is cut through on the mainland side, so that there is no way of going out save by one passage only which they can use; on no other side can they come in or go out. On the upper part of this ridge, whereon the city lies, are many small castles, very fair to behold, which can be seen from the sea.”

An idea of the place as it was then can be derived from a sixteenth-century wood engraving. Sir Henry Yule commented on it as follows :

“It will seem absurd, especially to those who knew Aden in the early days of our occupation, and no doubt some of the details are extravagant, but the general impression is quite consonant with that derived from the description of De Barros and Andreas Corsali : ‘In site and aspect from the seaward,’ says the former, ‘the city forms a beautiful object, for besides the part which lies along the shore, with its fine walls and towers, its many public buildings and rows of houses rising aloft in many stories, with terraced roofs, you have all that ridge of mountain facing the sea and presenting to its very summit a striking picture of the operations of Nature, and still more of the industry of man.’ This historian says that the prosperity of Aden increased on the arrival of the Portuguese in those seas, for the Mussulman traders from Jedda and the Red Sea ports now dreaded these Western corsairs, and made Aden an entrepôt, instead of passing it by as they used to do in days of unobstructed navigation. This prosperity, however, must have been of very brief duration.”

By the time the next description I have been able to trace was written, the Turks had destroyed the place, though there were still traces of its former glory. Writing in 1609, John Jourdain says :

“This cittie of Aden hath in former time been a famous and stronge place, but at present is ruined and destroyed by the Turks. There hath bene very faire buildings in it, as by the remainders of the faire houses which are lefte may be seene, falling to the ground for want of repayinge.

There are in this cittie yett remayneinge many Arabs of the poorer sorte, which are but as slaves to the Turke. This cittie is walled round with a stone wall, very stronge, and hath in it three very stronge gates, vizt. one on the north side, with yren grates to take up and downe at their pleasure, and within this gate there are twoe other gates, one a prettie distance one within another; these two gates are of timber, with great nayles as thicke as they can stand; and the reason why this gate is stronger than the other is because this way is the easiest way for anyemie to assault the cittie, having noe other good entrance but over rocks or by the sea. Under their castles on the south side there is annother gate; but this gate is commonlie kept fast, because that way there is noe recourse of people, because it is towards the mountains, where there is noe travelling. The third gate is toward the sea, which is towards the west, by the castell, which is without the towne, upon the top of the iland. All the gates have a guard kept in them naight and daie. The towne is cittuated in a valley envyronned aboute with craggie mountaines, except at the north side, where the three gates are; and on the mountaines there are castells and watch howses round aboute, with ordinance in them, and watch kept in all of them, although with fewe men, for that they are scituated in such stronge places that one man may keepe out twenty. All these forts are within falcon shott of the towne and doth command the whole cittie. . . .”

Even a hundred years later, 1709, Aden was still impressive, as can be gathered from the description by La Rocque :

“Aden is seated at the Foot of high mountains, which surround it almost on all sides. There are five or six Forts on the Tope of them, with Curtains, and a great many other Fortifications at the Necks of the Mountains. A fair Aqueduct conveys from thence the Waters into a great Canal, or Reservatory, built about three quarters of a mile from the City, which supplies the inhabitants with very good water. . . .”

“The place is encompass’d with Walls, which are at present in a bad Condition enough; especially towards the sea where nevertheless there are some Plattforms at certain distances, with five or six Batteries of Brass Canon, some of which carry a Ball of sixty Pounds weight. . . .”

“I say nothing about the Inside of this Town, which is considerably big, and where there are to be seen many fine Houses of two Stories, and Terrass’d on Top, but with all, many Ruins and decay’d buildings. ’Tis easy to perceive by what remains of it, and the advantageousness of the Situation that Aden was formerly a famous Town, and of great importance, very strong, and the principal Bulwark of the Happy Arabia. . . .”

“I must confess, that there are not to be seen of the kind, fairer Stoves and Baths than those of this Town; they are all lin’d with Marble, or Jaspas, and cover’d with a fair Dome, through which the Light comes, which is adorn’d within-side with Galleries, supported by magnificent Columns. All the Building is perfectly well divided into Chambers, Closets, and other vaulted Apartments, which all meet at the principal Hall of the Dome. . . .”

That was the final end of the impressive aspect of Aden. Just before the British occupation—1835—Wellsted wrote :

“All that remains of the former city are a few minarets, about a

hundred houses, and some disjointed remnants of its walls, the rest being occupied by tombs, mounds, and heaps of rubbish, roofless walls of older dwellings, or the wretched habitations of the present residents."

And in 1838 Haines the first Resident said :

"The little village (formerly the great city) of Aden is now reduced to the most exigent condition of poverty and neglect. In the reign of Constantine this town possessed unrivalled celebrity, for its impenetrable fortifications, its flourishing commerce, and the glorious haven it offered to vessels from every quarter of the world. But how lamentable is the present contrast. With scarcely a vestige of its former proud superiority, the traveller sees and values it only for its capabilities, and regrets the barbarous cupidity of that Government, under whose injudicious management it has fallen so low."

In 1877, Captain Hunter, in his description of British Aden, says :

"At present the town of Aden consists of about 2,000 whitewashed houses built of stone and mud, divided into streets and lanes; it is nearly 1,400 yards broad. Many of the houses are double-storied, but none are noteworthy for their architecture. The whole town has been rebuilt since the British occupation. . . ."

The only building of any pretension in the Crater is the Court-house and Treasury office; the barracks are commodious but not handsome; the Protestant church, situated on a hill, has some slight claim to honourable mention. The mess-houses of the two regiments stationed in the Crater are substantial and commodious buildings. . . ."

From then on travellers became more frequent, and I quote only Walter B. Harris in 1893 :

"What a scene of desolation and dreariness Aden presents to the new-comer! And how soon one gets to like the place in spite of it all! A background of dreary blackish rock, a sandy road, half a dozen rickety gharries under the shelter of a hideous iron-roofing, with sleepy little ponies and still more sleepy Somali drivers; a whitewashed domed saint's tomb, with an apology for a garden on each side, in which a few weary-looking plants were trying to appear green under a thick coating of dust and a sweltering sun; a long crescent of badly (designed) houses, with the exception of the handsome Aden Bank buildings, faced by an expanse of sand and black palings—and that is Steamer Point, as one first sees it."

And Colonel Jacob, in 1923, wrote :

". . . but Aden is still fifty years behind the times. The apathy of Government is visible in this settlement. . . ."

"There has been but little system or plan in the erection of buildings. There is scarcely one building in Aden of architectural beauty. An expert once landed and gave us hints, but these have not been carried out."

What a depressing thought it is that we who have done so much in the East have been guilty of building anything like the modern Aden. You will have gathered from the extracts I have read that we knew well enough what it was like of old, and we knew well enough what beautiful cities the Arabs round us were capable of building. Even if we had merely kept to the lay-out Haines made and encouraged builders from the Yemen and the Hadhramaut to do the rest, we should have had a town with beauty

and character and worthy of the grandeur of its setting, even if from a modern point of view it was not a perfect town. What the place needs is a plan for gradual rebuilding, with due regard to the architecture of the region and to its own needs.

For Aden will probably always be an important commercial centre, as it has been since the days of Ezechiel, and it will no doubt always be an imperial fortress. From the former aspect it needs replanning. It is ridiculous, for instance, that goods imported for re-export, such as skins and coffee, should be carried from the harbour up the pass into Aden town and then carried back again after repacking. From a fortress point of view the shoddy buildings of Tarsheh and Morbat need replacing with something more worthy. Why, for instance, it is necessary to have pent roofs, the development of a rainy country, in a country where flat roofs are required, is a mystery. But the roofs are a minor matter, the buildings are in themselves and from any point of view hideous.

But it is not of the commercial or military aspects of Aden I wish to speak, nor need I say anything about the government and life of the colony itself. The colony is year by year recovering from the long period during which the declared policy was to consider the garrison as the only part of Aden that mattered, and not to spend money and effort on the people. Since it became a colony, Aden has accumulated substantial surplus balances, and once hostilities are over great development of social services can be undertaken.

But it is of Aden as the potential culture centre of the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area that I should like to speak. Willy-nilly, since the time of its capture Aden started to play a part in the affairs of its neighbours. Before that time, such contacts as there were with South Arabia were conducted through the Government of Bombay and the Government of Mauritius. Gradually the protectorate was built up, as I have described, the chiefs were entertained, and as the commerce of Aden redeveloped, the town began to be the market of the Western Aden Protectorate, the Yemen and British Somaliland. It is now, alas, regarded as the acme of what the British think good. Aden has in the past been an educational centre despite itself. It just could not help it, because of its geographical position.

It is quite clear that anything Aden has better than its neighbours, must attract the latter to it. In the past the attraction has been mainly trade, though medical facilities have attracted many, and even the wretched education which it offered in the past has been used.

In 1935 a small boarding school for thirty-six selected pupils, mainly the sons of chiefs, was started, and that was the first active attempt to offer something educative to the people of the protectorate. Its avowed object is to help in the production of more enlightened chiefs, and, though roughly it only provides primary schooling, it has done definite good and has become a success.

As soon as the war is over the British Council will be opening what will eventually be a secondary school, mainly for boys from the protectorate and the Yemen, the Lord Lloyd College. Possibly later on it will attain university status.

CONCLUSION

If Aden were to exert itself to become the cultural capital of the area of which it is the centre, it could attract all that is best in that area to it, and they could take back the best that British culture could offer them. For in Aden, if anywhere, is the chance for Arab culture and British culture to mix on equal terms and to produce something worth while.

I think it is apparent from what we have seen of South-West Arabia that British culture and Western education alone are not going to make a strong appeal to the principal elements in the country, and in many ways it would be dangerous to give too much of it undiluted. It is by no means clear how many people with a Western education the W.A.P. is going to be able to absorb, and discontented educated people unsuitably employed can very well create trouble and discontent by no means divine. The Yemen is afraid of too much Western education and a Zeidi Government will do all it can to discourage it.

Taking the country as a whole, there are first of all the very fertile highlands of the Yemen, where almost any temperate crop could be grown; lower down are the mountains of the 4,000- to 6,000-foot level, mostly barren but with good cultivable areas; and then there is the huge area of desert mountain and coastal plain with only occasional oases. The Yemeni highlands are the preserve of the Zeidis, a most exclusive people. The rest of the country is mostly populated by settled and nomadic tribesmen of Shafi'i persuasion, with here and there in the Yemen and the Hadhramaut large towns with an urban population and commercial or cultural interests. About a fifth of the population of the Hadhramaut are seiyids. The whole of this area, whether independent Yemen or protected chiefdoms, is independent minded and places Islamic culture far above any other, and we for our part have no desire to threaten its independence or its culture.

The academies of the Yemen and Hadhramaut are poorly endowed, but they are always full with students, who live on a starvation diet in order to get their education. As another pointer to the demand for Arab culture, look at the three bookshops of Aden. In them it is possible to buy most of the great Arab classics of the Abbasid period and Arab Spain. All the shopkeepers tell me they find their best buyers among up-country visitors; the young men of Aden buy, when they buy anything, modern books and translations of novels from the Cairo presses.

If we provided Western education only, it would in the end attract people to it, but the risks of doing this are considerable. Has Western education been an unqualified success elsewhere in the East? There is no space to discuss this much-discussed question here, but I think on the whole it is safe to say that there are a good many who would agree that there are aspects of what we have done which are open to criticism and that the results of it all have not on the whole been too happy.

Considering, therefore, what was achieved by the culture centres of old, such as Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus, and that the south has never had a cultural centre to compare with them, and considering that there is much we can offer of our own culture which need not be destructive of Arab

culture, I think that Aden can, if it wills, play a great part in helping the people of South-West Arabia (and even of Somaliland if it wishes) to become more able to play a real part in the development of their countries and in the Arab world. Perhaps it is looking too far ahead to expect an Arab world politically unified, but it does seem certain that closer contacts in many things will now come to pass and in no field more so than in culture.

Perhaps the best way in which Aden could attract the best of the cultured and would-be cultured classes, would be by providing the best possible religious and literary education in Arabic as well as English courses, and courses on English culture, British imperial history and policy, and particularly Britain's rôle in the Middle East. I specify these two things because to a Muslim education without religion is an anomaly, and because one thing that needs to be understood in South-West Arabia, as elsewhere, is the British ideal in colonial administration and British intention in the Middle East. South-West Arabia is afraid of what it calls colonization. It would be well that it should understand what British "colonization" really is, that in any case there is no reason to fear our applying it to that area, but that we can help them to play a full part in the Arab world and are ready to do so. Such an institution could also provide courses of study in other subjects for which a demand developed, such as agriculture, civil administration, and so on.

South-West Arabia is a country with an area of several hundred thousand square miles and a population of several million, in which our only imperial interests are the fortress of Aden and the security of the sea and air communications. This does not conflict in any way with the interests of the people, who desire at present no more than their own freedom and independence in their own country and facilities to earn abroad, since their own country cannot support them all.

I hope I have made my picture intelligible. If I have you will have seen that the great majority of the people are intelligent and, out of their own country, often able in affairs. That they have an instinct for beauty, especially in their architecture, and a good deal of culture, which they value highly. That they are independent minded and that their strongest loyalties are to their faith and homes. You will also have seen that in comparison with modern world standards they are backward and that their individualism has been a chronic cause of disunion. Against this I think you will have seen that they are very friendly to us, and, provided they see no reason for suspicion of our intentions, can and do learn from us. I think you will have seen the enormous possibilities of Aden as a centre from which to help them and, taking everything into consideration, you may agree that we can probably best help them to take their full place in the Arab world through educational agencies centred there. Such agencies, though they would no doubt be assisted and approved by Government, would probably be more successful if they were not Government directed, since in that way it is easier to avoid suspicion of political motives.

Mr. PHILBY: I think you will all agree with the purport of the lec-

turer's closing remarks—that Aden to-day is a very dreary place, and we have not done ourselves much credit in the century we have been there that it should be so. Aden is not only depressing in itself, but it has a depressing effect on all those who have been there. I expect most of you in this room have visited Aden, or have at least called there at some time or other, and you can bear out this description of the place.

Mr. and Mrs. Ingrams are, however, an exception to the general rule. They are not only a unique pair in the history of exploration in Arabia, but they are exceptional in the way they have managed to keep themselves unsullied by this atmosphere of intellectual and mental depression. They are, I believe, the first people really to have explored the south-west corner of Arabia. Colonel Jacob, a generation ago, did some very good work in that area, but even he was never tempted into the parts beyond easy reach of Aden itself. The Ingrams have contributed a very great deal to our knowledge of the region outside the immediate neighbourhood of Aden; a region of which I think it is fair to say that the only previous accounts were either travellers' tales or an occasional official report hidden away in the files of the Colonial Office. Mr. Ingrams also has written his official reports, but, unlike his predecessors, he has managed to see to it that he has been on the spot to carry out some of the things he recommended should be done. No doubt the people of Aden and the Hadhramaut are grateful to us as a nation for what Mr. and Mrs. Ingrams have done for them. For, apart from what the Ingrams had already then begun, it is only within the last ten years that we, as a ruling power, have seriously tried to do something for these areas that we claim to govern.

Mr. Ingrams told us something about these countries of South-West Arabia, he said, in order that we might be able to bring the area into the general picture of what is called the sphere of Arab Federation.

We might call these countries prospective candidates for Arab Federation, were it not that under the conditions that obtain in Arabia to-day, Arab Federation is a completely impossible conception. You cannot have federation in any area of which half is free and the other half is under the control of foreign powers. However beneficent those powers may be, and even if they do good where they are in control, they ought not to be there at all.

Lahej is the natural fringe of the Yemen, and to the Yemen it will inevitably return some day. Hadhramaut always enjoyed a considerable measure of independence. Only in the second or third century A.D. was it absorbed into the Yemen of that day, and there is no question but that to-day it does not want to return to the Yemen nor to have anything to do with it.

On the other hand, a ruler who, like the King of Yemen, has governed an unruly country with success for upwards of forty years, deserves the gratitude of his people, for there is no doubt that had it had a less able ruler the country would have come under foreign control long since.

It may be interesting to you to know that to-day, as we sit here, a meeting is taking place between King Ibn Sa'ud of Sa'udi Arabia and King Farouk of Egypt at Yanbu' on the western coast of the Hedjaz. I do not think that under present circumstances Arab Federation has any

chance of coming into being. But without discussing that, they have much of common interest to consider. In itself the visit of a King of Egypt to a King of Arabia is a matter of the utmost importance and significance. For unless the Arab states can come to an understanding on such matters as are implicit in the project of an Arab Federation, there is no doubt that sooner or later they will come under foreign domination.

If Arabia, with its position in the centre of the world, is to keep quiet and become prosperous, its present problems must be solved. I believe the best form that our sympathy with Syria and the Lebanon could take would be if we could agree with the French that neither we nor they would control any Arab area. The secret agreement between ourselves and the French in 1916, against which the Arab world has always protested, is the foundation of the presence of the French in Syria and Lebanon. Unless we are ourselves prepared to give up control of Arab territories we have no right to criticize the French.

When we have done that, I hope that, in a spirit of friendship, we may be able to send them people like Mr. and Mrs. Ingrams, not as officials but as friends, to whom I am sure the Hadhramaut will always be grateful as to individuals who have taken the trouble to know the Arabs, to love them and to work for them.

Dr. HUZAYYIN : I would like to congratulate the Royal Central Asian Society on this lecture, and Mr. Ingrams on the way in which he managed to cover so wide a field so successfully.

There are one or two points that I should like to raise. One is the importance of this part of Arabia. It has been overshadowed in the last few years when the Arab world has been thrust into intimate contact with the West, and the name Arab has carried with it to European minds the general idea of a nomad, or a merchant with his caravan of camels. This idea has been taken from the character of life in the northern and central parts of Arabia, and similarly Arab expansion has been thought of as a movement by land.

But Southern Arabia also played a great part in the diffusion of Arabic culture, and Arab expansion southwards spread as much by sea as it did in the north by land. Hadhramaut has from ancient times had contacts with the Far East of Asia. The Omeiras had close contacts with East Africa, and, as you could see from the pictures the lecturer has shown us, the Far East in return influenced the architecture of South Arabia.

The culture of Southern Arabia was more advanced than that of any other part of the peninsula in ancient times. This heritage is still latent in those countries, and it is worth while to help them revive it and take their part in the affairs of Asia.

A second point which Mr. Ingrams neglected to stress is the part he has himself played in the development of this area. I met him first in 1936, when he was just starting work in the Hadhramaut. He was not content to lead a leisured life in the comfort of Mukalla; he chose instead to go to the people of the hinterland, and through his work he has come to command the respect of all classes of the community. I have met many Hadhramis and they used to speak freely to me as an Egyptian, and I have been struck by their appreciation of his work, in pacification, in develop-

ing friendly relations between the tribes, in work for education and for health.

I am afraid that what Mr. Ingrams says of Aden is true. It is a region of what we may call cultural contact, where Western and Arab ideas meet. Owing to the development of roads there is now a competition between the ports of Aden and Hodeida. Where commerce is developing there must be such cultural contacts, and unless this contact is controlled the result will be cultural confusion. I feel that the British Council might do valuable work, therefore, in trying to create at Aden a centre where Arabs may learn the best of Western culture, and may guide the developments that must arise in that region.

Colonel ELPHINSTON: We have been told that the Middle East is likely to be a testing ground of world controls. For reasons indicated by Mr. Philby, it may prove a more difficult testing ground than has sometimes been thought. But in that connection I would like to ask Mr. Ingrams one or two questions.

I understand that subsidies are not paid to the Sheikhs of the Aden Protectorate and the Trucial Coast, but that a subsidy is paid to King Ibn Sa'ud, and, further, that the Emperor of Abyssinia was recently offered a subsidy and refused it. Can Mr. Ingrams tell us if he thinks these subsidies a good thing, and whether he can suggest some way of controlling the expenditure of these monies so as to ensure their being used for the purpose for which they are given by the British taxpayers?

Secondly, the Jewish Agency in Palestine recently allotted some of the small annual quota of immigration permits to Oriental Jews, including some from the Yemen. Are the conditions under which Jews live in the Yemen such as to justify using up permits which may be desperately needed for European Jewish refugees?

Mr. INGRAMS: It is now agreed that it is better not to hand out large sums of money to rulers or individuals, which might be misused. But it is a good thing to provide money to start new and useful projects. I think that it is better to allow local freedom in the handling of these subsidies in such naturally independent countries, rather than to exercise a close control such as is applied in the ordinary type of dependency. In Hadhramaut it is not difficult to be certain that the money is well expended, because the Government is organized and has its own auditor, and there is a proper system of keeping public accounts.

No doubt there are sometimes instances of dishonesty, as such happen everywhere, but I do not think the Hadhramaut is at all bad in this respect. I once had an instance of the care that is taken, when a man from the Hedjaz came in to see me in my office, and when I waited to learn what he wanted, he said, "I have called because I thought I would like to tell you that this is the first port I have called at where I have not had to give a single bribe. Customs, passport officials, police, and everyone else, they have all done their duty without wanting rewards." And I think I can assure you that in the greater matter of the subsidies the money is properly spent and is not frittered away.

With regard to the status of the Jews. In Sana'a the outside exteriors of the Jewish houses do not look very promising, but when you get inside

the better-class houses there is a great deal of comfort. I do not think there is any oppression of the Jewish community, and within the limits of the sumptuary laws they are properly treated. There is a natural feeling of resentment on the part of the Jews against the sumptuary laws. On the other hand, they are much more lightly taxed than are the Arabs as Muslims. The reason why they are popular as immigrants into Palestine is no doubt that they fit in well and are welcome as very good citizens. In the western area of the Hadhramaut, too, they are felt to be very valuable citizens. In Yemen, like all other citizens, they lose their property if they leave the country. The law is that only Yemeni subjects can own immovable property in the country, and if anyone leaves the country with the intention of acquiring another domicile he ceases to be a Yemeni subject.

ANOTHER MEMBER : I have been told that King Ibn Sa'ud got teachers to supply his schools from the University of el Azhar in Cairo. Can the lecturer tell us whether it has been possible to follow a similar plan in the Hadhramaut? It seems a pity that a Westernized form of education should be brought in.

Mr. INGRAMS : In the Hadhramaut the improvement in education has been due to local enthusiasm and to several teachers from the Sudan. Great care has been taken in drawing up the educational programme to make it conform with the natural cultural traditions of the country. The seiyids are nervous of Westernized education, and it is all under the direction of Arabs in an attempt to strengthen the old culture of the Arab world while assimilating what is useful from the West.

Dr. HUZZAYYIN : Although time has not allowed the lecturer to develop that side of his subject, Aden has great possibilities as a meeting place. If we could build up an Arab centre there, we could have a wedding of Arab and British culture.

The CHAIRMAN then expressed the very warm appreciation of the audience and their thanks to Mr. Ingrams for his lecture and the really beautiful photographs by which it was illustrated.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND OUR POLICY THERE

By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR EDWARD SPEARS

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society at the Royal Society's Hall, on Wednesday, February 7, 1945. Chairman: General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, looking at this very full house it is unnecessary, at any rate, to stress the appreciation which you feel at being talked to to-day by Sir Edward Spears.

Sir Edward Spears, whom I am happy to claim as an old friend, has had a very distinguished career. He began his military life in the 11th Hussars, and then at the beginning of the last war he was appointed one of the liaison officers for the Commander-in-Chief, whose special duty was to report what was happening on certain sections of the front at any hour of the day or night. Sir Edward's experiences during that time—for indeed he was far the most distinguished of that band of officers—were recorded in his book *Liaison*, which is not only a classic of its kind but has been translated into many languages.

After the war he entered Parliament in 1922, and since 1931 has been Member for Carlisle and chairman of the Anglo-French Committee in Parliament.

When this present war broke out it was generally imagined that General Spears, through his unequalled knowledge of French and his experience in the last war, would have headed the British Mission to the French. But he did not get that appointment. Fortunately, in 1940 he was appointed head of the British Mission to General de Gaulle, and later headed the Spears Mission to Syria and Lebanon.

Here I will leave him to tell his own story, with a most sincere and hearty welcome to him on your behalf.

I WILL not attempt to thank your Chairman for his far too kind words as he looked back on my life. I looked back too, and I cannot say that we seem to see it in exactly the same light. However, it was a delightful and a kindly vista that he gave, and I am much obliged for what he said.

You know, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject of this talk, The Middle East and our policy there. I do not want before so distinguished an audience to do more than outline the problems of the Middle East. I am certain you are all convinced of the vital importance of those vast territories to the British Empire. They lie athwart our imperial communications and they contain our great oil reserves. The friendship of the people of the Middle East is essential to us. That friendship we enjoy to-day, but it is a flower of recent growth, and like all young things requires careful tending. It is entirely based on the belief that we are in sympathy with Arab aspirations. Should we forfeit the confidence the Arabs have in us we will certainly forfeit their friendship.

It is also a fact of the utmost importance that we should realize that modern science is tending to bring the Arab States together. It is turning deserts into convenient motor tracks. Separated as they were of old by vast deserts, political aspirations and modern science are bringing them closer together. That is an extremely important fact we should not lose sight of.

The bonds of the Arab States will draw together faster and grow

stronger in direct ratio to the pressure put on them from outside, for the Arab nations are now Arab conscious as they never were before.

The Arab world considers itself in danger from two quarters. It considers Zionism is a danger, and it considers the attitude of the French towards the independence of the Levant State is another danger.

Concerning the first I should like to say as little as possible, not because I want to shirk the subject, but because, thanks to the fact that the Arabs are anxious not to raise any difficulties for us during hostilities, they are willing to allow the question of Palestine to lie fallow until the end of the war.

Here I feel it necessary to utter a word of warning. If the Arabs lose faith in our goodwill, if they feel that we are abandoning them and have lost sympathy for their aspirations, notably in the Levant, it might well be that the truce would be broken and Palestine would flame up. So the questions of the Levant and of Palestine are very closely allied. If things go wrong in the Levant there may be immediate repercussions in Palestine.

However anxious I am to avoid dwelling on the Zionist problem, I think it necessary to say that Zionism and the Jewish problem are quite different things. It is, I think, quite possible to have one's heart rent by the persecutions of the Jews at Nazi hands and to feel that humanity has been disgraced thereby, and at the same time to feel a lively sympathy for the Arabs, who fail to see why any alien race should lay claim to their homes and land.

I personally have felt for a very long time that it would be a good thing if we could have a pronouncement from the great mass of the Jews of the world on the subject of Zionism, and especially of militant Zionism.

There is, I think, hardly an Englishman who does not count Jews amongst his friends, often amongst his dearest and most valued friends.

Here, as in other countries, some of the most ardent patriots, the best citizens, have been drawn from that community. Do these Jews, who form part of our body politic and every body politic, aspire to lay claim to another nationality? I think they might be glad to know that somewhere in the world there existed a kind of Jewish Vatican City, but would they not fear and dread anything that might in any way cast a doubt on the intangibility of their oneness with the other citizens of the land of their birth? I wonder what the answer of the Jews of France and the United States and of Britain would be to that question. Are the Jews to be allowed to choose between Palestinian and any other nationality? In this case would there not be at once created a difference between Jews and other citizens in every country on earth if some of our fellow-citizens had the right to opt for another nationality? If that were so, is it not the Jews who would suffer from such a differentiation? So much for the Zionist side of this question.

This aspect of the problem interests the Arabs not at all. Their point is quite a simple one. They contest the right of the Jews to their land, and Palestine is considered to be the land of all the Arabs just as much as any other part of the vast territories inhabited by sixty millions of them. The question of Palestine is considered to be of major importance to them all.

If we are inclined to raise our eyebrows at this, might not the Arabs ask, as indeed they do ask, what would our attitude be if the position were reversed? Supposing an outside authority decided that an unlimited number of Arabs were to be allowed to settle in Canada, would there not be repercussions in Britain? Would not even the United States consider this a matter of some moment to them? Would they not think that unlimited immigration might affect them? Or would they throw their frontiers open to the strangers? I wonder.

The problem of Zionism is in fact to the Arabs one of unlimited immigration. If it be accepted, as surely it must be, that any future settlement of this question must be one acceptable to the Arab world, then I for one do not believe the question to be insoluble, provided an effort is made to understand and appreciate the Arab point of view. Meanwhile, I think we must realize and understand that the Arab cannot and does not see the humour of foreign statesmen achieving great political triumphs by planting the flag of Zionism on Arab lands, in fact anywhere but in their own country.

Now to return to the immediate and very pressing problem of the Levant, a problem which, alas, may lead quite easily to a conflagration. I would like, in the first place, to say that I think one finds it very strange and very disturbing that we hear so little about what has been happening there lately. Why is it that so little news is coming through? We know there has been trouble in Damascus, but we are not told why. You may be quite sure that the enemy knows. You may be quite certain that at the present moment the Turkish Press is full of information on the subject, but here everything is silence. Why?

I think the British public is entitled to be informed about matters of such great moment to it. I for one have never really understood why, in a country where there is so little sand and no ostriches, the methods of that bird should have so many disciples over here. I observe that it is fashionable to-day in military circles to wear on one's shoulder a badge, designed to show the formation you belong to. It seems to me that the lapel of many well-cut civilian coats might be ornamented by a neat badge representing an ostrich with its head firmly buried in a bucket of sand.

It is indeed burying one's head in the sand not to realize the importance of this Levant question and the interest of the other Arab States in the Levant. Not very long ago all the Arab States signed in Alexandria a protocol, stating quite clearly that no one member of the Arab Union could sign a treaty which was in any way inimical to the policy followed by the remainder of the Arab world. It was made perfectly clear, and has been made clearer since, that the remainder of the Arab States do not approve of the attempt which is now being made by the French to obtain a treaty with the Levant States. It would be very foolish indeed not to recognize the influence the Arab States have in the matter, and the power.

What in essence is the cause of this trouble in the Levant? It is quite simple. It is that the French promised, the day before our troops and the small Free French contingent which accompanied them entered Syria, to bring the mandatory régime to an end, and we, the British Government, guaranteed that pledge. These are facts known to the entire Arab world.

The French now seem to claim that this promise was conditional upon the two Republics signing a treaty with France, giving France a pre-eminent and predominating position in the Republics. This is not the fact. May I give you—and this will be the only text I shall worry you with—the relevant text.

In General Catroux's proclamation before the Allied entry into the Levant in 1941 it was stated :

I have come to put an end to the mandatory régime and to proclaim you sovereign and independent.

Henceforth you will therefore be sovereign and independent peoples, and you will be able to establish yourselves as two separate States or as one single State.

In either case your status of independence and sovereignty will be guaranteed by a treaty which will also define our mutual relations. This treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your representative and myself.

It is clear, therefore, that from the beginning the French wanted and expected a treaty. The promise of independence, however, was not made conditional on a treaty; nor was there anything whatsoever about the French having the pre-eminent position they now claim.

It has always seemed to me that it was just possible that if France had carried out her undertakings and given the two States the independence they were looking forward to, they might conceivably have consented to sign treaties. It is, however, well known throughout the Middle East that the two Republics got no independence whatsoever until the November crisis of 1943.

Although in the Declarations of Independence of 1941 the States were promised their national forces, and this promise was in no way dependent upon the negotiation of treaties, the French are to-day refusing to hand these forces over. The States feel, and the other Arab States have made it quite clear that they feel with them, that to negotiate treaties in the face of this situation would simply be putting their heads in a noose.

Away back in 1936 the French proposed a treaty to the two Republics. The two Republics accepted. The treaties were passed by the Chambers of both countries and were ratified by them. But the treaties never even came up before the French Chamber because of military and colonial influences, and therefore were never ratified. Many people in France, and Frenchmen in the Levant, very much regret that, but there is no point in just weeping over spilt milk. What the Syrians and the Lebanese were prepared to do in 1936 they are certainly not prepared to do to-day. The Arab world has evolved a great deal since then.

It is the obvious belief of the Levant States—and the other Arab States evidently share that belief—that it is now clear that the Free French, no more than the Vichy French, never intended to relinquish their hold on these countries. Nothing, I feel now, will eradicate the belief of the Arabs that a treaty with France would be incompatible with their independence.

Everything that has occurred lends colour, it must be confessed, to

that belief. The French go on claiming a pre-eminent and predominant position in the Levant. How can any country be deemed to be free if a Great Power has such prerogatives within its borders? It is an unfortunate fact that events since General Catroux's proclamation of 1941 have not been of such a nature as to inspire confidence in French pledges.

As I have said, everyone knows in the Middle East that nothing, absolutely nothing, was done to redeem the French pledge until, the French having locked up the Lebanese President and Government because they asserted the independence a general election had ratified, the Lebanese people, unmistakably supported by the other Arab countries and by Great Britain and the United States, as well as by public opinion in the whole civilized world, obtained the liberation of their captive leaders and demanded that the powers so far withheld from them should be handed over. This was done with one major exception. The French realized that there was nothing to be done against the very strong public opinion, the wave of public opinion that then existed, and the powers were handed over with, as I say, the exception of the armies. As time went on the French position hardened, and they now say they will move no further in the matter unless the States negotiate a treaty with them.

Here it may be said, why should not the Republics initiate negotiations for a treaty? Would they not actually be in a stronger position if, the French terms proving unreasonable, they rejected them? The answer of the Republics would, I think, be this: "All the Great Powers have recognized, unconditionally, our independence. Either we are independent or we are not. We are, and we intend to remain so, and we will grant no one nation any special position within our borders."

Meanwhile they would probably add that their experience during twenty-five years of mandate has not been of a nature to lead them to wish to extend their association with France, and that the present impasse has not convinced them that the new France is so very different from the old.

They will also undoubtedly say that they received a very severe shock when the representatives of a France not yet liberated tried by violent methods to deprive a very small country of that very freedom France was asking the world to obtain for her.

I feel that if the two Republics were asked these things they would almost certainly add that they would like to remind the Great Powers of the long list of Vichy officials who to-day still hold office in the Levant. This is no light matter out there, because it was Vichy which ordered out the native troops against the Allies in 1941, and there has been no purge commission in the Levant.

Personally I do not see how the claim of the Republics to their armies can be denied. Quite recently, in fact in his last speech in Parliament, the Prime Minister said: "You cannot have a state without some kind of a national army."

In the same debate Mr. Eden said: "This country is fighting because it believes in freedom.

"Our authority is limited, but where it can be exerted the decision will be by the ballot box and not by the bullet."

“Ballots and not bullets,” said Mr. Eden.

This applies to the Levant, which is within our military sphere and whose freedom we have guaranteed.

Although public security is undoubtedly the responsibility of the local Governments, as was recently asserted by Mr. Eden, who said, in answer to a question in the House, that the Syrian and Lebanese gendarmeries had been re-equipped to enable the Governments to discharge their duty of maintaining order more effectively, the French now lay claim to this prerogative and have called out troops in Damascus, although nothing but peaceful demonstrations have taken place.

This is a very important point, and a point of controversy to-day. It is unfortunately one of the many signs that France is determined to use force and intimidation. There have been no disorders. There have been merely peaceful manifestations, and yet the French have called out troops.

Such measures can only increase tension, and I am afraid that public opinion must be gradually becoming inflamed. But, as I said at the beginning, we have very little news of what is going on.

It is greatly to be feared, it seems to me, that the French, having embarked on a policy of ill-disguised pressure, will now pursue that course. If they do, it is very highly probable that soon the whole of the Middle East will be aflame. In that disastrous eventuality it will not be the French who will be the chief sufferers. All that will happen to them is that they will finally lose what they have half lost already, but British prestige will suffer a disastrous set-back, and our position in an area vital to us will be in jeopardy.

If for a second time we let the Arabs down, if we do not support the Levant States as we are pledged to do, I do not believe that we will be given a third chance in the Middle East.

Admiral Sir HOWARD KELLY: My old friend General Spears the other day threw a little time bomb into the tranquil waters of the Middle East, and indeed another one of them has started exploding.

The reactions from the first bomb were immediate. The Lebanese and the Syrians are already parading in the open their case, and even General de Gaulle himself has now entered into the fray and told them that they are to have nothing. It looks rather a nasty situation, and, as General Spears said, somebody has to do something about it. We cannot go on indefinitely with these little wars springing up in different parts of the world, and now in the Middle East as well.

To go back a little, when we went into Syria, after the French handed over aerodromes to the Germans, the Arabs rendered us considerable assistance, and they naturally supposed that we went in there to occupy the country, which was one of the things they really wished. They thought that from us they would get a square deal. What actually happened was that we went in there and instead of going in to govern we handed it over to the French. The Arab reply was: “You came in here and turned out a more or less legitimate administration and replaced it by an illegitimate French administration, and we do not think that is right.”

The first time I went to Syria, General Spears had just gone home to receive his new mandate to be His Majesty's Minister in the Levant. Our people there did not know what the interpretation of the phrase "freedom of the Levant States" meant. So I went to one of the higher officials that I happened to know and said: "What exactly do you mean by 'freedom of the Levant'?"

He replied: "Independence like they had in Iraq when you first went in there"—that is to say, at the beginning of our mandate. That explained the question more or less. I do not know to what extent you have heard in England of the repercussions in the Arab world during the troubles of 1943. They really were very disturbing.

I think there was a good deal of unjustifiable interference in our own and other people's affairs, but at any rate they came out into the open at once with a formidable explosion. There were riots all over the place. The King of Egypt himself stepped in. That the crisis was settled was largely due to the firmness and tact of General Spears. I happened to be passing through there at the worst time. It was not at all a pleasant situation.

General Spears has pointed out to you how immensely dependent we are on peace and tranquillity in the Near and Middle East. It is absolutely essential. If you hold out to the Arab States an incentive like this for unity, it will be as in China. It will not be real unity, but you may get some concentration against some definite person or thing. If they get unity over this question, and are displeased with our action there, it might be a most awful nuisance.

To revert one moment, I do not know what was the clause in the Algeria agreement in 1943 that General de Gaulle referred to in his statement this morning.

SIR EDWARD SPEARS: There is no such thing. I put that as a supplementary to a question bearing on the same subject in the House of Commons this morning. Of course, the Minister naturally did not know; but, what is more serious, I did not know. The fact is that there is no such agreement at all. I think they will have to make enquiries as to whether General de Gaulle really did say so. The French know the facts, and you will find, I think, what he may have had in mind was the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, which was a private agreement between England and France.

Admiral Sir HOWARD KELLY: At any rate, it is very desirable that he should have thrown this bomb, that the matter should have come to the surface now, so that we can really get a settlement one way or the other.

But we must remember one thing. All those of you who have served in the Orient know the question of face. I hope the Lebanese Republics will consider very carefully this question of giving some face-saving clause in their agreement.

M. le Capitaine SCHAEFFER: I do not think you would like me to go deeply into this matter, since I am torn between the sentiments of a scholar of Syrian history and archæology and moreover have my Syrian friends there, and being in the uniform of the Free French Navy, I can speak at present neither as a private individual nor as an official spokesman.

What I could say perhaps is that General Spears rightly emphasized that the two problems of Palestine and the Levant cannot be divorced.

He stressed the fact that such information as appears in the Press regarding the present difficult situation is very inadequate. The country, however, is now getting information on what is going on in Syria, while darkness lies over what is happening in Palestine.

I have no authority to defend the French policy in Syria, but I would point out that as one side of the problem is in the dark and the other in the limelight, it is extremely difficult to make a balanced appreciation of the whole. I would again remind you that it is one problem, and ask you to be restrained in discussing it at the present juncture.

Colonel ELPHINSTON: I am very sorry indeed that you should call on me to speak, but since you have done so I would like to say something.

I think we all agree with General Spears that the events of November 11, 1943, were deplorable—the French themselves now take this view—and we also agree with Captain Schaeffer that the whole problem of the Middle East must be regarded as one.

The situation into which we were flung at the end of the last war, when we had to find something to fill the void that was left by the removal of the Turks, was a very difficult one. The Allied and associated nations had a very great moral responsibility for order in what was once the Turkish Empire. Our American allies were not prepared to take a part in filling that vacuum. Our French allies were, and somehow or other we have filled that vacuum for a time, and although there have been many disturbances, there has been considerable development, but the time has now arrived when those countries, on behalf of whom we and the French held mandates, are ready and desirous to receive their independence.

Personally I agree with General Spears that it was a psychological error on the part of the French to use the retention of the armed forces in Syria and the Lebanon as a lever to get a treaty. They would have done much better if they had done as Lord Allenby did in 1920, when he proclaimed the sovereign independence of Egypt and the end of the Protectorate without getting any written agreement from the Egyptian Government about the four reserved subjects.

It certainly took us sixteen years to get a treaty, and we got it when Egypt was under the threat from Mussolini. But we did eventually get a treaty which was freely signed and has stood the test of war. However, a consideration of what happened in Egypt does not get over this difficulty of a treaty which the French wish to negotiate in the Levant.

As I said, the situation in the whole of the Middle East has changed. There must no doubt be a new settlement. General Spears himself said that freedom with a predominant interest of one country is no freedom. We have a predominant interest in certain Middle East countries, and I presume that in the post-war settlement something will be done about that.

That is why I do hope that this problem that has cropped up in Syria and the Lebanon may perhaps be left to a general settlement after the war, when we can all put our cards on the table and all make sacrifices together for world peace.

Sir ROBERT CLIVE: I am not clear in my mind what exactly the last

speaker had in mind with regard to all making sacrifices. Did he suggest that if the French mandate in the Levant was abandoned the British should abandon their mandate in Palestine? I should be delighted to hear if that could be done. At the same time I cannot think at the present moment that it would be possible for us to abandon that mandate without there being the most hideous bloodshed between the Jews and Arabs within a year or less.

In fact, the Palestine question, as General Spears said, is more or less dormant until the end of the war, and is then bound to arise again.

Only recently I read in the papers how in America a large body of completely uninformed opinion is pressing for a very large extension of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Obviously that, at the present time, would be like applying a match to the whole question of Palestine and the Levant. Palestine and the Levant, as is more or less agreed, is really an indivisible problem. The two must be settled together.

Sir EDWARD SPEARS: I have got very little to answer in the well-balanced and interesting remarks which have fallen from the speakers who followed me.

The Admiral gave us a summary of the views of a Frenchman, a friend of his in the Levant, and as he spoke I could not help remembering a story I was told in the last war by a Frenchman whom I made friends with. He explained to me that in peace-time he made a modest livelihood by making lark pies. I asked him if in war-time he did not have some difficulty in getting a supply of larks. He said: "Well, yes. We do not talk about it much, but we add some other meat." I asked what kind of meat. He said: "Well, you must not tell anybody, but a little horse meat." I asked: "What proportion of horse meat did you add?" He replied: "Oh, fifty-fifty. One alouette, one horse." (Laughter.)

That seems to me to be about the degree of freedom the French would like to give to the Levant States.

The Admiral alluded to this statement in the *Daily Telegraph* which I saw earlier, thanks to the fact that I wanted to see if my article was in. Really it is absolutely amazing. It is based on documents the existence of which I have never heard, in which it is said France promised to recognize the eventual freedom of the two nations and to protect their liberty, and finally "We hope for their"—*i.e.*, the two Republics—"eventual independence."

That statements like that should be made by a responsible Minister of a Government is really very serious indeed. It is very serious for two reasons. You can imagine the effect a statement like that is apt to have on the Arab world; and it is really very serious for us, because we have guaranteed this independence.

I hope that our Government will take a very strong line indeed about this. It really is time we explained that we also, poor little England, have a point of view in these matters, and have got a stake, and that we really cannot go on saying Amen all along the line, because otherwise we shall get very badly carted indeed, as we are being carted in this case.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been trying as a listener to find the conclusion of the whole matter, and it seems to me to rest on one simple, fundamental

truth. I believe that what has made the British Empire and built it up to a large degree has been faith in the word of an Englishman.

We have given to that particular part of the world what I believe is to be a sacred promise, and we should not go back on that promise for any political idea or out of deference (as I saw in the paper the other day) to French sentiment.

What, indeed, would it profit England and the British Empire if they gained the whole world and lost their great credit, faith in their word? Let us see to it that that does not happen.

I am sure, on your behalf, you would wish me to thank Sir Edward for his most interesting and instructive talk, and also those Members of the Society who have been so good as to take part in the discussion.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF AIR WARFARE IN THE BURMA OPERATIONS OF 1943-1944

By AIR-MARSHAL SIR JOHN BALDWIN, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.

Lecture given on March 21, 1945. Chairman, Lieut.-General H. G. Martin, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.

THE CHAIRMAN: I know we all watch with the utmost admiration the story, as it is unfolding day by day, of the wonderful campaign fought in Burma by our soldiers of the Fourteenth Army, supported by the Americans and Chinese, the campaign which has now culminated in the victory in Mandalay. I think our admiration is probably all the greater because we may shrewdly suspect that furnishing the war in Europe means that the Fourteenth Army fights that campaign without a lot of stuff that they would be very glad to have. None the less, it goes on from one victory to another, until we begin to count the miles and days to Rangoon itself.

But, Ladies and Gentlemen, nothing of that campaign would be possible for the Fourteenth Army without air support. Possibly in no theatre of war are the land forces and the air forces so completely complementary. In Burma the Fourteenth Army relies on the Air Force, not only for its strategic and tactical bombings, and for its reconnaissance, but also for most of the food it eats and the ammunition it fires. And not only that, whole formations and divisions are moved freely from one sector of the front to another by air. It is with the very greatest pleasure, therefore, that I introduce to you to-day Air-Marshal Sir John Baldwin, who has commanded the 3rd Tactical Air Force throughout the operations of the last eighteen months in Burma—a period which has seen the most amazing transformation there—and who has very kindly consented to come here to-day to tell us all about it.

AIR-MARSHAL SIR JOHN BALDWIN: I am afraid that much of what I say now is to some extent ancient history. I make no apologies for that, because I think in many places in England at the present moment it is not realized what tremendous difficulties the forces out there had to contend with to get through into Burma, and I am just going, roughly, to dwell on the difficulties of the country which had to be traversed in the early stages.

The whole of what we call the Burma Front was regarded by us in the first place as a jungle barrier against the possible invasion of East India. The Japanese looked upon Burma north of Akyab, the Chin Hills, as a perfectly good barrier to anyone trying to come in to upset them. There are, roughly speaking, three ways of getting to India: by the sea in the neighbourhood of Akyab; possibly by the tortuous way through Imphal, which has been made better for military reasons; and now by the Ledo Road. You have only to glance at the map and you will see that everything in the shape of hills and rivers runs north to south. We were trying to go west to east over country which possesses no roads. You will see one or two small tracks, but once you leave the plain you meet very steep hills, very steep escarpments, narrow valleys covered in tropical jungle, country over which it was previously considered impossible to stage an operation. The Chindwin itself, in size, is not a very big barrier, and it is not until you get to the Irrawaddy that you get a large barrier.

When you get there the climate changes and you come out into what we call the dry belt. Anyone who has been there will agree with me that

the tropical jungle, apart from being difficult to get through, is not a pleasant place to wander about in. It is seldom dry, even in the middle of the day in the dry period. It is dark and dismal. If you want to keep a track open you have to cut 50 yards on each side to dry it out. You can imagine the difficulty we had from the air point of view in making airfields.

Unfortunately, there is even now some shortage of equipment, but in the days I am talking of it was far worse; we still had only very short-range aircraft, and in order to try to hit the Jap we wanted our aerodromes as far forward as possible. But when you try to make aerodromes in this country it becomes a tremendous task. Because of the difficulty of constructing aerodromes even during the fair weather in some of these valleys—on the paddy fields, the rice fields—we were driven to the expediency of using the seashore. The trouble with that arrangement was that we had to work out our operations to fit in with the tide, because we could not operate until the tide went down. That will show you how short we were of airfields until we got into the dry belt. We were also up against the weather. You get the double monsoons in Burma. Roughly speaking, you can call it fair weather from the beginning of November till mid-May, and then you get the rains.

There are over 400 inches of rain in the year at Cherrapungi in that area, and during the Arakan operations we had 21 inches in three days. In such conditions it is not very easy to move about. Now, quite apart from having moved up from the Bengal side of the Arakan and Chin Hills, we have gone right across to the Irrawaddy Valley and have got into the dry valley, where the weather is better and the rainfall much less, and we have snatched one very big advantage from the Jap. In fact, although we may not be out of the wood, we are out of the jungle, and things are going to move. That is a very rough sketch of the country we were up against.

Those of you who have constructed roads or airfields will realize another difficulty we were up against. Burma possesses no road metalling of any sort, and therefore you cannot make those heavy runways needed for the new type of aircraft. You cannot very well use even the rolled-out paddy, because most of the modern aircraft have a front wheel which is inclined to get into a rut, whereupon the aircraft takes charge and there is a crash. A moderately smooth manufactured surface is needed. All stone has to be shipped from India, brought along to Chittagong and unloaded into native boats, five or six stones at a time, which, you will appreciate, makes it very expensive. If you surface the runways with brick you need fuel for the brick kilns. There is no coal in Burma—it has all to be imported—and the only road we had was up from Chittagong, which is at the edge of the map, running up the railway. That had to be surfaced with bricks, which had to be burnt. Even a burnt brick does not like a three-ton lorry. These were some of the difficulties we were up against.

I said I made no apology for giving ancient history because of the importance of the air aspect of these operations. I make no apology for blowing the air trumpet. I say quite definitely that had the last Arakan:

operation taken place without air support it would have been a failure, and a disastrous failure. Imphal would have been a major disaster, and Wingate's and Stilwell's operations would have been impossible.

The Arakan operation is distinct as being the first time the Jap got something in the way of a knock-out. We only put him down for the count, it is true, but it was a shrewd blow. He is a good jungle fighter, and I am not disclosing any secret when I say that we lost the first Arakan operation because we put in troops who had not been trained for the jungle. If you do not know the jungle it is a nasty business, and you get frightened and jumpy. We lost that operation because the Japanese had been accustomed to jungle fighting: they had been through Malaya to Singapore, and they had played about in Burma, and, above all, they had been trained. We threw in Indian troops trained for mobile warfare, and the Jap was an expert at infiltrating round. We had no air support in those days and, therefore, anybody moving on the floor, having a soft tail, was at a disadvantage. The Japanese realized this, took full advantage, and created real trouble. The only thing to do was to walk back and consolidate behind.

Arakan, in 1943-44, was the turning point. The Jap tried his infiltration tactics here, and he was successful in so far as he got round our eastern flank where we had the African troops. It was the first time they had been up against the Japs. Although they were being air fed, we had nothing like the amount of air we needed, and we therefore dropped supplies two or three days at a time, and they were dependent on their carriers. The Jap infiltrated, got behind the soft tail, and spread alarm and despondency among the unarmed carriers, and he quite expected that it would mean not only the caravan force rushing back but that our main force would draw back too. But General Messervy had been over-run before. He formed his administrative box and decided to stick it out, and called for supplies by air, which we managed to deliver. This upset the Jap timetable. We had just enough reserves, in the shape of General Lomax's outfit resting at Chittagong, to counter-attack and restore road communications.

This was the first illustration I had of the extraordinary lack of initiative of the Jap, and that is why I am optimistic as to what we can do against him. He is most rigid in adhering to any plan he has conceived, and he cannot improvise if things go wrong—at least, he has not done so up to date. The Jap draws up his plan and gets the whole thing cut and dried. If a certain part goes wrong he carries on according to the timetable, and when we are in a position to upset his timetable we get him in the devil of a mess. That happened this time. On the timetable appeared dates for the capture of Chittagong, but the mere fact that we had air supplies and did not have to turn back, even if our tail got twisted for the time being, upset his timing, and that was the first knock-out he had. The dropping of supplies into a very narrow box would have been impossible without air superiority, and we had complete air supremacy. We won that round with Hurricanes and Spitfires against Japanese Oskars and Tonis. I had only two Spitfire squadrons at this period.

For some unknown reason the Jap would dribble his forces in. He

never put in more than 30 aircraft to begin with, even though he had at least 350 first-line aircraft on that front, of which two-thirds were fighters. Heaven alone knows why he did not use them; I don't. I would like you just to think of that and look at what he has done with his naval forces and what he has done with his forces in the Pacific and the Philippines. He seems incapable of learning the lesson of concentration of force. I suggest that is one reason why we may be optimistic about dealing with him. His complete inability to improvise is another great drawback to him and an asset to us. I do not mean to say the Jap is a bad fighter. He is a very nasty fighter if dug in, and his complete ignorance makes him even worse to fight against. He believes anything he is told by his officers. They tell him his brother is advancing on Delhi and he at Kohima is to sit down and fight it out; they give him water and rice, and he believes it all firmly. There also appears to be complete ignorance as to what is happening in adjacent areas. The Jap is a very well-instructed technical man. He knows how to use his arms and he knows all about his arms, but he is ignorant from what I might call a tactical aspect. When I say he is a good fighter, I mean as long as he is dug in and properly supplied. I am not so certain, once he is on the move, that he is going to prove such a good fighter.

In the south-west we had to winkle the Japs out of island after island. We have usually had to winkle them out of hill after hill in the Arakan area, and it was not until Kohima that we had the chance of giving them a real beating, turning them out of prepared positions, chasing them down the road and keeping them on the run. That was one of their crack divisions. They took a bad knock at Kohima and were beaten out of a very strongly fortified position. The 15th Division, who were besieging Imphal, were fighting very well. They knew the 33rd Division had had a knock, but it made no difference to their morale. This I put down to ignorance of knowing what was really happening. Directly the 33rd were hurled back on to them it did not take two days for the rot to start and spread in the 15th, and even two new reinforcement regiments of their 4th Division, which came up the Tiddim Road, caught the disease. So we have to remember there is a chance of shaking this Jap morale. We have done it once and there is no reason why we should not do it again, but it is essential to keep the pressure up and keep him on the run. I am optimistic of what we can do to him.

I think people ask why we got bogged down in Burma and what did we achieve by it? When you look at the map it looks a waste of effort, but there are other things to think about. Beginning with the period I am talking about, the Japs were in the ascendant in the East. They had knocked us out everywhere and they had had the better of the Americans. We had one abortive show in the Arakan and had been beaten back to our starting point. Japanese morale was high; ours had suffered, and British prestige was low. It was essential to do something. We could continue our offensive into Burma; alternatively there was the possibility of a direct assault on Rangoon or an attack in the Sumatra direction, possibly by way of the Andamans. All these alternatives were carefully considered in detail, but, as you can well imagine, the amount of ship-

ping, aircraft and naval forces necessary to undertake such an expedition ruled out Sumatra and Rangoon. Rangoon is a nasty journey. It is 40 miles up a twisty river, and you must have both sides of that river if you are to get there. It left us no alternative but to stage an overland offensive of some sort. Another incentive came through at this time. Things in China were in a bad way, and in spite of what I might almost say was a mania in the U.S.A. for the Hump traffic; this alone was not enough. We had to produce contact on the floor with our Chinese allies if we were to keep them in the war. The only possible way we could make contact on the floor was by pushing the Ledo Road through via Myitkyina. We were then roughly just by Shinbweyang, and that was the only way we could do it. If we wanted to keep the Chinese still fighting we must maintain contact on the floor, and so we were committed to do something in Burma.

Look at the map a minute—half the distance of the total Russian front. It is not a front, it is four fronts—the Arakan Corps, the Kohima Corps, the Stilwell Force down the Hukawng Valley, and the Chinese on the Salween, whom we hoped we might persuade to move. To these we added a fifth front when we flew in the Wingate Force. Lack of communications, shortage of transport—road, rail and air—made concentration of any large force a major problem and strictly limited the total possible. We had to exploit every single one of those fronts if we were to have any effect on the Japanese forces opposing us. That was the decision taken and that was the plan worked out, and I am bound to say I do not see any other way it could have been done. We had to do it in spite of the fact that we had indifferent intercommunication, and it really seemed impossible to get a co-ordinated attack by those five separate forces in that country without land communications. Tropical storms interfered with wireless.

I would like to elaborate a bit about the air aspect with regard to the Wingate show because it was the first big airborne operation out East. I would like to take this opportunity of paying a tribute to General Wingate and to warn people not to be drawn into a discussion of what did Wingate's first operation achieve? what did his second achieve? We cannot judge them like that. He taught us in the first place how to defeat this jungle barrier, and he certainly taught the Air Force and, I think, the Indian Army how to work together and how to get rid of some of our phobias. He bumped our heads together and got us and the ground forces working absolutely as one, and he did this in a very short time. That is the main theme on which his operations should be judged, not on what they achieved, although he did achieve a tremendous amount in the second.

We knew we were going to have difficulty with the operations in the neighbourhood of Myitkyina. Here were American-trained Chinese troops, backed by a few American Commandos, under General Stilwell in the Hukawng Valley. It was hoped that the Chinese from the Salween would be induced to move forward and co-operate. I do not wish to appear to be too disparaging about the Chinese. They had been at war a long time, they had seen us get the bump every time, and they had not much equipment and were heartily sick of war. I cannot blame them for not moving

earlier than they did. We knew the difficulty of getting to Myitkyina. Myitkyina was our key point. It was to this place we wished to run the petrol pipeline. It was decided to fly the Wingate Force over 100 miles into Japanese-controlled territory in order to permit them to disorganize and disrupt the Japanese communications for all their forces operating in North Burma. We also knew that the Japanese intention was to stage an offensive against the 4th Corps on the Imphal Front. We hoped it might so disturb him that he would drop his offensive, because we knew we had not enough troops available both to hold him at Imphal and to launch a heavy offensive elsewhere. The campaign in the Arakan was to open the ball, 4th Corps to demonstrate actively on the Chindwin, Wingate to be flown in directly Arakan operations were under way, and the Stilwell offensive to start immediately Wingate was established.

That was the original idea, but, unfortunately, it did not have the effect of upsetting the Japanese plan, although the Jap communications were successfully attacked. As I told you before, the Jap is a very rigid individual; he had made his plan, and he carried on and came to Imphal without any change of date, as was revealed by documents captured later.

As you know, Imphal went very badly for us, and, as far as the air was concerned, the difficulty was that it meant that what transport aircraft we had, had to be diverted; first of all to move reinforcements and afterwards to keep Imphal alive. Unfortunately, in spite of what we had already learned about the effect on Jap communications, it was decided to move the Wingate forces to try and help relieve the pressure on Imphal by pushing them a bit farther west. From my own recollection, I think Wingate was always against this. He maintained that the country in the area concerned was unsuitable to his type of operations. He was always for operating to the north and east. However, the emergency forced the trial and it was not a success; we abandoned the attempt and again turned north-east, but much valuable time had been lost.

By this time the attack in the Myitkyina area had got into a serious situation; it was, to all intents and purposes, hung up. The only thing was to try and speed the Wingate brigades up to divert some of the Japs south. It was very bad country as far as the air was concerned. The monsoons interrupted the dropping of supplies. The nature of the country prevented the construction of air-strips, so no air evacuation of sick and wounded could be carried out. At one point it got to the stage where there were over 500 malaria and wounded cases which Lentaigne was trying to bring along with him, which almost immobilized the movement of his troops. The General was faced with the decision whether he should abandon 500 British troops to the tender mercies of the Japs and rush on, or bring his wounded and sick along with him and be too late to be of any help to Stilwell. He said he could hang on to the southern end of Indawgyi Lake if we could get some float-planes to evacuate the sick and wounded. As I have said, this was monsoon weather. The only way to do this was to establish a temporary flying-boat base on the Brahmaputra River. We borrowed a couple of Sunderlands from Ceylon. They had never been up to this part of the world before, and they put down a temporary base. The current got to nine knots an hour, with great tree

trunks whistling past; and those poor old Sunderlands had to go up to 10,000 feet to get over the hills before dropping down to the Indawgyi Lake to pick up the casualties. They got the 527 away without losing a case.

That really, to my mind, enabled Lentaigne to go ahead and save Stilwell, and I do not think it is overstating it to say that the Stilwell advance was made possible by Lentaigne's Special Force from the south and Festing's 36th Division's forced march down the Hukawng Valley. From the minute these troops put the pressure on, it went forward. Directly this advance proved successful our friends on the Salween began to move. From that day the whole aspect of the campaign in Burma has changed. I told you we were now moving north to south; we have got over that awful struggle to get east from the west. That was the bad spot we were up against. We are over it now. That is the reason why I say, not only are we out of the jungle, but we are getting to much clearer country with regard to wood. But from everybody's point of view there is a big snag to this front. There is no base for the Army or the Air Force short of Calcutta, in Bengal, and no means of getting back to base except by sea from Chittagong or by the narrow-gauge and somewhat inefficient Bengal-Assam Railway. It is inefficient because up to the war little money had been spent on it. The Americans have taken it over and greatly increased the train paths, but there is no direct communication across the Brahmaputra delta and you have to ferry across the two rivers. That is a headache, unless you have unlimited air transport. In addition to all the commitments already mentioned, air transport was used to supply Stilwell's Force, using airfields in the Myitkyina area. It was always hoped that the Ledo Road would be able to carry these supplies, but when I left, the Ledo Road had never carried anything but petrol and its own maintenance supplies. It is a valuable engineering feat because the road is capable, at least, of maintaining the pipeline which has been laid with it, and our biggest haul into China in the way of cargoes was petrol. I should have said, when talking of Myitkyina, that another attraction was that, instead of having to route our Hump traffic up north and down again into China, we could then go straight across. Before we held North Burma that was the only route. We put the wretched cargo aeroplanes over mountains 23,000 feet high in the worst icing conditions in the world. Otherwise our cargo aircraft would have had to take off under monsoon conditions and then cross the "fair weather" gap in the Myitkyina area, where they would have been exposed to attack from Japanese fighters. Why the enemy never made any serious attack against this ferry route I am at a loss to understand. Another example of lack of initiative.

By capturing Myitkyina, not only did we kill the fighter threat, but our biggest height to go over was 9,000 feet. So we shortened the route, reduced the height, and cut out that Japanese fighter threat. Imphal, as I said before, would have been a major disaster without the air support. It was completely surrounded. On some maps you can see a track out of Imphal—from Bishenpur to Silchar. It will take a jeep if you take a passenger to put a stone behind your wheels when you reverse to get round corners, but that is all, and even this was cut, so there was no way

of getting out except by air. General Slim had to decide whether he would run the risk, with the monsoon at its worst in May, of eating up his reserves in Imphal in the way of munitions and rations, and flying up some reinforcements in order to try and get the road from Manipur open. There were not enough aircraft to do both jobs. We decided to take the gamble, but by May 25 we found we were rationed down to a single number of rounds of 25-pounders per day, that we had not even a week's reserves of rations in the kitty—it was not a nice situation.

I cannot speak too highly of the show put up by the British and American transport crews. The Middle East played up as soon as we sent an SOS wire to them and sent extra aircraft and crews. America played up and sent us some extra aircraft and crews who had really come straight out of the air school. They came in and picked up scratch ground crews from other units. Within five days of arriving in my area these lads, in monsoon weather which they had never experienced before, were flying into Imphal. This could not have been done without radar and other aids. It is not that we had better pilots, but better equipment. Imphal itself is 2,600 feet up and roughly in a saucer some 15 to 20 miles long by 12 to 15 miles broad. It has hills of 8,000 to 9,000 feet all round. We asked those lads to fly to Imphal through cloud and then make a let-down through those clouds into this saucer, on the floor of which there are nasty little pimples, about 1,000 feet high, which you have to dodge. That was during one of the worst months—June—in monsoon weather. Every day they flew in something. We said we would try to bump it up to 400 tons a day. I was told that an average of 600 tons a day was required. Those lads got through every day. On a bumper day we got in 1,000 tons, and our average was 700 tons a day in Imphal. I think that gives a rough sketch of what happened in Burma. We are now in a very much better position; we are sitting pretty. I hope to see real progress, and I cannot see the weather interfering to the same extent as before.

If anybody will ask questions to bring out the more important parts I have forgotten, it will probably be the best way to complete the picture.

Sir PERCY SYKES: Did the lecturer see anything of the work of that wonderful girl, Miss Graham Bower, who started the Militia in the Naga Hills?

Air-Marshal Sir JOHN BALDWIN: I think I am right in saying she is the only woman to hold a combatant commission as captain in the Indian Army. I believe she is an anthropologist. She was out there when the Japs came, and she refused to leave her head-hunters. They are on both the Burman and Indian sides of the border and they were the only troops in certain areas of the front. Apparently, Miss Bower established a very firm understanding with these people; they worshipped her, and when we had to evacuate from that country she sent a message, saying: "If my men are to stop the Japanese, where are arms for them?" We never had armed the Nagas. We thought better to leave them with their knives and darts than with arms. But the Commissioner in Kohima agreed that he would send out a certain number of shot-guns. These were dispatched to her. One morning, shortly afterwards, when the Commissioner got out

of bed, there, outside his house, were seven heads laid out to show what they had done. Miss Bower is running a very fine Militia, and to such an extent that she has been recognized by the Army authorities and has been given the rank of captain in the Indian Army.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any more questions?

Brigadier BERNARD FERGUSON: I have no question to ask, but as I served in both the Wingate expeditions, I would like to be allowed to say a word of thanks to the Air Force out there. Our debt to them is very tremendous. During two years and for 2,500 miles we were dropped supplies with the utmost and most astonishing regularity in the most appalling weather, including the monsoon. I should also like to mention the part played by American light plane pilots. Our debt to them is quite incalculable. I could not lay it on too thick. The help they gave us is always symbolized to me by the Dakota which, to mark the end of each supply drop, always used to throw out the morning paper. The liaison, the comradeship, between the people on the ground and in the air has never been surpassed, and I should like to take this opportunity of saying "Thank you."

Air-Marshal Sir JOHN BALDWIN: I am sorry I missed that about air evacuation. Both American and British pilots used to fly those little unarmed Moths, L.1's and L.5's, when we could not get the Dakotas in, and snatch out a couple of casualties. Most of you know a Moth by sight. I have seen one come down, and out of the place which the designer meant for one or, at most, two passengers I saw a stretcher case and two other huge negroes emerge. How they got in I do not know. It was there, also, that we did the first glider "snatch-off"—that is, an airborne Dakota flying over and snatching off the ground a loaded glider in exactly the same way as Army co-operation aircraft collect message bags. It's a weird experience, anyhow for the first few seconds, if you happen to be a pilot yourself.

Colonel ROUTH: Can you say anything about the near future?

Air-Marshal Sir JOHN BALDWIN: I would not like to prophesy at all. All I can say now is that before, when we had short-range aircraft and we were starved with regard to air transport, we were in a bad position. We had no, what you would call in this country, strategic targets for bombing. We have now got forward into an area where airfields are more easily constructed, we have got long-range aircraft, and we are within range of Rangoon, Singapore and Bangkok, in the way of strategic Japanese bases, where we can keep the Jap under observation, and we are getting much better communications for moving troops on the floor. We can now use our mechanized forces; we have rivers on which we can use our power-boats; we are getting bigger naval flotillas—I mean landing craft; and I shall be surprised if something very much bigger does not happen in the very near future.

I do not think I mentioned the use of "Bit-hess" for airfields. I said to-day it was the British engineers who invented it, but I was taken to task and told it was the Canadians. The engineers thought if we could seal the gravel surface with waterproof material that it would stand up to any traffic and see us through the monsoon. We tried it out at Imphal, and all

I can tell you is that when I left we had experienced the monsoon, but by using this material, which is really jute soaked in some form of tar, and sticking it down and then carefully covering the joins, it stood up amazingly well. It stands up to any amount of hammering, but you have to try to get your pilots not to put on their brakes too hard or turn quickly, for that tears it, although it can be patched very quickly. This is a most important invention out there to keep us mobile.

The CHAIRMAN: How do supplies come in? How do the supply lines run to Mandalay?

Air-Marshal Sir JOHN BALDWIN: At the present moment supplies are all being airborne to the forward areas. The Imphal-Tiddim, Imphal-Kalewa Roads, and the Japanese road from the Chindwin via Yeu to Mandalay, are all fit for M.T. traffic. Mechanical forces have been rushed through to south of Mandalay. No doubt air supply is now being supplemented by such roads and river services.

The CHAIRMAN: Are the two Chinese divisions down from the Ledo Road?

Air-Marshal Sir JOHN BALDWIN: The 36th British Division has come down via the Indore area and is operating in the Mandalay area.

The CHAIRMAN: Did any of that come down that road?

Air-Marshal Sir JOHN BALDWIN: I should say no supplies. They have to rebuild the road there, and they are working like smoke. It went to pieces in the monsoon, but I think that by this monsoon they will be in a position to take equipment through, besides the pipeline. You can get only emergency things through, generally, on the Ledo Road.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any more questions or remarks? I know I am voicing the opinion of everyone here when I tell Air-Marshal Sir John Baldwin how tremendously we have enjoyed his most interesting and entertaining lecture. I am very glad indeed that we have had the opportunity of hearing him.

THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE EAST AND INDIA TO-DAY

By SIR TORICK AMEER ALI

Report of meeting held at the Royal Society's Hall,, W. 1., on Wednesday, February 14, 1945, Chairman, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

The CHAIRMAN: Sir Torick Ameer Ali, whom we are glad to welcome here today, was educated at Marlborough and Christchurch, Oxford. He was called to the Bar, became a High Court Judge at Calcutta, and was, last November, selected for the very coveted post of Moslem Member on the Council of the Secretary of State for India.

He is going to talk to us on a very interesting subject indeed, the impact of this great citizen army that we have got in India; its reactions to the country and the people; and, on the other hand, the effect on India of its presence.

SIR TORICK AMEER ALI: The cause of this infliction upon you I believe to be a chance remark that I made to one of your distinguished members, to the effect that India had in many ways been shaken up by this war more than England. I did not mean to detract from the sacrifices or sufferings which England has gone through. On the other hand, when I came to think how to justify that statement in half or three-quarters of an hour I decided to limit what I had to say to one aspect of that shaking up, and I chose the one that General Sir John Shea has indicated.

I am not a soldier. I do not even belong to the martial races of India. I am, by adoption at least, an "effete" Bengali. My justification is threefold. In the first place, I have found the topic to be of absorbing interest. Secondly, I do not think that its repercussions are sufficiently appreciated in England. Thirdly, I have in a humble capacity had exceptional opportunities of observing both sides of the question.

Before I begin, I would like to make two preliminary observations: I am aware that I shall be treading on delicate ground; I have always been of the view that on some occasions delicate ground cannot be avoided. Secondly, I do invite you most heartily to treat anything I say as strictly untrue. I wish you to challenge it.

I will, with your permission, not give any set talk, but take the subject in certain stages, and deal with each as far as time permits.

In the first place, the country to which this "new" citizen army came: of it I shall say very little. In quality, in comfort, in amenities, it was not the country of the nabobs, ancient or modern, British or Indian. It was a country of second-class carriages, of poor housing, very poor amenities. A country of the poor middle class, which has a very miserable existence in India, where to be comfortable you must either be a beggar or a maharajah.

Then, it came to Bengal, my own province, and Bengal has never been part of a soldier's India. The exigencies of this war have made it so. It is a very large swampy flat plain with nothing to relieve it—disease, mosquitoes, an unhealthy climate, depression. Only one large city; with

“City lights,” if you like—very few of them at that; less than London at the moment. Calcutta was once described in the 1880’s as “situated between a muddy river and an unhealthy marsh, just far enough from the sea to miss its breezes and near enough to get its damp. Its situation is so bad by nature there is little man could do to make it worse, but that little has been faithfully and assiduously done.”

I have called it the “new Army.” I have got into trouble on a previous occasion for stressing that fact. The difference between the old and the new Army is, however, a fact. The old Army in India itself made the distinction. It said that the new Army spoiled the country; it was no longer a country for a soldier. You now had to clean your own boots and to pay whatever prices were asked in the bazaar.

The first lecture I ever gave to B.O.R.s was in the house of the Bishop of Calcutta under the auspices of Toc H. I took my Bengali shorthand-writer. After the talk the men came round and spoke to him. When I came away Mr. Mookerjee said to me, “Sir, they must belong to very noble families.” I asked, “Why?” He said, “Sir, they did not abuse me.”

It struck me then that this was an amazing opportunity to get in some of the slack that we have let go in India; the opportunity of presenting the ordinary Englishman to the ordinary Indian. That may seem to you extraordinary. Why do I stress “ordinary”? It is because it is very difficult to find an ordinary Englishman in Bengal, perhaps more difficult than in any other province. It is very difficult for any man to be ordinary. Money counts a great deal. Positions are abnormal. There is great attention to that supposed imperial bulwark, prestige. The ordinary clerk or shorthand-writer has perhaps been abused by the ordinary British soldier on his way back from his only pre-war amusement; he may possibly have been patronized by somebody in high authority. But the ordinary Englishman, such as he would meet in England, he has no opportunity of mixing with. With regard to the old Army, let me say this. The English citizens in Calcutta did not mix with the ordinary soldier, did not take much interest in him. On the other hand, he came generally of a class that would not be interested in private houses, or reading books, or listening to music. So there is some explanation of the fact that he was not to the Indian a *persona grata*.

I therefore would like you to visualize the picture of ordinary Englishmen coming out to India in large quantities, with all their good qualities and readiness to see things for themselves and take things as they are.

The next point I present to you is their mental equipment. Very largely from what I have said you will infer that my view was that their mental background was that of an ordinary Englishman. If I were to make distinctions, I should do so as follows. Some had not thought about India at all. The knowledge of others consisted of the usual catchwords like “East is East and West is West,” “Land of golden opportunity,” the “gorgeous East,” and so on.

To others it meant a little Kipling or, to a slightly more intellectual section, Macaulay. I express a purely personal opinion that all the benefits which Britain has ever conferred on India can hardly compensate for

Thomas Babington Macaulay. On the other hand, it is fair to add that the British Empire in India was really founded by three great Scots. Macaulay, generally speaking, means the "Black Hole." One British soldier said, "All I know about India is the Black Hole; and now that I have come out here, I had a talk with my chah wallah and my chah wallah says there never was any. There goes the brightest jewel in the British Crown."

What happened on the voyage out? Some of them had lectures, and from what I hear those lectures were very ill-advised.

Durban had a double effect. In general because they had such a magnificent time. It was such a glorious place that when they were landed in my unfortunate country they said, "My God! Anything to get back to South Africa." In Durban also they came up against the racial question. It started a feeling of uneasiness.

As to the lectures, from what I gathered they were delivered by what I take the liberty to describe as the wrong kind of man. There was much talk of prestige; prestige of the wrong kind. The old phrases were used, like "No Indian has a sense of humour," which is a very unwise thing to say of any people and an unkind thing to say to any young Englishman coming to India. "There is no word for 'Thank you' in the Indian language," an inanity which was dealt with first a hundred years ago by one of the finest writers on India, Frederick John Shore. He says you might just as well say no Frenchman is moral because there is no word for "home" in French. The result was that, when they landed, some of them were already uncertain. So much for mental equipment.

Reactions upon India and Indians. As regards the educated classes in Bengal, they had never seen any soldiers except a type by whom they expected to be "abused." They were very nervous as to what was going to happen to their wives and families. The British Army had acquired an undeserved reputation for ferocity. They were thoroughly pleased at being spoken to nicely by British soldiers. Certain of the older generation said, "Oh, they are very nice now. But what about in three years' time?" We began many things. Bengali ladies who had never spoken English or met an Englishman came out and gave tea parties. We got on very well. Everybody seemed happy. Of course, the politicians did not like it. I had warnings from some of my Congress friends that this was not the right sort of thing to do: "wasting a hate." I had similar warnings from another direction (to which I will refer later) on the English side. This was not the thing at all. You could not have British soldiers going and having tea with ordinary Indians and finding out that they are quite normal human beings.

As regards the poor. For many months I had two B.O.R.s convalescent in my own house, staying with us, having meals with us, living as members of the family. Relations between our B.O.R. visitors and guests and my staff were of the best. I should say that the Indian poor, generally, notwithstanding what I am going to note regarding the change that has taken place within the British Army, like the English soldier. On the whole the reputation of the British Army is deservedly high. It has

behaved amazingly well. On the other hand, you have to remember that it does represent the war, and the war in India has been a terrible thing for the poor. So that you cannot expect the British Army to be in itself popular. Individually and as men, I think the B.O.R. of the new Army is and will remain liked.

As regards a great and vital section of the Indian poor, the Indian Army, the situation is more delicate. I am here treading on ground where I hope somebody here, some officer in the Indian Army, may be able to correct me.

There is, of course, the discrepancy in pay. Just as the British soldier also can never be quite happy about the discrepancy between his pay and that of the American, there is that same difference between the pay of the sepoy and the B.O.R. The Indian soldier, especially the new class of Indian soldier (who sometimes is not worth it), thinks, "I can do the same things. Why should I not have the same pay?" Again, they have begun to draw comparisons. One thing that you have to take into consideration is the fact that many have been to Egypt and Italy. I have not met those back from Italy. I have met a certain number back from Egypt, good types and good soldiers. They draw comparisons between their condition in Egypt and in India.

In Egypt things are infinitely better. The hospitals are better; nursing is better; the relations between British and Indian troops were cordial. They come back to their own country and find them worse.

Moreover, the sepoy has been quick to observe and react to the reaction within the English Army, to which I am now coming.

Generally speaking, "to take the words out of the horse's mouth," as my Bengali friends might say, this reaction has been a "browning-off." I will again take a few points.

First, the country itself. Great discomfort: "I drive my lorry for hundreds of miles a day, and I cannot get a cup of tea." One regiment drove their guns from Bombay to Calcutta in the hottest time of the year. They had nobody to advise them; nobody to tell them what to eat or drink; and they lived the whole way on 14 oz. of bully beef.

Most of the men are urban. In fact, there are few young men in England who are not urbanized, even if they come from the country. Some of them could not abide animal life. The crickets, for instance, got on their nerves. I can understand it, although I do not think it would have affected the young men of my generation. There was nobody to tell them what was safe and what was not. They were thrown into camps in Bengal. The camp followers rather liked to frighten them. They told them, for instance, that the big marsh lizard is a very dangerous animal. It is, of course, perfectly harmless.

Secondly, other conditions. The bazaars: I suppose more ill-feeling has been made in the British Army in India by men going to the bazaars and being swindled than in any other way: being asked 5 rupees for a 1-rupee article and paying it. Exactly the same process took place in France during the last war and embittered relations between the two nations. It is not entirely easy to check, but it might have been checked to a far greater degree. The Army hates the Indian shopkeeper. It has

come to the conclusion that Indian labour is bad. As a rule it only gets (and pays for) the worst. So the browning-off process has gone on. The Congress riots had something, but not much, to do with it. I think the main causes were such as I have very roughly indicated.

One more dangerous topic—intentional “browning-off.” The officers on the whole—such is my experience—are less inclined to be friendly than the men. Partly perhaps for “security” reasons. Partly because they had other amusements—clubs. Partly from all sorts of causes. But the fact remains that, with notable exceptions, they discouraged fraternization. In the middle of 1942 there was undoubtedly a move from the high authorities, whoever they are, to stop fraternizing. “We must prevent this British Army becoming pro-Congress.”

I spoke to certain officers on the Intelligence side on this topic. One of them I will quote to you, a very nice man. He said, “If your clever young fellows get hold of the B.O.R. you will twist him round your little fingers.” I replied, “That is not my experience. I have lived in England, I have worked with the working man in England, but I have never yet known an Englishman who was persuaded by argument. There is no danger of Mr. So-and-so suddenly running about in a dhoti and waving a Congress flag.” He made the most astonishing remark to me: “You are assuming that the B.O.R. thinks.” I was and am. The fact that he makes up his opinion on what he sees and feels does not mean that he does not think. We all, in my humble opinion, do the same.

That reminds me that I have omitted another factor—disillusionment. The B.O.R. was told too much about the perfection of British, or rather Anglo-Indian, administration. I would rather have stressed the difficulties under which we carry on the administration and assert that we have done, all things considered, well. As it is, many have said to me, “If this is all we have been able to do after two hundred years, I do not think much of it.”

One further aspect of the intentional browning-off. I quite appreciate the necessity of security. After all, before the war there were anarchists in Bengal—and I was a judge. But security is a delicate thing. Unless you are to get something worse than that of which you are afraid, it has to be handled by very able people. In war-time most of your staff, in specialist posts, such as “public relations officers,” “security officers,” “liaison officers,” and so forth are provided, perhaps of necessity, from mercantile offices—by what we in Bengal call the East India Company. We still say that the East India Company rules Bengal. It is human nature that big offices do not always release their best men. The Public Relations Officer with whom I had to deal was the election agent in England of a recent Governor of Bengal. I am prepared to assert that on this side of India the policy of the British Army has been too far guided by the East India Company. Very clever men; very able at politics; curiously enough, so often their views coincided (as I have already hinted) with those of Congress. I would suggest that in taking care that the British Army shall not mix with the ordinary citizen they are playing the Congress game. The two converge to the same result: “Do not let the British Army get too friendly.”

Time is up. If I am wrong, for goodness' sake say so. Say the British Army is very happy. It loves India. If I am right, or fairly right, I suggest that you should not meet anything I have said with pained incredulity. Let us take measures to meet it as far as we can. Where we cannot, face it.

I suggest that the views of the British Army will count for a great deal in England. The very thing of which the East India Company was apprehensive has come about. I have said to the authorities here that 90 per cent. of their soldiers would vote for getting rid of India, because they do not want to go back. They do not want their sons to go back. They do not want to put their money into India. I have been told that it will be different when they get back and think of the lovely sunshine. But it has not been the sort of sunshine you have when you go out to New Delhi on a commission or deputation. The sunshine has not appealed to them.

The CHAIRMAN: This meeting is now open for discussion. Sir Torick has very kindly said that he is prepared to answer any questions. So if you have anything to say with regard to what he has told us, or any questions to ask him, will you do so?

General MARTIN: I was very interested in what Sir Torick said about the relations of the British and Indian Armies. General Mayne was talking to me the other day, and he said that in his opinion the relations between the two in the field had never been so cordial.

He cited many instances that had occurred in the Fifth Indian Division. I wondered whether Sir Torick agreed that that was so in the field as opposed possibly to Bengal?

Colonel MONTGOMERY: I most emphatically agree with the last speaker. In fact, I join issue with Sir Torick very strongly on the point he made that the British soldier does not like the sepoy or *vice versa*. The Fourteenth Army in my view—and I served in Burma—is one of the greatest assets we have to-day for countering the points that you have made, sir; with all of which I agree.

That brings me to this point. Here I agree with everything Sir Torick has said. It seems to me that we must now find some means of countering this very grave situation, because undoubtedly unless we take steps to counter the bad effects of this impact of the British Army in India, these effects will be disastrous for us in India and for India itself. I say that as an officer of the Indian Army, and I have had the good fortune to serve in that Army in Africa, as well as in the British Regular Army.

It seems to me that very little is being done at present to put the matter right.

Nothing has been done, as far as I know, in the past to educate the British soldier before he leaves this country. It must be done in this country, and we are responsible. (Applause.) It should be done in the first place by trying to teach everyone who goes out about India—not only the soldier; you must educate also the commercial man. First of all, they must be given far more of a background than they get at present. It is not sufficient to leave the matter to what I would call the University class.

We must go to all the classes who go out to India. We must give them a knowledge of the background of Indian life and of their life in India and the East. That embraces differences of custom, culture, habits, and, above all, we must try and give them some insight into the languages.

Next, when we get out there we must improve the Welfare Services. My own view is that this should be an integral part of the whole field service. I am impressed by the importance of the work in front of the organizations now being set up for welfare in India. In my view, that is really a part of the general question of providing for the welfare of the white man in India. How far that is being done I do not know; it does not concern me.

There is a wider significance in this problem which I should like to raise. It is not only, as I see it now, affecting the British. In India and China to-day there are half a million Americans. The American does not understand the East. That is my view. I came back from India a year ago. I am going back in two months—thank God!—and my view of what has happened in Delhi is this. The Americans will pay Rs. 500 in New Delhi for a carpet made in Macclesfield or somewhere like that. They do not understand the East. Their impact on India is much more serious than that of the British because of the effect on the value of the currency. That also must be considered. That is a very wide subject. I bring it to your notice because I feel it to be even more serious for the future than the problem of the impact of the British.

Of course, I admit the American influence is only a short-term one. I suppose when the Japanese war is over the majority of Americans will go back to their own country.

But the problem is the impact of the white races on India in all spheres of life, not only in the Army, and unless we tackle it we are in for very great trouble.

Mr. BRYCE: I have been immensely interested in what Sir Torick has said. I think it is a lesson for every one of us to try and understand the impact of the Army on India and *vice versa*. I hope the lesson will be learned of what Sir Torick said, that whatever happens we must understand each other in the course of the next few years; otherwise the contact is going to be disastrous.

I do feel India is facing a most colossal economic problem in bringing herself economically up to date. We can help in this. It can only be done ultimately by psychological understanding. If the psychological understanding is not forthcoming, the economic problems will be more difficult.

Mr. SHUTTLEWORTH: A nephew of mine is just back from the Burma front. He said that at the front the relations between the ordinary ranks of the British Army and the Indians were very good. He learned three or four languages. I helped him with his Hindustani before he went.

In connection with the last war, in all the hospitals in England the orderlies were British. I saw most of them because I was First Assistant to Sir Walter Lawrence. These British orderlies got on extremely well with the Indian patients, and the Indian patients liked their British orderlies very much.

Sir TORICK AMEER ALI: I am very glad to have been corrected by those who know more of the subject than I do, and who have exclusive knowledge of what is going on at the front. I only know what is going on behind the front, but I will give you the source of my information from the B.O.R. side: partly men I have known fairly well and intimately, men living in my own country; partly from those selecting B.O.R.s for officers, who have to find out the opinions of the B.O.R.s. In their view the relations with the Gurkhas were throughout cordial and admirable. The Sikh and Pathan on the whole—this is my limited view—have been too reserved. There is no bond, although it may come at the front, under stress of circumstances. I have seen the beginnings of friendship in an anti-aircraft regiment between the N.C.O. instructors, mostly Manchester men, and the men; the greatest of friendship. But I am only glad that my information is very fragmentary and possibly wrong. For it is a matter which, even if there is 10 per cent. wrong, leaves room for improvement. That, I think, it is only fair for me to say.

The CHAIRMAN: I am going to Mr. Amery, and I am going to ask him to send Sir Torick to Italy to see with his own eyes the relationship between the British troops there and the Indian Divisions that are fighting alongside them.

All my friends tell me that they are not an army composed of two distinct races, but that they are one army, of Indians and Britishers, who are fighting in the same cause; and that the admiration which the British soldier has for the Indian—not the Gurkha entirely, but also for the Rajput, the Moslem, the Sikh and the like—is only equalled by the admiration which that same Indian has for his brother, the British soldier.

When you have seen that, Sir Torick, I will concede to you that there is a difference in India.

I went to India fifty-five years ago and I lived in that delightful Kipling India. We had a lovely time and grouched like anything if we had to work after ten o'clock in the day. It was a wonderful life. Speaking for myself as an officer of the Indian Army, I can tell you that my Colonel—who, curiously enough, was a Mutiny Colonel, so he went a long way back—taught us to treat the Indian, not only the Indian soldier but the Indian civilian, simply as a fellow-citizen. I had to investigate these things, and it was not the soldier who made the reputation of the white man so bad, but it was the unofficial white.

India to-day is a very uncomfortable country. It is frightfully expensive and the amenities are very poor indeed. Bear that in mind, and how difficult it is for the British soldier going out there to live under those conditions. I pray that they all may be sent very soon to fight, because then their conditions will be much better than they are in that very uncomfortable country.

But I do agree that we are greatly at fault because we had not taught these men before they landed in India what they were to expect. There is a very intelligent little book which the American authorities give to the American soldier before he comes to this country, which tells him what the Englishman is like and his peculiarities. I believe it would be a very good thing if we borrowed that idea, and not only talked to the

British soldier but gave him something to read and digest, telling him exactly what he will find when he goes to India.

You may have irritated us, Sir Torick, but you have done us a lot of good, and we do thank you most sincerely for your very, very interesting lecture.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOUTHERN KURDISH, 1937-1944

By C. J. EDMONDS, C.M.G., C.B.E.

IN the Society's Journal for July, 1937, will be found a Bibliography of Kurdish Periodicals and Books published in Iraq up to the end of 1936, with a short introduction on the distribution of Kurdish dialects. Twenty-four years have now elapsed since the first number of *Pêshkewtin* (September 20, 1920) was issued to a delighted Sulaimani, and a quarter of a century since Kurdish was made for the first time the official language of an administration. The present is thus perhaps an appropriate moment to bring the record up to date and to analyse progress.

At first sight the literary output of the Kurds in this period seems to have been astonishingly meagre. The four-page *Pêshkewtin*, with changes of the name to *Bang y Kurdistan*, *Rhoj y Kurdistan*, *Umiyd y Istyqlal*, *Jiyanewe* and *Jiyan*, has continued to appear in Sulaimani, as a bi-weekly, weekly, or fortnightly, almost without interruption (the temporary rival *Zuban*, No. 1, 16, was published during the eleven months of *Jiyan's* suspension from March, 1938, to February, 1939, so that Sulaimani has never been without its newspaper) and must still be considered the main bulwark of Kurdish literary activity.

In the first four years counting from 1920 only one real book was printed, the Collected Works of the classic poet Shaikh Muhammad, "*Mahwi*," and this was primarily due to the initiative of a British officer, Captain V. Holt, then Assistant Political Officer and until recently Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad. The year 1925 was marked by the first publications outside Sulaimani: in Baghdad, Salih Zaki Sahibqiran began the issue of *Diyariy' Kurdistan*, No. 1, 12, a magazine in three languages; at Ruwandiz Saiyid Husain Huzni Mukriyani, the Kurdish Caxton, founded the *Zar y Kirmanciy* press and printed two short religious tracts (VI, 2 and 3). For the next five years output continued on much the same scale, with brochures little more than pamphlets, mostly of contemporary verse or histories of Kurdish dynasties or religious matter; half of these were written, printed, illustrated with woodcuts and published by the indefatigable Saiyid Huzni at his little hand-press at Ruwandiz; the rest were printed in Baghdad. In 1931 appeared the first two books of any size, a collection of biographies of Kurdish celebrities by S. Huzni, and the first volume of the *History of the Kurds and Kurdistan* by Muhammad Amin Zaki Beg (now, 1944, a member of the Iraq Senate); among other items the list shows three small editions of classic poets published in Baghdad by Kurdi and Meriwani.

This first peak of 1931 was followed immediately by a slump in 1932, the last year of the Mandate, when politics tended to monopolize attention, but there was a partial recovery in 1933. From 1935, following the taking over of the former Municipal Press by the talented and whimsical

poet, Hajji Taufiq "Piyre Mêrd," Sulaimani began to show a more varied activity and compensated for the extinction of the Zar y Kirmanciy press in the unfavourable atmosphere of Ruwandiz; several considerable books were published in Baghdad during the same period. In 1938 there was a new high peak, far beyond anything hitherto approached, though still very modest; the peak was not only in volume of out-turn, but also in the number of publications, pointing to a healthy independent activity among individuals.

Since the outbreak of war, conditions have of course completely changed, principally owing to paper shortage. The small independent publicist has disappeared and Kurdish literary work has come to be restricted to three periodicals: the ever-persistent Sulaimani weekly *Jiyn*; *Gelawêj*, the monthly magazine of Baghdad; and the war-propaganda publications of the British Embassy, first as isolated broadsheets, then as a weekly news-bulletin, and finally as a monthly magazine, *Deng y Gêtiy' Taze*, in which war publicity is combined with material of more general literary and historical interest.

Strange as the statement may sound, the broadsheets and weekly bulletins just mentioned are, from the literary point of view, the most interesting of all publications in the new list, by reason of the studied purity of the language employed. Arabic is the most vital and exuberant of tongues; almost everywhere the Arabs went, whether for conquest or for commerce, they imposed their religion; wherever they imposed their religion they imposed their alphabet; and wherever they imposed their alphabet Arabic words have tended to overgrow and even obliterate the native vocabulary, sparing little more than the skeleton of the syntax with the prepositions, pronouns, demonstratives, and a few verbs. In contact with other languages Arabic is like the luxuriant, splendid, unmanageable forests* of the tropics which, once vigilance and effort to keep them back are relaxed, will overwhelm the clearings and destroy the stoutest works of man. It is only in comparatively recent times that language has been associated with national or racial consciousness and religion has lost its spell. For centuries, throughout the Islamic world, there was no resistance whatever to the encroaching Arabic. Attempts made to cut it back in the last twenty-five years of greater racial or nationalistic sensitiveness have achieved little or nothing, and even to-day three out of four of the nouns and adjectives in an ordinary Persian newspaper article will be found to be Arabic; nor has the process of encroachment been confined to the literary language, for original native words have dropped out of common speech also.

Fortunately for itself (if it be granted that the purity of a yet unadulterated and philologically interesting language is worth preserving) Kurdish had hardly been written during the age of indifference and had in consequence preserved its rich and lively vocabulary unspoiled. But the moment it began to be written for official administrative purposes the danger arose. The literate classes were either *mullas* brought up on

* This simile of the "unmanageable forest" has been suggested to my mind by an article entitled "Mankind and the Jungle," by Sir Hugh Clifford in an old "Blackwood."

religious books, or men of Persian or Turkish education who, without having forgotten their mother tongue, had been trained to think their professional, scientific or even literary thoughts in those languages and so tended to use the Arabic words already there present and naturalized; it was the line of least resistance and, moreover, gave authors a comfortable feeling of superior learning or of genteelism. The encroaching forest would naturally be particularly "unmanageable" in war-time, when countless new or unfamiliar objects and ideas, with their special vocabulary, are pressed on the attention of the reading or listening public. In Iraq these first reach the Kurds through the medium of the Arabic newspapers or broadcasts, whose writers and speakers have perhaps themselves invented (by literal translation), or selected, Arabic equivalents for the new European words; without a conscious act of resistance, such words, though quite new even in Arabic, would have been accepted into Kurdish and so have enlarged the area of encroachment. Uninstructed resistance might have led to chaos, and future generations will have to thank Taufiq Wahbi Beg,* a real scholar, for the care with which he has guided this war-time development along the lines of philological rectitude. This guidance has been consciously or unconsciously followed by writers in the other periodicals and by broadcasters on the Baghdad and *Sharq-al-Adna* wireless. The appearance of some of the new words has led to a certain amount of criticism among the conservatives; but the Arabic words were equally unfamiliar two years ago, and cannot suggest to the mind of the common Kurdish man the real meaning of the new word as effectively as the Kurdish word compounded of familiar elements or constructed by analogy. The position was aptly put to the present writer by a Begzada of the great Jaf tribe, whose education was of the Persian-mulla type, thus: "My eye is not yet quite used to the news bulletins; but when they are read out they are very sweet to the ear and the meaning is perfectly clear to all of us; indeed, when the word used in the Arabic newspapers is placed in brackets after a new Kurdish compound word to explain it, the effect is the opposite, and it is in the light of the Kurdish word that I see for the first time the exact meaning of the Arabic, which I had only perceived dimly before as through dark glasses."

Finally, though strictly speaking not within the terms of reference of this article, mention must be made of the beginnings of Kurdish literary activity on the Persian side of the border at Sauj Bulaq (now called Mahabad), the headquarters of the Mukri country. A list of publications is added at the end of the Bibliography below. A point of great interest is that in spite of the probably justifiable claim of Mukri to be the purest of the dialects, the Mukri authors seem inclined to accept the Sulaimani idiom (the difference is, in fact, very small) as the vehicle of literary expression for all.

* Since July, 1944, Minister of Economics in the Iraqi Cabinet.

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- I. 2. *Bang y Kurdistan* (The Call of Kurdistan). A No. 14 appeared on June 8, 1923.
 I. 9. *Rhuwnaqiy* (Light). A No. 11 appeared on May 16, 1936.
 VIII. 1. *Te'liym y Taqim* (Platoon Drill). Add "9 pages"; omit words in brackets at end.

PART II.—ADDITIONS 1920-1936

III.—POETRY: OTHER VERSE

7. *Goraniy' Kurdiy* (Kurdish Songs). By various authors. Sulaimani: Municipal Press, 1925. $6\frac{3}{4} \times 4\frac{1}{4}$ inches; 15 pages.
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VI.—RELIGION AND MORALS

16. *Chil Fermuwde y Pêghemer* (Forty Sayings of the Prophet). By M. Qiziljaji. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1935. $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 44 pages.

VII.—PHILOLOGY

11. *Ehmediy*. (Ahmadi). A rhymed Kurdish-Arabic vocabulary, by Shaikh Marif of Nodê. Same as No. 2, but edited by Rashid Hajji Fattah and published by Sulaimani Press, 1936. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$ inches; 48 pages.

IX.—POLITICAL, ETC.

5. *Qanuwn y Wezayif y Meclys y Nahiyê* (Law for the Duties of Rural District Councils). Issued by the rebel administration of Shaikh Mahmud. Sulaimani Press, 1923. 7×4 inches; 14 pages.
 6. *Kurd le Keyewe Xeriyê?* (Since when have the Kurds been Active?) By Ruben Pasha, translated from the Armenian by Ali Irfan. Baghdad: Furat Press, 1927. $9 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; pages.
 7. *Duw Tegela y Bêsuwd* (Two Fruitless Efforts). Petitions addressed to the late King Faisal I in 1930 by Muhammad Amin Zaki. Baghdad: Meriwani Press, 1935. $7\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{4}$ inches; 69 pages.

PART III.—CONTINUATIONS AND NEW PUBLICATIONS 1937-1944

I.—PERIODICAL JOURNALISM

A.—Sulaimani Press

7. *Jiyan* (Life). Name changed to *Jiyn* with the same meaning from No. 555 of February 9, 1939 (or perhaps No. 554 missing from collection). Format changed several times; in 1943, $17\frac{3}{4} \times 11\frac{3}{4}$ inches. Year 1937 issues 39; year 1938 issues 7 (suppressed by the local administration from March, 1938, to February, 1939); year 1939 issues 35; year 1940 issues 26; year 1941 issues 36; year 1942 issues 44; year 1943 issues 38; year 1944 issues 37; latest issue No. 769 of December 30, 1944. Editor throughout: Hajji Taufiq "Piyre Mêrd."
 15. *Mecelle y Zanistiy* (Review of Learning). "A scientific, literary, technical, historical, economic fortnightly." First (and apparently only) issue February 25, 1937. $11\frac{3}{4} \times 8\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 8 pages. Founder and editor: Salih Qaftan.

16. *Zuban* (Tongue). "A Kurdish Weekly." Municipal Press. $17\frac{3}{4} \times 11\frac{3}{4}$ inches. First issue (with pirated title *Jiyan*) September 11, 1937; No. 4 (with name changed to *Zuban*) September 26, 1937; last issue No. 73 of July 16, 1939; special unnumbered issue on April 10, 1939, on occasion of death of King Ghazi.

E.—Baghdad

17. *Gelawéj* (Sirius). "A literary and cultural monthly Kurdish magazine." Najah Press, later Ma'arif Press, first issue January, 1940; $9\frac{1}{2} \times 6\frac{1}{2}$ inches, then, from last issue of 1941 $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches. Year 1940 issues 10, pages 640; year 1941 issues 5, pages 492; year 1942 issues 6, pages 576; year 1943 issues 12, pages 768; year 1944 issues 12, pages 864. Founder: Ibrahim Ahmad. Editor (1943-44): Ala-ul-Din Sajjadi.

18. *Deng y Gêtiy' Taze* (Voice of the New World). An illustrated monthly. Ma'arif Press (except Vol. I, No. 6, at Suryan Press), first issue October, 1943; Vol. I, October, 1943, to March, 1944, $13\frac{1}{2} \times 9\frac{3}{4}$ inches, issues 6, pages 288; Vol. II, April to September, 1944, format reduced to $9\frac{1}{2} \times 7\frac{1}{4}$ inches, issues 6, pages 576; Vol. III, from October, 1944, latest issue No. 3, December, 1944, issues 3, pages 288. Editor till June, 1943, Taufiq Wahbi; sub-editor, then editor since June, 1943, Husain Huzni Mukriyani.

II.—POETRY: ANTHOLOGIES AND COLLECTED WORKS

10. *Diywan y Heriyq* (Collected Verse of Mulla Salih of Zaiwiya "Hariq"). Introduction by Meriwani. Baghdad: Meriwani Press, 1938. $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 104 pages.

11. *Komelhe Shy'ir y Sha'ryan y Kurdiy* (Collection of Verses by Kurdish Poets). Edited by Mulla Abdul Kerim. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1938. 9×6 inches; 52 pages.

12. *Diywan y Mewlewiye we Rhoh y Mewlewiye* (Collected Verse of Maulawi and the Spirit of Maulawi). The original poems of Abdul Rahim "Mawlawi" in the Gorani dialect edited with verse translation into Southern Kurdish by Hajji Taufiq "Piyre Mêrd." Sulaimani: Jiyan Press: Vol. I, 1938 (misprint 1935). $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 231 pages.

13. *The Same*. Vol. II, 1940. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$ inches; 188 pages.

14. *Diywan y Sha'yr y Benawbang Mysbah y Diywan* (Collected Verse of the celebrated Poet Abdullah Beg Misbah-ud-Diwan). Collected and edited by Bashir Mushir. Baghdad: Ma'arif Press, 1939. $9\frac{1}{4} \times 6\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 130 pages. (See No. 9 for another edition.)

15. *Gulhdeste y Shu'era y Haw'esrim* (A Posy from my Poet-Contemporaries). An anthology edited by Ali Kemal Bapir Agha. Sulaimani: Jiyan Press, 1939. $9\frac{1}{2} \times 7$ inches; 56 pages.

16. *Shy'ir u Edebiyat y Kurdiy* (Kurdish Verse and Belles Lettres). An Anthology edited by Rafiq Hilmi. Baghdad: Tafayyudh Press, 1941. $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 146 pages.

III.—POETRY: OTHER VERSE

9. *Deste Gulh y Lawan* (A posy for the Young). Rhymed lessons by Zaiwar. Sulaimani: Jiyan Press, 1939. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 16 pages.

10. *Zykr y Muharebe y Bendegan y Miyr y Celiyulushan y Eziyz Beg y Baban ba Tayefe y Rhuwmiy* (Account of the Battle fought by the Servants of the Eminent Prince Aziz Beg Baban with the Turks). A qasida of "Salim" Sahibqiran. Sulaimani: Jiyan Press, 1940. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 12 pages.

IV.—HISTORY

14. *Pend y Tariyxiy* (A lesson from History). Some pages from the French Revolution. By Salih Qaftan. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1937. $6\frac{1}{4} \times 4\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 58 pages.

15. *Xulaseyêk y Tariyx y Kurd u Kurdistan* (A summary of the History of the Kurds and Kurdistan). Vol. II (Vol I, see No. 2). By Muhammad Amin Zaki. Baghdad: Arabiya Press, 1937. $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 431 + v pages.

16. *Kurdistan y Mukriyan ya Atropatiyn* (Mukri Kurdistan or Atropatene).

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17. *Tariyx y Slémaniy w Wulhaty* (The History of Sulaimani and District). By Muhammad Amin Zaki. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1939. $9\frac{3}{4} \times 7$ inches; 294 + XXI pages.

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V.—DRAMA, ROMANCE, FICTION

4. *Kemanchejen* (The Fiddler). Translated from a Turkish version of the German by "Piyre Mêrd." Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, Vol. I, 1938. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$ inches; 127 pages.

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7. *Piyes y Temsiylék y Rhast y Tariyxii* (A True Historical Play). By "Piyre Mêrd." Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1942. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 38 pages.

VI.—RELIGION AND MORALS

17. *Mewluwdname y New-esser* (A New Account of the Birth of the Prophet). By Shaikh Muhammad-i Khal. Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1937. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$ inches; 43 pages.

18. *Esas y Se'adet* (The Foundations of Happiness). By Mulla Abdul Kerim of Biyara. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1937. $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 33 pages.

19. *Gorhiyn* (Revolution). By M. Baghdadi. Baghdad: Fanniya Press, 1937 (Meriwani Publications No. 4). $5\frac{3}{4} \times 4\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 28 pages.

20. *Hengawêk Bo Serkewtin* (A Step Forward). By Mirza Muhammad Amin Pizhderi. Sulaimani: Municipal Press, 1938. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6\frac{1}{4}$ inches; 60 pages.

21. *Felsefe y Ayin y Islam* (The Philosophy of the Rites of Islam). By Shaikh Muhammad-i Khal. Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1938. 10×7 inches; 61 pages.

22. *Ferayiz y Beshkirdin y Miyras y Sher'iy* (Rules of the Shari'at for the Division of Inheritance). By Mulla Muhammad Sa'id. Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1938. 9×6 inches; 15 pages.

23. *Awat: Nalhe y Dilh y Ebdullha Cewher* (Longings: A Cry from the Heart of Abdullah Jauhar). Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1938. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 6$ inches; 55 pages.

24. *Siypare y Xuw we Rhewisht* (Essay on Character and Behaviour). By Abdul Qadir of Qara Hasan. Baghdad: Furat Press, 1938. $9\frac{1}{4} \times 6\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 83 pages.

25. *Hendê Prhupuwch y Pêshiynan we Metel* (Some Superstitions of the Ancients and Conundrums). By Ismail Haqqi Shawais. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1938. $8 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 48 pages.

26. *Hezar Béj u Pend* (A Thousand Sayings and Maxims). By Ma'ruf Jiyawuk. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1938. $8 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 91 pages.

27. *Menaqyb y Kak Ehmed* (The Virtues of Kak Ahmad). By Khwaja Effendi. Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1939. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 72 pages.

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29. *Le Wulhat y Ademiyzad-da Serbestekân* (The Free in the Places of Mankind). By Aghaoghlu Ahmad, translated by Abdul Wahid Nuri. Baghdad: Suryan Press, 1939. $8 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 34 pages.

30. *Piyroziy' Minalh* (Happiness for Children). By Abdul Wahid Nuri. Sulaimani: Jiyani Press, 1940. $6\frac{1}{2} \times 5$ inches; 30 pages.

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33. *Dwanêk le Babet Pêrhwewiy' Myllyewe* (An Essay on National Co-operation). By Abdul Wahhab Nuri. Baghdad: Ma'arif Press, 1942. $8\frac{1}{4} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 20 pages.

34. *Le Rhêga y Serkewtin y Insana* (On the Road of Human Progress). By Abdul Wahhab Nuri. Baghdad: Ma'arif Press, 1943. $8 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 21 pages.

IX.—POLITICAL, ETC.

5. *Awe Rheshe y Rhuws y Suwr* (The Black Water of Red Russia). Anon. Sulaimani: Jiyān Press, 1940. $7 \times 4\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 8 pages.
6. *Rhuwnaqiy' Rhê-w Ban* (Light on the Highway). Anon. Sulaimani: Jiyān Press, 1940. $8 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 14 pages.
7. *Deng y Naziy le Geruw y Hytlerewe* (The Voice of the Nazis from the Throat of Hitler). Anon. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1941. $6\frac{1}{4} \times 4\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 16 pages.
8. *Beyan y Heqiyqet* (A Statement of the Truth). By Taufiq Wahbi. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1941. $6\frac{1}{4} \times 4\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 50 pages.
9. *Blhawķirdinewe y Nawbenaw* (Occasional Bulletins). Being thirty-two propaganda leaflets issued by the Public Relations Section of the British Embassy between April, 1942, and August, 1942. $11 \times 8\frac{3}{4}$ inches; total 90 pages.
10. *Bawerh y Naziyeķan Beramber be Ayineķan Têķra we Islamiyet be Taybetiy* (The Opinion of the Nazis on Religion in general and Islam in particular). Issued by the Public Relations Section of the British Embassy, Baghdad: Ma'arif Press, 1942. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 18 pages.
11. *Blhawķirdinewe y Hefteyi* (Weekly Bulletin). Published by the Public Relations Section of the British Embassy, Baghdad: first issue September 6, 1942. 13×8 inches. Year 1942, issues 14 pages 166; year 1943, issues 17 pages 210. Last issue No. 31 of October 28, 1943.
12. *Barbuw* (Subscription). Issued by the Central Committee of the Serkewtin (Advancement) Club; being the description of a tour in the Kurdish districts by the founder of the Club, Ma'ruf Jiyawuk. Baghdad: Najah Press, 1944. $8 \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 96 pages.
13. *Dawa y Milliy' Kurd* (The National Claim of the Kurds). Anon. Place and date of printing not shown (probably 1943 or 1944). $8\frac{1}{2} \times 6\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 21 pages.

X.—PUBLICATIONS IN PERSIAN KURDISTAN

[NOTE.—The following are publications of a society styled "J.K." (? Jiyānewe y Kurd=Kurdish Revival), with headquarters at Sauj Bulaq, now called Mahabad.]

1. *Rhoj-Ejmêr y Taybetiy' Komelhe y "J.K."* (Special Calendar of the "J.K." Society). Comparative Calendar showing the months of the Persian solar year (with new Kurdish names appropriate to the seasons), the Hijri lunar and the Christian years. (a) For 1322 (1943-44) with Kurdish verses of Ahmad Beg-i Fattah Beg of Sulaimani and Hajji Qadir of Koi at foot of each page; 1943; $6 \times 8\frac{1}{2}$ inches; 12 pages. (b) For 1923 (1944-45) with verses by various authors; 1944; $7 \times 8\frac{3}{4}$ inches; 12 pages.
2. *Nyshtman* (Homeland). "A social, cultural, literary Kurdish monthly." No. 1 July, No. 2 November, 1943, double number 3 and 4 December, 1943, and January, 1944, No. 5 February, No 6 March, 1944: each $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{3}{4}$ inches; single numbers 24 pages, double numbers 36 pages.
3. *Diyariy' Komelhe y "J.K." bo Laweķan y Kurd* (Gift of the "J.K." Society to Kurdish Youths). Selections from the poems of (a) Mulla Muhammad of Koi, (b) Hajji Qadir of Koi, and (c) various patriotic poets. 1943. $6\frac{1}{2} \times 4$ inches; 96 pages.

PRESENTATION TO MISS M. N. KENNEDY

THIS took place at the Royal Society's Rooms, before the lecture of March 14, 1945.

General Sir JOHN SHEA : Ladies and Gentlemen,—Before I hand the Chair over to Sir Percy Sykes, who is going to preside at the lecture, I have a most pleasant duty to perform—not really a duty, but a great happiness.

When we knew that Miss Kennedy had quite irrevocably decided to retire, it was a general wish among the members of the Society that she should be given in some tangible form a token, not merely of our esteem, but more truly of our love. (Applause.)

You know how difficult it is to get anything nowadays. The choice is profoundly limited; the quality is terribly poor; and the prices are enormous. So we thought that possibly she would be kind enough to accept a cheque, and that indeed she very graciously consented to do.

What Miss Kennedy has been to our Society no words of mine can adequately describe. She has been our prop and stay for all these years. You know how clever she was in getting the right series of lectures, and in all the actual work appertaining to the secretaryship. But it has always seemed to me that perhaps the greatest mark of the years she has held office has been the remarkable comradeship which exists in this Society, which, with respect, does not exist in all societies. That, indeed, we may claim is entirely due to her.

I always think such as these are rather embarrassing moments, so perhaps it will be best to say little and get it over the sooner.

So now I have the great happiness and pleasure of handing Miss Kennedy a cheque for £800. I have also to say that £70 more has been promised, and these happy contributions continue to come in. (Applause.)

MISS KENNEDY : I think this is a most embarrassing moment. I can find no words sufficiently adequate to thank Sir John and all the members of the Society for their overwhelmingly generous gift. My life in the past years has been bound up with the Society's interests, and I have been happy in being able to look on all members as my friends. I hope I shall keep your friendship, even though I cannot be here so much now. (Prolonged applause.)

TEA DRINKING IN CHINA

By J. E. C. BLOFELD

THE Japanese tea ceremony, or "Cha-no-yu," is well known to the West through several excellent books which have been written on the subject by Japanese and Western writers. Though there is, at the present time, no exact counterpart of this in China, the study of tea-drinking habits in that country is, nevertheless, one of considerable interest. To obtain a thorough knowledge of this subject one must traverse the realms of history, literature, geography, botany, industry (for the processing of the leaf), commerce, porcelain manufacture, and even medicine. This has been done very thoroughly by Mr. William H. Uckers, an American writer, who has compiled a volume of some eleven hundred pages entitled *All About Tea*, which deals with every aspect of the subject in all countries where tea is produced or consumed, but some of the passages dealing with China approach the matter from the point of view of the foreign tea exporter rather than that of the Chinese consumer. This article, which is far from comprehensive, is an attempt to describe the part played by tea drinking in the lives of the Chinese.

According to Chinese mythology, the uses to which the tea plant can be put were first discovered by the Emperor Shen Nung nearly three thousand years before the present era. It is doubtful, however, if tea was widely drunk much before the fourth century A.D., and it was probably regarded more as a medicine than a beverage until about the eighth century, when it was popularized by the T'ang Dynasty writer, Lu Yu, in the first book ever to be devoted exclusively to the subject of tea, entitled *Ch'a Ching*, or *The Tea Classic*. The text of this book is corrupt in places and the exact meaning of some of the phrases employed is by no means clear. Nevertheless, it is an interesting work, and inspired at different times similar works by Chinese and Japanese authors. A short extract from the writer's translation is given at the end of this article, together with a poem by the T'ang poet, Lu T'ung.

There is little doubt that tea was first looked upon as a medicine and that it was not drunk purely for the sake of its flavour or mildly stimulating qualities until several hundred years after its discovery. Moreover, it was often adulterated with foreign substances, such as ginger, lemon, etc., much as Westerners adulterate it with milk and sugar to-day. Nevertheless, the eulogy contained in Lu T'ung's poem shows that, by the middle of the T'ang Dynasty, its merits were probably widely recognised. From then onwards the Chinese have always preferred to drink their tea plain, with the exception of certain kinds which are flavoured with fresh or dried flowers. Though there are high grades of "flower tea" or "scented morsels," the best tea is never mixed with flowers, as its own delicate aroma is considered far superior to that of any blossom.

The varieties of tea drunk in China to-day are almost without number,

and, with the exception of teas used for export, have not been carefully classified. The main categories are few in number, but each covers an enormous variety of teas of varying quality and taste. They are as follows:

Green Tea.—The leaves of this category of tea vary in colour from very light green, as vivid as that of young rice plants, to a blackish green, which is hardly distinguishable from black, or, as the Chinese call it, red, tea. The liquid produced by infusing these leaves also varies considerably from pale green to murky amber, according to the quality of the tea and the strength of the infusion. All tea which has not been fermented before firing is known as green tea.

Red Tea (known in Europe as black tea).—This is produced from the same plants as green tea, but fermented before firing.

Partly Fermented Teas.—These are produced largely in the Province of Fukien, particularly the Wu-yi district, and share some of the qualities of both red and green teas. They are not widely drunk except in the southern part of Fukien and the north of Kwangtung.

Brick and Ball Teas.—These are sold in the form of slabs or balls of tightly compressed leaves and are widely in demand in Tibet and Central Asia, where they are sometimes used as currency.

Green teas are used much more widely than any of the other varieties, and the majority of red tea is produced specially for the foreign market. Another way of distinguishing teas grown in China is to divide them into Chinese and China teas, the first intended for home consumption and the second for export. This distinction is due to the fact that most Westerners look for different qualities in tea from those which are admired by the Chinese, and, in most cases, require a flavour which is strong enough to bear adulteration with milk and sugar.

The methods of drinking tea, and, to a lesser extent, methods of infusion or preparation of the beverage, vary considerably from province to province. In Cantonese tea houses a large cup containing a bowl of dry leaves is served to the customer. It is then filled to the brim with boiling water and covered with a lid. When the leaves have been infused sufficiently the liquid is transferred to a small handleless cup and drunk. The advantage of this method is that, as the bowl is much smaller than the average teapot, it is refilled more often and consequently the water does not remain upon the leaves too long. In Szechuan and many parts of Central China the tea is drunk directly from lidded bowls, with the lids tilted in such a way that the liquid can enter the mouth while the leaves remain in the cup. If saucers are used, they are raised from the table together with the cup. In Peiping and North China tea is often drunk through the spout of a small teapot, and, in some families, special individual pots are reserved for frequent and honoured visitors. In Yunnan the leaves are sometimes toasted in an iron vessel held over a fire before infusion. In Tibet and Mongolia they are stewed and the liquid churned with butter and salt, while Tientsin tea-houses are famous for the enormous bowls into which the tea is poured after infusion. Teapots, accompanied by handleless cups, are widely used throughout all the provinces as an alternative to the above methods. In winter, a brass tea-kettle with a perforated receptacle for live charcoal, and with or without

a chimney running through the middle like that of a Russian samovar, is often used. In modern times tumblers with bases and lids of some plastic material have become common among the more "Westernized" Chinese. These are very suitable for light green teas, as they enable one to enjoy the delicate colour of the leaves and beverage.

The art of tea drinking has undoubtedly been brought to its highest perfection in the Amoy district of Fukien and the Swatow district of Kwangtung. It is true that the Japanese tea ceremony is far more elaborate, but its very elaborateness detracts from the sociable atmosphere which constitutes the chief charm of tea drinking. In these districts everything possible is done to ensure that the beverage is prepared in a way which will produce the best aroma and flavour, but there is no formality or ritual attached to the preparation. It is not uncommon for prosperous business men in Swatow and Amoy to experience a sharp decline in their fortunes owing to their over-indulgence in the most expensive kinds of tea.

The method of preparation is as follows: A fire of charcoal or scentless wood is built in a small earthenware stove, perhaps by the master of the house himself. The water is then boiled in a small brass kettle until the size of the bubbles proclaims to the expert eye that it is a few degrees below boiling point. Overboiling would destroy the "life" of the water—*i.e.*, de-oxygenate it—and produce a "flat" taste. While the water is boiling the host attends to the earthenware and porcelain utensils. These consist of a small, earthenware teapot of about the same capacity as an English teacup, four to six small, white porcelain cups and a tiny porcelain tray. The pot, which should be old and contain the deposits of many years crusted round its inside and absorbed into its pores, is heated, together with the cups, by immersion in hot water. A quantity of leaves, sufficient to fill half the pot, is then dropped into it, no single leaf being allowed to escape and be wasted, and the freshly boiled water is added. After a few moments' infusion, the tea is poured into the cups by a rotary motion, which allows a few drops to enter each cup in turn. To fill one cup first and then pass on to the next would result in each one receiving a liquid of slightly different strength; they are, therefore, placed rim to rim in a circle and the mouth of the teapot rotated above them until every one is filled. Each cup contains about as much liquid as a liqueur glass, extremely strong and dark in colour, by reason of the fact that the proportions of leaves and water are nearly equal. It is swallowed at a gulp and has a bitter taste, which is somewhat unpleasant at first, but which leaves a delightful fragrance in the mouth and throat for several minutes after drinking. All present return their cups to the porcelain tray immediately after drinking, and fresh cups are poured out after adding water to the pot. The second infusion is regarded as the best, since the first may be adulterated with fine powder from the tea leaves which has escaped with the liquid from the pot, and the third may not be quite up to strength. The tea employed for this form of drinking is of the partly fermented variety, and generally known as T'ieh Kwan-yin (Iron Goddess of Mercy) or T'ieh Lo-han (Iron Arahat). Teas bearing these labels are usually good, but vary enormously in quality and price. The very best may be almost literally worth their weight in gold.

Though the above method of preparation is confined to connoisseurs in certain parts of China only, tea drinking in one form or another is practised universally throughout the country. In almost every household it is available at all times of the day. Quilted baskets containing teapots, thermos bottles and simmering kettles make it possible to serve tea at a moment's notice. No guest is permitted to sit for more than a few minutes after arrival without a cup of tea being placed before him, usually in a handleless cup complete with lid and saucer. Tea is served to old people by their children as soon as they rise in the morning; it is to be found on every office desk throughout the day, and is sipped in the home or in tea-houses from morning till night. In former times the serving of tea to guests by officials had the dual purpose of extending courtesy to them and affording a means to put an end to their visits. When the host raised his cup for the second time the caller knew that he was expected to take his leave, and often the servants started calling for his sedan chair before the cup reached the official's august lips.

In Buddhist temples, tea is drunk at all times of the day and is served ceremonially before meditation, as it is considered a means of soothing the nerves and inducing wakefulness. There is an interesting story in this connection. According to one account of the origin of tea drinking, the Indian Buddhist missionary, Boddhi-dharma, was so vexed with himself for falling asleep during his meditations that he cut off his eyelids to prevent sleep from recurring. From these lids grew a shrub, the property of which was that an infusion of its leaves would induce continual wakefulness. This shrub was, of course, tea.

Tea-houses are extremely common in the streets of most Chinese cities, especially in West China. In Szechuan and Yunnan no food is served in these tea-houses except nuts and melon seeds, while, in the smaller eating-houses no tea can be obtained unless it is specially sent out for. In Peiping the tea-houses are much the same, but tea is invariably served in restaurants as well. In Kwangtung, tea-houses provide a great variety of hot snacks and even meals. These Cantonese tea-houses are usually tall buildings, and the tea served on each floor is slightly more expensive than that served on the one below, thus making it possible to drink tea in company of varying exclusiveness. In Soochow and other parts of Kiangsu, tea-houses have their own special clientele, and the larger ones have certain rooms for business men and others for the *litterati* and professional men. Of course, there is no hard and fast rule, but people habitually go to the room where they are likely to find a few acquaintances. Some of the lovely pleasure pavilions in the Winter Palace in Peiping have been converted into attractive tea-houses for the general public.

The teas most prized by the Chinese are the light green Lung-cheng (Dragon's Well) from the mountain of that name in Chekiang, the semi-fermented T'ieh Kwan-yin (Iron Goddess of Mercy tea), and various high-quality green, red and flower-scented teas from Fukien, especially in the area of the Wu-yi mountains, and, to a lesser degree, the Pu-êrh tea from Yunnan. Anhwei, Hupeh, Hunan and Kwangtung also produce good teas. Szechuan, though one of the first provinces to grow tea, produces very little that would appeal to a connoisseur.

The following T'ang Dynasty poem is a good example of some of the literature inspired by the delights of tea drinking :

A SPONTANEOUS POEM OF THANKS TO THE CENSOR*
MENG FOR HIS GIFT OF FRESH TEA

BY LU T'UNG

As the sun rose to its zenith, my sleep was still profound,
When a captain beat upon my door, frightening my dreamst away,
And crying "I bear a letter from the Censor."
Wrapped with white silk, it bore three seals and,
Opening it, I seemed to see you face to face.
I held it up and read that you had sent three hundred *Chin*‡ of *Yueh-T'uan* tea.

I have heard that when at New Year§ one roams among the mountains,
The hibernating insects are startled by the rising wing of spring.
As the Son of Heaven|| desires the taste of *yang-hsien* tea,
Of all the myriad plants it puts forth blossoms first,
The kindly breeze mysteriously producing buds of pearl and leaves of jade.
Then Spring draws forth the golden shoots.
These should be freshly plucked, dried until fragrant and wrapped
around,
And so become the finest and the best, but yet by no means dear.
This is the drink of emperors and nobles,
How comes it thus to my poor mountain home?
When the timbered gate is shut that no common guest may enter,
Wearing my gauze hat, I myself prepare and drink the tea.
Green clouds travel on the ceaselessly blowing wind,
The radiance of white flowers is reflected on the surface of my bowl.
One bowl moistens the throat and lips.
Two bowls and loneliness is banished.
Three bowls and, even in the mind's most deep recess,
A mere five thousand volumes can be found.
Four bowls produce a gentle perspiration.
And all my life's injustices are through the pores dispersed.
Five bowls and flesh and bones take on ethereal state.
With six I join the company of fairies and immortals.
Ah! Seven bowls are the most that I can drink!
Hsi, hsi, a soft wind issues from the armpits.
The Fairy Mountain,¶
Whither can it be?

* An official who was permitted to memorialize the Emperor if his actions seemed to call for disapproval.

† Literally "Chou Kung," referring to a saying of Confucius in the Lun Yu, "Tis long since last I dreamt of Duke Chou."

‡ Pronounced "jin." Slightly more than one pound.

§ Usually towards the end of February by our calendar.

|| The Emperor.

¶ Literally "Peng Lai Shan," the island of fairies in the Eastern Ocean (probably Japan).

The Sage of the Jade Stream*

Wishes to return there, riding on the gentle wind.
 On this mountain are the Fairies holding sway o'er the earth.
 Ethereal is their state and far removed from the storm of woe!
 How can they know the lives of the myriads of mortals,
 Falling 'mid mountainous precipices into sorrow and bitterness?
 You may ask the Censor concerning these mortals,
 Whether they can at the last attain to peace.

The following is a short extract from the Ch'a Ching (Tea Classic), composed by Lu Yu in the T'ang Dynasty :

"When it has been dried, tea takes on all kinds of shapes. In general the leaves look like shrunken Tartar's boots, or the breasts of oxen, . . . or drifting clouds arising in spirals from the mountains, or the effect of the wind playing upon the water, ruffling its surface, . . . or the effect of rain suddenly running in rivulets over newly cultivated ground. All these are excellent kinds of tea. Some are like bamboo shoots, firm, solid and difficult to steam and pound. . . . Others are like a lotus touched by the frost with withered stem and leaves."

* A name used by the poet of himself.

GERMAN DIPLOMACY IN THE FAR EAST

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B.,
C.M.G.

FOR over a decade it has been one of my chief interests to watch the progress of Germany across Central Asia, in which area I have travelled widely. Her leading and most capable agent was Dr. W. Filchner who, during the last World War, had been active in parts of Tibet. Since, however, he had not attempted to plan any outrages, such as disgraced the Germans in Persia and elsewhere, he was permitted to return home across Kashmir and was treated with courtesy.

The activity of Germany in Asia after the last World War steadily increased. In 1927, "Junkers," a German company, was granted by the Persian Government the monopoly of postal and passenger services by aeroplane from Teheran to Meshed, Resht and Bushire; it also served Baghdad to the west. Of far greater importance was the fact that the company, later, served Kabul.

Dr. Filchner was busily surveying sites for aerodromes in China proper and still more in her western provinces, thereby clearly indicating German ambitions. He had given a lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society in 1932, and had exhibited a film which a companion had taken, he himself appearing in it wearing Tibetan clothes. I had not met him on this occasion.

Early in the following year he wrote to me that he was most anxious to meet me in London on a matter of considerable importance, and that he wished to bring an English friend with him to serve as interpreter.

Somewhat puzzled by these preliminaries, on February 22, 1934, I received Dr. Filchner and his friend at my club. He immediately opened the conversation by stating that he had been commissioned by Captain Roehm, with the approval of Hitler, to whom he also had access, to sound British opinion as to the possibility of establishing Anglo-German co-operation in the Far East, including secret service. If I agreed, he hoped that I should arrange for him to meet Members of Parliament and other influential men. Before proceeding further with this matter, I would mention that the Reichstag trial had just ended with the acquittal of the Bulgarian Dimitrieff. It will be recalled that, during the trial, Göring had threatened "to get him, even if he were found innocent," and that, at the time of our meeting, he was still in custody.

To resume, astonished at Dr. Filchner's proposal, I told him frankly that, in my opinion, until the innocent Dimitrieff and his compatriots were released and until Germany ceased to threaten Austria, there was no hope of co-operation between Great Britain and Germany such as he envisaged. These remarks much upset Dr. Filchner, who stated that he failed to understand the importance attached by me to the treatment "of the Bulgarians." After some minutes of silence he broke out with: "I now understand; England, the land of liberty!"

He was much dejected at the expression of my private views on the

matter, but, when saying good-bye, he promised to secure the release of the Bulgarians within a few days. To my delight this was accomplished, and, on March 4, I received a letter from his English friend in which he informed me that Filchner wished me to know "that the release of the three Bulgarians was due to his efforts on your advice."

Dr. Filchner subsequently returned to China by sea to continue his important explorations. At Shanghai, which he reached at the beginning of 1935, he met Mr. Hubbard, who was a friend of mine, and asked him if he knew me. Upon receiving an answer in the affirmative, he said that he had some private papers which he did not wish to send back to Germany but that he felt sure that they could safely be entrusted to me. My friend, who was about to leave for home, in due course handed me over the papers, which were sewn up in canvas.

To return to Dr. Filchner, he made an important journey across China through the Tsaidam. After undergoing hardships and much trouble with his servants, he reached Cherchen, where he was well received. Further on, however, at Khotan, partly owing to the unfortunate murder of a Tungan officer near the house he was occupying, he was arrested. For seven months he remained there, but, probably owing to the good offices of the British Consul-General at Kashgar, he was permitted to continue his journey to that remote city. He was now in relatively well-known country and, when a day's journey from Srinagar, he was met by the German Consul-General, who informed him that he had been awarded the German National Prize. Furthermore, he was appointed a professor. I duly welcomed the explorer upon his safe arrival in Kashmir and gave him an invitation to give a lecture, which he accepted.

In due course, travelling to Europe via India, Dr. Filchner reached London to deliver the lecture on March 26, 1938. In view of the fact that he was accompanied by his daughter, it was arranged that they should dine at the Ladies' Annexe of my club. There I seized the opportunity to tell my guest that I had received his papers and enquired whether he did not wish them to be returned to him. Showing distinct signs of agitation, he replied: "No, no; please keep them." In view of the fact that, not long after the Reichstag trial, Captain Roehm had been murdered by Hitler, my guest was obviously wise to reply as he had done.

To conclude, Dr. Filchner gave an admirable lecture, which was attended by the entire staff of the German Embassy. The speech of their eloquent leader rang with the theme: "We are working day and night for peace!"

ARAB LABOUR IN PALESTINE

By J. ASFOUR

Notes of a meeting held at the Royal Society's Hall on March 14, 1945. Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN said that the lecturer, Mr. Asfour, came from Haifa, where his family, who belonged to the ancient Christian community, were well known, being also landowners in the hills nearby. Mr. Asfour himself was a member of the Anglican Church, as his father had been before him.

He served his apprenticeship to the Law as Chief Clerk of the District Court in Haifa, presided over by Judge Litt; he then was called to the Bar, and was now an Advocate of many years' standing. As an Advocate Mr. Asfour had defended Arabs concerned in the troubles of 1929 and 1936-39 in Palestine.

He had been long engaged in developing Labour organizations in Palestine, and had also turned his attention to anti-Zionist activities. He was now in England studying Labour organization in this country, and was a member of the Palestine Labour Delegation to the World Trade Union Congress.

MR. J. ASFOUR said he was glad of the opportunity to address the Society on the subject which was nearest to his heart—the Arab trade union movement in Palestine.

The speaker and his friends came in these difficult times of war to represent for the first time the Arab workers in Palestine at the World Trade Union Conference.

The Conference itself had two main objects. The first was to pledge all the power and energy of some 60,000,000 workmen all over the world to increase yet further the war effort and assure the freedom-loving world of a quick, speedy and fruitful victory for the United Nations. That was a thing which had been on the minds of everybody, Labour and non-Labour alike.

The second, which was just as important from the point of view of trade unionism, was to set up an international body not only to advise but if possible to co-operate effectively with the international bodies who are going soon to meet and discuss the peace settlement of the world.

The audience would be glad to know that both these two aims had been achieved, and the committee which had been set up to implement these resolutions had already met and taken steps to that effect. They now hoped to have yet another conference. They said it might be held in Paris, but Mr. Asfour hoped it would not be there, but in London again.

The Palestine delegation would take this occasion to say they were very grateful for the kindness and hospitality which they had received from Londoners and for the generosity with which many friends had treated them.

With regard to Palestine and the Arab Labour movement there, he reminded the audience that Palestine is hardly the size of Wales. It is about 10,000 square miles in area. Its land may be divided into three main categories, the largest being desert, the second the hilly country, and the third the coast side, which is the smallest.

In this small area are now living some 1,600,000 people, of whom 1,000,000 are Moslems, about 100,000 Christians of several denominations, and 500,000 or so Jews, also of diverse origin.

The chief means of livelihood in Palestine remains, as of old, agriculture. According to the most recent statistics, some 70 to 80 per cent. of the population live on the land. Their farming entirely depends upon how much Providence sends in the way of rain, as there are no natural means of irrigation.

The country is densely populated, beyond what one would expect in a country enjoying the ordinary means of living without any additional resources. This increase in population was not the natural increase, for Palestine until about 1918 contained some 700,000 people—amongst them about 60,000 Jews, about the same number of Christians, and the remainder Moslems—but had been mainly due to immigration.

Prior to the last war the chief industries in Palestine were agriculture, soap-making, transport of goods and loading and off-loading on quays. Soap-making—which produced to no small extent the industrial wealth of the country: Palestine exported soap—was worked in gangs. There was, though not in the modern scientific sense used now, some sort of a scheme of collective employment—*i.e.*, the leader of the gang made a bargain and he performed the work with his men, each one sharing in the work that had to be done. Between the gangs there was no competition, and there was a sort of a gentleman's agreement that each gang should enjoy the rights of bargaining without any competition from others. There was, therefore, some sort of an understanding, although, of course, it did not take the form which we now know as trade unionism. People lived quite happily, although there was plenty of room for improvement, and things went on smoothly.

The carriage of goods by land—for the country had no ships to carry them by sea—and the loading and off-loading of goods on the quays took a form similar, but not as strong in character.

As regards agriculture, the peasants again were of two different categories—owners of small holdings in the villages and tenant farmers. During the Turkish régime it was not a difficult task for persons of influence to succeed in obtaining registration of ownership of lands behind the back of the tenant farmer or the small farmer. Such people lived in the cities, which were in those days the seat of Government, and the speaker stressed this because such persons corruptly obtained registration of their ownership in such a way as to prevent the farmers from being able to get any reversal of what had been done. The farmer living on the land could do nothing. He was, notwithstanding that, undisturbed; he lived on the land and paid to the landlord, not in money but in kind, one-fifth of his crop. Such farmers numbered thousands. They were settled in tens of villages, and chiefly on the best part, the richest type of soil, in the plains.

This was the state of affairs in 1914, but after the 1914-18 war was over and ended in favour of the Allies—of whom the Arabs were one—the Arab countries which had formed a part of the Turkish Empire, in spite of the promise of independence, were then divided between France

and Great Britain. Palestine had also imposed upon it the establishment therein of a Jewish National Home.

The founding of Jewish colonies had meant a decrease in the number of Arab tenant farmers. For of course, if somebody buys a piece of land, he wants it free from any encumbrance or rights, and so the absentee landlords, in pursuance of their undertaking when they sold their lands, had to turn out hundreds of Arab tenant farmers who had been living on that land for generations.

Those landless Arabs knew only two alternatives—either to maintain their traditional way of life and remain farmers, or to go to town and become wage-earners. But to be a farmer it is essential to have land. The lands in those villages which were owned by the villagers themselves were hardly sufficient to maintain the owners. So to the villages the landless Arab could not go. He must go to the town, and in the town become a wage-earner in such industries as were able to absorb him. The net result was to turn those landless Arabs into a floating population: casual labourers at one time, pedlars at another, and paupers in the end.

That had, of course, affected the trade union movement. The situation was not one to cause despair; but still amongst the ranks of the Arab industrial labourers were ex-farmers who had become, certainly against their wish, workmen in the towns.

The speaker thought the official agrarian policy of the country needed reform. In the case of the fellah who had a small-holding, by the law of the country that holding becomes at death divided by inheritance among his natural heirs-at-law. These are numerous, and they, most of them, sink down and down and eventually become landless wage-earners. There had been no endeavour made by the Government land settlement officers to encourage any sort of consolidation of holdings which would make more intensive methods of farming possible. They merely left the farmer with long, scattered strips of land.

Very little either had been done in the way of co-operative societies for the peasants. A co-operative society office was set up. It started as a group of a few Arab officials to deal with the Arabs, and remained that way to-day; no further development had taken place in that direction.

In the citrus plantations, however, there was an effort made jointly by the Government and the landowners, and there Jews and Arabs were working together on the same board. There was some marked development as regards regulation of export, inspection of fruit before it went out, and such things.

Finally, during this war, when there was a great demand for food products, the Government began to provide tractors, which could be bought or were given on the lease-lend system, and there had also been some distribution of seed.

To return to the organized Labour movement. After 1914, with the new political status, with the beginning of the influx of Jews into Palestine, and with an increasing number of Arab peasants becoming landless, the Arab workman found himself in a more precarious position than ever before. He was alive to the danger and began to struggle in the early days of 1920 for bare existence.

The alarm that the Arab workman rightly felt, however, did not make him lose hope of being able to strive alongside the Jewish workers already in Palestine; and together with the Jews, then, the first committee was formed of workmen, Jews and Arabs together, in Palestine. That committee had as its aim the better development of labour, and to reduce and later to abolish any sweated labour.

The Jewish workman ordinarily is not out to fight or struggle. He wants to live and to live peacefully. This is the general feeling; but he came under Zionist influence and followed Zionist dictates, and would not, of course, agree to the step which was taken in 1922 by his Arab comrades in their union when they represented to Government the need to limit Jewish immigration.

In 1922, therefore, this split occurred. The Jewish workers joined what is now known as the Palestine Jewish Labour Federation, which is not only a Zionist organization but the backbone of the Zionist movement in Palestine, and the Arab workman was left to make the best alone of the situation he was placed in, and to spare no effort to develop an organized body which should be able to act collectively.

In 1922 the first meeting of Arab workers was convened, and, working slowly but persistently, they were able to register the first society of workers in 1925, which took the name of the Palestine Arab Workers' Society. It began with some 20 to 30 members in Haifa, but as time went on it developed, and it has now 20 branches all over the country with a registered membership of some 12,000 to 15,000. In times of industrial emergency, where something is being done by one of the big employers—e.g., by the Government—and a strike is declared or threatened, the Arab workers unite together and mobilize for that particular purpose, and at such times the registration has gone up to 50,000.

In this Society are included all trades and industries, each unit enjoying full internal independence and management of the affairs of its members. The secretary of each union is a member of the general executive, and of those secretaries the general governing body is formed. This general body handles the major policy of the society and is kept *au courant* with all matters of importance.

Recently the Arab Labour movement had also developed co-operative groups. They had now got fourteen registered co-operative groups, which also include a savings and lending bank. Grocers, butchers, slaughterers, tailors and so on were included among these fourteen groups.

Their aims were not distinguishable from those of any other Labour movement. They existed to stand up for the rights of the workers against every employer who endeavoured to exploit them. They were not associated with any political party, but were united with all parties in following the common aim of national independence, and were eager to see Palestine ruled by its own people for its own people. If an Arab employer tried to exploit his workpeople, or the Government—which is the biggest employer of labour in Palestine—made discriminations in pay and other conditions, it was the duty of the Labour organizations to protest. But they had not, and never in the past had, any animosity or feeling of dislike to Jews as such.

They claimed, and rightly so, that the Arabs, whether at the time when they were the sovereign state, or when they had become a subject nation, had never allowed any persecution of Jews. They had always maintained the principle that a nation, to live, must live with all its component parts.

With regard to Jewish industries, these were flourishing since the outbreak of war. But at all times they were closed to Arabs. Mr. Asfour had friends amongst Jewish Labour people, and sometimes asked them, "Why is it that you, professing Socialism, with its wider philosophy, introduce into it this form of Fascist philosophy? Why do you have 'Hebrew Work for Hebrew Workers' not only as a slogan but as a rigid and fast rule?" The answer was either, "If we employ non-Jews in our industries we cannot get the sympathy of persons abroad who are paying money towards the development of the national home," or else, "Oh no, it would be contrary to our policy that the master should be a Jew and the servant an Arab."

The direct result of this policy was that the Arabs, in their limited industries, began to do the same. It could therefore be retorted, "Do Arab employers engage Jews? What is the kick about?" It was so, because the Arabs found they had to do to others as was done unto them. One could not say that this was an improvement on the Gospel injunction, but it was a way of meeting the present unfortunate state of affairs.

The Arab Labour organization had done its best. The Arab workmen, who first sought to form a union with the Jewish workmen, still seek that co-operation, provided that both work to build up a real and democratic Palestine, where there shall be no man on either part who cherishes an idea of ousting the other or, as it were, stealing the rights of the other. The moment that the Arab union gets the recognition by Government that will give it power in Palestine it will grow. And then it hoped that from amongst the Jewish workers who want to live peacefully there were many who would join its ranks, and there would be no more talk about the ousting of Arabs and the institution of someone else in their place. The Arab Labour movement in Palestine had always welcomed within its ranks every person of goodwill who intended sincerely to build up the real Palestine.

In conclusion, the speaker looked forward to a new world of partnership. He hoped that that friendship which is so old between the Arabs and the British that it had become a tradition might develop into a partnership, since it is better to entrust mutual international interests and rights to a partner than to a subordinate.

The CHAIRMAN then expressed the thanks of the audience to the lecturer, and the meeting closed.

ST. GEORGE OF ENGLAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST

By LIEUT.-COLONEL GERALD DE GAURY, M.C.

AS each war winter has been grimmer so each spring brings a stronger feeling of thankfulness and gratitude. The patron saint of England and of warriors, whose day was ordered to be held as a feast throughout England by the Great National Council at Oxford in 1222, it is probably well known, is identified with the spring, with Green George, and he has his day on April 23. All over Europe, too, St. George's day is in April. In White Russia a song represents St. George as opening with his golden keys the sunbeams, the soil which has been frozen all the winter. In Moravia, too, they have a song in which they ask Green Thursday, the day before Good Friday, what he has done with the keys. He answers that he gave them to St. George, who unlocked the earth with them. The Wallachians look on St. George's Day as very holy, and the Bulgarians share their belief. The Huzuls of the Carpathians render him homage, and the Ruthenians and Esthonians have age-old ceremonies on his day. In Southern Bavaria he has a shrine where annually thousands of mounted men come to his festival, and in Silesia and many other parts of Europe there are varied forms of the spring festival in his name. The Serbian girls pick nosegays and, naming them with the name of the young man they would have as sweetheart, they lay them out at night, believing that if they are touched with the dew in the morning they will have their way. In the Tyrol, processions of young boys ringing bells go from farm to farm to "ring out the grass," and at each are rewarded with bowls of milk. In Bohemia, too, they celebrate his festival; in England he was so revered that Edward the Third founded an order of knighthood in his name; and there is hardly a part of Europe where St. George, Green George, is not thankfully remembered in April.

Readers who have perused *The Golden Bough*, by Sir James Frazer, in particular his second book, *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings*, and his fifth and sixth, *Adonis, Attis and Osiris*, will recollect that he writes there of the evidence to show the connection between St. George and Adonis or Tammuz with the spirit of the trees and vegetation. He touches upon the belief that he was a giver of offspring to women. It was particularly in the East that St. George was reputed in this rôle, and he was revered for it by Moslems as well as Christians. He quotes S. J. Curtiss as saying: "His shrines may be found in all parts of Syria; more places are associated with him than with any other saint in the calendar. The most famous of his sanctuaries is at Qalat al Hosn in Northern Syria. Childless women of all sects resort to it in order that the saint may remove their reproach. Some people shrug their shoulders when the shrine is mentioned in this connection. . . . Nowadays the true character of the place is beginning to be perceived and many Moslems have forbidden their wives to visit it."

According to one story, the fight of St. George with the Dragon, who held captive the daughter of the King of Phœnicia, took place on the shore near Beirut in the Lebanon. Some say that in this rôle, of slayer of the Dragon, St. George was the successor of Bellerophon and the Chimera. At Lydda in Palestine there is a tomb of St. George, and they annually sacrifice lambs and bring locks of their children's hair as an offering to the Saint on April 23. His mother, it is said, was a Palestinian woman and he inherited her estates in that country. Many of our soldiers will remember passing the isolated arch, near the Pools of Solomon, on the road from Jerusalem towards Egypt, which marks the way to a beautiful monastery and a village known by his name. There are very early churches in his name at Constantinople, and Justinian erected one in his honour in Lesser Armenia. The Hellespont was known as the arm of St. George. He was martyred at Mosul in the reign of Diocletian, so Tabari, the ninth-century historian, says and gives the story. Dr. Butler in his *Lives of the Fathers and the Saints* gives the year as 303. Moving farther East, Green George changes his name to al Khidr, the "green" in Arabic, and we find shrines in his name frequented still in our day and particularly by women in the hope of offspring. And these visits they make in the spring. Other rites, where there are any, are also celebrated in the spring, although the point, adoration for the renewal of life, may long ago have been forgotten. In Iraq, Khidr or al Khadir are found in many places—at Baghdad itself, on the Euphrates, and at the outlet of the two rivers. There is a shrine on Abadan Island, another on Falaika Island at the head of the Persian Gulf. In Persia, too, Khidr was much revered.

Imad-al-Kirmanî, who died in A.D. 1374, wrote, "What cares he for the road, the pain, the trouble and the sickness who has Khidr for his friend and Christ for his companion?" Sa'ib of Isfahan, who died in A.D. 1677, wrote, "What profit is there from a perfect guide to those whom fate hath left empty handed? for even Khidr brought back Alexander athirst from the water of life." For Khidr, according to one tale, could make himself immortal but not confer the gift.

A whole branch of the Khidr traditions rests on his relation to Alexander. He is said to have been commander of the advanced guard of the army in its search for the source of life. In other accounts he is the cousin of Alexander and given a more mundane rôle. In yet others he accompanied not Alexander but Elias. (The Baghdad mosque on the west bank of the river at the north end of the city is called Khidr-al-Yas.) In some accounts he lived on an island at the meeting-place of the seas and was the patron of navigators. Here and there off the Arabian coasts he used to be invoked by mariners in trouble. Farther east, in the Indian Ocean, under the name of Khodja Khidr, he becomes a water god and is represented astride a fish. Among Arab writers there are some who hold that he bestrode a green furrow. His bibliography in the East is immense. The traditions about him are legion and his mention in the Quran alone has given rise to quite a large literature. The story in the Quran, the tradition about Alexander and Khidr, the tale of the hero Gilgamesh dying of sorrow for the loss of his friend Engidu and setting out to find his ancestor Utnapishtim at the mouth of the waters, and the

Jewish legend about the voyage of Elias and Joshua ben Levi all have a certain resemblance in common. There is always one who holds the secret of the source of life, who is the guide, as it were, to life itself. In Northern Europe the renewal of life is represented by the thawing of the earth in the spring, in the more barren Middle Eastern countries by water and a green furrow, and, to people who live by the sea, by their livelihood the fish.

Green George belongs only to the countries where spring comes suddenly upon the land. As in most of Southern China some trees never lose their leaves and the bamboo and the banyan are always green, so the annual renewal of life is less evident, and the Far East does not know him. It is only in the Middle East, on the shores of India and in Europe that he is known. Here in Europe his cult has been Christianized and in the East Moslemized, but he survives still and he is likely to survive—until, if ever, artificial sunlight and germination is universal. Up to now there is still a “green” thread through the pattern of European and Middle Eastern life which is common to the whole. The old Fathers gave us St. George, saviour of warriors, whose name is linked with life itself, for the patron of this country, so knitting us with the old world where civilization was born.

REVIEWS

Long Range Desert Group. By Major W. B. Kennedy Shaw. Illustrated. Collins. 12s. 6d. net.

This book is a narrative of the work performed in the Libyan Desert by a unit known as the Long Range Desert Group during those dark days between 1940 and 1943, when the only bright spots in the general gloom were provided by the armies in Africa. The author, Major Kennedy Shaw, is particularly qualified to write on the subject as, not only did he serve in the L.R.D.G. from its formation until the end of the war in Africa, but prior to 1939 he had accompanied several exploring expeditions into the southern Libyan Desert, and had therefore a most extensive knowledge of this, the harshest, desert in the world.

The book does much to confirm one's view that it is a miracle Great Britain should ever win a war considering the almost criminal lack of preparedness and foresight displayed, not only by our various Governments, but also by the Army staffs on the spot. Since 1935 and the days of Sanctions, Italy had made no secret of her intention to invade Egypt when the time was ripe, and proof of this was provided by the great army the Duce had massed on the Cyrenaican border prior to the outbreak of the war. The operations against the Senussi in this desert in 1916 had demonstrated the extent to which a few long range patrols operating behind the enemy's lines could demoralize his whole campaign, and yet, though Brigadier Bagnold—the Major Bagnold of the Libyan Desert—happened to be available in Egypt, no steps had been taken to organize the Long Range Desert Group when Italy declared war in 1940, and it was not until September of that year that the first patrol set out to cut the enemy's communications. It is said that the late General Orde Wingate held the view that the war in North Africa might have been shortened by a year if the L.R.D.G. had been four times its strength, and had been ready to strike in June, 1940. It may have been the opinion of the Staff that the Senussi Arabs of 1916 were easier to demoralize than disciplined Italians, but, reading between the lines of this book and others on the subject, one gathers that this was not the case, and that the Italians when their communications were threatened in any way were prepared to throw up the sponge in an amazing manner. It requires no great stretch of imagination to visualize a strong force of the L.R.D.G. striking at various points along the western shores of the Gulf of Sirte during Wavell's advance, and causing a withdrawal of the enemy to Tripoli.

As Major Shaw relates, we were not only the pioneers of desert mechanization, but also the monopolists for many years, and at the end of the last war there was in existence a redoubtable force of Light Car Patrols under the New Zealander Major Williams, which had operated all over the Libyan Desert for two years, and which was the progenitor of the L.R.D.G. In 1920 this inexpensive little unit was disbanded, the Army withdrew from the desert, and interest in it was maintained only by a small fraternity of officers led by Bagnold, from the Royal Corps of Signals, the Royal Engineers and Royal Tank Regiment, who, at their own expense, in their annual leaves, and with no encouragement whatsoever from Higher Command, explored the Libyan Desert for the ten years prior to the war. It would seem reasonable to expect that these officers, with their expert knowledge of desert craft and the lie of the land, would have been ear-marked for service in the Libyan Desert on the out-

break of war, but nothing of the sort. Bagnold, on his way to a routine job in East Africa, passed through Egypt, and was retrieved from obscurity by the personal intervention of Lord Wavell, who "shanghaied" him from his ship, but the remainder were scattered all over the Empire. Then, when the L.R.D.G. was formed by Bagnold, with the massing of the enemy on the actual frontier, it was treated in a most grudging and stingy manner by the staff in Cairo, who in consequence were nick-named the *Short Range Desert Group*.

The officers and rank and file of the group were picked men—one patrol being composed entirely of New Zealanders, whilst others were from the Guards Brigade, British Yeomanry and the Rhodesians, and anything less like a typical guardsman than the heavily-bearded, half-naked savages, which are depicted in the photographs, has never been seen in any previous war. The force operated cheerfully and most effectively 800 miles and more from their base, putting the fear of God into the Italians, cutting their lines of communication, occupying most important oases, burning aircraft and hangars, and destroying wireless stations. Among other things at the outset of the campaign they captured a mail lorry and obtained very secret despatches showing the complete dispositions of the Italian forces. They linked up with the Free French Forces from Tibesti, 600 miles from the coast-line, and at the same time were extremely active on the left flank of the Eighth Army in Cyrenaica along the shore. They carried on with their good work until Montgomery had taken *Gabes* in Tunisia, and here, with the circumscribed area left to the enemy, owing to the First Army and the Americans closing in from the north and west, there was no further scope for their special activities.

Major Kennedy Shaw writes extremely well, and his descriptions of the high desert—a most difficult subject to depict—are better than anything attempted previously. "Late in the evening when the sands cool quickly, and the dunes throw long shadows, the Sand Sea is one of the most lovely things in the world; no words can properly describe the beauty of those sweeping curves of sand. At a summer midday, when the sun beats down all its shapes to one flat glare of sand and the sand drift blows off the dune crests like the snow-plume off Everest, it is as good an imitation of Hell as one could devise." Among other things I am grateful to the author of a vastly interesting book for supplying me with something I have been seeking for thirty years—a description which does full justice to desert water—'it must have been the inspiration for Epsom salts.'"

The book is very well illustrated by private photographs, official war photographs with permission from the authorities, Royal Italian Air Force photographs without permission from the Duce, and some extremely strong black and white drawings by Captain McIntyre of the New Zealanders, whose striking work is well up to the standard of the book—and this is no mean praise. Incidentally, Brigadier Bagnold was awarded the O.B.E. for his services.

C. S. JARVIS.

Middle East, 1942-1944: A Study in Air-Power. By Philip Guedalla. Hodder and Stoughton.

Mr. Guedalla's recent death leaves a sad gap in literary ranks. It means particularly a loss to military literature in that he possessed the gift of imparting to the dry bones of strategy and tactics a most enlivening interest.

In his last book he tells for the first time the full story of the British Air Force in the Middle East during that exciting period which began when we

were in a position of perilous inferiority both as regards number and capacity of machines and which ended when, with superior equipment and victorious tread, we were approaching the gates of Tripoli.

His opening chapters discuss "The Board," "The Game," "The Players." He deals in the first of these with the theatre of war, in the second with the development of the Air Force and of its tactics, and, in the third, with relative strengths. Then follow a number of chapters depicting, as far as possible in chronological order, a series of episodes each complete in itself: "The Desert: Advance," "East Africa," "Greece," and so forth.

When Mr. Guedalla was commissioned by the Air Ministry to undertake the task he approached it with a completely open mind. He confessed to have previously never been higher off the ground than on a bicycle, and, though he had studied Mahan and Clausewitz for sea and land operations, he could find no comparable authority which treated of warfare in three dimensions. In order therefore to obtain insight into his subject, he flew 20,000 miles over his allotted theatre, painting as he went, from a study of the countries concerned and from talks with airmen, a picture of that splendid individual heroism and that masterly general direction which made the Air Force a principal and indispensable factor in victory in the Middle East. In doing so, although concentrating his attention almost entirely on the feats of the R.A.F., he does not in the slightest degree derogate from the fine part played by the other two great Services. On the contrary, he praises them and emphasizes the need that all three should work as one.

There are certain aspects of aerial warfare to which he repeatedly calls attention. The first is the tremendous use made of the flexibility *cum* versatility of the new arm. He calls it juggling; and indeed there seemed to be a measure of magic in the fulfilment by our airmen of the manifold and multiform duties in the immense theatre involved.

The second point on which he insists is that campaigns are now essentially a struggle for aerodromes. That is undoubtedly true to a certain extent of warfare in any country. It was especially the case in North Africa, where the capture or possession of an airfield might determine the fate of a battle. In close country and in a less fluid campaign it might be wise not to attribute so high an importance to this factor.

A third point is one made often by Montgomery, than whom none should know better—namely, that the air-battle must be won, if possible, before the land-attack is launched.

Fourthly, he indicates the imperative need of recovery, repair and maintenance. Our superiority in this respect went far to redress our adverse balance in numbers in the early stages of the war. At one period we were able out of 1,000 damaged machines to set no less than 800 in the air.

His final point is the importance of mobility in an air force—that is, the capacity for speed in the construction and repair of airfields and in the transport of essential stores to them, so that, whether in advance or retreat, an army shall never suffer from lack of aerial support, especially fighter support.

Of the various episodes described, the defence of the airfield at Habbaniya may be mentioned, for it is depicted with a wealth of detail that has not previously been released. The story is an epic of gallant fighting, against seemingly overwhelming odds, on the part of the R.A.F. and the garrison. The author, however, makes clear that only by the narrowest of margins did we escape a disaster that would have had evil and far-ranging repercussions on our global strategy. He does not explain how we came to choose such an isolated and obviously dangerous site for an aerodrome.

Another story to which particular attention may be drawn is that of the

cover afforded to the Eighth Army in its retreat from Knightsbridge to El Alamein. It is reminiscent of the days when the cavalry of a defeated army would sacrifice themselves in heroic charges to cover the retirement of their infantry and guns. It effectively interposed an aerial shield between pursuers and pursued, but in doing so it suffered a high percentage of losses.

Middle East is well worth reading, and it is illustrated by excellent maps and some clever sketches of leading air chiefs concerned. It is a fine tribute from an artistic pen to a magnificent Service.

H. R.-R.

The Future of the Jews. A Symposium; edited by J. J. Lynx. Pp. 195. Lindsay Drummond. 10s. 6d.

Anybody who hopes to find a clear and definite answer to the problem of the Jewish people after the war may be disappointed by this book. Anybody who wants a serious and comprehensive study of the future of the Jews, considered from different aspects, will find what he seeks. For the collection of essays which the editor—we suspect that Lynx is a fictitious name—has brought together is a genuine symposium. The contributors belong to all classes of society and thought: some are Gentiles, some are Jews. Their views and their approach to a solution are often in opposition. “They investigate the subject from all possible angles with a view to finding a way out of the jungle of difficulties, misunderstandings and narrow-mindedness which have made the Jewish problem and its moral consequence a nightmare to all decent citizens.” The one point on which they are agreed is that the solution must be international, and that it must be based upon the acceptance of Jews as human beings who have suffered in our time more than any other people from man’s inhumanity to man.

The book opens with three introductory essays which give the foundation and background to the rest. The first is by Thomas Mann, who writes movingly of the contribution of the Jews to civilization and the barbarity of Hitler’s anti-semitism. That is followed by a short message from Dr. Benes, who concludes that the Jewish problem will have to be solved on a worldwide international basis within the framework of an organization of Europe and the world of tomorrow. The terrible story of Jewish agony during the last twelve years, the darkest period of the long and tragic history of the most historical of peoples is told simply and with thorough detail by a Jewish refugee from Germany, Mr. Adler-Rudel. He gives the figures of the casualties in the war of extermination against the Jews up to the end of 1943, when they were already estimated at over three million.

The essays that follow are concerned with the constructive proposals for the future. They start with a paper by Edward Hulston, the editor of *World Review* and the founder of *Picture Post*, whom one had not suspected before of any deep interest in the Jewish problem. His study, however, shows remarkable understanding. Circumstance, he points out, has made the Jew seem nearly always a foreigner, though the difference is usually one which he or his ancestors have acquired by sojourn not in Palestine but in another country. This foreign character “to the intolerant is inexcusable,” and makes the Jews the chosen scapegoat. But Hulston looks forward to fresh Jewish settlements in the less occupied countries of the new world, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand; and when man has learnt the virtue of co-operation the whole world will be the Promised Land. It is striking that against this view the Zionist solution, the gathering of the Jews in their national home is most persuasively advocated by two non-Jews: by Camille Huysmans, the Belgian Socialist who has observed the Jewish problem with the eyes of a Flemish citizen of Belgium, and by Mrs. Dugdale, who has been the steadfast champion of the policy which her uncle, Lord Balfour, made a part of the peace aims at the end of the first world war. The philosophy of Zionism is analysed by a Lithuanian Jew, Dr. Heller, while the philosophy of assimilation is analysed by a British Jew, Professor Hyman Levy, who is an outspoken believer in socialist internationalism. He and two other writers, one British and one Russian, believe that the Soviet Union has shown the way to fight and abolish anti-semitism.

The particular problem of the future of the Jewish refugees from Germany and Central Europe, who found asylum in the English-speaking countries and in Palestine, and—though few have survived Nazi occupation—in the democratic States of western Europe, is examined on the one hand by two English Liberals, Mrs. Corbett Ashby and Sir Norman Angell, and by three of the refugees themselves. The English writers are convinced of the valuable contribution which the refugees can continue to make in peace times to the life of this country which they have served well during the war. The refugees stress the contribution which those Jewish refugees who wish to return to their original country—and they would be a small minority on any showing—can make to the rehabilitation of life and humanity in those countries. One of the writers who is anonymous urges that the refugee has learnt in his years of exile the fundamental truth that man can live without a banking account, but is doomed to perish if he loses his self-respect.

The last two essays reflect again the varying outlook of Christian and Jew. Reginald Sorensen, M.P., writing on our "common humanity," asserts the value of dual loyalty of the Jew to his people and to the country of which he is a full citizen. At the same time he thinks that the Russian example of setting aside specific areas wherein the Jewish communities may dwell and enjoy cultural autonomy is worthy of a trial. The Jew, Louis Golding, is more enthusiastic about the part which Palestine must take in the Jewish future. A people that have preserved their sense of nationality for more than two thousand years must be allowed to achieve or re-achieve its nationhood for at least as many years as the impetus towards nationhood remains powerful. His last word is about anti-semitism, "that foolish and ignominious thing"; and about that he has one positive counsel: Christian teaching must be more emphatic on the truth that the Jews were just as much responsible for the success of Christianity as they had already been responsible for the establishment of the moral law; and it must make a sharp and decisive differentiation between that remote handful of Jews who were involved in the crucifixion and all the Jews of the succeeding centuries.

A curious error appears in the essay of one of the refugees, who writes of an "arbitrary commission and arbitrary tribunal," where it is apparent that he means arbitral.

N. B.

The Life and Works of Ibn Er-Rūmī. Rhuvon Guest. Luzac and Co.

Pp. 143. London. 12s. 6d. 1944.

This most recent of Rhuvon Guest's publications to some extent resembles al-'Aqqād's *Ibn al-Rūmī, ḥaiyātuhu min shi'rihi*, but is a more liberally documented, more intimate character-study. A Western scholar, too, approaches Arabic poetry from a different standpoint to that of an Egyptian writer.

From allusions in Ibn al-Rūmī's poetry and from biographical material derived from literary sources of the period Guest has carefully constructed a biography of the poet. Quotations in Arabic of significant passages from his verse relevant to the more prominent events of his life are given in a separate section along with other notes. While easy to consult, these notes, laying no obligation on the reader to peruse them all, do not withdraw attention from the main thesis. A very interesting general description is given of the characteristics of Ibn al-Rūmī's poetry together with the opinions of Arab literary critics ranging over several centuries.

The life of Ibn al-Rūmī is doubtless typical in some degree of the career of the successful poet during the 'Abbasid period, a hanger-on of "society," in which his social position seems not dissimilar to that of the Bohemian painter in the Victorian era. A gifted poet, he seems to have been a rather disreputable character, his life a succession of friendships with patrons or with individuals, inevitably terminating in a violent quarrel. The panegyrics of the new patron, which mark the beginning of their association, are followed all too soon by a stream of scurrilous lampoons. Most of the poems are written in response to, in expectation of, or because a hoped-for gift had not been bestowed. Ibn al-Rūmī, like many Arab poets, exercised a sort of blackmail over his patrons, much as does the roving minstrel (*dawshān* or *maddāh*) in the Arabian peninsula today. His violent death by poison at the hands of a high official, when too much of a nuisance to be further tolerated, is typical of

the risks of this profession. It is, however, impossible to dislike a personality so intimately revealed to us in all his petty vices, his tastes, and his preferences in food, wine, and women.

The author has based his study on three thirteenth-century MSS. of Ibn al-Rūmī's poems; of these he gives specimen facsimile photographs. These are the Cairo MS., apparently the basis of Egyptian extracts or partial editions of his works, the Constantinople and the Escorial MSS. The latter was presumably photographed before the disappearance of the Arabic MSS. during the occupation of the Escorial by the International Brigade. As late as May, 1939, these MSS. had not been recovered, and it may be that Guest's twelve photostats are the only trace now existing of this Escorial manuscript.

Minor points of criticism may be noted; the sources listed on p. 4 could have been given in more complete form, and there are a few questionable transliterations. We concur with the expressed wish of the author of this valuable guide to Ibn al-Rūmī that the complete critical edition of his works may be "undertaken in Egypt where so much has been done for Arabic literature in modern times." An edition such as those commenced by the Dār al-Kutub of the Aghānī and Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi's al-'Iqd al-Farīd would be most welcome.

R. B. S.

Arabesque. By H.R.H. Princess Musbah Haidar. Pp. 244. 9½" × 6¼". Hutchinson. 18s.

There is little enough about Arabia in this discursive volume of gossip about life in Constantinople during the last years of the Ottoman Sultanate, but its colourful decoration and its elaborate pattern of petty intrigues provide, one must suppose, the justification for its title.

Miss Musbah Haidar, daughter of the Sharif 'Ali Haidar, tells us of the daily routine of her father's house at Chamlujah on the Bosphorus, and of the domestic excitements which attended the births, marriages and deaths that occurred in the family. She tells, too, of her father's appointment to be Amir of Mecca in 1916, and of the misfortunes which prevented him from ever taking up this post. She writes bitterly of King Hussain and his sons, but makes no mention of the kindness and courtesy which the Hashimite House showed to herself and to her two brothers in their exile in Iraq.

The authoress has much to say about the virtue and dignity of the old life of the harem: "Gradually the old order changed, the new one, aping European morals and manners, came to take its place, a tinsel synthetic substitute for what had been genuine and precious." Those who have known her in recent years will be surprised by this spirited defence of the veiling and seclusion of women.

To the older women of the cities of the Middle East who retain nostalgic memories of social life under the Ottoman Empire this book of memoirs, with their atmosphere of bygone days, will be happy reading, and the student of affairs will find some facts, not elsewhere readily available, about the rivalries of the two branches of the Sharifian family, the Dhawi Zaid and the Dhawi 'Aun.

V. H.

Whither Christian Missions? John Van Ess of the Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church in America persecutes the Assyrian race and Church. By D. Barsum Perley, Secretary Assyrian National Federation. The Randolph Press, Yonkers 5, New York. \$1.50.

This publication is interesting in a variety of ways to students of Middle East problems, and to a degree not commensurate with its mere 23 pages. These consist mainly of hot denunciation of some very unconsidered statements by the Rev. John Van Ess, quoted from a book *Meet the Arab*, which, we confess, we have not yet had the opportunity to study, or judge other than by reference to the quoted, offending paragraphs.

Firstly, apart from the booklet itself, these three points are noteworthy:

(1) Few people can be aware that there are so many Assyrians in the United

States—presumably in good positions and prepared to exert their influence on behalf of their less fortunate countrymen in Iraq and Syria—as are indicated by the long list of Assyrian societies in the U.S.A., and by the activities of the Publicity Committee, Assyrian National Federation, which have sponsored this and other publications, including Yusuf Malek's *British Betrayal of the Assyrians*, another American publication we have not yet had the pleasure of reading.

(2) The mere fact of the above disposes of the suggestion too often made that the Assyrians are a "difficult" people who can't get on anywhere. In a single generation they seem to have got on in America surprisingly well, and, given a fair chance, there seems no reason why they should not do quite as well in Arab territories, or within the British Empire or anywhere else.

(3) If any writer becomes obsessed, as many are apt to do, with one side only of an Eastern problem—to lavish praise on this or that race alone, and claim they can never do wrong—he cannot today expect to escape a barrage of cross fire from those he may once have thought to be inarticulate, and to lay what may otherwise be a good book open to the damaging charge of partisanship.

Coming now to the booklet itself, there is no doubt that, even if in places it is somewhat verbose and curiously expressed, and if at times the writer rather unnecessarily voyages on to shaky ground, the attack on Van Ess is perfectly justified.

Writing as a Christian missionary who lived at Basrah, hundreds of miles from the nearest Assyrian village to endure violence, the author who has the temerity to raise again the shocking and best forgotten massacre of Simel cannot be commended either for tact, Christian charity to those of his own religion, or in any other way. If he wishes to benefit his friends the Arabs and enable Iraq to become a united, tolerant, progressive State, then, as Perley rightly says, what point is there in reopening these old sores?

Had the Arab case been a good one in this instance, and the Assyrian case a bad one as Van Ess rashly claims, the course would still be most unwise, particularly for a missionary. But when, as Perley shows and many know, Bekr Sidki's set-up for the massacre was carefully arranged so as to preclude British interference or the presence of undesired witnesses, and took the Assyrians completely by surprise, Van Ess's poor attempt to whitewash the brutal event is wholly to be deplored. The proof that the Assyrians were not the instigators of the trouble is the fact, which should be as obvious to Van Ess as to anyone else who has examined the sequence of events, that the Assyrians had gone off to Syria in search of a new home for their race at the suggestion of Iraq, and had left their villages and their women and children trustingly within the latter's power while they did so. Separated from their families, who were at the mercy of the Iraq Army, were they likely to want to join battle unless they were deliberately goaded by news of events already taking place in their villages, or, of course, if they were fired on by the enemy? The word rebellion used by Van Ess is sheer nonsense.

Bekr Sidki's eventual death by assassination, following on his equally well-staged murder of Jafar Pasha, is held up by Van Ess to show that there may indeed have been this one black sheep who carried the defeat of "the vaunted Assyrians" (as he sarcastically puts it) to unnecessary lengths, but he does not say that, far from being reproved in Iraq, Bekr Sidki was heralded after the Assyrian massacre as a conquering hero and decorated by the Iraq Government of that time. Thus Van Ess appears to give all the evidence he can to make the Assyrians appear a truculent undisciplined people, and none that they were victimized, as in truth they were.

Perley puts his case well in this matter. With some justification he tackles the British officials of the time, too, for inactivity. This is a serious challenge. It is certainly up to us to disprove the assertion by ensuring that the future of the race is adequately safeguarded—as indeed we must, or Britain's good name will be greatly harmed and the Arabs themselves and all the Near East will look down on us. "Serve Britain and suffer for it" will be their gibe.

But the sweeping generalities and exuberances of Perley's "White Paper," as it might be called, often leads him into difficulties and spoils the general literary effect. This blemish is a pity, for he has marshalled an astonishingly wide bibliography on the Assyrians, and his quotations from Parliamentary and House of Lords debates, from Iraq Reports of different periods, and from all the multitude of writers who

have ever mentioned the Assyrians, make the booklet a classic of references on the subject, and of documentary support for his claims and arguments. The references quoted total no less than 74, and are as diverse as to include extracts from the *Dublin Review* and speeches of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The large number of British supporters of the Assyrians who are quoted seems in itself to disprove the alleged perfidy of Britain, but this is a minor point. The main one is that notwithstanding his care in preparation of the booklet, he has missed some of the most powerful matter wherewith to discomfit his opponent. This is the practical and not the religious or historical aspect. Everyone admits the Assyrians have given fine, loyal service to Britain, and have earned our gratitude and the rewards of good soldiers. Moreover, the British Empire, and indeed all the Allied nations, owe them a heavy debt following their key victory at Habbaniyah in 1941, which checked German expansion to Asia Minor and stopped a rapidly growing danger of linkage in force with Japan via the Persian Gulf at a time when the latter was poised for attack. But for the Assyrians' historic stand at Habbaniyah, Rashid Ali and Nazism would certainly have controlled Iraq; the Allies would thus have been split at a critical phase of affairs before they had mustered their strength, and the vital oil region would have been lost—as probably would have been the war itself—for both India and Russia would have been isolated and the Mediterranean outflanked.

Thus the loyalty and gallantry of the Assyrians at Habbaniyah may well, some day, be claimed as their greatest contribution to mankind.

These major points would have been better ones for Perley to drive home, and thus assist in giving Britain the necessary opening to do more for the Assyrians—a task which is, in fact, no easy one considering all the conflicting issues, particularly if the old religious and racial hatreds are sustained, or new troubles whipped up by thoughtless people.

Finally, this new source of publicity for the Assyrians will be welcomed by all those who have done and are doing their best for them in this country. But it must emphasize their fitness for, and willingness to take part in, the many tasks of the future rather than to dwell on the misfortunes and disappointments of the past. More publications are therefore hoped for from the same source, and, if the masses are to read them, they must be at a price within the reach of all. \$1.50 for 23 pages, or 6 cents a page, is rather expensive reading matter for those not specially interested in this problem, and if such booklets were a little cheaper there would be a distinctly wider public.

A. M. H.

Into All the World. By Dr. S. Zwemer. Zondervan Publishing House, Grand Rapids, Michigan. \$2.

A volume from the pen of Dr. Zwemer is always worthy of careful study, and readers of this new book will not be disappointed. The author is Professor Emeritus of the History of Religion and Christian Missions, Princeton Theological Seminary, and, moreover, he has travelled extensively, with exceptional opportunity for study at first hand of all the non-Christian religions, apart from the fact that he is an acknowledged authority on Islamic questions.

The central theme of this new book is the Great Commission which, in other words, is that tremendous charge committed to the Church of carrying Christianity all over the earth and among its nations and tribes. The subject is an extensive one, and in less capable hands it might become diffuse, but the author's handling of material is so competent that he is able to draw generalizations from a mass of detailed information on the ethnic as well as on the theological side. He notes that already the number of those who profess and call themselves Christians is twice that of any other religious group in the world, and maintains that as "Christ's laws and Kingdom are intended for all humanity everywhere," it must be the business of the Christian Church to study ethnology as well as theology.

F. L. F.

Britain Opens a Gateway. By S. S. Perry. 8" x 5". 96 pages. Museum Press. 1944. 3s. 6d. net.

Whether these Jewish protagonists for the National Home actually help their cause or otherwise is arguable. One would like to see this same author state the case for the Arabs, though perhaps this would be asking too much.

The point they neglect is that the Arabs, possibly with good reason, fear the effect of what might become a powerful Jewish State. Would Dorset and Wiltshire like to see Hampshire developed by a powerful German trust with unlimited resources and man-power behind it, even though production and output were raised substantially and native employment and amenities were improved beyond recognition? The logic of material improvement may not convince the Arabs any more than a wife would appreciate the building of a new factory in her garden because her husband found it lucrative.

Mr. Perry, in fact, considers that because the Jews have had a raw deal, the Arabs should give place to them in what is their best land, even though its area is only 1 per cent. Because Jewish resources can develop what has lain fallow, he regards this as justice, as the greatest good for the greatest number. He has put only one side of the case, though he has expressed it well, and presented his facts with force and lucidity.

Luckily for the impartial reader, Mr. Perry quotes in extenso the Mandate for Palestine of 1919 (pp. 71-77) and the American recommendation which led to it (Appendix 3, p. 78): also speeches by Mr. Churchill in May, 1939, Field-Marshal Smuts in November, 1941, and Mr. Lloyd George in May, 1939, which last especially brings out the nature of the Balfour Declaration as a hard bargain rather than a sentimental recognition of Jewish hardships. He also offers the reader, in the White Paper of 1939, a reasoned epitome of why the Mandatory Power could not see its way to permit unrestricted Jewish immigration without the consent of the existing inhabitants. This "White Paper" is perhaps the best answer to the author's arguments, until such time as (p. 88) "the Arab people of the country . . . are prepared to acquiesce in" the expansion of the Jewish Home to an indefinite extent by immigration." E. M. R.

Palestine Pamphlets: A CONSTITUTION FOR PALESTINE; RECONCILIATION IN PALESTINE. By E. B. Castle, M.A. Friends' Book Centre, N.W. 1.

An article by Mr. E. B. Castle in the *Hibbert Journal* for January, 1945, has been published as a separate pamphlet by the Palestine Watching Committee of the Society of Friends. At the same time another paper, entitled "A Constitution for Palestine," with an introduction by Major the Hon. Ralph Beaumont and Colonel S. F. Newcombe, has been put forward by a committee composed of three Jews, three Arabs and three English Christians.

In both pamphlets the point is made that it is impossible to effect a settlement in Palestine by merely weighing the case for Arab and Jewish nationalists respectively and then handing the country to the winners of the argument. To begin with, Mr. Castle says that the grounds of the claimants are quite different: "It has been suggested that the political claim of the Arab to political predominance in Palestine is incontestable and the political claim of the Jew is weak. We recognize, nevertheless, that the human claim of the Jew is great and that somehow it must be met." But even if the Arab and Zionist protagonists were pure nationalists, as they are not, the mind of the world jury to which they appeal is clouded by quite other considerations which warp the judgment, and which will give an air of complete unreality to the verdict unless these also are taken into account in open court.

Palestine is of fundamental importance as the centre of three great religions: to ignore this is to ignore the main driving force behind the whole problem. "Persecution of the cruellest kind has made essential *some* form of political status for *some* Jews," says Mr. Castle, but it is religious and historical feeling that is behind the Jewish desire to live in Palestine, and it is therefore suggested in both pamphlets that it is only reasonable to expect the Jews to be able to take into account also the religious and historical emotions of the Muslim and Christian worlds which are

similarly bound up with Jerusalem. Then, quite apart from this issue on the highest plane of human thought, there is the strategic position of Palestine on the air routes between Asia, Africa and Europe. And, as Mr. Castle points out, there is also a smear of oil across the whole Arabian picture.

The solution adumbrated by Mr. Castle is some form of bi-national state within a federation of Palestine, Syria, Transjordan and the Lebanon. He quotes with approval from a paper by Dr. Judah Magnes that "through the establishment of a federation several hundred thousand Jewish refugees could be admitted to Palestine with advantage to the country and without disturbing the political balance."

The Constitution suggested in the other pamphlet provides for a self-governing Palestine with a bicameral legislature, and to assure the Arabs against expropriation and the Jews against violence, it proposes means to preserve the local balance by relating it to "Christian, Muslim and Jewish world interests." "Such a Palestine State would not be exclusively Arab nor exclusively Hebrew. It would give recognition to legitimate Christian, Muslim and Jewish world sentiment. The special character of Palestine as a Holy Land of the three religions would be internationally acknowledged, while the historical connection of Arab and Hebrew culture with the Near Eastern environment would be recognized by their integration into that area."

The development of modern means of communication seems to be bringing a federation of Arab States into the field of practical politics. These two pamphlets suggest that such a federation, supplemented by international collaboration, might also provide a way of linking Palestine to the rest of the world and happily solve problems which baffled the wisdom not only of our own generation, but of the Caliph Umar, the Emperor Heraclius and King Solomon himself.

Malaria and Malaria in Iraq: Facts and Prospects in Iraq. Series, No. 5.

By Dr. Ali Ghalib. The New Publishers, Iraq. 1944. Luzac and Co. 6d.

This is a somewhat clumsy title to an informative pamphlet of 42 pages, of which the greater part is occupied by a concise account of the life history of the malaria parasite and of the malaria-carrying mosquitoes. The last few pages give an estimate of the degree of malaria infection in the different regions of Iraq and emphasize the crippling effect of this disease on the economic and social life of the country. More information is needed on the local breeding habits of the different species of malaria-carrying mosquitoes, but the preventive measures undertaken by Allied troops (for their own safety), both in the last war and in this, show what a startling improvement can be effected by vigorous administration. It appears from Dr. Ghalib's account that the suppression of malaria in Iraq has become a problem of social engineering rather than of science; what is now required is a well-organized campaign by all the authorities concerned, and particularly by the Government Departments dealing with health, agriculture and irrigation.

E. H. W.

Eastern Pilgrimage. By Francis Bacon. Lutterworth Press. 5s.

This short account of the main features of the Eastern churches by a young Englishman in Eastern Orders is most welcome; it should provide a slight doctrinal and historical background to a more detailed study of Middle Eastern minorities shortly appearing from the pen of A. Hourani, and as such is to be commended to all diplomatic, political, administrative officers in the Middle East in lieu of the larger books, which are practically all out of print.

Its principal defect is its complete onesidedness in not considering the Uniate churches; the Papacy has reconciled to itself a variety of erstwhile heretical and schismatic bodies, and has provided a considerable measure of protection and stimulated a higher standard of education as a result. Whatever the methods may have been, it has provided a pattern of reunion. Likewise no mention is made of the work on a smaller scale of the Anglican Bishopric in Jerusalem among the various branches of the Eastern churches in that area; added to which, there being no biblio-

graphy and no map, not much encouragement is given to the home reader, if, stimulated by this book, he wishes to pursue his studies further.

As to general principles and detail, Mr. Bacon, like Fr. Zernov, chastises the Latins for the sack of Constantinople in 1206, and neglects the massacre of the Western communities and traders in Constantinople a short while before by the Byzantines; over this, as over lack of assistance given during the Crusades, complaints were in no way onesided.

In points of detail it may be mentioned that the Coptic Church has installed its new head without excessive "baksheesh" to the Egyptian Government; and the Assyrian Patriarch, who was largely responsible for the failure to achieve a settlement for his community by his insistence on his temporal rights in Iraq in 1933, is now in the U.S.A.

If interest in the Eastern churches is to revive, it is high time new editions of Adrian Fortescue's books were produced or an up-to-date English edition of Janin's *Églises Orientales et Rites Orientaux*; let us hope Messrs. Burns Oates or Sheed Ward will take the hint, seeing that these are Catholic publications; or perhaps we may look to Mr. Bacon for a fuller and more authoritative work.

R. GODDARD WILSON.

Pakistan: A Plan for India.

This is a solid and fighting, if not pugnacious, defence of Mr. Jinnah's plan.

Politically—that is, as a political device—it may well be infallible, but from the fact that so careful and distinguished a disliker of Moslems as Mr. Gandhi is prepared to concede the principle I am inclined to suspect a catch: for instance, that the child would be economically strangled before it is weaned.

Where I agree with the author is regarding its psychological origin—a reasonable apprehension that on the advertised departure of the present paramountcy the great Hindu majority in the Sacred Name of majority, democracy, or the like, will behave towards the Moslem minority in a manner in which no decent, or even cautious, individual citizen or ruler would behave to other individuals.

I disagree, however, completely with the author regarding the historical and sociological basis of this theory—the fundamental difference and antipathy between Hindu and Moslem in India.

I am aware that at certain periods, for instance, mid-eighteenth century, the Hindus showed a certain aggressive cohesion. This was observed by Mons. Jean Law in his *Memoires*. Also, that, under the eye of that able Scotch-Frenchman, the Hindu badra-log of Bengal looked to and intrigued with the English in order to dislodge the Moslem paramount with the same recklessness as in more recent times it has looked to Japan for a similar purpose. But so far as this eighteenth-century Hindu-Moslem difference had any basis other than ordinary human impatience it was competition for priority upon the impending collapse of Mogul paramountcy.

The competition for priority resulting from the notified impending removal of British Paramountcy is and will be far more acute owing to the gift of political England to India, democracy, the rule by quantity, the Sacred Right of majorities to oppress minorities.

I do not believe in the permanent division of India. The divisions created by democracy will bring their own cure, another paramount. It was, by the way, a converted Hindu, Adina Beg, who on the last occasion opened the north-west door of India to the most likely competitor for paramountcy. It was cholera which caused Ahmed Shah Abdali to withdraw and leave the field open between the English and the French, the winner to dispute the final prize with the Mahrattas in the days of their decline.

TORICK AMEER ALI.

The Making of Modern China. By Owen and Eleanor Lattimore. Geo. Allen and Unwin. 212 pp. 8s. 6d.

In the Preface to this important book it is stated that "half the people in the world live in Asia; of that half about half are Chinese." Hardly any of the people in Asia rule themselves—the Chinese do rule themselves.

Therefore what the Chinese do and what happens to them are important to everybody. This is not to be gainsaid, and the authors proceed to show why this is so.

The actions of all the Powers in China have been open to criticism in the past, but it is a feature of this book that the shortcomings of all nations have been fairly represented. There is no glossing over the fact that though America took no concessions from China the U.S.A. was always willing to adopt a "hitch-hiking" attitude to the Imperialistic policy of the European Powers. The policy of the "Open Door" and the "Most-favoured Nation" clause in all treaties meant that whatever concession was made to any country that concession should be made to all. Acknowledgment is made that the Open Door notes from America did not propose a *cessation* of Imperialistic demands on China, but registered a claim of "me too."

The first two parts of *The Making of Modern China* are strongly recommended to those who wish to understand what led to the make-up of modern China. It is most certainly impossible to grasp the present situation without some knowledge of China's long and chequered history.

The comparative historical chart at the end of Part II shows at a glance the progress of civilization in East and West; that the first printed book appeared in the East between five and six hundred years before the same thing was happening in Europe. That King John was signing Magna Carta at about the time that Jenghis Khan and his Mongol hordes were rushing like a fiery scourge from East to West—a bettering of the life of the common man in the West and a worsening in the East.

On page 138 the authors describe the firing from foreign gunboats at the time of the advance of the Nationalist armies as "vindictive." This word hardly seems justified, as "some foreigners were killed, including missionaries, and some foreign property burned or looted." This firing may have prevented the loss of large numbers of foreign lives, and it is unlikely that the judgment of history will be that it was "vindictive."

Part IV is devoted to contemporary China, and opens with the statement that China has been more disrupted than any other country, even Russia. This is to a certain extent true, but in a sense there was less to disrupt. It is probably true to say that China away from Japanese-occupied territory is little disrupted, though nationally, of course, it is so.

One would like to hear more views on the Communist question, but the authors merely give us the official point of view.

The vexed question of Hongkong is treated quite unequivocally. If Hongkong is returned to China soon there will be good feeling between China and Britain. If Hongkong is not returned to China for a long time there will be bad feeling between China and Britain.

What is to be our attitude to this question? Are we to give up this valuable trade entrepôt to please China? An answer to these questions is one of the many that will have to be found during the coming post-war years.

The Lattimores have presented us with a readable short history and some up-to-date comments which must be of use to all those interested in Far Eastern problems.

H. St. C. S.

My Years in China By Hallett Abend.

During the past half-century it would be difficult to find any twelve-month period when China was free from a serious crisis of some sort—political, economic or social, but the fifteen years that covered Mr. Abend's life in China—from just after Borodin's reorganization of the Nationalist Party to just before Tojo's attack on Pearl Harbour—were more prolific of stirring events than any other similar period. Mr. Abend showed the flair of the born journalist when, in spite of many discouraging circumstances—difficulties on the spot and indifference at home—he decided that the China story was "his egg," and determined to sit on it until it was hatched. Mr. Abend has the journalist's gift of presenting news in a vivid and arresting manner. He never fails to catch the attention of even the casual reader, and, however inaccurate he may be in detail and sometimes even in big important issues, he succeeds in conveying a sense of atmosphere and in painting a

picture—impressionistic but true—of the general scene in which the drama of history is unrolled.

To this extent the book will be of value to the historian, but no historian would accept, without ample confirmation and translation into plain English, Mr. Abend's account of particular events. Mr. Abend yields too often to the temptation to prove in retrospect how often he pulled off scoops which made important people look foolish, and he heightens the sense of drama by reporting conversations in the language of the film scenario, and with little respect for the feelings of high officials who deem it to be part of their duty to maintain confidential relations with representatives of important journals. In spite, however, of the Hollywood flavour of the descriptions of Japanese attempts to bribe the foreign press there is little doubt that these incidents occurred exactly as described: no art is needed to make more fantastic the way that Japanese behave on such occasions.

Mr. Abend's worst mistake is the sensational story at the beginning of the book about America's reaction to Sunyatsen's alleged request for armed intervention to save China from Moscow. There is not a word of truth in all this foolish tale. Much space is devoted to accounts of the author's grievances and quarrels, but this is the least interesting part of the book, and Mr. Abend fails to win the reader's sympathy. In 1936, for example, the Japanese civil and military authorities in Shanghai made a formal presentation to Mr. Abend of a statue of a Japanese soldier bearing an inscription indicating that the presentation had been made with the Emperor's knowledge and consent. The reason for this unusual honour was that the Japanese considered that Mr. Abend had reported the Manchurian campaign of 1931-32 "with conspicuous fairness and lack of bias." The Chinese nationalists, however, who rose to power in 1928 regarded Mr. Abend's journalistic activities with disfavour, resented the extraterritorial privileges which made them possible and tried in vain to have him deported from China. Many will be inclined to take the Chinese side in this dispute.

J. T. PRATT.

The Small General. By Robert Standish, author of *The Three Bamboos*, etc. Peter Davies. 8s. 6d.

Two pitfalls waylay the feet of all those who try to write down what they observe of other nationalities than their own: unless, of course, they are not observers in any true sense at all, merely deliverers of their own preconceived opinions. The first is to be so lost in admiration of the subjects that they can only be seen *couleur de rose*; these present their readers with visions of semi-angels living in an earthly paradise—and like no other beings on this earth. The second is to pick out all the darker proclivities and show their victims sunk in practically unredeemable misery or vice. In the first instance, the authors will be able to return to the land of their attentions to the sound of acclamations, though given a trifle uneasily. In the second, unless filled with a powerful urge to reclaim and pay the price of their unpopularity, they do well to stay at a distance. We British have personally known both attack and adulation so we can sympathize with the Chinese who of late years have received so much of both. And we have also to bear in mind that it is only recently, as far as history goes, that China has come under the glare of the spotlights; till then she felt herself, justifiably, worthy only of emulation by the untutored tribes about her borders.

There is, however, a third approach: that of a friend, who knows and values the citizens of other nations for their real qualities, and appreciates the balance of good and ill, stupidity and intelligence, which is the make-up of most people. And Mr. Standish has taken that middle path: he will be able to go back, sure of a pleasant welcome from his Chinese readers, for nowadays we have to remember that Chinese intellectuals, with all their age-long and polished powers of criticism, will read such books as are written on their country. After all, we British who have lived so long in China ought, when we become articulate, to achieve this happy mean. Certain of our number who have dwelt long in India or have been born there have managed it. More than any other race it is we who have sojourned in distant lands, learned

to speak more native tongues than any other peoples—specially in our younger years, when the mind is adaptable—so perhaps what we have to say may be of value.

A special pitfall, however, waylays writers on China. Yet those easily betray themselves to the *cognoscenti* who fall into it; for those who know China well readily recognize those others who embroider their themes with fanciful *chinoiseries*. And again Mr. Standish stands the test: his China is the real China of observation, lit up by imagination. The book opens with a lively scene giving the flappings and pipings of thousands of ducklings—a piece of pure verisimilitude to those who know the Chinese countryside in its more watery aspects. A boy of nine, dubbed the Small General, is leading out his army of ducklings to their feeding-places on the wide rush-grown Tungting Lake. This is not so far from the great merchandizing city of Soochow, famed for its silk filatures and its luscious restaurants. Young Sung has a father, Sung the Elder, who has had it laid upon him by his ancestors to scoop up the smelly, good mud from the lake bottom to spread on the ground where grow his mulberry trees, bearing their precious leaves for the silkworms: and that lot will fall on Young Sung, too, in his time. Then there is the faithful middle-aged mother with her gift for cooking, and no book on China can truly avoid that glad aspect of life, any more than a book on France. We meet, too, the semi-reformed bandit, with his useful help in time of need, and Lok, the buyer of Sung's cocoons, and his half-rival. Through the whole book runs a jest, a very good jest, on the part of Sung the Elder, who is a delightful mixture of honesty and astuteness, like many another merchant not in the Occident, also. It concerns the abnormal number of those cocoons Sung exports from his island.

Finally, we have the conscienceless and murderous encroachments of the Japanese—for the years have passed on—and the last moving speech of Peahen, the new, yet old, species of Chinese wife and mother, concerning the China of to-day, that must forget provincial differences, and think of all her children as members of one family.

Personally, however, with certain remarks in the book I cannot agree. When Mr. Standish refers to our former long, honest and honourable British trade with China he dubs it exploitation. (Now, I should have thought the Elder Sung's trading methods more open to that accusation.) He also does not hold with banks or banking. To my mind, then, he is historically unsound in his first premise, and in his second his economic ideas are, to say the least, disputable.

Otherwise this is a very knowledgeable, agreeable and lifelike picture of Chinese life, which I much enjoyed. I hope Mr. Standish will write more such books.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE EDITOR,

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SIR,

As an old member of the Indian Political Department may I be allowed to comment briefly on the review by D. S. (Pyen-Dua) of Mr. Penderel H. Moon's book *Strangers in India*, so far as it deals with chapter iv., "The States"?

1. The author is quoted as saying that the Political Department have found it "increasingly advisable to regard only actual rebellion as a criticism of gross misgovernment."

This somewhat obscurely worded statement apparently means that the Government of India do not think it advisable to check misgovernment by the ruler of an Indian State unless it is so gross as to provoke rebellion among his subjects. This is palpably untrue. Except in cases of abnormal recalcitrance (rare in these days) on the part of the ruler, the presence of the Viceroy's representative in the person of the Political Officer should and does usually suffice not only to check misgovernment by friendly advice and, if necessary, by warnings, but, in the case particularly of the minor Chiefs, is the principal influence behind improving standards of administration.

The knowledge of Mr. Moon and of his reviewer about the 600 odd Indian States is, not unnaturally, scanty.

2. Further, the author, according to Pyen-Dua, "rightly suggests" as follows: "In the States the presence of the British prevents the operation of self-acting checks." This is true, of course, if rebellion is the only self-acting check referred to. But the generalization which follows is absurd, that "Once the British support is withdrawn the standards of the Princes as a whole are likely to improve." In every Indian State so much depends upon the personality of the Prince and of the Political Officer that I, for my part, hesitate to generalize. My own personal experience, however, although not recent, is worth quoting in contradiction of Mr. Moon's sweeping dictum. In one State in which I served, the post of Revenue Commissioner was filled by a very able Indian officer, lent by the Government of the United Provinces, and this is what he wrote to me *after* I had been transferred to Hyderabad. Omitting what he ascribed to the Resident as having been done for the good of the people and the administration, the writer said it would scarcely have been possible for him to accomplish anything if it had not been generally realized that he possessed the goodwill and support of the Resident. And he proceeded to confess that before taking service in a Native State "I shared the popular Indian belief that the Residencies, far from helping administrative progress in Native States, actually hindered it! It, however, did not take me more than six weeks to get completely disillusioned, and I have since then been prescribing to personal friends that the surest remedy to curb some of our Nationalist leaders of the wrong notion they entertain would be to send them for a taste of Home Rule in a Native State."

If Mr. Moon is right, any reader of this review would logically conclude that the Political Department ought to be abolished. But in that case how, it may be asked, could the Government of India discharge its responsibility for, *inter alia*, the administration of States during minorities? The best governed States today are, with few exceptions, those which in the past have been nursed during a minority under the guidance of experienced Political Officers.

3. Finally, the reviewer implies that it is only of late years that young Princes have been taught about their serious duties as well as their privileges. Shade of Lord Curzon! That eminent Viceroy took the greatest personal interest in the improved education of Indian rulers, whom he more than once referred to as his "colleagues." And it is impossible to believe that at least from his time onwards the elementary duty owed to his subjects has not been impressed upon every young Prince or Chief, whether educated in one of the Chiefs' colleges or under a tutor or guardian. Whatever be the method of instruction, the effect of the teaching given to any young man of course depends largely upon the personality of the teacher. And I can well believe that as the number of Europeans in the Services decreases it becomes impossible for Government to spare their own officers to inculcate British standards of duty on the young Princes.

STUART M. FRASER.

THE EDITOR,
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SIR,

With reference to Sir Stuart Fraser's letter about the review of *Strangers in India*, may I reply to his points as follows:

1. I think that if Sir Stuart had been working in India lately he would recognize the truth of Mr. Moon's remark. I have no great knowledge of six hundred Indian States, nor, do I suppose, has Sir Stuart Fraser, but I have worked in late years in one State, stayed for lengthy periods in another, and been in close touch with many in the south, and I endorse Mr. Moon's statement in a general way.

2. As Sir Stuart Fraser rightly remarks, much depends on the personality of the political officer, but the general policy of Government has reduced the power and influence of the political officers. Indeed, beyond the administration of minority States there would appear to be little reason for this very expensive department as regards the States.

3. My statement that it is only of recent years that young Princes have been taught *as much* about their duties as they have been about their privileges is obvious to anyone who has, of late years, been in touch with Chiefs' Colleges. Until lately the most ludicrous privileges were acquiesced in; for instance, one of the younger ruling princes was, on admission to his Chiefs' College, carried to and from his work as it was *infra dig.* for him to walk. What could be the result of such absurdity?

D. S. (PYEN DUA).

ALVERCLIFFE HOUSE,
ALVERSTOKE,
GOSPORT,
HANTS.
February 21, 1945.

THE EDITOR,
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

DEAR SIR,

The report of Commodore J. T. S. Hall's lecture in the January issue was very interesting, and brought out the important part played by the Indian Navy. One activity of which he did not speak was the charting of the Persian Gulf and survey work in general.

My grandfather, Captain Charles Constable, joined the Indian Navy in 1835. He was a son of the artist John Constable, and was himself a very fine marine painter. He and Lieutenant Stiffe of the Indian Navy charted the Persian Gulf between 1857-60, continuing the work commenced by Captains Guy and Brudes of the E.I. Marine in 1821-29. The chart was beautifully illustrated by Constable.

In 1936, when travelling from Bombay to Karachi in a B.I. ship, one of the officers showed me the chart of the Persian Gulf in the chart room. It was that of Captain Constable and Lieutenant Stiffe, still in use after over seventy-five years, a testimony to the skill with which the work was carried out by the Indian Navy.

After the capture of Bushire in the Persian War, Charles Constable was given command of the marine base and General le Grand Jacob the land base. At the end of the war they travelled together, with Constable's bearer, all dressed as Arabs, through Persia and Arabia to Egypt, making notes and sketches. Constable was a great linguist, and his knowledge of the countries bordering the Gulf was frequently of use to the Government of India.

Yours sincerely,
JOHN CONSTABLE (Lt.-Col.).



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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

In the year which ended in December, 1943, the *expenses* of the Society were £120 more than the revenue.

In the year which ended in December, 1944, the *income* of the Society was £113 greater than the expenses.

The REASON was that we received £129 from the Inland Revenue as the result of members having signed covenants to pay their nominal subscriptions for seven years. This increase in revenue has cost members NOTHING.

So far we have received just over 300 covenants out of a membership of over 1,500—that is *under 20 per cent*.

The expenses of the Society are bound to increase in the near future: the Journal will again be published four times a year, the library will be restored, lectures will increase in number. More important still, our staff must be adequately remunerated.

This can ONLY be done if we increase our membership *and* if more members will sign covenants. REMEMBER that this does NOT cost you anything but it DOES help the Society's funds.

The Council again appeal for your help in the matter.

DEED OF COVENANT

I

of
hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound and five shillings* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said

In the presence of

Address of Witness to your signature

Occupation of Witness

NOTICES

THE principal object of the Royal Central Asian Society is to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or war service may now lie in one of the countries of Central and Western Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 5s. There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend ^{him}
_{her} for membership.

Proposed

Seconded

^{His}
_{Her} connection with Asia is :

NOTICES

The Council are grateful for the following accessions to the library :

Nine parts of the *Proceedings of the University of Ankara*, 1942-44. Presented by Mr. W. E. D. Allen.

Five parts of the *Journal of the Royal Faculty of Medicine of Iraq*, 1942-44. Presented by the Government of Iraq.

Three parts of *Reports of the Iraq State Railways*, 1940-43. Presented by the Government of Iraq.

The Teheran Conference. A record published in Persian. Presented by the Government of Iran.

The Diwana Gerexwin in Kurdish. Presented by Jaladet Badr Khan.

Members are asked to notify the Office if they do not receive their Journals, and to send in any changes of address.

Members and contributors only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

The Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal has been awarded in 1945 to Miss Ursula Graham Bower, and see page 320.

ERRATUM: On page 27 of Vol. XXXII., Part I., of the Journal, paragraph 6, *substitute* "we could have enlisted, say, 1 in 20" for ". . . 1 in 2".

Free courses of tuition in Turkish are held weekly at the Londra Türk Halkevi, for both elementary and advanced students. For further particulars, application should be made to 14, Fitzhardinge Street, W. 1.

OBITUARY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

By THE RIGHT HON. LORD HAILEY, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.,
G.C.I.E.

To render a tribute to a departed friend is a sad duty, and it is sometimes a difficult one. For most men are many-sided; and in the anxiety to do justice to the qualities which have earned our admiration and respect, one may unconsciously paint a picture that is in some respects unreal. But the character of Sir Percy Sykes presents no such difficulties. The picture is clear. It is one of single-minded devotion to the causes he had at heart and of unselfish help to all those who were associated with him in his work or shared the same field of study.

That is pre-eminently the memory which the members of the Royal Central Asian Society will have of him. His connection with it was long and exceptionally close. At the time of his death in June last he was one of the six senior members of the Society, having joined it in 1907. He became an Honorary Secretary of the Society in 1932, and continued to hold that office till the time of his death.

He took no light view of the obligations this involved; the interests of the Society became one of his major preoccupations and he was unremitting in the attention he gave to them. The Council had, just before his death, elected him as an Honorary Vice-President of the Society, in order to mark their sense of the services he had rendered both in adding to its membership and in the encouragement and help which he gave unstintingly to members who sought his advice on Oriental studies or travel.

He brought to the Society a wealth of experience and an intimate knowledge both of the past history and present circumstances of Central Asia such as few others could claim to possess. The Empire owes much to its soldier-scholars, who have pursued into the fields of historical or archæological research the interests first formed during the travels incidental to their foreign service. Sykes will certainly rank high among them. Early in life he had been attracted to the study of Persia, and in 1893 he obtained permission to travel overland through Persia in order to rejoin his regiment in the Punjab. That was the beginning of a long period during which, whether as a traveller, or as Consul at Kerman and at Meshed, or General Officer Commanding the South Persia Rifles, he acquired the intimate knowledge of Persia which gave him a high standing as an authority on Persian history and affairs. It is clear, moreover, that his attachment to the Persian people, and the close friendship he had formed with many of its leading men, gave him an unusual degree of influence in the country. The record of the achievements of the South Persia Rifles has perhaps been somewhat obscured by the many

operations of a more spectacular scale involved by Turkey's participation in the war of 1914-18; but it is clear that Sykes' personal influence, and the handling of the small force at his disposal, contributed much to prevent the outbreak of anarchy and disorder which had seemed in 1916 to threaten Persia.

His interest in Persia and the studies he had made of its past, culminated in the issue of his *History of Persia* in 1915. Marked by the high standards of exactitude and precision of statement which always characterized his work, it has become, and will doubtless remain, the standard history of the country; the Persian Government recently paid it and its author the compliment of republishing it in a Persian translation. While his main interest lay in Persia and its close neighbours, such as Persian Baluchistan, Sykes extended his knowledge of Central Asia during a term of service as Acting Consul-General at Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan, in the course of which he made a trip to the Pamirs. After his retirement in 1920 he gave his time to study and lecturing, but he also devoted much of it to his *History of Afghanistan*, published in 1940. It was not based on the same intimate knowledge of the country as his *History of Persia*, but forms the most comprehensive treatment of the subject, marked by the same conscientious study of all available material and care for accuracy of statement. That he had also the qualities which can lend interest to a record of travel is shown by his publication in 1902 of *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia*, a vivid account of travels many of which were shared by his sister, the late Miss Ella Sykes, and his *Through Deserts and Oases of Central Asia*, published in 1920, which contained much of value regarding Chinese Turkestan.

The Society will mourn the loss of one who brought distinction to it by his scholarship, and whose personal qualities won for him not only the respect but the affection of its members.

[At the meeting of the Society on June 20, 1945, General Sir JOHN SHEA said: As this is the first public meeting of the Society since the very sudden death of Sir Percy Sykes it seems appropriate to make some reference to him, however brief. Possibly few of us realized, until we read the obituary notice in *The Times*, the remarkable scope of Sir Percy's varied, interesting and most useful career, as a soldier and administrator, a consular Agent at Kashgar, a great traveller and an author of repute. His *History of Afghanistan*, his *History of Exploration*, and his *History of Persia*, which latter has been translated by the wish of the Persian Government into their own language, will remain classics. But it is to his work for the Royal Central Asian Society that I would specially refer now. He had been a member for many years. In 1932, thirteen years ago, he became the Honorary Secretary, and began that quite remarkable partnership with Miss Kennedy to which the Society owes so much. Sir Percy worked indefatigably in the interests of the Society; he gained it many members and he maintained the deepest interest in it until his end. Perhaps it is a melancholy satisfaction to think that the Council had decided to ask you at the forthcoming Annual Meeting of the Society to elect Sir Percy as an Honorary Vice-President, which was the highest distinction the Society could confer on him in recognition of his great services and devotion to its interests. Sir Percy Sykes has indeed served his generation, and we will think of him as a kind and generous friend and as a great gentleman in the very best sense of the word.

Members then stood in silent tribute to the memory of Sir Percy Sykes.]

SIR GEORGE MACARTNEY, K.C.I.E.

By COLONEL F. M. BAILEY, C.I.E.

By the death of Sir George Macartney at the age of seventy-eight we lose one of our greatest experts on Central Asian affairs, a man unique in the fact that he spent twenty-eight years of his official career in Central Asia.

Born in China—the son of Sir Halliday Macartney, Secretary to the Chinese Legation in London—he was educated at Dulwich and in France. In 1888 he was posted to the small force which turned the Tibetans out of Sikkim and accompanied the detachment which entered the Chumbi Valley at that time.

In 1890 he was sent to Chinese Turkestan, where he collaborated with Sir Francis Younghusband. For several years he remained in Kashgar with no official status. His position in the eyes of the Chinese authorities and *vis-à-vis* the Russian Consul-General was exceedingly difficult, but, by strength of character, he held his own. He once told the present writer that, at this time, when challenged as to his authority, he was obliged to say that he was only a traveller on a short visit to Kashgar. It was not until 1904 that his position was regularized and he was appointed British Consul at Kashgar; but this appointment was not recognized by the Chinese, who claimed that we could only send Consuls to the regular treaty ports. Six years later, with the assent of the Chinese, the post was raised to that of Consul-General. He spoke Chinese perfectly and his influence with the local authorities was immense; a most fortunate thing, as he did not receive the amount of support which the Russian Government accorded to their Consul-General. His influence spread far afield and was great even in distant Tashkent, the capital of the neighbouring province of Russian Turkestan, which he visited in 1918 during the Russian revolution; his prestige and influence were most useful to the British Mission which was at that time in the city.

It would be difficult to single out any act worthy of special mention when Macartney's whole career was devoted to his duties in one spot, but mention may perhaps be made of his action in the freeing of slaves. At first the cases of slaves of Indian nationality only were taken up, but this led to the freeing of slaves of other nationalities as well.

Lady Macartney lived many years with him in lonely Kashgar, where her support of her husband and her hospitality were remembered years after she had left.

Sir George settled in Jersey after his retirement and suffered under the German occupation. These hardships probably hastened his death, which took place just after the termination of the occupation of the island by Germany.

He had been a member of the Society since 1909 and had given lectures and written papers for us. His quite unrivalled experience and knowledge of Central Asia was always willingly placed at the disposal of the Society.

FEEDING THE MIDDLE EAST IN WAR-TIME

By KEITH A. H. MURRAY

(Late Director of Food and Agriculture, Middle East Supply Centre, 1942-45)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on June 20, 1945. General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN, introducing the lecturer, said: Mr. Murray has come to tell us, with great authority, something as to the feeding of the Middle East during the war period. I, first, would like to give you some details of his career. He is a Scotsman, which possibly some of those present regard as a recommendation! He was educated at Edinburgh University, where he gained the B.Sc. in Agriculture, and then a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship to study Agricultural Economics at Cornell University, New York State, for three years, following which he returned to the Oxford University Agricultural Economics Research Institute from 1929-39. He was made Fellow and Bursar of Lincoln College in 1937 and was a member of the Oxford City Council from 1937-39. So pleased were they with him at Lincoln College that they made him their Rector in 1944, which distinguished position he now holds. Mr. Murray was with the Ministry of Food for two years, 1939-41, to advise on prices—a somewhat onerous task. He was in the Royal Air Force from 1941-42 on special duties, and was seconded by the R.A.F. to the Middle East Supply Centre, from 1942-45, as Director of Food and Agriculture. If all that is not sufficient to entitle him to speak on the subject of his lecture, I honestly do not know what else would constitute him an authority.

IN spite of the details the Chairman has given, it is with trepidation that I address the Royal Central Asian Society. Probably most of those present have had much greater experience of the Middle East than I have, for I have spent only three years in a region where time has been counted in dynasties. In many out-of-the-way places in the Middle East I came upon the Society's Journal, always a source of interest to me, and when I recall the articles therein I realize how inadequate is my experience and that my acquired knowledge falls far short of that to which you are normally accustomed.

I should like to divide my talk into three parts: firstly, to explain briefly what the Middle East Supply Centre is and what it was designed to do; secondly, to describe its work on food supplies and production; and, thirdly, to enumerate a few of the points which might be of interest from the point of view of the future of the Middle East.

I

The Middle East Supply Centre was established by the British Government in April, 1941. The underlying reasons, as I see them, were three-fold. Firstly, and most important, the shipping position was rapidly deteriorating and the Mediterranean was becoming unusable; that led,

naturally, to the need for much greater self-sufficiency in the Middle East area as a whole. Secondly, the lines of communication, the ports and the transport facilities had to be cleared to enable military personnel and supplies to be moved. This was particularly true of Egypt and of the Eastern Mediterranean to facilitate the passage of supplies to North Africa. The other particularly important area was the Persian Gulf area, where the passage of aid to Russia became the paramount consideration. Thirdly, the Centre was to assume responsibility for the civil economy of the whole area while the Services got on with their real job.

At first the Middle East Supply Centre was a British organization; subsequently it was labelled "Anglo-American," and, in view of Sir John's gentle dig in his opening remarks, I will disclose that the "Anglo" part consisted of an Australian Director-General, a New Zealand Deputy Director-General, and, of the four Directors, three were Scotsmen, the fourth was American. The functions of the Centre were purely advisory and co-ordinating; it had no executive powers and worked through some eighteen different Governments and administrations, but shipping and supply sanctions added emphasis to our advice, since the recommendations on imported supplies for the area were submitted to the supply authorities in London and Washington, and in almost every case they were accepted by them. The ultimate decisions, of course, rested with the Combined Boards in Washington. I wish to emphasize how dependent the Centre was on the Governments in the various areas. Having no executive powers, the Middle East Supply Centre had to work in very close collaboration with those eighteen administrations, and credit for anything that the Centre managed to do must be shared with them.

The area covered by the Middle East Supply Centre was fairly extensive; it had responsibilities for most purposes towards a population of about 81,000,000, the area being about $4\frac{3}{4}$ million square miles, about two and a half times the size of Europe.

There has been considerable discussion recently on what countries constitute the Middle East; it would be rash for me to attempt to define it, and I would suggest that that may be impossible. Its constitution must vary according to the problems being considered; it is one area culturally, another agriculturally, another strategically, and so on. For our purposes we distinguished two regions—an Inner Circle and an Outer Circle.

The *Inner Circle* consisted of (a) the Fertile Crescent, containing Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan; (b) the Lower Nile Valley, Egypt, Northern Sudan, and ultimately, when annexed by the 8th Army, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; and (c) the Arabian Peninsula, including the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, the responsibility for certain food of which was transferred to the Centre when the Indian food position became serious at the beginning of 1943. The *Outer Circle* consisted of (a) a northern zone, comprising Cyprus, Turkey and Persia; and (b) a southern zone, consisting of Southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalias. That was a fairly extensive area to cover, particularly at a time when shipping was so scarce.

Incoming supplies were brought in under two programmes—one into

the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea area, and the other into the Persian Gulf. Those were the two big central pools from which redistribution was undertaken by rail, road, canal and feeder shipping services. Internal transport facilities were barely adequate for the needs of a peace-time economy, and superimposed was the whole volume of war materials for the whole of the North African campaign and for Russia, amounting to several million tons a year. Transport was strained to the extreme, and it was necessary for the Centre to work with very close measurement.

The Middle East Supply Centre was organized on a commodity basis, the main divisions being: food and agriculture; material supplies and industrial production; medical supplies; and transport. The Middle East Supply Centre carried out no commercial transactions; it was a planning and co-ordinating body. All commercial transactions were carried out by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, and here I pay my personal tribute to the immense and splendid work the Corporation did.

II

I understand that Commander R. G. Jackson, now Deputy Director-General of U.N.R.R.A., is to address the Society later on the Middle East Supply Centre as a whole, so I will deal now in greater detail with the question of supplying the Middle East with its essential food and agricultural requirements.

The Food and Agriculture Division had four main functions: firstly, to ensure that the production of food in the area covered by the Centre was increased to the maximum; secondly, to ensure that food imports were reduced to a minimum; thirdly, to see that the food supplies that were available in the area were distributed as fairly as possible; and, finally, to export any surpluses of home-grown foods from the Middle East for other parts of the world.

1. *The Development of Agricultural Production.*—Agriculture is essentially a long-term industry, and it is necessary to plan far ahead in order to ensure results. Unfortunately, little was done to get Middle East agriculture on to a war-time basis until 1942.

However, some immediate results were obtained; mainly through changes in the kinds of crops grown. One of the most astounding changes was that brought about by the Egyptian Government; the Egyptian cotton crop is the life-blood of the country, covering about 1,750,000 acres in pre-war years, but almost overnight a law was passed which reduced the area to 650,000 acres; in other words, over 1,000,000 acres were diverted from cotton to wheat and barley, possibly one of the most fundamental changes in agricultural production which any country has ever achieved.

Another effective change in production occurred in the Sudan, where the Sudan's wheat requirements were grown in the place of millet and a small amount of cotton. Palestine gave up certain crops and grew, instead, potatoes both for its own consumption and for the British

troops, vegetables and other foods needed under war-time conditions. The British soldier does not like to forego his potato, but it is a most bulky product to transport and also very perishable in hot climates. Syria and the Lebanon, which had not previously grown potatoes to any extent before the war, also managed to grow large crops. Such changes in cropping to meet war-time requirements gave immediate results.

Next, there was the rather longer-term programme of developing new areas and extending the area under cultivation. In this connection one factor, for which the Centre was not responsible, was most effective—namely, inflation. Prices commenced to rise rapidly as Allied military expenditure increased in the Middle East area, and that, more than anything else, encouraged the farmers in the Middle East to farm more land. It is probably true to say that the cereal area in most countries increased by about 20 per cent., though this cannot be proved statistically.

Special production schemes were also started by the various Governments. In the Sudan a large area of new land was brought into cultivation; in Northern Syria, in the Djezireh area, there was another big scheme; in Cyrenaica there was the Barce Plain scheme, where 12,000 acres were farmed by the military administration. Given more time, greater results might have been achieved.

Another method of increasing food production was to bring more fertilizers into the area, because, by their application, bigger crops could be produced. But a bigger supply of fertilizers was not easy to achieve because the world-supply situation was so seriously curtailed. In the old days, Egypt had used about 600,000 tons of fertilizers per annum; for shipping reasons that tonnage had been cut down to about 120,000 a year, which meant a serious reduction in production of food in the Middle East. It was therefore necessary to ensure that such fertilizers as were obtained went only to food crops and to those food crops which gave the greatest return, such as cereals and vegetables.

Imports of farm machinery had also to be planned, not so much to increase production as to maintain it. A serious shortage of spare parts and replacements had developed in 1940, 1941 and 1942, during which period large numbers of rural workers had left the land in order to take advantage of the higher wages offered in the towns and by the Allied armies. Under these conditions, imports of machinery and spare parts became very important.

At the same time it became necessary to take measures to conserve what was produced. Anti-locust controls was the most important step towards this end. Locust attacks reach a peak about every twelve years, and a heavy infestation was expected in 1943 or 1944. The Centre, under supervision of the Interdepartmental Committee for Locust Control in London, co-ordinated the work of the various units established to control the locusts in each country. The Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Palestine, India, Russia and the Sudan all worked together. Conferences were held and the campaigns aligned. Saudi Arabia is the main breeding-ground of the locust, and a campaign was organized by the Centre to tackle that problem in 1943. H.M. King Ibn Saud co-operated by allowing an expedition consisting of technical officers and 1,000 British troops

with 400 or 500 vehicles for a period of four or five months to destroy the locusts in their breeding-ground. The expected spread of attacks throughout the Middle East did not materialize. Locust attacks at the height of their cycle have been extremely severe. They may penetrate into Southern Russia, into the Balkans and Mediterranean countries, as well as over the Middle East, with catastrophic results as far as crops are concerned. Had the locusts been allowed to spread unchecked during the war years, there might have been very serious famine or, alternatively, demands on shipping amounting to one, two or even three million tons.

The Centre also co-ordinated efforts to control other pests and diseases which broke out from time to time. For example, there was a serious outbreak of horse-sickness in 1944, which resulted in an unprecedented demand by all territories and the Army on the relatively small quantity of vaccine available from East and South Africa, and it was left to the Centre to regulate the supplies. The vaccine was directed to those areas in which horse-sickness actually existed, and a wide spread of that disease, which might have had serious effects on the next year's cultivation, was avoided.

2. *Co-ordination of Imports and Economy in Imports.*—Prior to the war, about 6,000,000 tons of goods were imported into the principal countries of the Middle East each year. Space and transport had to be cleared for tanks, guns, shells and so on, and for that purpose it was necessary to reduce the civil supplies passing through the ports, which were badly congested in 1941 and 1942. Imports were eventually reduced from 6,000,000 tons a year to just under 1,500,000 tons. It will be readily realized that it was necessary to be certain that there was no cut in the supply of commodities absolutely essential to the civil economy of the Middle East, otherwise the war effort would have been impeded by unrest and discontent on the lines of communication.

Imports were controlled, again through the Governments concerned, in three ways. Imports by individual traders were licensed. When a trader wanted some article he applied for a licence through his own Government, which licence came to the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo and, after it had been "vetted," it was sent to the supplying country. There were about 2,000 commodities dealt with in this way, and some 30,000 to 40,000 licences a year passed through the Centre.

Under war conditions the supplying firms in Great Britain and the United States could not deal with vast numbers of small orders; for many important goods, therefore, the orders were bulked by the Middle East Supply Centre and combined with any Government orders. The commodities dealt with by this means were iron, steel, fertilizers, agricultural machinery and so forth, so that there went forward to the supplying countries one large order from the whole of the area.

Then, under the "Pool System," the Middle East Supply Centre imported for the area as a whole all the requirements of certain goods. These included the bulky commodities—most of the principal agricultural requirements and foodstuffs such as cereals, sugar, tea, coffee, oil-seeds, fertilizers, locust poison, tinplate, etc.—which were purchased by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in world markets at world

prices, shipped to the Middle East, and held in the Mediterranean and Red Sea Pool, or the Persian Gulf Pool, and then allocated by the Middle East Supply Centre to the various countries as their need arose.

The vast majority of the items either came in under the bulk indenting system or the pool system; only the smaller items were dealt with through the system of individual licensing.

It may be of interest to note how the pool system worked. It had definite advantages under war-time conditions, but there has been a certain amount of criticism, both in this country and in the Middle East, of what is called Government trading and monopoly import under U.K.C.C. sponsorship. It was essential that there should be control over the essential commodities. It was unfortunate that, to a certain extent, private trading had to be superseded, but this was absolutely necessary. In the first place, there were emergency demands with which the ordinary licensing system could not cope. When a private trader in some country put in his order and it was screened by his own Government, passed to the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, thence to London or Washington, handed out to some manufacturer and finally shipped, there was a gap of about six months or even sometimes of a year between the time an article was asked for and its arrival; on one or two occasions even two years elapsed. The delay was due mainly to shortages in the supplying countries. It will be readily realized that such a system in the hands of individual traders could not possibly cope with emergency demands. For example, the Army took 200,000 to 300,000 prisoners in North Africa in quite a short space of time, resulting in an emergency demand for thousands of tons of grain. Again, there were occasional cereal crop failures in some countries, or delays in harvesting, or an absence of wind for winnowing the corn, which always made possible serious and sudden calls for grain. Then there were transport breakdowns to be contended with; feeder shipping in the Red Sea was fairly decrepit and the possibility of cargoes being delayed owing to breakdowns had to be borne in mind. Only a pooling system could handle efficiently food supplies under such conditions.

Moreover, the pooling system was more economical; the Middle East Supply Centre central reserves were much less than the individual reserves that would have been needed had each country held its own reserve requirements of many foods.

Again, there were shipping uncertainties. For example, in one of the main loading areas from which we drew our wheat there were unprecedented frost and cold, with the result that only 7,000 tons of wheat were loaded as against our needs of some 59,000 tons; had there not been centralized reserves and control of supplies, the results would have been disastrous two to three months later.

These centralized supplies also undoubtedly gave a certain amount of bargaining power which was important from the point of view of the Centre. For example, the Centre was responsible for seeing that the troops had enough beer. Hops and malt had to be imported—only a few tons of shipping were used for this as compared with the tens of thousands of tons of beer that would have been required if brewing had not been expanded in the Middle East itself—and rigid control of their issue to the

breweries ensured that the bulk of the output went to the Army instead of being soaked up by a civil population with full purses and a growing taste for beer.

Finally, there were so many changes under war-time conditions in what we termed the loading areas that the individual trader would have been completely at sea. At one time of year we might be drawing from Australia, at another time from North America or South America, and so forth. As shipping and as exchange and supply conditions changed, it would have been hopeless to leave individual traders to cope with the circumstances. Thus the monopoly trading system was forced upon us as a result of war-time conditions. These controls are gradually disappearing; they are now practically limited to five or six of the most important commodities.

The extent of this work is indicated by the fact that in 1943-44 the Centre, in collaboration with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, was allocating about 200,000 to 250,000 tons of centrally controlled foods each month, worth about £5 million to £6 million.

3. *Fair Distribution.*—Fair distribution was possibly one of the most difficult but one of the most interesting tasks; while total supplies might appear adequate on paper, yet there might be serious shortages locally. That had to be avoided, since the task allotted to the Middle East Supply Centre was to keep the Middle East fed and happy. Hoarding of supplies developed seriously in 1942, as a result of two factors. Firstly, as the war approached the Middle East, memories of 1914-18 were revived, recalling the famine and starvation that prevailed in some areas. Secondly, rising prices encouraged speculation. As prices rose, farmers, merchants and others all held on to their supplies in the hope of making increased profits later on. The result was that while total supplies might appear to be adequate, they might not reach the market when they were wanted, where they were wanted, or at prices the people could afford to pay. That was one of the biggest problems.

One development which arose out of that was what were termed grain collection schemes. The Governments in practically all the principal territories instituted Government monopolies of the grain market and control of transport. Egypt, Palestine, Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and the Lebanon, the Sudan, Iraq, Persia and Ethiopia all had schemes for the collection of crops, all instituted by their respective Governments.

The complexity of the schemes varied in the different countries. The Egyptian Government probably had the most complete scheme. They estimated the area of crops each farmer was growing; then, when harvest-time was near, they estimated what his harvest would be; they sat on his threshing-floor while his grain was threshed; finally, they assessed the farmer's requirements for his family, his livestock and his seed, and then the Government claimed the rest. Each farmer had then to deliver the grain to the Government stores. Control was assisted by the fact that it is not possible to store grain in the Nile Valley for much more than a year.

In other areas, however, control was less effective than in Egypt, since conditions allowed grain to be stored for a long time. In Syria and the Lebanon, farmers can bury their grain in a hole in the ground, put the

earth back and grow another crop on top, keeping the grain below for two or three years. In co-operation with the French and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, there was a joint scheme in Syria and the Lebanon which was staffed by British and French officers and which worked very well. Whereas the Centre had to supply Syria and the Lebanon with 90,000 tons of grain in 1941-42, enough grain was collected from the country districts in 1942-43 to feed the towns, and in 1943-44, as a result of the work of Office des Cereales Painifiables and of the good harvest, a surplus of about 70,000 tons of grain was made available for export to other countries that were in need.

In 1942-43, Persia had to be supplied by Middle East Supply Centre with some 60,000 to 70,000 tons of imported grain. But, at the same time, the Persian Government instituted a collection scheme, and in 1943-44 and this year they were self-sufficient.

The point to be borne in mind is that while there might be plenty of grain in a country, yet the cities and towns might be so short of it that the population would be starving. That had to be guarded against. We found that it was no use taking a passive line and hoping for the grain to come in, even though such inducements as high prices and cash payments were offered; appeals and propaganda had no effect. Private trade had to be controlled rigidly and often supplanted. Our experience is of interest, because there were similar problems elsewhere. In North Africa the country normally produced 300,000 tons of grain a year for export, and yet under war conditions grain had to be sent in. The same happened in Italy and also in India, particularly in Bengal, where there was the biggest rice crop for years and yet there was famine in Calcutta. As a result of the institution of the grain collection schemes an immense amount of shipping was saved in the Middle East. In 1943-44, about 2½ million tons of grain were collected from farmers under official schemes and taken for feeding the cities and towns, which might otherwise have had to be brought in from Australia and North America.

Among other methods adopted for the control of consumption and to save shipping, was the adulteration of bread. This was not popular, but the Middle East Governments undertook it, with the result that there was an immense saving of wheat. Officially, into the bread went barley or millet; but unofficially, in some areas, quite a lot of other things went in as well. In general, there was a saving of about 25 per cent., the loaf being made up of 25 per cent. of millet, barley, maize and other grain, and 75 per cent. of wheat. The wheat was also milled to a far higher degree than in Great Britain; about 90 to 95 per cent. of the wheat grain went into the bread instead of the normal 70 per cent. On the whole, the war-time bread was not bad, and probably saved a further half to three-quarters of a million tons of wheat and shipping in a year.

Rationing as it is known in this country was not very successful in the Middle East; the Government departments were understaffed and inexperienced in this kind of work and had not the personnel to enable them to put a rationing system into force successfully. Palestine probably had the most advanced system; they had a points system and straight rationing, as in Great Britain, and the system worked remarkably well. Cyprus and the Sudan also had a fair rationing system, but in general

little can be claimed in the way of success in regard to direct consumer rationing in the Middle East.

Then there was, as I have said, the rationed distribution of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, seeds, etc., since it was necessary to ensure that they were used for the crops for which they were best suited and distributed at prices which the poorer cultivators could pay. In the more important countries, joint committees were set up for such purposes; these were very successful. For example, in Egypt there was a joint Egyptian-Anglo-American fertilizer control committee, which was responsible, through the Egyptian Agricultural Credit Corporation, for the distribution, down to the smallest cultivator, of a total of 300,000 tons of fertilizers in 1944.

4. *Export of Foodstuffs*.—Finally, in addition to importing a considerable amount of foodstuffs into the Middle East, certain surplus crops of immense value were exported to other countries: for example, the potatoes grown for the British Army all through North Africa and throughout the Middle East. Iraq grew barley, some of which was shipped to help the shortage in India. Possibly one of the most important exports was Egyptian rice. Egyptian rice, in return for fertilizers, made available rice which saved the rubber industry in Ceylon, practically the last source of natural rubber left to the United Nations. In Ceylon the rice on which the labourer works used to come from India; when food conditions in India became most difficult, Ceylon was left with little or no rice. The labourers cannot live on anything else, so they left the rubber plantations and went to the mainland. When the Ministry of Food came to the Centre in Egypt and asked for rice, large quantities were collected by the Egyptian Government and sent to Ceylon, whereupon the labourers returned to the plantations and the crude rubber supplies were saved.

III

Having described the Centre and having given a few examples of the type of work which the Food and Agriculture Division tried to do, I would end by bringing out one or two points which may be of interest for the future. I again emphasize that I was only three years in the Middle East, so that any remarks in this connection must be regarded as tentative and only personal impressions. Moreover, when dealing with an area so large and diversified as the Middle East, there are grave dangers in trying to generalize.

One point impressed on my mind is that agriculture is the basis of the life of the people in the Middle East. There is sometimes a tendency to judge the Middle East from its urban conditions, where one sees on the surface a more or less Western civilization and good standards of living. One goes to Egypt and sees such cities as Alexandria and Cairo; to Palestine and sees Jerusalem, Tel Aviv; to the Levant and sees Damascus, Beirut and perhaps Aleppo; to Persia and so forth and sees other towns. There is in the Middle East a vast rural population, probably comprising 80 per cent. of the total population, and most of the people

live on very small farms spread throughout the whole of the area. One of the first things which I had to learn was that the governmental centres to which I went were not the Middle East.

The second point was the very low standard of agricultural productivity and, consequently, the low standard of living throughout large areas. That was most striking. The contrast was most marked when one visited other neighbouring regions, such as East Africa. There is too much poverty, disease, bad housing and so on. Part of this is inherent as a result of the relatively poor natural resources of the area, but, on the other hand, it cannot be claimed that these resources are as efficiently utilized as they might be.

Another factor which strikes one very forcibly is the very slow advance in agricultural production, or any type of production, in relation to the very rapid rate at which populations are increasing. Sooner or later that is going to have very serious effects, if the two are not brought into closer relationship the one with the other.

There are dangers of over-optimism in regard to food production possibilities. One or two recent books appear to make the Middle East a potential Garden of Eden once more. In my view, many of the factors which are limiting production in the Middle East are long-term factors, and there is no quick remedy for them. Underlying everything is the land-tenure system, which prevents the introduction of improved methods of farming. By reason of the inheritance laws, farms are subdivided until they are so small as to be unable to provide enough food for the cultivator and his family. In Egypt it was said that the fellah had sufficient land to provide him with only about 120 days' work in the year. Moreover, these small holdings are often wastefully split up into small strips scattered throughout the village. The most awkwardly shaped farms that I ever saw were in the north of Syria, where strips of almost a mile long by a yard or two wide can be found. This is not conducive to good and productive farming. In Cyprus, when the Government wanted to acquire 250 acres of land for experimental farming they had to deal with over 600 owners. The solution cannot be achieved overnight; it is likely to be a slow and painful process; there is a lot of hard thinking and hard work to be done.

Then there is the question of soil erosion. The fact that soils are being washed away or blown away creates a serious problem over a large part of the Middle East, and one which has to be tackled soon if soil erosion is to be prevented and cured. Some of the Governments have already set to work in that connection, but it is, again, a long-term problem, and expensive.

There are many other factors which make for slow development in the Middle East. There is lack of real leaders; there is an absentee landlordism of the worst type. There is rural indebtedness, which has been reduced materially during the war as a result of higher prices and new ways of marketing and paying for produce; this progress should not be lost. There are also other long-term considerations, such as the slow growth of health services, education and transport. All these are factors which will have to be tackled before it will be possible to achieve any

greatly increased food production and agricultural prosperity in the Middle East, and I repeat that agriculture is the basis of most livelihoods in the Middle East.

There is, however, no doubt that a great deal could be done in a short time while the long-term factors are being solved. There can be better breeding, better selection of plants and livestock, improved use of water, new fodder crops, and so forth. Already significant experiments are being undertaken to overcome the most difficult problems, such as the system of land tenure; there are several examples of new types of agricultural development and land utilization. In the Sudan there is an amalgamation of the State, companies and tenants—in the Sudan Plantations Syndicate—co-operating together and working very successfully large areas of land; instead of a multitude of narrow strips, farming can be carried on more economically in larger units. Again, in the Sudan there is an enterprise in which the State and tenants are partners—the Alternative Livelihood Scheme—which is possible of development and extension. State enterprise and State farms in Turkey up on the Anatolian plateau may also be pointers to the future. In Palestine there are the group settlements, the Jewish colonies, and so forth. In Iraq there are large-scale private land companies, such as the Latifiya Estates Company. These experiments are designed to get over the difficulties of the land-tenure system and the strips of uneconomic size, and should be watched with interest because they may provide answers to this almost insuperable obstacle to progress.

Another conclusion to which I came was the need for regional action in the Middle East. There are common problems throughout all the areas, and those common problems call for common action. For example, the three main rivers of the East pay no attention to political boundaries; if they are going to be used to their maximum they must be used commonly amongst the various countries. One country cannot develop without reference to others. Animal and plant diseases, on which a great deal of work is needed, disregard territorial frontiers. The number of trained technical personnel is limited and so are the funds and equipment for research; they must be economized if the fullest use is to be made of them. At present there is too much duplication of effort, too many people in different countries trying to grapple with the same problems without those contacts with one another which are essential if their efforts and money are not to be wasted. The various Governments must work together if their problems are to be efficiently tackled and solved.

These problems are not merely agricultural. There are as many common problems in the field of industry, public health, education, transport, communications—in fact, over the whole field of human endeavour.

Another striking feature is that “regional” unity in the Middle East is now a fact; it is no longer merely an ideal. That should be noted more closely outside the Middle East. I am not absolutely certain that the existing machinery in London is the best devisable for dealing with the Middle East as a region. There are the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Colonial Office and other departments all interested in Middle East problems. The division of responsibility is particularly clear when you

come to deal with technical personnel, a question which is becoming increasingly important in the Middle East. British staffs in Cairo and Baghdad happen to be interchangeable with those of Madrid and Tokyo, whereas the staffs at Aden and Palestine happen to be interchangeable with those of Nigeria and Fiji. Surely it would be better if the exchange was made between areas which have problems and outlooks of a similar nature. There may be arguments against regionalization, but I suggest very humbly that they should be seriously questioned.

There is one last point that I would make—the shortage of technical advisers. One of the most pleasant aspects of the work in the Middle East Supply Centre was the contact with scientific workers in the different countries and the interchange of technical assistance that took place. Political influence is increasingly suspect, but technical advice is welcomed. Other countries have recognized this and are providing expert technical assistance; it does not seem desirable that the Commonwealth should lag behind, since we have much to give that would be of mutual benefit.

The Middle East has opportunities and means for development and raising of standards of living, but in my opinion the task is likely to be a slow and difficult one. There is one warning which I think should be sounded. I must frankly admit that, on the basis of three years' experience, I do not know in which direction the Middle East is going to look. I do not want to suggest that the institutions of Europe, America or any other part of the world which are being brought to the notice of the people in the Middle East are models that will be copied by them. Judging from my experience, the rise in the standard of living will, no doubt, be achieved within the framework of their existing institutions. The Middle East in the past has been a link between the East and the West, the region in which the conflict of ideas and aspirations has produced a rich and varied life. To-day, there are certain scientific techniques being developed in the West which may be of use to the East, but these techniques can be applied only in the way which fits in with the existing forms of social life; their application rests with the people of the Middle East and their Governments.

Finally, I wish here to pay tribute to the unfailing courtesy and good nature of the Middle East administrations with whom I came in contact. Much that was asked of them in the interests of the war cannot have been easy for them to carry out, yet our proposals were almost invariably accepted, which made our work a pleasure. I look back on three happy and interesting years in a part of the world which, and among people whom, I shall not forget.

Lord HAILEY said that Mr. Keith Murray had no need to apologize for the fact that he had spent only three years in the Middle East. He had brought to his task there the trained mind which gives experience its real value, and it was this which had enabled him to give the Society the advantage of so clear and comprehensive a view of the practical problems which the Middle East Supply Council had to face.

The Council had four definite achievements to its credit. In the field

of primary production, it was no mean feat to increase outturn by some 20 per cent. It was, in the second place, no easy task—given the character of the cultivators and the type of rural economy in this region—to effect a substantial change in the type of cultivation. Large areas in the region are better suited for the growth of *durra* and other millets than of wheat. Thirdly, it was able to effect a notable reduction in imports; to bring them down from six to two million tons was a great contribution to the transport problem; and though this measure met with local criticism, this was probably due to the fact that in the Middle East (as in some of our Colonies also) it was necessary to operate through the agency of an improvised organization, inexperienced in trade matters and lacking the necessary statistical material. Fourthly, it had to overcome grave problems of distribution. We had some experience of what these difficulties could be in the course of the recent famine in Bengal. The difficulty of collection of supplies is due to the fact that in the Middle East, as in India, production is in the hands of a vast number of small cultivators. Tradition, born of the experience of recurrent periods of scarcity, has led them instinctively to hold back a considerable part of their foodstuff production from the market, and the actual machinery of marketing is often primitive. Mr. Keith Murray had said that success in this matter was not as complete as the Council could have desired, yet in view of the obvious obstacles the results were by no means inconsiderable.

But the crisis which produced the Council is passing away; it will doubtless cease before long to operate in its present form. Our chief interest now lies in the permanent effect which its activities may have had on the conditions in the Middle East. The outstanding problem is to raise the standards of living of the mass of the population, and this resolves itself first and foremost into finding means for increasing primary production. Our method will doubtless be the extension of irrigation, though there seems little scope for major projects, save in Egypt and the Sudan; elsewhere irrigation facilities will presumably have to take the form of the greater use of subsoil water. A second method is the use of more scientific methods of cultivation. But, as Mr. Keith Murray has pointed out, there is an obstacle here not only in the difficulty of inducing the cultivator to change his traditional system of cultivation, but in the existence of forms of land tenure totally unsuited to more advanced types of production.

There is in this respect a problem which we still have to solve also in many of our Colonies. The problem of increasing primary production used at one time to be viewed as an alternative between what may be described as a peasant economy and the use of systems of the "plantation" type, in which the capitalist supplies skilled management and equipment while the peasant supplies his labour. But there are many now who doubt whether the future actually lies between these two alternatives. May we not have to turn to methods such as that familiar in the Gezira, which represent a tripartite partnership of Government, the capitalist and the peasant farmer, or even to systems of collective farming akin in some form to those adopted in Russia?

Lord Hailey asked Mr. Keith Murray to say what possibilities there were of experiments in this direction. He also asked him to give his

opinion of the possibility of securing advance in primary production by these or other methods, in view of the political factors existing in the region. We had to face the fact that there was a growing spirit of nationalism in most of the units concerned—that was certainly the case in Egypt and Syria and Lebanon, and it was presumably true also of other units. Would this prevent their combining to obtain the necessary technical advice or availing themselves of such guidance as would assist in raising the general standards of living?

Mr. MURRAY: I will try to answer the questions briefly. First, as to change in the land-tenure system, it seems to me essential to ensure that a better system is initiated wherever the agricultural area is extending; as in parts of the Sudan and Syria. It is essential to ensure that the old mistakes are not made again, that where new areas are opened up they should be opened up under a system whereby the subdivision of holdings does not continue indefinitely and the units become so small that they do not provide a livelihood for the individual or his family. The examples I cited from the different countries of larger-scale organization are the types of organization that one must watch with interest and decide which is best suited to the conditions and the different crops. The second step is much slower—to try to remedy the evils where they already exist. That, I must confess, is one of the most difficult, since their origin is rooted in age-old custom and closely bound up with the Moslem religion and Turkish law.

The second question Lord Hailey asked was in regard to regionalization in relation to world organizations, and I would just make one reference to that. We had a series of conferences with representatives of the different Governments, who sat round a table with us and discussed the problems involved. At one of the conferences, that on agriculture and agricultural development, a proposal was put forward that the Middle East Supply Centre should organize a Middle East Council of Agriculture. That suggestion was made spontaneously, a constitution was drawn up, which the representatives of the twelve countries finally agreed upon. The scheme has now been adopted by the Arab Unity Conference, and they are going ahead on an Arab basis. They have seen the economies which resulted from the interchange of information, the sharing research workers, and so forth, and it is a most hopeful indication that unity is not to be practised solely on a political basis.

I believe, too, that regionalization has a place in the world organization. As you know, a permanent organization called the Food and Agricultural Organization was set up in Washington after the Hot Springs Conference. It seems to me that the strength of any world organization will, to a great extent, depend on the strength of the regional organizations which it will eventually embrace. It will be difficult to centralize successfully an organization of forty-four nations, and it will be easier if there is regional co-ordination and cohesion based on regional community of interests. That is why I believe a Middle East Council would be a source of strength to a World Council, at any rate from the point of view of dealing with technical subjects.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have had a great privi-

lege this afternoon, because not only have we had a most instructive lecture of absorbing interest, but also Lord Hailey has given a most agreeable sequence to that lecture. He has voiced the questions which I am sure were in all our minds following on the views which Mr. Murray expressed. I know that I am echoing the thought of every individual present when I say that we owe you, Mr. Murray, a great debt, and we are grateful to you for all you have told us.

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE POLICY OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

By ADMIRAL SIR HOWARD KELLY, G.B.E., K.C.B.,
C.M.G., M.V.O.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 9, 1945, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—About two years ago I was walking down the Euston Road when I was astounded to see a big poster in red letters, which said: "Come to Euston Hall on Thursday night and hear Harry Pollitt tell you why we should immediately embark on a Second Front." That was about a year before we actually landed in Normandy. I suppose that is the biggest instance of muddled thinking that one has come across during the war. There are many criticisms on the actions of Turkey during the war, and perhaps they may claim second place. Because there has been such wrong thinking about the attitude of Turkey during the war we especially welcome Admiral Sir Howard Kelly to-day. He is going to tell us all about Turkey from inside knowledge. There is no need for me to refer to his very distinguished career in the Navy because that is so well known. But he was actually four years in Ankara as British Naval Representative.

THE last leaf of the history, both glorious and inglorious, of the Ottoman Empire was turned at the end of the last war, and the first leaf of the history of the Turkish Republic was commenced not long afterwards. In this sketch I propose to carry forward only one item from the old account to the new—the fact that Turkey was an ally of Germany in the last war, because this had a definite bearing on Turkish policy in World War No. 2. By their methods, with which we are now all too familiar, the Germans managed to inspire in the Turks both dislike and distrust, and were finally considered by them as a menace to their independence, so that any possibility of a renewal of that alliance was unthinkable, and when war became inevitable the Turks, following their inclination, were driven into the opposite camp, as isolation, they knew, was impossible.

The last war left no bitterness between Briton and Turk; they respected each other as fighting men; and Turkish memories dwelt more on Crimean days, and on Britain's constant policy of preserving the balance of power, which had so often helped them in the past, than on the Dardanelles and Palestine.

That war brought about the complete liquidation of the Turkish Empire, and it is an extraordinary thing that I have never met a Turk who regretted this. The Turks had always been smothered by minorities, from whom they had now become free, and the two great minorities in Turkey Proper—the Greeks and the Armenians—had been disposed of by a process of elimination, leaving Turkey to the Turks.

Whilst they were prepared to accept the loss of the empire, the Turks, then as now, held strong views on the integrity of the territory of Turkey proper, and the loss of the rich province of the Hatay, which under the treaty had been given to France with Syria, could only be put up with until they were strong enough to recover it by diplomacy or even by force

of arms. Happily, peaceful means prevailed, and this province and the important port of Iskanderun is again Turkish territory.

The history of the Turkish Republic was started by the most revolutionary revolution of all time. A normal revolution usually implies a change in the system of government through a national uprising, usually accompanied by violence. The Turkish revolution, without the aid of violence, not only completely changed everything in the system of government but also brought tremendous changes into the national and family life of every soul in the country.

The abolition of the Caliphate and of the Mohammedan religion as the state religion was considered necessary, owing to the retrograde influence of that religion, which Attaturk believed would have prevented the modernization of the country and its institutions which it was his intention to carry out.

The national dress was altered to the drab uniform of the Western world, which took so much colour out of the life of the country. Many items of this dress had been designed for the convenience of the Moslem worshipper—the fez, the loose trousers, the slipper, all were specially suitable for the genuflexions which are part of the Moslem rite. In the mosque of to-day the fez is replaced by the cloth cap of the West, worn with the peak at the back, the tight trousers must sometimes be a cause of anxiety, and the laced boot or shoe, at the door of the mosque, must on leaving be put on without the aid of a shoehorn.

The very language has been changed. For the change in the script every foreigner will offer up heartfelt thanks, and will wonder when other nations preserving the complication of a national script will be induced to follow this excellent example.

All words of Persian or Arabic origin are in process of elimination, which from the poetic point of view will be a distinct loss, but the phonetic system of pronunciation is very simple and effective, thanks to the increase in the number of letters obtained by the use of the cedilla below and the double dots above certain letters, giving them an entirely different value.

The emancipation of women has gone further than in most countries, from membership of the National Assembly to practically every other occupation; all are open to women, who certainly enjoy their freedom and still find time to pursue their more normal occupation of ensnaring the other sex.

The Sultans disapproved of powerful families, who might have formed foyers of rebellion, so family names were forbidden. Attaturk, wishing to foster the family spirit, in the home and in the nation, directed that every family was to choose a surname, which was then to come into common use.

Strangely enough, this is the reform that it has been most difficult to put into practice, and even now intimate friends may have difficulty in remembering the surname of those they have known for a lifetime. For foreigners at least, women are better known by their surnames than the men, who are still Ahmed Bey, Ismail Bey, and so on. This may bring a complication into the lives of those inclined to flirtations, who may find themselves unable to telephone to the object of their affections unless they

are sufficiently intimate with the husband to know him by his first name.

All titles and decorations have been abolished and only the silver-gilt medal of the revolution is worn by the most distinguished, and the titles of Pasha and Bey are no longer correctly used.

No revolution could have had a more unfavourable start. The British were at Constantinople and the Greeks strongly installed in the Smyrna area of Asia Minor, with an army with war experience and well equipped. They had been invited to go there by Mr. Lloyd George in order to prevent the Italians from taking possession of some of the territory promised to them before their entry into the war. The bad habit prevailed in those days of offering anybody anything that belonged to somebody else, provided they would side with us. This was done both by treaty and by propaganda, and when the war ended these promises, however unauthorised, came home to roost and caused us endless trouble.

We prevented the Greeks from advancing at a time when they would have met but little opposition, and when after the return of King Constantine, in spite of the fact that all the Greek commanders and officers who had war experience had been relieved by others long separated from the military career, the Greek Government decided that for political reasons the advance must be attempted, we stopped all supplies. The result was that the Greek army was defeated and the Greeks were driven out of Asia Minor, while the British were very glad to leave under the terms of the Treaty of Mudania, as we certainly did not want another war on our hands.

After the Treaty of Sèvres had been replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, much more favourable to the Turks, which had been negotiated on the Turkish side by the present President, Ismet İnönü, then Minister of Foreign Affairs under our old friend Raouf Orbay, lately Ambassador, as Prime Minister, the Turks were practically sent to Coventry by the Allied Powers; which at least gave them a chance to settle down and, free from outside interference, to establish the tremendous changes to which I have referred.

During this period of partial seclusion from European affairs, the Turks were naturally driven towards Russia, who was in a similar case. I happened to be at Geneva when Turkey and Russia were first invited to take once more their places in international affairs. The first step was to invite them to take part in the disarmament commission of the League of Nations, which they accepted, and sent Litvinoff as the principal Soviet delegate, and Rustu Arrass, afterwards Turkish Ambassador in London, as the Turkish delegate.

The results were not encouraging. No gestures of friendship were made and no fatted calf was slain. When either of these delegates had a proposal to make it was strongly supported by the other, and unanimously negatived by the whole of the remainder of the commission, and similarly, when one of the other Powers made a proposal the two dissentient votes were those of Turkey and Russia.

As conditions stabilized in Turkey so the sympathies of the outside world were gradually won, and in recognition of the valuable constructive work done by Attaturk, relations steadily improved.

One of the substantial signs of this lay in the signature of the Montreux Convention, governing the passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which restored to Turkey the guardianship of the straits.

Under these improved conditions Turkey was able to look to the future and to decide on her long-term foreign policy, which was to develop their old friendship with Great Britain, so long neglected, whilst continuing their amicable relations with the Soviets.

Turkish policy also strongly supported the idea of a Balkan Entente, which failed only through the opposition of Bulgaria. At the moment during the war when Roumania, under German pressure, was called on to relinquish to Bulgaria the whole of the Dobrouja as a reward for Bulgarian assistance to the Axis, the Turkish Prime Minister, Sarajoglu, told me that had Roumania been prepared to accept his suggestion to cede to Bulgaria half of the territory she had now lost, the Balkan Entente might well have been formed, and who knows what the effect might have been in the present war.

There is no doubt that the visit of King Edward VIII to Stamboul, where he made great friends with Attaturk, had much influence on the decision to form a definite alliance with Great Britain.

The Turks had hoped that this treaty would have been more comprehensive by the inclusion of Russia, as at the time we were making our unsuccessful efforts to come to an agreement with the latter in 1939, Sarajoglu, at that time Foreign Minister, was also sitting in Moscow hoping to sign a Russo-Turkish treaty.

We know that these efforts failed and were replaced by a Russo-German treaty, but, undaunted by this deplorable change in the political situation by which our value might have appeared to have deteriorated as an ally, the Turks were steadfast in their intention, and by their own free will signed the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty to our considerable benefit.

Through this treaty we derived advantage from Turkish influence in the Moslem world, and the menace of Turkey was probably a decisive influence in keeping Italy out of the war until it had apparently been won. Also, the Turkish army has been almost completely mobilized during the whole war, a potential threat that the German command have always had to bear in mind when disposing their forces.

This was a triple alliance, and when Italy entered the war and France dropped out (although such a contingency was provided for in the treaty), when asked to declare war on the Axis, the Turks never pleaded the altered circumstances of the loss of a powerful ally, and in their refusal confined themselves to the governing clause of the treaty, to the effect that they would do nothing to affect their good relations with their great neighbour Russia, at that time an ally of Germany.

It was at the moment of the outbreak of war with Italy and of the French armistice that I first arrived in Turkey; not a very cheerful moment, but neither then, nor in the worse moments that were to come, did I ever find any loss of faith in our ultimate success or any semblance of defeatism on the part of the exceptionally well-informed Turkish General Staff, with whom I was in close and constant contact.

Turkey was in a very difficult position; Russia had already reoccupied

Bessarabia, bringing her closer to the Turkish frontier, and by the spring of 1941 Bulgaria had gone over to the Axis, with their army mobilized on the Turkish frontier, and the invasion of the Balkans had started. At the time of the opening of the German attack on Russia, with some exceptions, in most of which German sympathies prevailed, the whole of Europe was a solid block in the hands of the Axis Powers. With the Rashid Ali rebellion in Iraq and the French aerodromes in Syria at the disposal of the Germans, things could hardly have looked blacker from their point of view, as, except on the side of the Caucasus, Turkey was isolated, and, with the Ægean Islands in the hands of the Axis, she was virtually blockaded.

In such circumstances it took some courage for Turkey to resist the bribes and threats of the Germans, who, failing an entry of Turkey into the war on their side, insisted that the right of transit of war material should be granted, even if that of military personnel was refused.

But Turkey stood firm, and it was Turkey, and not only the government, as under such menaces it was the will of the people that prevailed; and they were right, their fateful decision has been justified. The Iraqi rebellion was put down, Syria was occupied by the Allied forces, and under the protection of the bastion that Turkey was for our forces in the Middle East, we were able to carry out and eventually to bring to a successful conclusion our operations in North Africa, the indispensable foundation for our future victories.

This brought to an end the grandiose dream of the Axis Powers: of the advance through Turkey, Syria, Iraq, through the Persian oilfield to India, where they were to join hands with the Japanese after their advance through Burma.

When this situation had been relieved it was possible to consider the entry of Turkey into the war. During the critical period it was more advantageous for us to have a non-belligerent Turkey, until such moment as we might be in a position to supply her with the modern war material which she completely lacked, and to reinforce her in the air, in armour, and in artillery services, so that she could take her part in the operations.

For a country that had suffered as much as Turkey from continuous wars, it was not an attractive prospect to pass from a state of peace, in which they had been doing very well, to enter into all the horrors of modern war, but the Turks definitely accepted their obligations, and it was only on the question of when and how that the discussions finally broke down.

At the back of it all, to my mind, was the question what military action could Turkey take at the appropriate moment; as to pass beyond her frontiers she would have had to go through Bulgaria, who was still in a state of peace with Russia, and whom Germany had been trying to goad into action for years past. Transport was not available for the employment of Turkish troops in other theatres of war, nor was their system of training similar to that in practice in our forces.

Unless we were prepared to recapture the Ægean Islands as a first operation if Turkey came into the war, which at that time would not have been convenient, Smyrna and the Dardanelles would not have been

open to our ships, and with the bottle-neck of the single-line railway northwards from Adana, where all the lines of communication from the south by sea and by land concentrated, we should have had difficulties in supplying the military and civilian needs of Turkey alone, without the added complication of maintaining the British forces that would have been required in Turkey.

The Turks thus believed that without rendering any military service to the Allies by drawing off German troops from other operations, their three principal cities would have been destroyed by air attack, and all to no purpose.

Without actually entering the war at an earlier stage, Turkey has rendered us great service, far beyond the bounds of the most benevolent non-belligerency, and it is good to remember that every such action was immediately known to the German Embassy, who, in addition to lodging protests, also asked for some reciprocal benefit.

Perhaps Turkish resistance to these appeals was fortified by their knowledge of the fact that the Germans always treasured to the last a vain hope that after the war they might still have in Turkey, I will not say a friend, but at least an acquaintance, with whom they could trade and have relations, and for this reason their protests stopped short of being menaces.

The discussions with Turkey about her entry into the war broke down in February, 1944, over the question of supply, so the British Government decided that our war material and personnel could be more usefully employed in other theatres of war, and Turkey again fell into disfavour until our interests demanded a renewal of our contracts, when in that summer Turkey was asked to reduce the supplies of chrome to Germany. In reply to this request she cut off the whole supply, and soon afterwards, at our demand, broke off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany, though she would have preferred to declare war as more in accordance with her dignity, but for us this was more satisfactory as producing immediate results, whereas a declaration of war entailed a certain delay pending the receipt of essential war material. Shortly after, she broke off relations with Japan, to close down a source of leakage of information, and finally declared war on the Axis, a technical point, entitling her to take part in the proceedings of the San Francisco Conference; a very necessary one, as no settlement of the Balkan problem could be made without the active participation of Turkey, who also is particularly interested from the point of view of "bon voisinage" in the solution of all the difficulties of the Middle East.

So much for the past. What is to be Turkey's policy in the future?

Owing to the stability to be obtained under a one-party system, such as exists in Turkey, a forecast should not be difficult.

The Government have made it clear that friendship and co-operation with Great Britain is not a war-time measure; it is a long-term policy, and one that must be fully taken into consideration when deciding our future policy in the Middle East.

The Turks are devoid of territorial ambitions; they only wish to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the many difficulties of the post-war

period and to be allowed, in dignity and peace, to continue the work of social, democratic and industrial development which was the object of the revolution but temporarily suspended on account of the war.

The Turks are a proud race and will not accept any infringement of their territorial integrity. They probably realize that under the altered conditions that now exist, the Montreux Convention, governing the passage of the straits, will require amendment, but they also know that this was an international agreement and can only be altered by the contracting Powers.

The notification by the U.S.S.R. of their intention to replace the treaty with Turkey signed in 1925, by one more in keeping with the present situation has received a conciliatory reply from Turkey, and both parties will realize that our closest attention and warmest good wishes will follow their proceedings, with the hope that they may arrive at a decision that will be mutually satisfactory to our two friends and allies.

There are great opportunities for us to assist Turkey in the development of her industries and in the execution of the numerous public works which are to be carried out when circumstances permit.

The Turks are anxious for our help; the difficulty will be in arranging the manner of payment. Our interests in Turkish exports are limited and the present price of their commodities is high, owing to war-time competition; it is hoped that the important economic conference which has just come to an end may have been successful in facilitating future commerce between our two countries.

British financial circles also are anxious to know what security there would be for British capital employed in Turkey, and whether protection can be given against discriminative taxation. With goodwill on both sides good results will surely be obtained.

The Turks have always maintained that a strong and well-armed Turkey would be a valuable asset to us during the difficult period of post-war reconstruction; but please God there may be no further need of the armed might of any country once hostilities have ceased.

After the last war the former allies worked almost openly against each other; this time we shall want, and should cherish, every faithful friend we can find, if this second war to end war is not to be followed by a second peace to end peace.

Colonel NEWCOMBE: Sir Howard Kelly has filled in many gaps where I did not know the full story. The first one was how much Lloyd George assisted the Greeks in this, that and the other. But Sir Howard Kelly made a slight slip when he said that the Islamic religion was a hindrance to progress. I think Moslems would agree that Islamic law and Islamic conventions and the power of the Shaikh al Islam that have grown up since the religion started have been a hindrance to progress, but a great many would be offended if you said it was the religion of Islam itself. They are very definite on that point.

The LECTURER: The religious education, not the religion.

Colonel NEWCOMBE: I agree that is what made Attaturk take the action he did. It was hopeless for Turkey to come into this war so long

as the Germans had the Ægean Islands; until we got them out it was no use the Turks entering the war. It is a point many people miss when they criticize Turkey's action. I am extremely glad Sir Howard Kelly put so strong a case and explained it very clearly in its proper light. We must all understand that we have to be friends as a matter of mutual interest. To protect our strategic communications we have to act together.

General SHUTTLEWORTH: I have listened with very great interest. I was actually in Constantinople for five years during a period when relations were strained between ourselves and our friends the Turks. The Admiral has stated the position as he knew it so far as the Greeks were concerned. Twice I was sent from Constantinople to examine military conditions between Broussa and the forward areas from Eski Shehr to Afion-KaraHissar. I came to the conclusion that the Greek Army was not organized. There was a shortage of equipment. There was practically no gun ammunition for its pack artillery. The men were good, but the officers were politically divided. We who were serving in Turkey were of the opinion that the Greek Army was unfit to advance because it was inadequately trained and equipped and could neither supply nor feed itself. This report was sent home, and other soldiers were sent out to examine, who were not so convinced of this as we were.

In March, 1920, it had been my job, as a British Commander, to take over the Turkish War Office. We had to deploy considerable forces, but we used minimum force. It was my duty also to work for a time, as President of the Allied Committee of the Turkish War Office, with Marshal Fevzi, and gradually we came to a working understanding. I might say definitely that I realized that Marshal Fevzi intended to leave Constantinople. He left, and by going he strengthened the Kemalist position in Anatolia. As Admiral Sir Howard Kelly said, there were dissensions over Allied policy as applied to Greece and Turkey, but the British forces in Turkey tried to be impartial and do their job at a difficult time when feeling ran very high.

Colonel GIBSON: It is most interesting to have this opportunity unexpectedly offered of hearing Sir Howard Kelly. I would like to say, from my own rather professional point of view, that I had four years in Turkey during the present war, and I would like to endorse all that is said about consistency in Turkish policy and the help they gave us at all times. I think that consistency showed great moral courage. It is also to my mind a hopeful sign of a certain decentralization in the form of government in Turkey; because the people I dealt with were of the middle rank of civil servants and general staff, and yet they were not afraid to take decisions when these agreed with their own moral feeling, and that feeling tended towards the Allies.

Mr. GOAD: I was for some months in Konia during the armistice period after the last war. I went out in 1919 until January, 1920. Behind the Turkish lines everyone felt the Greek position was hopeless, and had the Turkish commander decided to attack he would have driven the Greeks out easily. We saw the training of the Turkish troops going on all the time behind the lines. We were powerless to stop it. Every morning, apparently, they went out to training, but came back very much

soiled, as if from months in the trenches! Actually, of course, they were relieving other contingents of troops who were in the line. Those troops were coming back for leave in Konia, so that in that way the Turkish Army was keeping a very much larger force in training than was suspected. We reported this time after time, but I do not think it was realized how serious was the peril the Greeks were in, because the force that Kemal could put into action if he desired was so much larger than appeared.

I would like to ask, What happened to the dervishes? One knows that the religious orders were dissolved; but I had friends among the Dancing Dervishes of Konia, and I have often wondered what happened to all those old fellows. There were a great many younger dervishes, who lived all round the city, and in Konia monastery there were a lot of older men. I should like to know what happened to those of the Chelebi and the other orders? Have you ever come across them?

The LECTURER: The question of the disappearance of enormous sects is a remarkable one in Turkey. It is not only the dervishes who have disappeared. You cannot find a sign of the old officials either. They seem to have disappeared off the face of the earth. I understood at the time that the old dervishes had settled down in the vicinity, and that the young ones had gone into trade and settled down peacefully into ordinary citizens.

I would like to make a further remark about General Shuttleworth and the last gentleman's statements. I am speaking of a period anterior to that to which they refer. I went to Greece in 1919, and was over in Smyrna then. General Pariskovopulos had a good army and lots of stuff. It was later on when the trouble started. The War Minister was Theotaki, afterwards murdered by the Greeks. For a short period he had been Minister of Marine. I used to go and see him every day, and begged him to stop. The Greeks had got to Eski Sehiz and got the two lines of railway. I said, "If you stay there you are all right; if you go on you will be done." The King had to give orders to go on, with the results we know. Their having no stores or anything was due to our having stopped their supplies.

Mr. WRIGHT: I have just returned after four years in Turkey, and it is excellent to find Sir Howard Kelly lecturing and putting Turkey's attitude during the war into the right perspective. I was appalled when I got back to find people so badly misunderstanding Turkey's position.

As to the dervishes, when I was in Mersin one of my friends was one of the Chelebi Dervish family of Konia. He is now settled in Mersin, where he runs a newspaper. His house is built in Seljuk style, and inside there are texts in Arabic script and other reminders of Konia. Some of the dervishes settled in Aleppo and other parts of Syria, I believe.

A small point I should like to make is that during my various travels in Turkey I found, almost without exception, that old soldiers, who during the last war had been prisoners in our hands, were enthusiastically anglophile—more so, perhaps, than any present-day pupil of the British Council!

I do not altogether agree with what Sir Howard has said about the

emancipation of Turkish women. It may be as he says in Ankara and Istanbul, but in Eastern Turkey old customs and habits prevail, and even to-day the schoolmistress is still regarded as rather a bad woman and someone to be avoided. My wife was the only woman to swim in the Black Sea at Trebizond, and she might have lost her reputation yet further if she had ventured to play tennis with me.

Mr. HERBERT: I would ask what is going to be the position of the Turkish students who in the years before the last war went to German universities as a matter of course? We shall try to vary that, but I was wondering whether the idea was taking hold—whether we shall induce Turkish youth to come to this country, or possibly France. Is there any possibility of their changing their venue?

The LECTURER: I think the Turkish students would be only too enchanted to come to Great Britain to pursue their studies. They would find a more sympathetic entourage. But they got their education in the university in Berlin for practically nothing at all, whereas in England there is the cost of living and fees to be paid. The same thing applies to the United States. They cannot pay the fees and the living expenses.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure you would wish me to thank Sir Hóward Kelly most sincerely for having put the Turkish case really in its proper perspective. If what he has told us is better understood in this country, then I am sure his dream of this country and Turkey working together for peace will come true.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN THE MIDDLE EAST

BY COMMANDER R. G. J. JACKSON

Being the Anniversary Lecture of the Royal Central Asian Society, given on July 11, 1945, the President (The Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.) in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Commander Jackson is here to speak to us on "Some Aspects of the War and its Aftermath in the Middle East," a subject which needs no commendation to you; nor, indeed, does Commander Jackson himself, if he demands a little introduction, require any commendation. From 1937-40 he was on the Naval Staff at Malta. From mid-1940 he worked with Lieut.-General Sir William Dobbie in connection with the historic defence of the Fortress of Malta, with particular reference to supplying the island.

At the end of 1941 Commander Jackson joined the staff of Mr. Lyttelton, Minister of State in the Middle East, and from 1942 until early in 1945 he was head of, and developed, the Middle East Supply Centre.

Early in 1945 he was appointed Senior Deputy Director-General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and in May of this year Governor Lehman asked him to return to London as his personal representative to take charge of U.N.R.R.A.'s office in Europe.

There you have an epitome of Commander Jackson's qualifications to lecture to us on this highly interesting theme, and those qualifications, I am sure, will be justified in the result.

COMMANDER R. G. JACKSON then said: Lord Hailey, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I speak with considerable reservation because, for one reason, there are many here who know more about the Middle East than I do. I emphasize at the outset that all I have to offer are the conclusions drawn by one individual from certain aspects of the war in the Middle East. There were many others concerned with these problems who were in the Middle East with me, and it is now a question whether we can put that experience together and make some use of it in the future.

I regret that I have prepared no notes from which to speak, but I make no apology, for the simple reason that the work connected with U.N.R.R.A. is now of critical importance in Europe, and for the last four months I have done nothing else but concentrate on that work. Also, my subject is such a wide one that I can only touch on some aspects which we in the Middle East thought about in particular and leave you to form your own judgment as to whether our conclusions were sound or not.

I am not an expert on the subject of supply; my experience really started in Malta when Italy came into the war. There we soon learned that in a fortress we could not separate those things which were essential for the Services and those which were necessary to keep the civil population alive. As we gathered experience of the Malta convoys we developed a system by which the whole fortress was maintained by a single supply line, and the requirements of the Services and of the population were handled as one. Sitting in Malta we sometimes had time to think, and many of us reflected that what had been done in the island could, possibly,

be applied in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Others in London had been thinking on those lines, and also some people in Cairo. Towards the end of 1941, when Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, who was then Minister of State, came to Malta, we talked of this matter, and he suggested that I should go to Cairo and spend three weeks making a summary of the situation. The three weeks extended into three and a half years, and I do not regret that experience. Speaking simply from the strategic point of view I say, without hesitation, that the plans which were developed then were right. If by any misfortune there were another major war in that part of the world I would, without hesitation, repeat what we did during this war, only more quickly.

Towards the end of 1941 supplies for the Western Desert were being shipped through the Red Sea and aid to Russia was being carried through the Persian Gulf. An essential problem for the Commander-in-Chief was to increase the supply of munitions in both those areas. First, consideration had been given to major development schemes in various ports and to increasing the capacity of our lines of communication, but a few then thought of applying an additional process and suggested that it would be well to consider how to obtain the maximum economic assistance from the Middle East itself in supporting the population there, and by cutting down civil imports free port capacity, and thus permit the import of those increased quantities of munitions which were so essential to our strategy. We therefore developed the Middle East Supply Centre with that primary object in view.

There has been much talk about regional planning and how M.E.S.C. was formed with a long-term view. As far as I am concerned that is not true. It was conceived purely for reasons of strategy, but in carrying out that work we learnt certain lessons which it seemed could be carried forward into the future.

With the object of making the Middle East as self-supporting as possible we operated in three broad fields: first, in the agricultural field, and you have heard from Dr. Keith Murray, who was out there with me as Director of Food and Agriculture, in detail on that subject. We concentrated mainly on increasing grain production as quickly as possible, because that had been the major single commodity imported not only into the Red Sea but also into the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, he has told you about the various grain collection schemes which we instituted and the lessons learned from those schemes in 1942 and which still hold good in 1945, though they can be quickly forgotten.

In parenthesis, after the attack was made through North Africa, we had discussions in Algiers, when we persuaded the Governments to maintain control of grain. At that time there was a surplus of about 500,000 tons in North Africa. By maintaining control and as a result of the lessons we had learned, that area was just fed in 1943. Recently those controls were removed, and present reports now indicate a deficiency of over 1,000,000 tons of grain. I instance that as the kind of lesson that had to be learned because it indicates the size of the problems with which we had to deal. When there are limited port capacities a single error can make all the difference in blocking the ports with large grain imports or

having a starving population. I would explain also that that particular condition is likely to apply in many of the liberated countries in Europe during the coming winter if we fail to profit by the lessons we have learned during the war.

We operated in the grain field and, thanks to the excellent collaboration of the Governments, success was achieved. Firstly, as I have said, we operated in the field of agriculture—getting the people to provide their own food. Secondly, we got on to industrial development. We did not achieve so much there because the Middle East is predominantly agricultural, but we eased the situation in regard to one critical commodity. The railways were run on coal; we converted them to oil, which resulted in a saving of 800,000 or 900,000 tons of coal a year coming into the Red Sea, which, in turn, meant another 800,000 or 900,000 tons of munitions available for the war in the Western Desert. And then, again with the collaboration of the Governments, in the third field we eliminated non-essential imports; again, I emphasize, with the very definite collaboration of the Governments themselves. We achieved striking success in that field, and I emphasize also that any success obtained was as a result of the British and Americans in M.E.S.C. working matters out with various Governments in which there were many nationalities. It was a common success. There was nothing particularly attributable to any one person or organization.

I sometimes look back over 1942, which was a bad year in some ways in the Western Desert until towards the end of that year, and reflect on our own small contribution towards that ultimate victory. The flow of civil imports through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf dropped by 82 per cent. during those twelve months in 1942. There is a beautiful graph (from my point of view!) of that work, because civilian imports dropped with a rush and military supplies rose most rapidly. There was an absolute peak of military imports during July-August, 1942, which provided the build-up before El Alamein.

I am convinced that we did achieve what we wanted in the strategic sense, thanks to the collaboration of many people of many nationalities.

As a fairly young man out in the Middle East, I was much impressed by the very good results achieved by the members of the various Governments with whom we dealt so long as we explained what we were trying to achieve. There was nothing very complicated in making an area self-supporting and saving shipping, so long as those concerned knew what we were driving at, and I was very impressed by their ability to carry out the job for us. It may be that we conceived the plan, but the execution was primarily in the hands of the Governments of the Middle East, and to them belongs a great deal of the success which was achieved.

There is the story. To me the lessons of it emerge in a variety of ways. We held many conferences during those two or three years with the various Governments in the Middle East, sometimes on agriculture, sometimes on transport, sometimes on finance and matters of that nature. Undoubtedly, those conferences played their small part in bringing the people of the area together, and I think assisted, rightly or wrongly, in creating the idea of the Middle East as an entity. Certainly those of us

who talked with some of the delegates to the Alexandria Conference in September, 1944, felt that was the case, and, for better or worse, there has been a great deal of thought given to treating the Middle East as a region. I have emphasized the lessons we learned in regard to the ability—certainly of Britishers and Americans, and I have no doubt of other nationalities—to work together with the people of the Middle East. That seems to me the key to the future. If we can carry on doing that it will be possible to get results; if we cannot carry on in that way, it seems to me we are in for a very difficult time indeed.

It seemed to us in the M.E.S.C., some time in late 1943 or early 1944, that, from a British point of view, it was most necessary that there should be some form of stocktaking of our position in the Middle East. It was the second time in twenty-five years that we had had to learn the lesson, and it seemed to some of the younger men amongst us who may have been thinking of a more distant future, that we would be well advised to try to clear our minds as to the policy of the British Government in the Middle East. We talked with a large number of people on that subject. I am conscious that most of this audience know much more about this than I, but I think all of us felt that it was necessary that there should be a realistic appreciation of the situation. There was much idealistic thought in regard to regional planning and things of that nature. They have their proper place, but as an individual I have never yet, certainly in travelling, found any country get very far away from the fundamental interest of its own security. It seemed to me, as soon as we, as Britishers, thought of the Middle East we could not deny our nationality, and that is why I draw attention to your warning at the beginning of this talk, Mr. President, because I now serve an international organization. I do not think the British have considered any important matter in the Middle East without weighing up its effect on their future security. It is necessary to be realistic in these matters. On the other hand, it is obvious that if there is to be security it cannot be achieved by one nation only. That means that British interests have to be balanced not only with the interests of the individual countries of the Middle East but with those of the other major powers concerned in that part of the world. With them it is essential to reach agreement.

The British interest, as most of us see it, stems back to strategic-requirements far more than to any commercial interest. Many Britishers consistently hoped that an assessment could be made of the minimum British needs in that part of the world, and from that it should be a major objective of British policy to achieve a clear understanding with the Governments of the other countries concerned, and see whether it is feasible to come to a realistic arrangement of the many interests involved.

Some of those who are associated with Chatham House may have seen papers which a group of us sent to the Commonwealth Meeting held in London in February of this year, in which we pointed out that there seemed to be three ways in which we could set about achieving that policy. One was by the old-fashioned British method of enforcing it. We thought that that was not a good policy to try and apply in the present world. The second was the rather negative form of approach, to come to a series

of agreements with other major powers concerned with the area and to ensure that all their interests were safeguarded. That seemed obviously to neglect the interests of the people who live in the Middle East, people whose well-being had become a primary consideration to many of us. The third alternative which we conceived, was the further development of the treaty system which has been used in Iraq and Egypt. Most of us came away from the Middle East hoping that it would be possible to perfect and develop that treaty system in the light of developments during the war and in the light of the greater knowledge we had gained by working with the people of the Middle East. It seemed to us that we should explain to them what we needed out there and then see how far that could be matched to their own requirements. It would have to be a case of give and take on both sides and a question of clear understanding. We put that forward as the most realistic line of approach. If that were done, it seemed that we could in our own way—and there are many other nationalities beside the British—make a very definite contribution towards assisting the countries of the Middle East in their future development.

That brings me back to a field about which I speak with more certainty. Whenever we were dealing with agricultural, medical or industrial matters, so long as we had a staff of first-class men at our disposal, we found their advice and guidance was readily accepted: and so long as we can provide first-class men in the Middle East I should say there is every likelihood of both the Governments and the people concerned accepting that advice.

If that line of approach were accepted by the British authorities, we then proceed to consider our experience of the organization which we used in the Middle East during the war. There were the normal arrangements with diplomatic missions in most of the countries: the High Commissioner in Palestine, Governors in Aden and Cyprus, and then, in addition, the Prime Minister, as you know, arranged for the appointment of a Minister of State as a member of the War Cabinet in 1941. We ourselves in the M.E.S.C. were able to carry out some of our work only because we had the weight of that authority behind us. It seemed to most of us that in the Middle East itself, in addition to the ordinary arrangements, some provision should be made for those subjects which are clearly common to the area as a whole, and if, as part of the policy to which I have referred, we were endeavouring actively to help those people, either in agricultural, cultural, social or health matters, then some form of overall co-ordinating machinery could be of definite advantage.

But much more important to us than anything which might have been developed in the Middle East was that we felt—and this is a subject which has been referred to in many periodicals and papers published in England—the necessity for a far more definite approach to the Middle East as an area by the Government in London. We all felt strongly the effect of the division whereby certain countries were dealt with by the Foreign Office, others by the India Office, and others by the Colonial Office. Whilst the subjects may have been dealt with perfectly efficiently

in an individual sense, we very strongly felt that in the Middle Eastern sense much more remained to be thought out and done.

There was a general feeling that action should be taken to establish in London one department in a particular Ministry, to deal with Middle Eastern affairs as a whole. If at that time there existed a reasonably clear-cut policy as to what the British Government desired to achieve in the Middle East—always realizing that those needs have to be weighed up with the needs of other countries—and if that policy could be communicated through the central department to the various British authorities in the Middle East, there was confidence that a more sensible and realistic handling of our affairs could be achieved and this in turn would certainly be to the benefit of those other countries who were affected by British policy.

I have not touched on any individual political problems. There are obvious reasons why I refrain from so doing. I now find myself with responsibilities to forty-four nations! Ten days ago I was talking in Maryland University answering a Mexican doctor as to what he felt should be Anglo-American policy in relation to Russia! I prefer at this time to omit reference to particular political problems, but those problems definitely affect any general approach in the Middle East, and must be carefully assessed in relation to British policy as a whole.

There are two points I wish to stress in closing. Firstly, that some form of stocktaking is essential. I left the Middle East five months ago, still far from satisfied that there was any clear-cut appreciation of those needs which are essential to British security, and not enough realistic thought had been given as to how those needs could be matched up against the requirements of the countries of the Middle East who were equally interested in their sovereignty and their security. It seems to me that there is a vast field of work to be covered there, and it is going to need some very realistic as opposed to idealistic thinking. We must be certain what those British needs are, and how they can be matched up with the needs of other countries. Secondly, let there be a clear-cut organization to execute that policy. I was not satisfied that our organization was as efficient as it could be.

Now I come back to the final factor. Without taking this factor into consideration it is meaningless to know what the British want and how they are going to achieve it. That is, the factor of the men who are going to serve in the Middle East in the future. It seems to me that the problem which we have in Europe to-day, where we are concerned with another variety of countries, is exactly the same as the problem in the Middle East. If you have the quality of men with the necessary experience, with the proper understanding, they can overcome a great number of inefficiencies which may exist both in policy and in organization. I believe all of us came away from the Middle East with a very strong admiration for the Sudan Civil Service and the job which is being done in the Sudan, admiration for the men who were trained there and who had then gone into other senior appointments in the Middle East. We all came away with the feeling that either special arrangements should be made with the development of an Arab Centre for training not only

British officers but other British people who are going to serve out there, or that the Sudan Civil Service should be developed to a sufficient extent to enable it to provide the quality and quantity of men needed for key appointments in the Middle East.

Those men, to us, seemed to fall into two clear-cut categories: (1) those required only for British appointments and (2) those required as advisers to Governments. The question of advisers to Governments is one which I found of much interest, not only in Iraq where we had British men, or in Persia where there were Americans, but I have been interested in American advisers in South America. If advice is to be given and we are to provide advisers, then it is a question of the quality of the men, the training of the men, and, I should add, their security of employment. Only by providing such men will you find a means of achieving an effective policy in the various countries of the Middle East.

To end this talk. It seems to me—and again I have no doubt many of you know more about this than I do—that if you are married you either stay married or you divorce. Divorce seems to me to be an exceedingly negative approach to life. We do want to be quite certain that we do not forget the Middle East, that those of us who are back here in London or based over in Washington, as I am, do not get drawn away to other considerations, either in the Pacific or in Europe, and say: “Oh, it will be all right; we got away with it in the Second World War, we got away with it in the first; it will work out all right again if anything goes wrong in the future.” I do not believe it will. I am certain, in relation to our relative strength in the world to-day, that the best way in which we can hold that position is by the quality of our moral leadership as a nation and empire. I am equally certain we will hold that position by a precise knowledge of what we need in the various parts of the world; by our ability to organize ourselves as a commonwealth; finally, by the quality of the men we use as our representatives in the widest sense. I do, therefore, think we should realize that, whether for better or for worse, the countries in the Middle East have during the war learnt a great deal of the methods of Europe, and in that learning, it seems to me, what they have learnt can either be turned to the mutual advantage of both those countries and ourselves, like a good marriage, or, if the Middle East is neglected and there is a divorce, then I do not think it is by any means too far-fetched to recall the history of Japan. In 1867 the Japanese first started to learn about European methods. To-day, only a few decades afterwards, the methods of Europe have been absorbed in a most unfortunate manner and we are fighting the people of Japan.

It seems to me the essential thing in the Middle East is to make certain what we need, to match those needs with the requirements of the other countries concerned, and then provide men of the right calibre who can carry out our policy for us.

The PRESIDENT asked Commander Jackson whether he could foresee the possibility of maintaining after the war an organization which would carry on the work which had been discharged by the Middle East Supply Centre during the war. Its work had been of great value in many fields,

but would it be feasible to carry on this work in the post-war period, in view of the fact that the interests of a variety of independent political units were concerned?

Commander R. G. JACKSON: There are two separate fields—the approach from our side and the approach from the Middle Eastern countries themselves. I would not like to express myself on the political side to any extent, because that will always have to be resolved in London in the light of relationships with other nations. In the technical field we found no difficulty whatever in dealing with common problems. We, however, felt, when the international organization for food and agriculture was set up at Hot Springs in America, that we, too, had been working on the same lines in the Middle East. We had the idea of setting up a Middle Eastern Council of Agriculture, which would have formed a common platform for the kind of agricultural problems which had to be dealt with during the war. I say frankly that I believe we lost the initiative in that at an early stage because of the absence of any definite policy in London, and in any case the Middle Eastern people themselves in the Arab Conference at Alexandria laid out the pattern of that organization which they feel can be followed in the Arab League. Thus the idea of a Middle East Council of Agriculture, initiated by us, has passed to the people in the Middle East. But in the statement on the Middle Eastern organization and the M.E.S.C. I was thinking, largely, in the technical fields, where we dealt with matters, such as locust control, which took us all over the place, control of health and certainly cultural activities also. I cannot see the political organization resolved anywhere except in London. I do not know what would be the position of the British Government if the Arab League came into full effect and was based as a single authority at any one point in the Middle East. That might call for the setting up of a comparable British organization.

Mr. BUSTANI: I speak as an Arab from Lebanon, and should like to say that I was glad to hear the lecturer stress the importance of the Middle East. It is wise that, even while she has other problems on hand, Britain should think of the Middle East as one of the important problems which has to be solved. The lecturer compared the Middle East to Japan, but I should like to point out that there is a difference. When Japan adopted modern methods she always had a hostile attitude towards the West. The Arabs of the Middle East, as represented in the Arab League, do not take that attitude. The charter on paper does not convey the real spirit of the people of the various States constituting the Arab League. They are at present eager not only to adapt modern European methods, but to trade there on a first-class basis with European concerns. If any effort is to be made in London to solve the problem of the Arab Middle East without conferring with the representatives of the Arab League, without taking into account their point of view, which, quite frankly, is highly national but not nationalist to the point of saying "Away with the West," as Japan was saying all the time; rather seeking co-operation with the West, especially with Britain—if there is an effort in London to solve the problems of the Arabs in the Middle East without first conferring with the people themselves, I am sure it will not lead to

wholesome results. While stressing the importance of the point made by the lecturer as to the two great nations of the Middle East and Britain coming together, I would say that during this war Britain has lost a great deal of her past and future trade with the Dominions and other parts of the world. The Middle East offers a very good market, and the people of the Middle East at this present stage are very eager to deal with Britain, provided certain basic principles are taken into consideration, particularly recognition of the national feeling for complete independence, and, at the same time, recognition of the fact that we seek help, not to be dominated but to co-operate with the West, and especially with Great Britain. If this is kept in mind while the set-up in Britain is prepared, I am sure both we in the Middle East and you here will reach very satisfactory conclusions which will lead to peace in the Middle East and help to promote the peace of the world in the future.

Mr. LOGGIN: Commander Jackson told us of the arrangements made for securing some sort of ordered economy in war conditions and the reasons for it. One can see clearly that there would be great advantages in such an organization functioning in times of peace. I should like to ask how economy is to be ordered amongst a number of different countries in different states of dependence, some entirely independent. Those of us who during this war have been responsible for advising completely independent Governments as to their dealings with the M.E.S.C. have always had one reply to give when asked, "Why cannot we buy what we want? Why cannot we sell what we want?" Our answer has always been: "You will do so because you must; it is no good your placing orders in America or trying to sell anything to America or to England, because you have no access to shipping except through the good offices of the M.E.S.C." In fact, that was the one weapon we had with which to persuade these independent Governments to accept the dicta of the Middle East Supply Centre.

Commander Jackson will remember that there was a great deal of argument about leakage of shipping space due to the dhow traffic of India. I believe it is true to say that that was very difficult to control, especially when registered in Egyptian ports. When there is no control over shipping space, how would a post-war successor to M.E.S.C. implement an ordered economy?

Commander JACKSON: As to that, I recall my reference to the fact that there had been some idealistic thinking in regard to regional planning and expressed my reservations on that subject. I do not believe in any watertight economy in the Middle East. You can take the Middle East during the war as a nice separate strategic area. As soon as transportation over Europe and India is opened up that economy will fall back into the ordinary channels through which it has flowed for centuries. That is bound to occur. But I think most of us at the Centre in 1943-44, as we gradually removed controls, especially at the beginning of 1944, came back to the feeling that the field in which we could operate most effectively was the purely technical one. I offer no way of enforcing that except by the quality of the men provided to do the job. I may have the wrong view on this, but the Middle East in this war compared to the last has

come through, probably, a little better; there was not the starvation, there was greater stability and a far more secure base, so far as my reading of history goes. I believe that a number of people here have the idea, and many in the Middle East also, that because there has been a VE Day in Europe the worst period is over. Personally, I feel that the most difficult period of all is before us. I do not pretend to offer solutions for next winter in Europe, but those who study the available food in the world—and the ration in England is one example—and the existing transportation situation will realize that we are by no means out of the difficulties we have had to face during these past years. If the Middle East wishes to avoid some of those difficulties it may be necessary to revert to certain of the controls and consider the manner in which they may be applied. If the factor of shipping is removed, there may still remain the factor of insufficient food and transportation in the Middle Eastern countries, so that the independent and individual Governments will have to work out their own systems of control for themselves. I believe that in those fields they will need advice from the Western world, as a short-term policy, if they are going to avoid starvation. As to the long-term job, I do not think there is any means of enforcing it, apart from the quality of the men on the spot. I have been discussing with the Americans their experience in South America, and it seems to me that if you do not have some form of adviser system it is difficult to predict whether the lessons taught in Europe by the war can, in fact, be passed to the countries of the Middle East.

I was exceedingly interested in the remarks by the speaker from Lebanon because I have discussed the matter both with people in Syria and the Lebanon, and again I come back to the question of marriage. For a change, a girl may ask you to marry her; if you keep on refusing her, her affections may go somewhere else.

I admit I am prejudiced in favour of the Middle East. When I refer to the British and moral leadership, I feel that we have a definite contribution to make not only in the Middle East but in other countries of the world, if we can be certain what we are endeavouring to achieve and if we put the right men into those countries to carry out our policy. If we fail to do that, and send out men with the wrong ideas, I am certain that we shall see in the Middle East a definite reversal of the present attitude towards British prestige. That may mean divorce after an unhappy marriage, and at best the girl will seek another suitor.

Mrs. GREGORY: I have been in the East, and would like to know how Commander Jackson proposes to make it possible to get men to go out to the Sudan Civil Service for training as advisers and technical experts.

Commander JACKSON: To my knowledge the Sudan Civil Service has produced a fairly impressive record, and there is no reason why that state of affairs should not continue so long as the conditions of service are made reasonable. I referred to the question of the security of those advisers, and I spoke of the British, but in doing so I did not mean only the English, Scotch and Irish. Australians, New Zealanders, Indians and South Africans have all fought and served in other ways in that part of the world. I have talked with many of the men of the 8th Army, and I

believe, if we are prepared to take care with recruitment and training, there is a good field from which we could draw our future representatives. But the men must feel that they are entering a good service and one in which they will find reasonable security and salaries. The one thing the men want is security of employment. They certainly have an affection for the countries of the Middle East and are willing to serve in them. The Sudan Civil Service is a very good service which could be expanded to take men such as these and then second them for service in whatever part of the Middle East their services may be required.

In thanking Commander Jackson for his address, the PRESIDENT said that it had illustrated with great clarity some of the outstanding problems of the Middle East. The Society had heard lately from Mr. Keith Murray of the detailed problems which had been encountered on the supply side; Commander Jackson had surveyed on a broad front some of the major issues which had to be faced—issues of importance not only to Great Britain but to the world. The Middle East was not only a focal point of great strategic importance; it possessed great political importance, because the problems which arose in that field were likely to be—and indeed had already been—a cause of friction in the international world. The situation in Palestine, the direction taken by the growing nationalism of Egypt, the destiny of Syria and Lebanon, the future of the Arab Federation—these were typical of the kind of issues to which he referred. They did not concern Great Britain alone; they might prove to be the concern of the dynamic centres at Moscow and Washington as well as of London; nevertheless, it is incumbent on us to take, if we can, a leading position in all Mid-Eastern questions.

But there are other problems, arising in the social and economic field rather than in that of political relations, and they are not less important, because in the long run the political stability of the Middle East can only be attained by an adjustment of its social and economic conditions. There are problems of primary production, complicated by the character of local land tenures; the problems of health and education are immense, and all the more formidable because the resources of many of these countries are small.

What contribution can we ourselves make here? Commander Jackson had referred to the provision of advisers. Everyone would agree with him that we must find men of competence and personality for such posts; but it is also clear that the authority they can command and their capacity for good work will depend on our political relations and the good-will these can inspire. There is an increasing spirit of nationalism among the peoples of the Middle East; it will need great care and patience on our part to see that this does not become a source of friction or mutual irritation, and thus injure the prospect of our being able to make a contribution which will not only be a credit to us but of real benefit to the ordered progress of the peoples of the Middle East.

ANNUAL MEETING

THE Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting was held at the Royal Society's Hall on July 11, the President, the Right Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., in the Chair.

PRESENTATION OF THE LAWRENCE OF ARABIA MEMORIAL MEDAL FOR 1939

In presenting the medal to Mrs. Ingrams, the President recalled that the medal was instituted as a memorial to T. E. Lawrence, and its purpose was to recognize work of outstanding merit for the British Empire and of distinction in exploration, research or letters. Such service must have been rendered by members of the British Empire within the area covered by the activities of the Royal Central Asian Society.

The award for 1939 was made to Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Ingrams jointly.

In 1934, Mr. Ingrams undertook the first of a series of important explorations in regions of the Hadhramaut that were previously unvisited by Europeans. These journeys, in which Mrs. Ingrams participated, were attended with considerable risk, and their value, not only to geographical knowledge, but also to the administration of that area, was attested by Sir Bernard Reilly, who was at that time British Resident and Commander-in-Chief at Aden.

As a result of personal friendships made during this reconnaissance, if it may be so called, Mr. Ingrams, with the help of his wife, accomplished without bloodshed the notable achievement of persuading the war-like inhabitants of the Hadhramaut to abandon their blood-feuds and their banditry and to seal a treaty of peace. There has been no achievement of pacification on a comparable scale by any other frontier officer in recent years. As a result of the establishment of law and order in this area the development of the country since 1937 has been remarkable; agriculture, trade and commerce, education and medical work have greatly advanced. Mr. Ingrams was British Resident Adviser at Mukalla in Southern Arabia from 1937 to 1940, when he became Acting Governor of Aden. He was Chief Secretary to the Government of Aden from 1940 to 1942, and then returned to the Eastern Aden Protectorate as Resident Adviser and British Agent. He and his wife returned to England on leave a few months ago, and this was the first opportunity that had occurred to present them with the Lawrence Medal. He now had great pleasure on behalf of the Society in presenting the medal to Mrs. Ingrams.

Mrs. W. H. INGRAMS: First, I should like to thank Lord Hailey for all the kind remarks he has made about us both. Anything I can say will be quite inadequate to describe how grateful we are for the great honour of receiving this medal. We not only look upon it as a great honour but also as a great encouragement. My husband, unfortunately, had to fly to Germany this morning, but he asked me to offer you his sincere regret

for not being here in person; regret which I fully share, because he would have been able to thank you so very much better and more adequately than I can. I would also like to add an expression of our appreciation and gratitude for all the kindness and encouragement we always received from the late Sir Percy Sykes. I thank you very much.

The President said that it would be unfitting if he did not avail himself of the occasion to endorse on his own behalf and on that of the Society the eloquent tribute paid to the memory of Sir Percy Sykes by Sir John Shea at the last meeting of the Society. The forthcoming issue of the Journal would contain an expression of the sentiments which all alike must feel regarding the loss which the Society had suffered. He himself would only add here that it must mourn the death of one who had added distinction to the Society by his scholarship and earned by his personality both the respect and affection of its members.

As for the events of the past year, a year so momentous in our history, the President felt that he was justified in saying that the crowded and anxious times through which we had passed had not prevented the Society from continuing to fulfil the objects for which it existed. But these events had also been such as to add fresh significance to the work of the Society. The regions in which its primary concern lay had become of growing importance in the international sphere. The future of their peoples must create an important problem in the settlement of a new world order, and an institution which was devoted to a study of their conditions and interests must have a special position of its own. He hoped that there would be an increasing recognition of this fact, shown in an enlarged membership, which would enable the Society not merely to continue but to enlarge the scope of its activities and of the facilities for study and interchange of views which it could offer.

The CHAIRMAN then called on Colonel S. F. Newcombe to read the Honorary Secretary's report.

Colonel S. F. NEWCOMBE: I have to report that the Society at present numbers 1,672 members. At the beginning of 1945, some 120 of these members were out of touch with the Society, owing either to their being in German-occupied Europe, or prisoners of war, or on foreign service. Some 6 of these, however, have already returned and taken up membership again since VE Day, and we hope that in due course and at the end of the war in the Far East all will come back. There has been an increase of 28 members during the year, due to the election of 111 new members, and the resignation of 57, whilst the Council deeply regrets the death of 26 members. Four members were killed in action, and amongst distinguished members of the Society who died this year were Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, who was one of the six senior members of the Society and had been Honorary Secretary for thirteen years, and who had always taken a warm interest in the Society and done all he could to further its work and enlist new members; others were Sir Eric Teichman an Honorary Vice-President, Air-Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Sir Verney Lovett, Sir George Macartney, Air-Marshal Sir William Mitchell, and Sir Charles Bell.

Sir Charles Bell, who was formerly a member of the Council, has bequeathed part of his library on Tibet and the sum of £500 to the Society.

A number of younger men have joined as members, and the Council welcomes applications for membership from those returning from countries in which the Society is concerned, and hopes that they will thus keep up their interest; similarly we welcome as members those beginning their services in those countries as administrators, soldiers, or in business.

Miss Kennedy retired in January, 1945, and from a fund subscribed by members she was presented in March with a cheque for £800, and with a further cheque for £110 subsequently.

The Society, through its Council, has kept in touch with the American Circle, the Scarborough Committee, the British Council, and various bodies connected with Middle East countries. The number of societies, etc., interested in these areas has grown, and, though their functions do not overlap, they tend to widen the number of people involved.

Twenty-seven lectures were held during the year. The Persia Lecture was given by the Right Rev. W. Thompson, Bishop in Persia.

The Library is being refilled with some of the books and records sent out of London in 1939 for safety. Though the most valuable were destroyed, including the Society's only complete sets of the Journal, which went back to 1901, we are indebted to members for a number of accessions during the war, including some bound numbers of the Journal, for which we are particularly grateful. The membership subscription has never been more than just sufficient to cover the current expenses of the Society, so that the existence of the Library is entirely due to the generosity of members, past and present.

The Journal is now published three times yearly, owing to paper restrictions, and it has been difficult to supply any copies beyond those sent to members. It is hoped that there may be an increase in the paper quota within the next few months, which will enable us not only to accept subscriptions to the Journal from overseas universities and libraries, but also to use a gift from Mr. W. W. Astor to cover the cost of sending fifty free copies of the Journal to Naval, Military, Air Force, and other centres in the East, where we have had several indications that it would be very welcome.

The CHAIRMAN called on Lieut.-General Martin to read the Honorary Treasurer's report on behalf of Major E. Ainger, who was unavoidably absent.

The HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT: The accounts for the year ended December, 1944, are before you. The Income and Expenditure account shows a fall in subscriptions which has been offset by a rise in the amount received in repayment on the Society's Income Tax Repayment claim. There has been an increase in our expenditure on printing and on salaries—the figures for which will probably both show a considerable further rise next year.

When I spoke to you last year I said that the Council considered that your staff must be adequately paid; arrangements have now been made for increased payments under this head, and we are also arranging for

a pension fund to be established under a Trust Deed. In consequence, though we can again show an excess of Income over Expenditure, I am not certain that as good results will be shown next year. I would, therefore, again stress the help which the Society has received from the signature of covenants, and would appeal to all of you—but particularly to new members—to help us in this way if they can do so.

Turning to the Balance Sheet, our Capital Funds now amount to approximately £725, as compared with £685 last year; the Entrance Fee Account has increased from £293 to about £335. Against this we hold investments to the value of £615 at cost price. Following our usual practice, as our financial position allowed of its being done, certain of our surplus funds are being invested so as to bring these two items into closer balance. I would point out that the capital value of the Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund is insufficient to provide for the cost of the medal from the income of the fund and that the balance has to be made up from the Society's current account. It is, in my opinion, desirable that the capital value of this fund should be increased to, say, £250, so that it may become self-supporting.

The Chairman of the Council has told you of the legacy which has been left to us by the late Sir Charles Bell. This will help to strengthen our financial position and will allow us to view the future with greater confidence.

On the motion of Lieut.-General H. Martin, seconded by Mr. O. White, the accounts for 1944 (as shown at the end of this section) were then approved.

ELECTION OF HONORARY OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1945-46

The nominations made by the Council for Honorary Officers and Council for the next year had been circulated to all members.

General Sir John Shea was re-elected as Chairman for the ensuing session.

The Hon. W. W. Astor, M.P., and General Sir Robert Haining, K.C.B., D.S.O., were elected as Vice-Presidents in the place of the Right Hon. Sir Robert Clive, P.C., G.C.M.G., and Sir John Pratt, K.B.E., C.M.G., who retired in accordance with Rule 16.

Major Edward Ainger was re-elected as Honorary Treasurer.

In May the Council had appointed Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes to be an Honorary Vice-President of the Society in recognition of his great services. It is regretted that he did not live to take up this office.

There was thus a vacancy for the election of an Honorary Secretary. The Council recommended that in future there should be three Honorary Secretaries instead of two, to represent the Society's activities in the Near and Middle East, in Central Asia, and in the Far East. Colonel Newcombe would continue to represent the Society's interest in the Near and Middle East, and on the nomination of the Council, Lieut.-General H. Martin and Sir John Pratt were elected as Honorary Secretaries for Central Asia and the Far East.

On the retirement of Colonel J. K. Tod as Honorary Librarian, Colonel F. M. Bailey was elected.

Four members of the Council were retiring: the Hon. W. W. Astor, General Sir Robert Haining, and Mr. Oswald White under Rule 25, of whom Mr. White was eligible for re-election; Mr. Peter Hume had retired on being given an appointment in the Far East, and Lieut.-General H. Martin was becoming an Honorary Secretary. On the recommendation of the Council, the following members were elected to fill the five vacancies so caused: Mr. Nevill Barbour; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, G.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., lately H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad; Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., late British Naval Representative in Turkey; Major-General Sir Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B., formerly Director of Demobilization and Reconstruction, G.H.Q., India; and Mr. Oswald White.

General Sir JOHN SHEA: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to propose a hearty vote of thanks to yourself for having so kindly presided at this lecture and for having presided at the Annual General Meeting. I would also like to thank you, Sir, on behalf of the Council of the Society, for your interest in our work and for all the help which you give to us.

The vote was passed with acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you all.

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 8, CLARGES STREET, W. 1.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1944.

EXPENDITURE.								INCOME.								
				1943												
				£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.							
				£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.							
<i>Office Expenses:</i>																
Salaries and National Insurance	417	12	4	1,559			By Subscriptions received	1,525	18	8
Rent	230	0	0	89			„ Journal Subscriptions and Sales	84	9	0
Lighting and heating	32	7	3	18			„ Interest Received (less tax)	17	17	8
Telephone	12	12	0	7			„ Deposit Interest	8	5	4
Stationery and printing	47	4	3	129			„ Income Tax Repayment claim	221	14	0
Postage	83	8	1	0			„ Dinner Club (Contributions to expenses)	0	0	0
Office cleaning	42	15	6	2			„ Sundry Receipts	0	0	0
Audit fee	5	5	0										
Insurance	6	16	5										
Bank charges	7	10	7										
Repairs	8	18	3										
Sundries	27	8	3										
							921	17	11							
<i>Journal:</i>																
Printing	492	3	11										
Postage	34	2	3										
Reporting	64	9	6										
							590	15	8							
Lectures													
Library													
Legal and Professional Expenses													
Balance (being Excess of Income over Expenditure for the year, carried to Balance Sheet)													
							147	19	10							
							£1,858	4	8					£1,858	4	8
							£1,804							£1,804		

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 8, CLARGES STREET, W. 1.

BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1944.

		LIABILITIES.						1943		ASSETS.					
		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
3															
	<i>Creditors</i>				337	16	9	13	<i>Cash:</i>						
	<i>Capital Funds:</i>							15	At Bank on Current Account	18	4	8			
	Life Subscription Fund	196	0	0				8	On Deposit: Post Office Savings Bank	322	15	11			
	Entrance Fee Account	334	3	0					Petty Cash in Hand	16	2	9			
	Legacy Account	100	0	0									357	3	4
	Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund	96	11	0				193	<i>Sundry Debtors and payments in advance (including Income Tax Repayment claims receivable)</i>				251	2	0
					726	14	0		<i>Investments (at cost):</i>						
	<i>Income and Expenditure Account:</i>								£100 3½ per cent. War Loan	100	0	0			
	Balance, January 1, 1944	58	10	9					£434 11s. 3d. 2½ per cent. Consolidated Stock	337	6	3			
	Add: Surplus for year to date	147	19	10					£173 9s. 6d. 3½ per cent. Conversion Stock	175	9	9			
					206	10	7	613					612	16	0
								100	<i>Society Premises Account:</i>						
									Balance as per last Account				100	0	0
					£1,321	1	4	£942					£1,321	1	4

PERSIA FUND.

		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.			£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
	<i>Accumulated Fund:</i>								<i>Investment:</i>						
	Balance, January 1, 1944	372	5	9					£467 8s. 3d. 3½ per cent. Conversion Loan				331	17	3
	Add: Investment Income	8	3	8					at cost						
	Deposit Interest	1	0	7					<i>Cash:</i>						
					381	10	0		On deposit with Halifax Building Society				56	8	9
	Less: Persia Fund Lecture and copy of "Iraq"		6	16	0										
					374	14	0								
	<i>Sundry Creditors</i>				13	12	0								
					£388	6	0						£388	6	0

AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above balance sheet, and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and as own by the books of the Society.

251-252, DASHWOOD HOUSE,
 OLD BROAD STREET, E.C. 2.
 May 8, 1945.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.
 (Chartered Accountants).

THE WINGATE EXPEDITIONS, 1943-1944

By COLONEL BERNARD FERGUSSON, D.S.O.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 18, 1945, Lieut.-General H. Martin, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the meeting, said: It is with the greatest pleasure that I introduce Colonel Bernard Fergusson, who took part in the Wingate Expeditions of 1943 and 1944; indeed, he played a leading part in both those wonderful adventures; in the first as a Column Commander, and in the second commanding a Brigade.

COLONEL BERNARD FERGUSSON: I am very much aware that this lecture should have been given by General Wingate himself, he being a Lawrence medallist of this Society as well as holding many other honours. Had he been here to give the lecture it would have been an unforgettable experience for everybody, because his gifts of rhetoric and of writing matched his gifts as a soldier. All I have to say to you, with regard to the two expeditions with which General Wingate's name will always be associated, can be taken as a tribute to him. He not only led the expeditions, but also planned and devised the very nature of them—an experience which falls to few leaders in war.

The principle upon which the Wingate expeditions of 1943 and 1944 were based was exceedingly simple: the principle that a small body of troops at the heart of the enemy's communication system could do damage to, and have an effect upon, the enemy's war effort out of all proportion to the number of troops so engaged. Not a very profound principle, but one which had not previously been applied in this war to the extent to which General Wingate applied it. He persuaded the authorities to exploit that principle and to give him an army, so to speak, with which to carry it out.

Man-power was exceedingly short in India in 1942 when the then General Wavell first sent for the then Brigadier Wingate to come and organize the long-range penetration columns in Burma; but he was furnished with a brigade, got together not without difficulty. It consisted of one British battalion, of which the average age of the men was thirty-two—a battalion raised in England and sent out to India for garrison duties and not for any dramatic expedition; a Gurkha battalion, of which the average age was as low as that of the British troops was high—the men looked about fifteen, but no doubt they were a little older; and, lastly, the only battalion of the Burma Rifles in India. These had come out of Burma in 1942 during the evacuation with a not very high reputation. They had been trained for a war other than that which they fought; but I think that all those who have soldiered with them since, when they were employed on duties more congenial to them, duties for which they were really fitted, would say, as General Wingate said in his report, that one could never ask to command finer troops than the Burma Rifles. They were regular soldiers, mostly Karens recruited from the Delta areas of

Burma, with some Kachins and Chins. They were absolutely magnificent. The original expedition consisted of seven columns in all—four basically Gurkha, three basically British; and each column had a certain proportion of the Burma Rifles attached for propaganda and intelligence duties, to engage guides, provide rice and other foodstuffs locally, and so on. They were our eyes and our ears; without them I doubt whether the expedition could have progressed very far.

General Wingate planned, not to take in his expedition as an unsupported venture, but as an integral part of the offensive; the idea being that, while the regular army fought the Japanese in the normal way, the long-range penetration troops would slip past the enemy's defences, get well behind his lines to the centre of his communications and his dump system, and there play havoc. Such an offensive was planned for January and February, 1943. The then 4th Corps was to move across the Chindwin into the enemy country. Wingate's force of one brigade, or seven columns, was to go in about a month ahead and prepare the way by disrupting the enemy's organization 200 miles in his rear. Unfortunately, for many reasons, that offensive could not be staged, and General Wavell actually flew up to Imphal to call off Wingate's subsidiary operation. The latter managed to persuade the authorities, not without difficulty, that the men were all keyed up to go in, and if once they were ever allowed to go off the boil, as it were, they could never return to the same pitch of enthusiasm. So General Wavell allowed Brigadier Wingate to take in his men: firstly, to gain information with regard to the situation in Upper Burma; secondly, to disrupt communications and induce the Japanese to pay attention to their rear; and, lastly, in order to give Wingate the opportunity to prove to his many critics, and the even larger number of sceptics, that such operations were in fact feasible.

I will not go into that first operation in detail. Suffice it to say that the columns slipped across the Chindwin about the middle of February, 1943. They were supplied wholly from the air, a means of supply resorted to in the past only as an emergency measure in New Guinea and at Bir Hakim. This was the first occasion on which an expedition counted exclusively on air supply, because at that time there was no other possible means. Those columns went in in various directions. Two were sent across the Chindwin, primarily to decoy the Japanese away from the part of the Upper Chindwin where the main body was going to cross; this main body consisted of five columns. About a fortnight's travelling brought it to the main railway from Mandalay to Myitkyina, the line which through the upper part of its length runs through high mountains which press closely upon it. The actual point that the columns reached upon the railway was some miles south of Indaw.

While five columns were engaged in distracting the enemy's attention, two were sent on ahead to blow up the railway, which they did in about seventy places over a stretch of about ten miles, varying from small culverts to fair-sized bridges, and including at one place a gorge which crowded in upon the railway and was brought down on to the lines.


The Japanese surmised, as General Wingate forecast that they would, that, having destroyed the railway, the whole force would withdraw to

India; so the Japanese directed all their efforts to erecting a barrier between the railway and India, which suited the expedition very well, because it was in fact going to cross the Irrawaddy. This it managed to do. Two columns out of the five which were provided for diversion did get into trouble, were more or less beaten up, and had to withdraw to India. They managed to get out the greater part of their men, but lost a good deal of equipment and some of the animals. These columns had, in any case, discharged their primary function. The other five columns had crossed the Irrawaddy more or less intact. One or two had a rough time during their crossing. Major Calvert, as he was then, was caught in the very act of crossing; he had many of his men on a sandbank in the middle of the river, and all but thirty of his mules and other animals were still on the western side. He got the rest of his animals across (including an elephant to which he had become attached, having stolen it from the Japanese *en route*). He succeeded in fighting the Japanese off for a day, completed his crossing at night with his thirty animals, and when he eventually returned to India he wrote a paper advocating thirty as the ideal number! Brigadier Calvert is a man who always makes the most out of any misfortune that comes his way.

It was now towards the end of March, and the climate was exceedingly hot. The men were suffering from malnutrition and from failure of supplies, due not to any technical breakdown of the aircraft or lack of effort on the part of the crews, but because the Japanese were exceedingly thick on the ground, and more and more of our supply drops were becoming interrupted. The amount of food available for the men was, therefore, greatly reduced. The climate was playing havoc with them, and at the end of March Brigadier Wingate was ordered to return to India. At that time, of the five columns which had crossed the Irrawaddy, two were within twenty miles of each other in the south, and three, including brigade headquarters, were concentrated in a loop of the Irrawaddy and Shweli rivers. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the columns in the loop had to remain there for some little time, and the Japanese brought up what we believe to have been the greater part of two divisions. They spread those divisions round the banks of the river; and as the Irrawaddy is over a mile and the Shweli river about 700 yards wide, the rivers were a considerable obstacle to cross, especially with the Japanese on the wrong side. The two or three rubber boats which each column had were insufficient to enable the columns to cross. An effort was made to cross back at the point at which General Wingate and two columns had crossed the Irrawaddy a few days previously, in the hope that the Japanese would not suspect a backward move so soon after the Irrawaddy had been crossed. That effort proved only partially successful. Only two platoons got across, and the Japanese realized that the rest were in the pocket. General Wingate came to the conclusion that he could not get his force out as a complete force, that the only alternative was to divide it into small groups of about a hundred or fifty each and attempt the crossing, breaking out of the circle of rivers over a wide area in the hope that the Japanese would not be able to intercept them all. That hope was more or less realized, and although those units had a difficult time (especially

those which had the misfortune to lose their wireless sets and therefore received no more supplies dropped from the air) the greater proportion of the expedition ultimately reached India. Sixty-five per cent. of the whole expedition finally got across the Chindwin or came out of Burma by some other route.

Therein lay some of the fruits of the expedition; because, while some columns came directly westward, others came out up the Hukawng valley,



where General Stilwell's Chinese-American forces were stationed up north. More passed out at Fort Hertz, the last shred of British territory in Burma where there was a small landing ground. One set of men walked right out, 600 miles, into China. As they were walking miserably along, towards the end of June, not knowing where they were getting to, they unexpectedly met an American Air Force officer, complete with aerodrome, where probably nobody but Marco Polo had ever previously been. He asked: "Do you guys come from India?" "Yes," they replied.

“Do you want to go back there? If so, would you like to go back before lunch or after lunch?” As they had been walking for some five months, they did go back to India, I think “after” lunch! The fact that those men had come out by taking such a wide half-circle was of enormous value, because they brought back to India information as to what the Japanese were doing, the conditions under which the inhabitants were labouring, the communications which the Japanese had made, the probable reactions of the Japanese to any new threat from India, and a host of information of that nature. As a result of that march we were provided also with increased topographical knowledge of the whole area, which had hitherto been little known.

That was the 1943 expedition, from which the lessons learnt were numerous but not of general interest. But the expedition did capture the imagination of the public to a certain extent, particularly so of the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, and President Roosevelt, with the result that General Wingate was enabled to raise a very superior force for operations the following year. That force comprised a considerable number of first-class troops. The British battalion in the year 1943, with its high age average and other unsuitabilities, had acquitted itself exceedingly well, but the troops furnished for the 1944 expedition were of a very high quality. The three British brigades had seen service in the Western Desert, in Crete, in Tobruk, in Syria; some had been in Somaliland and many in the Palestine revolt. Other troops were of similar calibre. There were Gurkhas, West Africans, Burmans, and British; it was a mixed collection and a happy family.

In addition, we were given that dream of the soldier which is so seldom fulfilled: a private air force, consisting of a squadron of bombers, a squadron of fighters, and four squadrons of light planes; the latter added by President Roosevelt himself, because he was much haunted by the fate of those who were so unfortunate as to be wounded and left behind in the 1943 expedition. In 1943, if anybody was sick or wounded but still able to walk he came out, but if wounded and unable to help himself in any way he had to be left. That was not good for morale; indeed, it was a most miserable business for all concerned. It put a grievous responsibility on the shoulders of commanders. Personally, I was somewhat sceptical at first about the light aircraft, but they really did a most wonderful job. They were manned by American pilots of a very high calibre, and they used to land on the little strips we made for them on the paddy fields, take off in 280 yards, and carry out with them two or three wounded men. So well was their task performed that I do not believe, out of my whole brigade, I lost more than ten or fifteen men in 1944 who would not have been lost on an ordinary campaign. The performance of those American light plane pilots is deserving of the highest admiration.

The bomber and fighter crews did equally good work, and as a result of having a private air force we were enabled to carry out all sorts of experiments which are normally much harder. The speed with which the offensive support came in to us from India was fantastic. One of my columns calling for support on the Indaw lake received it within fifty

minutes from fighter aircraft in South Assam, without briefing. Those familiar with the process of briefing will realize that this is a considerable achievement.

Altogether, in 1944 we went into Burma a much better equipped force and not half so ragamuffin. Most of the force was flown in, some in gliders, some in Dakotas, two complete brigades carried in gliders being put down either at "Broadway" or at "Chowringhee," remote spots on either side of the Irrawaddy which the Japanese were hardly likely to find. In one instance they did reach the spot, only to find artillery, and they withdrew hastily. One unfortunate brigade—it was my own—walked in from General Stilwell's area over some considerable mountains running up to more than 6,000 feet, and I had the satisfaction on one occasion of giving my position for the night as "three miles south of the Y in un-surveyed." (The map shows a great blank space there with the word "un-surveyed" written across it.) It was the worst track I ever saw animals go over, the gradient being sometimes 1 in 1. We seemed to carry the loads of the mules as often as they carried them themselves. At one stage we had covered only 35 miles in nine days, which was not at all encouraging; and one began to wonder which campaign one was aiming to take part in. After five weeks we got down to the Chindwin, and, as a marked contrast to the scramble across the river in 1943, we crossed in 1944, like gentlemen, in motor-boats flown in to us in gliders and landed on the sandbanks in the middle of the river; and even before the gliders were emptied, some of the motor-boats were chugging their way across the river: as one of my men said, it was "a Blackpool benefit." At any rate, it was a wonderful performance, and there was no waste; we put the motor-boats and the engines and engineers back into the gliders, the aircraft came along, took them off the sandbank, and flew them back to India. There was nothing for the salvage people, even if they could have got to the spot.

A bridgehead was formed by flying in troops in light planes, landed on sandbanks in the river. Booby traps were laid on the track leading to Singkaling Hkamti, the nearest Japanese garrison, about ten miles downstream. We became very casual in the use of light aircraft; indeed, they were used as though they were jeeps or taxis. We thought no more of hopping into them and going for a trip round than of getting on to a bicycle. The number of wounded carried out was very great. Incidentally, lightning cures were sometimes effected. I remember two men of the Queen's who were very sick; they were lifted carefully into a light plane, which took off, hit a tree, and fell to the ground. The two Queen's men got out hastily, apparently completely cured.

The plan for 1944 was that the airborne troops were to land in the Indaw area and seize the positions on the main line from Mandalay to Myitkyina. My brigade, coming in from north of Indaw, had to join up and to seize the two airfields at Indaw. General Wingate maintained, and rightly, that Indaw was the key to Upper Burma. The railway and the road which the Japanese have built along it run through high hills, which are populated on either side by the Kachins, who are 100 per cent. loyal to the British and have been fighting the Japs for three years, un-

supported. South of Indaw there is a large number of roads and communications rotating in all directions. North of Indaw there is wild, little-known country. It was thought that if we could capture Indaw we should dominate all the places which its supply dumps supported. There were two fronts. The 4th Corps faced the Japs on the Chindwin. The 18th Japanese Division faced General Stilwell. This 18th Division was supported by the railway and the road which ran beside it. To these there was only one very poor alternative, which was already blocked with two or three columns who were attacking it twice a day. It was hoped that, with the seizure of Indaw and the completion of blocks on the railway, the Myitkyina garrison would certainly starve, and, possibly, the Chindwin garrison also. One mixed British and Gurkha brigade brushed two Japanese companies off a position on the railway 20 miles north of Indaw, and set up there a place called the "White City" (so called from the number of parachutes hanging on the trees). It was actually a block on the railway which comprised five low knolls, making a half-moon parallel to the railway line, which ran on a bank about 80 feet high, with one stream running through the half-moon of hills. In that solitary position, sometimes two and sometimes three battalions lived for eight weeks. They were sometimes invested by the Japanese; they were often subjected to mortar and artillery fire; but when they were not invested they were able to go for a run. Indeed, they were just thinking of starting up a local pack of hounds in the neighbourhood which they dominated, when they were invested again; their own supplies were dropped on, and their wounded evacuated from, the little strip of land between the railway and the hill, the strip being less than 300 yards long and 40 feet wide. However noisy the outside world might be as you flew over the Japanese lines, when once you got down to the ground you were defiladed by the embankment on the one side and the hills on the other. I have lost count of how many times the Japanese tried to push that brigade out of that particular position. It is an interesting commentary on the Japanese mentality when you consider how they tried to turn them out: they brought up battalion after battalion, which always attacked from the same direction at the same time of night with the same amount of preparation; there was never any variety. The result was always the same, except on one occasion when they did get in; but they did not get out again, and eight Japanese officers committed suicide in a row. That was the only time they ever penetrated the perimeter. Whenever there was a breathing space the garrison was changed. This fortress was honeycombed with passages and dug-outs, and never looked like falling. Eventually, however, the Japanese gave up their efforts to carry it and left their 18th Division to their own devices. That division eventually starved.

I could tell many stories about the "White City" block. The one which amused me most was connected with a Nigerian Askari who was suddenly confronted with a Japanese officer. The Nigerian had been in the army for many years; he was a sergeant; but he forgot all he had been taught when he saw the Jap. He grounded arms, picked up a great metal grenade box, hit the Japanese officer on the head with it, telescoped him completely, picked up his rifle and stood at ease. On one occasion,

also, some Nigerians under my command ate a supply of blood plasma, spreading it on biscuits!

In the middle of May the weather in Burma becomes very bad, and it became no longer possible to fly the sick and wounded out. In addition, the Japanese had forced a crossing of the Chindwin and were now menacing the Imphal-Kohima-Dimapur area. It was therefore decided that the original plan to move in troops across the Chindwin, to exploit the situation created by the Chindit forces in Central and Upper Burma, must be abandoned for the time being, because every available formation had to be employed in pushing the Japanese out of the Imphal plain area. It was a disappointing decision so far as I was concerned, because I had succeeded, after one failure, in capturing one of the airfields at Indaw. Nevertheless, we had to move north, because the forces which were to have been flown in from India to our aid at Indaw were no longer available. It was, therefore, decided to move the force northward in order to help General Stilwell. It was considered that we could do more good by helping General Stilwell get to his objective, Myitkyina-Mogaung. So from about the beginning of May onwards, the long-range penetration brigades in Burma were routed north, except for my own, which was brought out by air. We had to abandon the strongholds we had set up in the hills and the friendly areas around Indaw, from which we had been maintaining our effort. These strongholds consisted of air-strips about 1,200 yards long; much food and equipment had been flown in in gliders; they included medical centres for the use of the local people; they were a centre of intelligence and propaganda for the local inhabitants as much as they were designed for our own support. I even had strongholds about 30 miles north of Indaw in a valley running into the Chin Hills. There we started the "Aberdeen" and District Co-operative Society, Ltd., from which we sold to the locals garments and luxuries of various sorts flown in from India. We had told them that the British Government was back and had taken them under its protection once again. It was, therefore, sad to have to go north and leave all that, and our friends in those valleys, to the possible revenge of the Japanese. It was one of those things that have to happen in all wars; but our regret was all the keener because we had been so certain that this time we were there to stay and not, as in 1943, just raiders. We all withdrew to the north. As a result of the operations during the next two months, General Stilwell was able to get on to the Myitkyina-Mogaung line, and eventually there was made possible the spectacular advance of the 36th British Division right down the railway almost into Mandalay during the last cold weather. The conditions under which the troops operated from the end of May until August—that is, during the Chindit operations—were really bad.

A great deal of mischief has been done owing to a misplaced desire to give credit to troops of the 14th Army and those of the Far East by exaggerating the frightfulness of jungle conditions. This is a great disservice. Conditions in the jungle are by no means bad, and decently trained troops can make themselves extraordinarily comfortable. In the monsoon, of course, conditions are at their very worst; it does rain all the time; the weather is hot and steamy; also very unhealthy; and there is a great deal

of malaria, no matter what precautions are taken; typhus is prevalent, together with other diseases, jungle sores and that type of injury; and troops which start fresh and in good condition at the beginning of the monsoon look very shoddy at the end of the season. Certainly by the time the troops came out in August they were pretty down; but I would emphasize that, with training and imagination, one can keep very fit in the jungle, provided one is allowed to observe a rest period in the middle of the day and take it easy when possible. Harm can be done by overworking troops for too long a period on end. By looking after yourself and the men properly (Japanese permitting) it is possible to keep fit and quite cheerful.

The facts that most of our Chindit soldiers would like emphasized are: first, the tremendous debt they owe to the light plane pilots and crews who came in and took out our wounded, who otherwise would have had to be left behind; secondly, most of us are worried by the lack of credit given to the natives of Burma. Those who came out of Burma in 1942 did so under conditions which were not likely to endear the Burmans to them. I know from my own experience that when being chased one does tend to feel that everybody's hand is against one. The help we have had from the inhabitants of Burma in the last two years of operations has been tremendous. Without their help we could not possibly have got in or out again, or stayed in, or done any good while we were in the country. By no means all of them are prepared to run their necks into a noose for the sake of the British, though many are; but I think it may be said that the whole of the inhabitants of Burma, with the exception of a very few who are on the Japanese pay-roll, have been praying for two years for the day when we get back. The Jap is a cruel master. In Burma, however little the really rural inhabitants understand what has been going on in the country, they do know that the benevolent rulers whose rule they enjoyed for some decades have disappeared, and with them all the luxuries of life. The people cannot get sugar, salt, clothing, or any of the things that make life tolerable to them. They have had to live on rice and more rice after that, and nothing with which to sweeten or salt it. The people do connect that with the entry of the Japanese and the disappearance of the British. Furthermore, the Japanese have levied from the inhabitants a tremendous contribution of their young men for forced labour on roads and railways, at ludicrous rates of pay, if any. The Japanese have taken away all the cattle used for meat and those with which the Burmans used to plough their fields. Therefore, there will soon be a rice shortage. The Japanese have a shocking record of brutality, summary execution without reason, and so on. So there is little to be surprised at in the help we have received from the Burmans, the Kachins and the Chins and Shans who live around Indaw and farther north; they have been 100 per cent. pro-British. I have yet to hear of Kachins turning fifth columnists. They do not like the Chinese, but for us there is no limit to what they will do. The most dramatic proof of that to my own recollection was when, with a party of thirty men, I lay hidden by the Kachins from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. in a bamboo clump 400 yards from a village. I happened to be buying rice when a superior number of

Japanese came into the village. We were in poor condition and had with us a number of sick and wounded, all very weak. The Kachins put us out of the village and hid us in the bamboo clump, keeping us there all day, while they lied cheerfully to the Japanese. There was not a whisper about us being there. We lay smoking and eating cold rice until the Japanese moved off. If word of our presence had been given the Japanese would have rewarded them and the whole community would have benefited immensely. Our friends the Karens have contributed a large number of troops and they are first-class people. The Chins I do not know so well; I believe their record is equally good. The Burmese themselves and the Shans, though not very warlike, have helped us, looked after our wounded, and have given us information. We shall always be grateful to them. There has been much muddled thinking in regard to the attitude of the Burman to the British.

I should like to conclude by endeavouring to give some idea of a day in the life of a member of a long-range penetration column. The column was about 400 strong with about 60 mules. We woke up as soon as it was light, or a little before, and saddled up our own packs, which weighed 70 lb., about half one's own weight—very heavy and more than a mule carries in proportion to its weight. We moved as soon as it was light enough to see, so as to get as much as possible of the march over before the hot part of the day. We halted each hour for a quarter of an hour, and at every second halt the loads were taken off the mules. At the end of two hours we stopped to have a cup of tea and a light snack. Then on again until about 11.30 a.m., by which time we had been marching for about five hours, and did not like it. We settled down for the midday halt, the pleasantest part of the day; we wirelessly to our betters and juniors; had a bath or a wash; perhaps a shave, depending on one's views on that subject. We read and had a really good meal. Those three or four hours in the middle of the day by some stream were very pleasant. About 3.30 p.m. we saddled up again and put in another three hours' march before settling down for the night. By choosing carefully a good, secure bivouac, it was possible to reduce the number of sentries to a minimum and give as many men as possible a good night's sleep. When that routine continues for four months on end it becomes tedious and it is hard to get the men really rested. To ensure that the troops will be fresh and fit when they fight, the time to choose for a battle is after a good night's rest and a hearty breakfast. But we found that our battles always broke out just before the evening bivouac, and thus they were apt to be discouraging! At any rate, life had its compensations, and mail was most welcome, dropped from the air by parachute, though sometimes it went wrong and the Japanese got a complete mail of ours; on one occasion some Burmese had it. I received letters from home more quickly in Burma than they ever came to me since I went abroad, and, what is more, I think my family wrote to me more frequently.

Summing up the achievements of the expeditions of 1943 and 1944, one can say that the first expedition achieved little that was tangible, but it did show that there was a future for this form of operation and that when you can afford the men you will receive a good dividend often from

comparatively few troops—a dividend out of all proportion to their numbers. Secondly, we learned a great deal of jungle fighting, movement and topography. In 1944 the achievement was, again, rather abortive; because, unfortunately, owing to the Japanese not co-operating with our plan and fighting the 4th Corps across the Chindwin, and India being short of men at the time, we were unable to exploit the situation which General Wingate had created, although the time was ripe for the seizure of those areas north of Myitkyina and a throttle-hold on Mogaung. However, we do claim to have helped General Stilwell considerably. Of the 18th Japanese Division hardly a man escaped, apart from its divisional commander. We also like to claim that much of the pick-up, as one might call it, in 1945 has been left over from 1944. Although our achievement may not be material or tangible, we have learned a great deal; and it is up to us, who have had the experience, to try to exploit it and think out how it can be applied in the future.

I end, as I began, with a word about General Wingate. It happened that he was to make his name in this particular form of warfare, and it is a form of warfare with which his name will always be linked. But we who were with him, and who had the honour to be his lieutenants over a period of time, feel most strongly, and would like all to know, that it was only chance that he made his name in that particular form of warfare. We feel that he had a contribution to make to any type of warfare which he might have followed. Quite apart from the technicalities of long-range penetration, to him must go a great deal of credit for the development of supply-dropping aircraft. They received an advertisement from the first expedition in 1943 which led directly to their development. Without supply-dropping aircraft, as Sir John Baldwin said on this platform a fortnight ago, the war in the Far East would be very different from what it is. Also, General Wingate was the man who devised and used a method, about which I cannot now say much, of bringing supporting aircraft on to their targets in support of infantry. In many other fields, some big and some small, he was a real pioneer. I feel that, to some extent, his memorial, and that of the officers and men who died with him, many of whose graves are not and never will be known, must be in the continued success of the armies in that field. I am told that General Leese a few weeks ago, in a message to the Long-Range Penetration Force, said that they had shown the 14th Army the way. That may well be true; and, in view of the tremendous achievements of the 14th Army, we feel that to be the most gratifying memorial possible to the many officers and men in the Chindit force who lost their lives or their liberty in these two campaigns.

Group-Captain SMALLWOOD: We have, I am sure, all listened with interest to and been thrilled by this informative address by Colonel Fergusson, and I was extremely gratified to hear him pay tribute to the work done by the Air Force. At the same time, I sound a note of warning. I hope that as a result of the success of what he termed a "private air force" he does not want to put the Royal Air Force under the Army in the future. It is an old bone of contention as to whether the Army should

have its own air force or not. While that has proved most successful in this particular instance, I trust it will not be the text for a proposal to put the whole of the Royal Air Force under the Army.

I was intensely interested by what Colonel Fergusson said about the Burman people, largely because I know the Christian Karens very well in that area near the Pegu Yomas. I look upon them as the finest men with whom I have had anything to do. They are Christian, and, although I am not pro-missionary, it seems to me that in this particular case, when the missionaries came upon a field in which there were people with practically no religion, they gave them the Christian religion. They really are most magnificent people. I had a hunter, and one day I was out after buffalo in Burma. The particular animal turned on its tracks and charged my hunter from behind, putting a horn through his chest. We had to carry the man for something like ten days back into civilization. Probably 99 men out of every 100 would have died, but he, with his tough jungle upbringing, came through and was entirely restored to health. People of that toughness of fibre should make fine soldiers. The description Colonel Fergusson has given of the natives is amply warranted. The Kachins are fine fellows; one might describe them as the Gurkhas of Burma.

Could Colonel Fergusson tell us what has happened to those stout-hearted fellows with him, the Kachins and the Karens in the Burma Rifles?

Colonel FERGUSSON: I would like to assure Group-Captain Smallwood that I have no designs whatever on the sovereignty of the Royal Air Force. It was a great advantage to be able to make experiments owing to having the same group operating with us day after day, and I would like to pay tribute to the 31 Squadron and to the 117 Squadron of the R.A.F., whose devotion in dropping supplies and equipment to us was something we shall never forget.

As to the Burma Riflemen, most of them, I regret to say, are still operating. The average Burma Rifleman has marched between 4,000 and 5,000 operational miles. They came out of Burma in 1942, went back in 1943, came out again in 1943 and went in again in 1944, came out in 1944 and went in again. When it is realized that some of the men have passed within a few miles of their villages and still come out, one has some measure of their devotion to our cause.

Captain Lezum Tan, a Kachin officer, who passed within two miles of his village, found his wife and daughter had died; he saw his two sons, whom he had summoned to the next village to meet him, sent them back home and carried on to India. Rifleman Pawai La spent a night in his village, and had his pack on ready to come with us the next morning before he told me it was his village. I gave him three months' leave.

The Karens, of course, have been unable to get back to their homes. H.E. the Governor of Burma, who was in London recently and knows their worth and their work, is, I know, thinking out how they can best be rewarded and honoured for their contribution to the war effort in Burma. Most of the Kachins have had leave home. I do not know how they enjoyed it; probably not very much, for they had to walk there and back.

Air-Marshal Sir R. BROOKE-POPHAM: I would like to congratulate the

audience on their good judgment in coming here this afternoon to hear what has been a perfectly fascinating and extremely interesting talk; I will not call it a lecture because it was far too interesting.

I would like to ask Colonel Fergusson how the troops found their way. I gather that maps of the country are not particularly good. How far did the troops rely upon maps, how far upon guides, and how far did they just go due east until they came to some place?

Colonel FERGUSSON: I always compare finding one's way in such a country to a small boat sailing in a thick fog by compass. It is not possible to rely on any human habitation marked on a map, or indeed on anything human. The Burman moves his village every twenty years or so, and the tracks move when the village moves. It is not possible to rely on any man-made thing for navigation. One has to depend on contour lines or on features which are so large as to be quite unmistakable, and steer happily for four or five days until arriving at one of those unmistakable features or until one finds oneself suddenly there. It is exactly similar to sea or air navigation and, consequently, guides are invaluable. The difficulty is that they are liable to fall into enemy hands, and not only suffer for having helped you but also they may disclose your intentions and direction. Often we used to keep our guides until we had a body of them trailing along behind us. We kept them until we were safely out of their areas, and then we released them. Finding the way in Burma demands a very high standard of map-reading, and, fortunately, that was quite high with us, even down to junior N.C.O.s. In the provision of guides the Burma Rifles were excellent; they would go into the villages in plain clothes and find us a guide in no time.

The CHAIRMAN: I feel sure I am speaking for all present when I tell the lecturer how enormously we have appreciated his inspiring and extraordinarily interesting lecture. We thank him very much indeed.



(B) DASHI SAMPILON.



(A) RADNA AND NIMA SAMPILON.



(A) SHILON K. HURLATT.



(B) DALAI AND DASHIPILON (see Part II)

MONGOL DELEGATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1925-1929

By SERGE M. WOLFF

Introductory Note: At the conclusion of his scholarly sketch of Mongolian literature the great Orientalist Berthold Laufer wrote in 1907: "The importance of the Mongols in the history of the world is so great that everything concerned with the intellectual life of a people which could once make Europe tremble and which drew her kings and popes into its orbit must interest us keenly."* Our knowledge of Mongol culture has grown substantially in the intervening years, but few travellers have had the privilege of studying it at first hand, especially near its original source, in Outer Mongolia, and many riddles remain unsolved. This fact is my excuse for giving a somewhat detailed account of the Mongolian Trade Delegation and Educational Mission, which functioned in Germany and France from 1925 to 1929, and for which I acted as interpreter and secretary. In this capacity I met and learned to know well several outstanding personalities, who have played a great rôle in the history of modern Mongolia. The two missions moreover largely succeeded in carrying out the tasks assigned to them, and the results, in the industrial and educational field, will no doubt one day be traced. For most of my statements I can rely on various records in my possession, and although the recollection of minor incidents and chronological sequence are bound to be affected by the passage of time, the whole period of work with my Mongol friends has remained very fresh in my memory.†

IN the second half of December, 1925, two Asiatic-looking gentlemen called on me in Berlin in connection with what they described as "a business matter." They did not look Chinese, although they had slanting eyes and their cheek-bones were high and prominent. One was tall, with an intelligent and pleasant face; he spoke perfect Russian, with only a trace of an accent. The other was very small and did not know Russian, but had a good working knowledge of English. Neither could speak German. The tall one, obviously the leader of the two, addressed me, stating that they were Chinese merchants on a business mission in Germany and that they needed a trustworthy assistant. They would require my time for only part of the day.

The prospect of part-time work suited me well, because it enabled me to continue my studies at the university. My visitor warned me, however, that from time to time it would be necessary to accompany them to Hamburg, where they had extensive business connections. He also told me that they had a secretary at the moment, but that he was not satisfied with him and, having discovered that the secretary had accepted a bribe, wished to dispense with his services. Since this man was apparently in poor circumstances and dependent on what he was now earning, his employer explained that he was not sure whether he would have enough moral

* "Skizze der Mongolischen Literatur," *Revue Orientale*, 1907, p. 261.

† My lecture on "A New Republic" to the Longfellow Club, an English debating society in Berlin, on March 7, 1928, benefited by information given by Ichi-Dorji, representative of the Mongol Ministry of Education, and it was published in an abridged form in the *Contemporary Review* (1929, vol. 135, p. 362), and in full under the title "Die Volksrepublik der Mongolei" in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (1928, vol. 5, pt. 9, pp. 755-769).

courage to dismiss him. Nevertheless, if I was willing to try the post, I should call next day at three o'clock. I was offered 150 marks per month for work from about 9 a.m. to 2 p.m., and the visitor told me that I must refuse any bribes which might be offered to me, because otherwise I would share the fate of my predecessor! I agreed to call as suggested, and asked how they had come across my name, but to this I received only an evasive reply.

Next day I went to the address they had given me, which turned out to be that of a private flat in western Berlin. Here the older of the two men, his wife and small daughter occupied three rooms. A German arrived soon after I did and I was asked to translate what he said into Russian and English and the replies back into German. The German was an official of the so-called Akotech (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Auslands- und Kolonialtechnik*), a Government organization designed to assist foreign Governments which intended to engage German technicians or specialists in their choice of men, so that "no unworthy people should discredit Germany's name"; it probably served also for economic penetration and espionage. There was a long discussion about a contract and the employment of a mining engineer for work in what was obviously a Far Eastern country, but it was not yet clear to me which country it was. I was asked to stay for tea, however, and informed that I could commence my employment as from that day, if I wished to do so. I accepted the post, and was instructed to return in the afternoon of the following day.

My new chief then told me that his name was Sampilon (see Plate I, B), but that he had become accustomed to being called Ivan Ivanovich while he was in Russia (his Mongolian personal name, as I later learned, was Dashi). He was a graduate of the Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy, and one could see in his eyes alone that he was an alert, shrewd and intelligent man. His expression was pleasant. Although he had characteristically prominent cheek-bones, the colour of his skin was Northern European rather than "Asiatic," even if browned as if by sunburn.

Sampilon told me that he and his colleague were leaving for Paris on business the same evening, to return only after Christmas, and that his wife and child were accompanying him. My employment was regarded as having begun, however, and as my first assignment I was asked to translate from Russian into German an article of his on sheep-breeding in Mongolia, published in some Russian agricultural journal, and also an estimate from a German firm for the complete equipment for a brick factory with a capacity of 10,000 bricks per day. The estimate had also to be translated into English for the benefit of his colleague.

At the same time I was introduced to Sampilon's wife Radna, and met their small daughter Nima (see Plate I, A), a bright and charming creature aged about two and a half, who looked like an Eastern doll and spoke a little broken German. I was surprised to find that his wife knew my Christian name and patronymic, as I did not remember having mentioned them; it was in any case evident that they had discussed me in detail.

When we were leaving for the station, Sampilon gave me two sheets of headed stationery and asked me to write next day to the Dresdner

Bank, giving them some instructions, and also to the post office, requesting that his correspondence should be re-addressed to him for the next fortnight. Both sheets of paper were blank except for his signature. I looked at the printed heading and read: "Handelsdelegation der Mongolei" (The Trade Delegation of Mongolia).

I knew very little then about either the political or the economic position of Mongolia, about the culture or character of the people, or about the work I might expect. But I did ask my new chief how he found it possible to leave with me, a stranger, a signed sheet of paper with the letter-heading of the delegation, only to receive the reply that this was his concern. On his return from Paris, however, he began to tell me a great deal about Mongolia, and also, several weeks later, of how he had come across my name.

Sampilon explained that he had needed someone who was fluent in German, Russian and English, but preferably not a German. Therefore a Russian emigré who, like myself, was not engaged in any political activity, was suitable for his purpose. He had asked the manager of a Czechoslovak-Russian bookshop, who was a friend of mine, to suggest someone, and was given my name. He did not, however, approach me for some time. My friend happened to meet Sampilon again in a Berlin store and he was sure that Sampilon must have overheard the remark that he was the Mongol to whom I had been recommended; but there was still no immediate effect. A further period elapsed before Sampilon called at my house.

These preliminaries to my employment and the circumstances in which I started work are of interest because they reflect the secrecy and caution of the Mongol mentality, perhaps reinforced by unpleasant experiences with Europeans. In the course of my four years' work with them I learned to know many Mongolians well. It was, of course, the flower of the country which was sent to western Europe. I came to respect them for their natural self-restraint, for a kind of inborn grace and for their intelligence. I also learned to like them very much personally. Yet their minds seem to work rather differently from those of most Europeans.

Mongols may be described as clever with a good admixture of cunning. The way in which my chief conducted his business negotiations was admirable, and his method of bargaining was imposing, although often too exhausting to be pleasant. He was only in his thirties but he usually won out on every point.

Sampilon treated German institutions, particularly of a scientific or official character, with great respect, but he disregarded many normally accepted customs. By this I do not mean to say that he was not a well-educated man. An example of what I mean occurred when we went to a large department store to buy a leather attaché-case. After very long and careful deliberation, Sampilon made his choice. The price was 25 marks. He asked me to say to the shop assistant in German that he was willing to give 20 marks for it. I tried in vain to explain that it was hardly possible to bargain in a shop of this nature and standing: I had to submit. To my surprise and embarrassment the manager of the department appeared and, on learning that the prospective purchaser

represented the Mongolian Trade Delegation, willingly found a flaw in the attaché-case, which allowed him to reduce the price to 22 marks. That seemed reasonable to my chief, and the case was bought.

He proceeded similarly in important commercial negotiations. Always on his guard, he negotiated quietly, was a master at bringing down the price, and certainly understood his man, in spite of the difficulty of knowing only a few words of German (or so he maintained). His ability received due recognition on his return to Mongolia, as he became Minister of Economic Affairs, holding this office until 1929.

Sampilon's wife, Radna, was of mixed descent, her father being a Russian from Siberia, her mother Mongolian. She was very good-looking in her way, intelligent, and possessed great charm. She spoke Russian without an accent. Sampilon himself was not a Mongol of the Khalkha tribe, which predominates in Outer Mongolia, but had Buriat blood. The Buriats, whose homeland has long been part of southern Siberia and who have thus had opportunities for a European type of education, have very often supplied the leading people in Outer Mongolia, although they frequently seem to lack the innate nobility of the Khalkha Mongol type.

Sampilon's colleague, Shilon K. Hurlatt, came, I believe, from Barga, in north-western Manchuria, and had therefore been more subject to Chinese than to Russian influence in childhood (see Plate II, A). He came from a well-to-do family, and after being educated somewhere in China, he went to the United States and graduated from a technical high school in Springfield, Ohio. Later he worked for some time in Tientsin, apparently as a young man of means. He told me that he used to ride his own motor-cycle and that he had no lack of money. Hurlatt, too, was a man of great charm. Shy and reticent at first, he was very pleasant when he came to know and trust a friend. He spoke little, perhaps because of his slight knowledge of German. He was less of a personality than Sampilon, but combined modern civilization, primitiveness and the grace of the Mongolian nomads in an oddly attractive way. He had less natural authority and certainly less knowledge than Sampilon, and perhaps also less intelligence, although one had to make allowances for his relative youth (he might have been 28) and his great reserve. He was pleasant to work with, and was always extremely polite.

The Sampilons lived a rather isolated life, but they had one personal friend, whom I soon met. Sergei Mikhailovich Kolesnikoff was a gifted painter of partly Mongolian descent, born in Kalgan in 1889. He lived in Berlin with his Russian wife, and I well remember his quiet manner and winning personality. In appearance he was very Russian, with perhaps just a trace of Mongol features, and he spoke Russian perfectly. I remember best his very original lino-cuts, depicting in vivid colours various Mongolian scenes, mainly with horsemen. There was a successful one-man exhibition of Kolesnikoff's work in Berlin.

Another person whom I met at the Sampilons' home, but also at the office, was a rather mysterious man, aged about forty, called Bernhard Waurick. In the 1914-18 war he served in the German Army, and was taken prisoner and interned in Russia, from which he escaped via Siberia to Mongolia. After spending some time there he continued across the

Gobi Desert to China, and so back to Germany. While in the East he contracted malaria, and he suffered severely from relapses at times. He was employed by the Junkers Werke in some capacity but obviously had a connection with the German Foreign Office also. He was *persona grata* with the Russians as well and used to travel to Soviet Russia on missions relating, as he said, to the Junkers works. Waurick lived alone in a small flat in western Berlin, and his rooms were full of oriental rugs, but there was little else to give any clue to his interests and personality. He seemed to know everyone and yet, in an odd way, conveyed an impression of mystery. He was certainly intelligent, and well-informed on Mongolian affairs.*

From time to time Waurick acted as a sort of unofficial adviser to Sampilon. Occasionally I even had the impression that my chief was somewhat afraid of Waurick; in any case, he certainly regarded Waurick with definite respect, mixed with a certain cautiousness.

Such were the personalities among whom, after the return of Sampilon and Hurlatt from Paris, the first regular work for the Mongolian Delegation began. Negotiations were in progress with foreign specialists who were to be engaged for Government work in Mongolia, and with commercial firms from which materials, mainly machinery and supplies, were to be purchased.

The most colourful personality among the specialists we were negotiating for was a German mining engineer called Fritz Weiske. He was the colonial type of German, or rather a man with a lust for adventure, for whom Germany was too small. He was very competent in his profession, however, and had served various foreign firms and Governments; he spent some time, I believe, in the Dutch East Indies, and also spoke of his experiences in South America. He had an intelligent wife, who usually accompanied him on his journeys, and a little daughter.

After prolonged negotiations, Weiske signed a contract for a year of geological surveying in Outer Mongolia, and other work as directed by the Mongolian Government. A stout, strong, middle-aged man, he had quite a commanding personality, and I can remember only one human weakness to which he confessed—he was terrified of frogs. It was a nervous feeling of disgust which he had the greatest difficulty in combating; but he mastered this fear as he had probably mastered all the real obstacles in life.

Weiske duly went out to Mongolia, leaving his family behind, and stayed a year. On his return he told me that he did not in any way regret the time he spent there. He liked the country and the people, but he was disappointed by many official difficulties, "red tape" and "foreign interference." He considered Outer Mongolia to be very rich in mineral deposits. †

* See his introduction, entitled "Die Heutige Mongolei," to a series of articles on Mongolia (the first by F. Weiske: see below) in *Ost-Europa* (December, 1928, Vol. 4, pt. 3, pp. 147-8).

† For a general account of economic conditions, see his article on "Die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse in der Ausseren Mongolei," in *Ost-Europa* (December, 1928, Vol. 4, pt. 3, pp. 149-165).

The next specialist I remember was Freiherr von Monteton, of the East Prussian gentry. He was young and not particularly striking, but quite pleasant. He had been recommended by his employers, the firm Hannoversche Maschinenbau A.-G., from which the Mongolian Trade Delegation bought two haulage tractors, one large and one small. Von Monteton was engaged to drive and maintain them, and he, too, soon left for Mongolia. I believe he stayed only for a year, the duration of his original contract. Photographs of the tractors "in action" were sent to his firm and published in their journal.

A third specialist was engaged by Sampilon and Hurlatt during a short visit to Sweden. Sven Lindblom, a mining engineer, came from Dalarne in central Sweden, and he spoke a far from perfect German in the quiet, drawling way of the Swedes. He left very soon and I do not remember him well, but he seemed to be a decent sort of man.

The more important part of my work consisted in negotiations for the purchases made by the Trade Delegation. These were all of a highly technical character, concerning machinery, tools and so forth. For everything that was purchased, a Russian licence for transit to Mongolia had to be obtained. These licences were applied for and given out through the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin. Sampilon handled these matters, but I had to help him as well, and at times I accompanied him to the Russian offices. All goods were transported by Derutra, the official Russo-German forwarding agency. They went by rail, via the trans-Siberian, to Verkhne-Udinsk, capital of the Soviet Buriat-Mongolian Republic, and then by oxen, camel, car, etc., through the border towns of Kiakhta-Altan Bulak to Urga, the Outer Mongolian capital, renamed by the Mongolian People's Government "Ulan Bator Hoto," which means "Town of the Red Heroes."

There was no railway in Mongolia itself, and I do not believe there is any now. I remember one of my Mongolian chiefs saying that it was better so, because a railway is a quick means of communication for friend and foe alike (at that time tanks probably did not enter into the calculations of a Mongol). However, an air line of Soviet origin connected Verkhne-Udinsk with the main Mongolian towns and with the capital, Ulan Bator.

Some of the business negotiations had begun while my predecessor was still working with the Delegation, but although Sampilon and Hurlatt arrived a few months before they approached me, I do not think many purchases had been completed. Contracts for the equipment of a brick factory and for two haulage tractors have already been mentioned; in connection with the latter, there was an agreement with Hanomag for the further supply of spare parts. Sampilon told me that American Dodge cars were the most widely used in Mongolia, because of their high axle, and that the Buick also was popular. A high axle is obviously advisable for driving over open, steppe-like country where there are few roads or even tracks and many stones are scattered about. Some small lorries and light passenger cars were nevertheless bought from the German Opel Company.

From Sweden the Delegation ordered machinery and materials for

a foundry, and tools and material for a repair workshop. Other purchases, all from German firms, were instruments and material for the same workshop; some textile machinery; a steam boiler for a heating and ventilating installation; paints; spare parts for the brick works and a monometer; spare parts for ploughs; transmission belts; and, I believe, a Diesel engine. A film on the production of bricks was also bought and despatched to Ulan Bator. There must have been other purchases, but this list stands out in my memory because the goods were sent to Mongolia some time after the departure of the Trade Delegation, and I was responsible for obtaining transit licences from the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin and dealt with transport problems. The authorities in Ulan Bator constantly urged us to speed up delivery, and we had to press the firms under contract and above all the transport agency Derutra—a rather dreary task.

One day in February, 1926, Bernhard Waurick called on Sampilon and informed him that Theodor Streve, editor of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, would like to have the pleasure of an interview. Sampilon succumbed, and we went to see Streve. He had a clever commercial scheme for a future exchange of goods between Mongolia and Germany, presumably involving the reduction of Russia's share in the foreign trade of Mongolia. He wanted to organize a large clearing house in Leipzig to deal with Mongolian goods such as wool, camel's hair and furs (marmot, fox and sable), which would be exchanged for machinery, utensils and other Mongolian requirements. Streve told Sampilon that he could produce a group of influential financiers who would put the whole scheme on a firm basis. Sampilon seemed to like the idea; there were, no doubt, political reasons and reasons of personal ambition for this. But, being as clever and cautious as he was, he did not commit himself in the least. The conversation switched over to life in Mongolia and an interview of the usual type took place. Soon afterwards the illustrated supplement of the *D.A.Z.** carried an article on Mongolia with some illustrations. I never heard anything further of Streve and his plan, and it was clear that Sampilon had quietly dropped the whole matter.

Another visit of interest was that to Legationsrat Trautmann of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, then the head, I believe, of the Far Eastern Department. Here the question of the political recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic was very delicately handled. A tentative suggestion was made to the effect that Germany might be prepared to recognize Mongolia not only *de facto*, as had already been done, but *de jure*, in exchange for preferential treatment for Germany in Mongolian trade. Here Sampilon again evaded the issue by explaining that Mongolia was a small state (in fact, its area equals that of Germany, France and England together, but its population is barely more than a million), that it was not a rich state, and that the maintenance of representatives in Western European states would be a heavy burden, since political recognition by Germany would give rise to similar action by France, England and other countries. It was preferable, Sampilon explained, to maintain an embassy only in the neighbouring Soviet Union, which had recognized

* February 7, 1926.

Mongolia, and to send missions abroad from time to time, when the necessity arose. Sampilon promised, nevertheless, to sound the opinion of his Government, but again that was the last I ever heard of the project.

Although Hamburg was specially mentioned when I was engaged, it was in the spring of 1926 that Sampilon, Hurlatt and I undertook our first, and incidentally our only, journey to that city. We called on the export and import firm of Karlowitz, well known for its network of branches in the East. Conversations were of a general nature and nothing tangible resulted. The firm was obviously interested in my Mongolian chiefs, because all three of us were given a most courteous welcome. An official of the company was attached to us and we were taken out every evening of our stay, which proved to be rather a nuisance. We returned to Berlin via Bremen, where Sampilon visited a large wool importing concern and also conducted negotiations of a general nature.

As the months went by I was gaining further insight into the temperament of my employers through various characteristic incidents. During one of our nights in Hamburg, for instance, the booming of guns was suddenly heard. Having been born in St. Petersburg, where guns were fired as a warning whenever the Neva rose and flooded the lower parts of the town, I guessed the reason for the sudden noise, particularly as a gale had been blowing all evening. A minute later the telephone in my room rang: it was Sampilon. But when I told him what I presumed to be the explanation he was at once reassured and went to sleep again.

Another incident may illustrate Sampilon's quiet sense of humour. In discharging my duties I naturally did not profess "universal knowledge," but, on the other hand, I was supposed to understand and explain "things around us." When travelling back from Hamburg we went to the restaurant car to have dinner. The menu was typed in Gothic characters, which were rather confusing to me. The main dish was *Kassler Ruecken* (a sort of boiled ham); owing to the great similarity of "R" and "K" in Gothic type, I read it as "*Kassler Kuecken*." The word *Kuecken* means a chick, although it is not used to describe chicken as food. Nevertheless, I embarked on a theory that it meant "Kassler chicken," and on being asked "Why from Kassel?" I said that presumably the chickens from there were the best. When the dish was served Sampilon said nothing; but several hours later he remarked laconically, "Strange are the chickens in Kassel!" We both laughed and the incident was closed. Fortunately, such occasions were very rare. I tried to be most conscientious in carrying out my work, and I valued to an increasing degree the confidence shown me by Sampilon and Hurlatt. As far as a Mongol can feel complete confidence towards a European, I hope that I have the right to think I enjoyed it.

Early in 1926, Hurlatt asked me whether he could not come and stay with me, having heard that there was a spare room in our flat. He did not require any meals other than breakfast, and my parents, with whom I was living, had nothing against Hurlatt's request. He proved to be a pleasant person to have about the house. He never complained about anything, had a way of keeping himself aloof in a quiet manner, and in

fact was often out, without discussing his private life. He invited me from time to time to have a drink with him, however, and our friendship gradually deepened.

Presently he introduced me to a girl whom he had encountered somewhere in Berlin and with whom he was spending a considerable part of his leisure time. She came from the German lower middle class, with something not unpleasant about her which reconciled one to a certain vulgarity and lack of education. Fräulein E. did not speak English and Hurlatt knew very little German, but I concluded that they had become friendly because both felt rather lonely in the world. I learned later that she was an orphan, brought up partly in an institution and partly by an aunt, in rather sordid surroundings. Her childhood and youth had, in fact, been very unhappy, and already as a young girl she began to spend her evenings in Berlin cafés. One of these was the Kaffee am Nollendorfplatz, which Asiatic students used to frequent, and she once told me rather pathetically that these men treated a European woman with more respect and gratitude. In any case, she showed what seemed to be a real affection for Hurlatt.

One evening Hurlatt asked me to come to his rooms, where I found Fräulein E. He requested me to translate to her the statement that he had reached the conclusion that he harboured nothing but brotherly feelings towards her; he wanted to remain her friend, but that was all. It was clear that this news put her into a rage, but in an unexpectedly restrained and dignified manner she asked me to tell him that she was "not prepared to become his sister." As she said this she moved towards the door. But before she could leave the room, Hurlatt shouted at the top of his voice, "E——, Stop!" and, to my amazement, turned to ask me to convey his request that she should become his wife! I felt bound to try to persuade Hurlatt to take time for reflection, but he practically ordered me to translate. I did so, and Fräulein E. accepted his proposal. I had at least the reward of a happy scene.

Hurlatt afterwards gave me an explanation of his action. He said that at the time he already knew that he would soon have to return to Mongolia to take up his duties at a Ministry there. He felt that he wanted his future wife to be a European woman. He had once liked a Polish Jewess in Tientsin very much, but she had been too clever for him and he had found it exhausting to be forced to "look up" to her all the time. In the case of Fräulein E., he felt that she looked up to him, and that she was attached to him. He had wanted to test her by his first statement, and, judging by her reaction that she must be really fond of him, he felt that he should not miss this chance.

Hurlatt gave a reception on April 10, 1926, to celebrate his engagement, and I assisted him, as usual. We hired a large room in the restaurant of the Schoeneberg Town Hall and a festive dinner was served. The guests were rather mixed, but all enjoyed the party. Hurlatt asked Weiske and his wife and a few German officials; Fräuein E. asked her brother and her aunt and, I believe, her landlady and the latter's family. My parents were also invited, and so were of course the Sampilons, Kolesnikoffs and all the other Mongols, including some students, in Berlin.

Shortly afterwards Hurlatt began to prepare for his return to Mongolia. I am not sure whether the marriage formalities remained to be completed there, but E. was to accompany him back. Her ideas about his country were rather vague. She was very much worried by the food problem, and Hurlatt used to tease her by saying that there were no potatoes in Mongolia; life without potatoes seemed to her inconceivable! She had indeed never travelled before, and when she boarded the Nord Express and was told that she would now spend a few days in the train, she was very frightened lest she should not be able to see Hurlatt, who had entered the next carriage, before Moscow, and wondered whether they would get any food. I had a card from them from Moscow, dated May 1, 1926, and later a couple of letters from Ulan Bator. E. seemed to be quite happy and Hurlatt kept his promise to build her a European house.

In March, 1926, I had the unusual experience of seeing the New Year in, for the fourth time within one year. After the Jewish New Year in September, 1925, there had been New Year's Eve on December 31, according to the European calendar, and the Russian Orthodox New Year on January 13, 1926, according to the old-style Russian calendar. Now, at the request of my Mongolian friends, I lent them the dining-room of our flat, which was very large, for an evening party to celebrate the Buddhist New Year. There was plenty of food and drink, and all the Mongols in Berlin came with their friends.

Soon after these social events, however, a new and more strenuous phase of my activities began with the arrival of an Educational Mission from Mongolia.

(To be concluded)

DESCRIPTION OF PLATES

- I.—A. Radna and Nima Sampilon (Berlin, 1926).
- B. Dashi Sampilon (Berlin, 1926).
- II.—A. Shilon K. Hurlatt (Berlin, 1926).
- B. Dalai and Dashipilon (Siegesallee, Berlin, 1927). *See Part II.*

SOME ARCHÆOLOGICAL GLEANINGS FROM GANDHARA ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA

BY MAJOR-GENERAL H. L. HAUGHTON, C.B., C.I.E., C.B.E.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 18, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

In opening the meeting the CHAIRMAN said: We are very fortunate in having General Haughton, because his name has been for many years past a household word on the North-West Frontier of India. His father was a most distinguished soldier, whose knowledge of Sikhs, their ways, their customs and their idiosyncrasies was certainly second to none. His fame as a soldier spread all over the Frontier. So great was that fame, and in such respect was he held by the tribesmen, that on the unfortunate occasion of his death on the Frontier in 1897, under circumstances of almost unparalleled gallantry, his body was cared for by the Afridis, against whom he was fighting, and, contrary to their custom, they carried his body in and handed him over to the Political Agent at Peshawar. I personally have no knowledge of a parallel incident.

The lecturer has succeeded to that name. It is not an easy task to succeed a very illustrious father, but by his own career he has carved out for himself a name that in India to-day is equally well known. He had a distinguished career in the army. He was known far and wide for his intimate knowledge of the Sikhs, and was a sympathetic and understanding Commandant of the Royal Indian Military Academy. He set that institution very firmly on its way to its present great success.

TO most people mention of the North-West Frontier of India conjures up a mental picture of bare, rocky hills and of Pathan tribesmen, as rugged and relentless as the hills amongst which they live. For some whose duties have taken them to the Frontier, memory perhaps turns more towards such matters as inter-tribal feuds, the pros and cons of a forward or a close-border policy, the Sandeman system, and so on, subjects which for years have been the daily concern of many of us. Such a vision of Frontier life is no doubt a true enough picture and one of absorbing interest, but it is not the only one.

Many, I think, even of those who have spent some time in those regions, fail to realize the wonderful background which lies behind the scene of to-day; historically a vague and hazy background, no doubt, but one which may still be discerned in the many traces of the remote past which are to be found in profusion throughout the country, a past in which the Pathan, as we know him to-day, did not exist and the great religion of Islam had not been born.

It will be my endeavour to-day to reconstruct for you from the "bits and pieces" gleaned from this Frontier field something of that distant past.

In doing this I would ask you to remember that I am no trained archæologist, and therefore can only speak to you as one who has spent much of his spare time wandering about from village to village as a "picker up of unconsidered trifles." In these circumstances I would crave your indulgence and ask you to forgive any shortcomings that may be apparent in what I have to say.

The area with which I shall attempt to deal formed part of the two

ancient provinces of Gandhara and Udiyana—that is to say, from Jalalabad east to the Indus and the Swat valley.

This was included in the twentieth satrapy of the Persian Empire according to Herodotus, a point of some importance in that Alexander, after the defeat and death of Darius, claimed sovereignty over it as the rightful successor by conquest.

In particular I shall invite your attention to a smaller area which, to my mind, more than any other, offers scope for investigation from an archaeological point of view. The area to which I refer is that which skirts the hills flanking the Peshawar vale on its northern side, from the point where the Kabul river debouches into the plain through Shabkadar, Charsadda, Mardan, Shahbazgarhi, to Swabi, Ohind and the Indus opposite Taxila.

This we know to have been in olden days the most thickly populated part of the country, and through it ran the great Royal Road which, starting at Charsadda, ended far south at the Mauryan capital of Pataliputra, near the modern Patna.

In those days the country through which the modern grand trunk road passes from Taxila to Peshawar must have been swamp alternating with scrub jungle intersected by numerous *nullahs*, in which as late as 1526 Baber and Humayun hunted the rhinoceros.


Moreover, it seems that it was not until about the first century A.D., when the great Kushan ruler Kanishka made it his provincial capital, that Peshawar became a place of any importance. On the other hand, we know that the fertile tract along the base of the hills, watered by the Swat and Kabul rivers, contained many places of note. For example, it was at Shahbazgarhi that Asoka inscribed his famous edicts upon the rocks by the roadside about the middle of the third century B.C., and there we may still see them to-day. We know of this place also from the Chinese pilgrims who visited it later and have left to us delightful accounts of its attractions.

It was Sung Yun in particular, if I remember right, who wrote enthusiastically of the climate, the beauty of the flowers and fruit trees, and even of the butterflies. He must, I think, have been a great nature lover as well as a devout pilgrim.

Again, the little village of Lahor, not from from Swabi, is believed to have been the birthplace of Panini, the first Sanskrit grammarian; but most important of all without doubt is Charsadda. This small town, together with the surrounding villages, such as Prang, Utmanzai, etc., is known locally as Hashtnagar, "The Eight Towns," and covers the site of the ancient city of Pushkalavati, which the Greeks called Peukalaotis. It is this place, evidently a city of importance before the days of Alexander, which, I suggest, formed the cultural and administrative centre of the Greeks in this part of Northern India. And what of the country to-day?

Apart from well-known places such as Jamalgarhi, Takht-i-Bahi and Ranighat, the country is so thickly dotted over with ancient sites—some lost to view, some easily recognizable as such—that the ground may be said to be a veritable mine of treasures great and small: sculptures by the ton, seals, pottery, terra-cotta and, last but not least, coins. I have little

hesitation in saying that scarcely a week passes in which some object of interest is not brought to light. This is not effected by any deliberate digging for treasure, but through the normal operation of the day-to-day



By the courtesy of the Numismatic Chronicle.

life of the people; that is to say, when digging the foundations of a house, levelling a field, opening up a water channel or, most frequently, when removing earth to enrich the sugar-cane fields, from the many *dheris* or

mounds which are such a feature of the country and nearly every one of which is the site of some building of a forgotten age.

At this point it may be desirable if I attempt to give you very briefly an historical sketch, however faint and uncertain it may be in places, to serve as a background to the present scene.

The Alexander story still lives to-day in Northern India in many tales of the doings of the great Sultan Sikander zul-Qarnain, "The Lord of the Two Horns," and his exploits will form a good starting-point for our historical sketch to-day. But it must be remembered that such Greek influence as there may be in the sculpture and arts of Gandhara are to be traced to the Bactrian Greeks and later to contact with Imperial Rome rather than to the great conqueror or his immediate successors. For Alexander himself spent but few months in India, and Seleukos, after his battle with Chandragupta Maurya, surrendered all territories south of the Hindukush; so that it was not till later, after the death of Asoka, that the Bactrian Greeks under Demetrios established themselves once more in India. Still, it is of interest to follow the footsteps of Alexander through our area, from Jalalabad fighting his way through Bajaur into the lovely Swat valley, storming the isolated hill of Birkot and pursuing his enemies to their mountain fastnesses of Aornos.

We know too that whilst this was going on he had sent Hephæstion to besiege Peukalaotis—which he would not have done unless it had been a place of importance—and thereafter to push on to the Indus and prepare for the river crossing, after which Alexander passes out of our area to receive the submission of Taxila and to fight his great battle with the valiant Poros on the banks of the Jhelum.

Of the Bactrian Greek rulers I fear there is no time to say much, but some at least of them must have been fine soldiers and strong men, for at times they extended their expeditions as far as Central India and the Indus delta, though they may not have occupied the country permanently. Incidentally, they and their mint masters turned out some of the finest portrait coins that have ever been struck.

Including the early kings who ruled over Bactria only, more than thirty Greek kings and one queen ruled in Afghanistan and North-West India during the three centuries B.C. Very few are mentioned in classical literature and most are only known to us from their coins. Some of them, such as Menander, were certainly great sovereigns holding sway over vast territories, others were probably little more than hill rajahs. On their coins one can observe that whereas the early Bactrian rulers used only Greek for their inscriptions, the Indo-Greek rulers used Greek upon the obverse and the Karoshti script, for the sake of their Indian subjects, on the reverse. Moreover, generally speaking, there was a progressive deterioration in style and workmanship, though to the very end there appear to have been a few die cutters capable of turning out good work.

I am afraid I must pass over the Skythians, Parthians and White Huns, who at various times came surging into India through the northern passes; but I would like to mention one king, Gondophares, who is of romantic interest. For, according to the apocryphal legend of St. Thomas, it was this Gondophares, king of the Indians, who brought St. Thomas from

Syria and was, together with many of his Court, converted by him. It is only within about the last 100 years that finds of this ruler's coins and a dated inscription at Takht-i-Bahi have confirmed the existence of such a ruler at the beginning of the Christian era, and to that extent have lent support to the legend of St. Thomas.

One other dynasty, however, concerns us too closely to be passed over—that of the Kushans or “Kwei Shang” of the Chinese annals; for it was these invaders who put “finis” to Greek rule in this part of the world. This we know from the fact that the names of Hermaios, the last of the Greek kings, and of Kadphises, the first of the Kushans, appear together on coins struck towards the end of the reign of Hermaios, after which Greek names disappear for ever from the coinage of India.

Moreover, Kanishka was indeed a great ruler and a great Buddhist, who extended his empire at least as far south as Muttra. It was he who established his provincial capital at Peshawar and built there the great stupa and monastery to receive the holy relics of Buddha. The site of the stupa is still known locally as Shahji-ki-Dheri, the “Mound of the King,” though few Pathans have ever heard of Kanishka, which shows, I think, how tradition lives on in certain places in spite of a change of people and religion. The actual relic casket, with an inscription which has been read as “Made by the overseer Argiselas by order of the great King Kanishka,” was found about 1910 and is now in the Peshawar museum.

Pundits still disagree about the date of Kanishka, but I think we may take it as being about 100 A.D.—until someone proves definitely that it isn't! It is indirectly due to the religious zeal of Kanishka and his successors that the district we are considering gives us so much material to work upon, for without doubt most of the sculptures, etc., which remain to us were the embellishments of Buddhist stupas, shrines and monasteries, so that the art of Gandhara has often been called “Græco-Buddhist.” Now that we are dealing with these Kushans I may mention a question which probably came to the fore at this period and which I think still calls for much investigation—*i.e.*, the matter of contact between India and Imperial Rome.

We have seen something of the link between India and Greece through Bactria; what about the influence of Rome? Where does direct Bactrian influence end and that of Rome begin? And how far did Roman influence come via Syria, Mesopotamia and the great overland route, and to what extent was it transmitted by sea via Alexandria, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf? We do know that in the early years of the Empire much Roman gold came to India each year in exchange for pepper, spices, muslins, silk, pearls and other merchandise, and we are told that part of the indemnity demanded from Rome by Alaric was 3,000 lb. of pepper, which indicates the value set upon this commodity in the Europe of those days. This trade was no doubt carried on mostly by sea through Alexandria and Petra, and many large hoards of Roman coins have been found in Southern India.

On the other hand, I have had coins of Trajan, Domitian, Caracalla, Antoninus Pius and even Republican coins from Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier which surely must have filtered through by the

northern route. We know, too, that an Indian king about the time of the first Kushans sent an embassy to Augustus, for Nicolaos of Damascus met them in Antioch in the year 21 A.D., and gives some account of the strange beasts, including tigers, which they brought with them, the tigers being fated to make their first public appearance at the opening of the theatre of Marcellus.

The name of the Indian king is uncertain, but the fact that some early Kushan coins bear a portrait evidently copied from that of Augustus seems to point to the probability of its having been Kadhises who despatched the embassy. Later, in the year 99 A.D., another Indian embassy was honourably received by Trajan, presumably sent by Kanishka.

Another indication of such contacts with the Roman world is possibly to be found in a series of palettes by no means uncommon throughout the North-West Frontier. The exact purpose of these palettes is debatable, but it is remarkable that in almost every case the scheme of decoration is secular rather than religious, and I understand that most of the designs have now been traced to Roman silver work. Then, again, there is the common use of the Corinthian pillar and of a motif of cupids and garlands, to which an exact parallel can be found in Rome. Lastly, I have a small ivory Cupid found, with twelve gold coins, in a stone casket near Lalpura in Afghanistan, which, as I will show you in a slide, seems to have its prototype on a Roman sarcophagus.

Now, I hope I have been able to demonstrate that this pet area of mine, the scene of so many pleasant wanderings, memories and friendships, has much to offer; but what is needed is systematic excavation by experts over a number of years, for continuity and precise record mean so much. Such men as Sir Aurel Stein, Sir John Marshall, Spooner, Hargreaves and others have done magnificent work, often under great difficulties—but how much remains untouched!

It is true, too, that of late Mohendjo Daro and Harappa have rather eclipsed Gandhara and have, probably rightly, proved greater attractions to the archæologist.

The art of Gandhara must no doubt be relegated to the position of a provincial school, but a provincial art and history which throws its tentacles as far as Central Asia and China and draws something of itself from Greece and Rome has many problems to offer which only systematic survey and excavation can hope to solve. Perhaps it is my sincere affection for the country and its people and the happy memories I retain of days spent amongst them that makes me feel that in spite of all that has been accomplished much still remains to be done, which can only be done by experts with regular financial backing. At the same time, conditions being what they are, I would put in a word on behalf of the wanderer, the casual gleaner.

Much has been said with justice in condemnation of the treasure-seeker and the inexperienced excavator, for whom I hold no brief. But what of the thousand and one objects of interest which are brought to light almost daily by the spade of the cultivator? Thanks to his activities, several interesting sites known to me personally have already almost disappeared, and I have no hesitation in saying that but for the interested

wanderer most of the minor objects thus unearthed would be lost for ever. This, you may say, is a broad contention, and so to misquote Kipling—

“ And since the broad contention often fails,
Of instances observed I'll tell thee tales.”

One of my most valued possessions is a small female terra-cotta bust in pure Hellenistic style. This I obtained from one of my village friends, a small Pathan girl of some six or seven years of age, who had found it—in a site now nearly demolished by earth removal—and had kept it to play with. On another occasion a brother officer and I were shooting snipe at Turangzai, the original home of the famous Hajji, who was for many years a thorn in the side of the Frontier authorities. Whilst we were having our picnic lunch another of my friends came and told us that “hundreds of Buddhas and heads” were being unearthed at a place called Skarro Dheri, “The Mound of the Charcoal Burner,” but that the local mullah was having them destroyed as soon as they came to light. Accordingly, we decided that we had shot enough snipe and would go and see for ourselves what was happening. On reaching the place we found that some men in the process of breaking a new field had laid bare the foundations of a small building, around which the ground was littered with broken plaster heads and figures. I prodded along the wall with a stick and soon found a stone sculpture of two men wrestling and two very charming plaster heads.


At this moment the mullah arrived on the scene and at first was inclined to be offensive. However, by tactful handling and an explanation that our interest in these things denoted no idolatrous tendencies, he melted and ended by asking us to tea. We eventually parted good friends, and he went so far as to say that he would cause no more to be broken up, though I fear that this was too much to expect when once we had left.

Another day I stopped at a place between Charsadda and Mardan, where I knew there was an old site, to ask a man standing by the roadside if anything had been coming out of the mound lately. “Oh yes,” he replied, “a few days ago a fine big Buddha came out,” but in answer to my enquiry whether it was broken, he added, “It was perfect when found, but I broke it up into pieces of a suitable size to mend the wall of my house”! These are but a few of many instances of this nature which have come within my own personal experience.

Furthermore, it is thanks to my friendship with the local people that I have had the chance to examine and record numerous hoards of coins which have come to light in this region, one of which consisted of several hundred coins, including specimens of no less than eight Indo-Greek rulers. Had I not had early intimation of these coin finds from my friends the hoards would have been hopelessly split up and dispersed, rendering all examination, comparison and record impossible. It is the profusion of such hoards and the variety of their contents within a radius of some 20 miles from Charsadda that convinces me of the importance of Peuka-laotis during the days of Greek occupation, and I suggest that the recording and examination of coin hoards is a matter which has been sadly neglected in the past and should receive far more attention in the future.


It is in these circumstances that I suggest that, until the scientific excavator arrives, the gleaner of a harvest that has already fallen by the wayside has his uses and is not always so black as he is sometimes painted.

Mr. K. de B. Codrington very kindly consented to carry on this subject on January 10, 1945, when he gave a lecture to the Society on "Afghanistan in History and Art."



Sketch Map
of
THE MARSH COUNTRY
OF SOUTHERN IRAQ.

Approx. Scale of miles.



- Marshland.
- Irrigation Areas.
- Roads.
- Railways.

45°

46°

47°

THE WATERWAYS OF 'IRAQ

By LIEUT.-COLONEL LIONEL DIMMOCK, O.B.E.

I

IT might be said jestingly, but with some element of truth, "As for the waterways of 'Iraq, there ain't none!" The water is there, a-plenty, and the ways have been partially exploited, but only along the rivers, first by Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Co. for commercial purposes when they started the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Co., many years ago, and then, in the war of 1914-18, by the Inland Water Transport (I.W.T.) of the British Army, when both the Tigris and the Euphrates were used as lines of communication.

In the second World War of 1939-45, a far more efficiently organized I.W.T. made considerable use of the Tigris as far as Kut-al-Imarah for heavy traffic, and to a lesser extent they developed waterborne traffic as far as Baghdad and beyond, but the Euphrates was scarcely used at all. Between the two wars navigation of the Euphrates had practically ceased, except for a few mahailahs carrying grain and dates to village communities; nor was there any incentive for the British Army to develop this river, because supply lines tended northwards and eastwards towards the Persian border and to the Caucasus beyond.

Several circumstances have combined to encourage this deplorable neglect of the Euphrates as a navigable river. Silting and underwater snags have made navigation difficult, especially in the important section between Hammar and Nasiriyah, and other speedier and more modern means of communication, such as roads and railways, have had the most marked effect in diverting traffic elsewhere.

In all countries there is a tendency for more modern means of communication and transportation to absorb or displace older methods, and it is only in quite recent times that the wiser policy of co-ordination has influenced the minds of men. London Transport is an example of what can be achieved in this way.

In the British Isles the history of transportation shows how the railways practically killed the old canal system, which might, instead, have been a valuable adjunct to them now. The railways, in their turn, were greatly perturbed by the development of road transport, and are striving to obtain a share in the latest development of an air transport system. Any fears entertained of competitive rivalry are groundless, for new methods serve to supplement rather than to displace the old.

'Iraq is greatly favoured in the development of a unified transportation policy, because the railways are state-owned and road construction and maintenance are in the hands of the Public Works department. 'Iraq is certain to develop in the future as the great entrepôt of the Middle East, provided that she enjoys a period of guaranteed tranquillity, and her importance as a member of the Arab League will depend quite as much upon her internal development as upon her airways and railways.

Her "communications" policy has hitherto been shortsighted, but the various directorates concerned can hardly be blamed for this, because, as public servants, they are bound to subordinate their activities to the policy of the Government in power. Unfortunately 'Iraq has had a variety of governments during the past thirty years, including a short-lived and unhappy dictatorship under Bekr Sidki in 1936, and latterly, under German influence, an oligarchy known as "The Golden Square."

Among the British public servants who have served 'Iraq so faithfully and impartially, one, the late Sir John Ward, conceived the idea of creating a terminus of rail, sea and air communications at Ma'qil, near Basrah. He lived long enough to see his ideas partially developed, in that the airport which he planned, the railway marshalling-yards and terminus station, all adjoin the modern wharves which were developed from the wartime wharfage for the British Forces in 1914-18. His greatest achievement was the cutting of the Rookah Channel through the bar beyond Fao, where the Shatt-al-Arab flows into the Persian Gulf, thus allowing steamers drawing 30 feet of water to enter the river.

Now that the war-clouds of the second World War have receded from the dusty face of 'Iraq, we may look forward hopefully to further developments, if she is blessed with a long period of political stability, guided by far-seeing statesmen. Among these developments it is essential that the inland waterways should be fully developed, not as rival means of communication but as supplementary links with the railways and the roads.

Before considering the difficulties in the way of such an achievement it is desirable first to study the map. So far, only the two great rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, have been mentioned, but there is a vast area of marshland extending approximately from Kut-al-Imarah on the Tigris and from Al Kifl on the Euphrates to Basrah on the Shatt-al-Arab, which is the river formed by the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates at Qurnah. From Amarah, which is the principal town of the marsh country, to Qurnah the Tigris flows almost due south, and to the east of it the marshlands extend well beyond the Persian border. (Presumably, one should speak of the Iranian border, but with innate British conservatism let us adhere to the old and better-known name of Persia.)

The area thus roughly indicated forms a most complex system of water communication; complex because two desert barriers are interposed between three converging belts of marshland. These desert areas and the marsh country between contain unexplored relics of bygone civilizations of priceless archæological value.

Astride the Euphrates some 30 miles north of al Kifl-stands the famous Hindiyah Barrage, from which flow canals controlling irrigation over an extensive area. The most important of these canals is the Hillah Canal, which, when full, is navigable for small craft to Diwaniyah and even as far south as Rumaithah. Since the principal object of this canal is irrigation, it is not possible to enter it from Samawah on the Euphrates farther south.

At Kut-al-Imarah on the Tigris another barrage has been built in modern times, which controls irrigation southwards towards Kut-al-Hai

and beyond, but the main canal does not connect navigably with Nasiriyah for the same reason. Somewhat to the south of Shatrah most of the surplus water runs off eastward into a chain of marshy lakes called "Haur." This name "Haur" for a marshy lake is peculiar to 'Iraq, and may be connected with the Arabic root meaning "danger."

Finally, to the south of the Euphrates, which here flows eastward from Nasiriyah to Qurnah, lies a very large lake, called the Haur-al-Hammar. This lake is some 70 miles long from the west to the eastern end, where a cut allows it to drain into the Shatt-al-Arab at Qarmat Ali, a few miles above Basrah. The Haur-al-Hammar is divided into two natural parts by a chain of marshy islands and reed clumps, through which are numerous twisting navigable channels known to the inhabitants. These reed-clumps are a feature of the marsh country; the reeds stand 10 feet or more above the water and provide the marsh Arab with the raw material for his houses, his mats and even for his small canoes and other craft.

The eastern part of the Haur-al-Hammar is the deeper and contains stretches of open water; it is about 30 miles wide from north to south. The western part is some 15 miles wide, and many of the shallower navigable channels are full of water-weeds which prohibit the use of power craft.

The great marsh area east of Amara has already been mentioned; it contains the second largest lake, the Haur-al-Hawizah, which has only been partially explored, although it is known to have patches of open water upon which flying-boats could alight in an emergency. The Haur-al-Hawizah is about 60 miles long from north to south and perhaps 25 miles wide from east to west.

II

The area of country discussed in the foregoing paragraphs is perhaps one of the largest areas of marshland in the world, comparable to the Everglades, except that it includes alternating stretches of bare desert. Altogether there are some 20,000 square miles, the greater part of which is marshland, so it is pardonable that few people, even British officials in 'Iraq, know anything about it, and, equally, it is obvious that the task of developing it is not to be achieved in its entirety by any one man or even in the lifetime of one man. Here is one more fact about it: the whole of it is alluvial land and, apart from waterborne gravels, it contains not a single fragment of workable stone.

Mr. G. N. Loggin, in a lecture given before the Royal Central Asian Society in July, 1944, spoke of the difficulty of constructing good roads in this area, because of the nature of the ground and because it is extremely difficult to decide what is the saturation level of the soil, above which it is essential that the surface of the road should lie. He gave it as his opinion that, "until more comprehensive measures than any yet undertaken have been applied for the control of the floods of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the betterment of communications in these very rich riverain areas raises almost insuperable difficulties."

Railway construction presents a similar problem, with the added

problem that no ballast is available, gravel being less suitable than alluvial mud, which has the merit of setting hard when dry. The railways constructed by the British Forces in the first World War were either abandoned or diverted during subsequent years.

The main Basrah-Baghdad line skirts the southern shores of the Haur-al-Hammar and crosses the Euphrates at Samawah, whence it runs parallel to the Hillah Canal. There are two branch lines—one from Ur Junction to Nasiriyah, and one from Hindiyah Junction just south of Hillah to Kerbelah. During the second World War a railway was constructed from Kut-al-Imarah to Ba'qubah on the Diyalah River, by-passing Baghdad, and giving direct rail communication between the oilfields at Kirkuk and at Khanaqin and the fringes of the marsh country at Kut-al-Imarah.* The importance of this is obvious when it is realized what a big part is played by the internal combustion engine in water transportation.

The main roads run more or less parallel with the railways, but the Baghdad-Basrah road, when it nears the Hammar Lake, makes a wide detour to the south and enters Basrah from Zubair. This little township is reputed to have been the home port of Sinbad the Sailor in bygone days, but the creek is now silted up and Zubair stands far inland.

The other important road in the area is from Baghdad to Kut-al-Imarah, following the eastern bank of the Tigris; from Kut it runs on to Amarah, still keeping to the eastern bank, and so onward to Basrah by way of Qurnah, crossing from the east to the west bank by a ferry at Qalah Salih. Another road runs from Kut-al-Imarah southward to Kut-al-Hai, Shatrah and Nasiriyah.

Thus the main administrative centres are more efficiently connected by road and rail than in Ottoman times, but it is unfortunate that the natural water communications with the surrounding districts are either cut off or made more difficult by these same improvements.

The river steamers now ply between Basrah and Baghdad only in the flood season, and less frequently even then than in former days. This is partly because much of the freight is handled more quickly and expeditiously by rail or moved by road, and partly because the river is less easy to navigate than formerly during the low-water season owing to neglect. The flood season, which provides an adequate depth of water, is short and has also its attendant dangers. The Tigris is a swift stream flowing 3 or 4 knots in the dry season and from 5 to 6 knots or more in the flood season.

The Euphrates is a more sluggish stream, but for that very reason it is the more impeding to navigation by reason of silting. Water communications cannot possibly become serious rivals to roads and railways, but they could be used as valuable distributaries for goods, produce and passengers to riverain villages if a proper conservancy organization and a fleet of motor mahailahs were established.

A comparative estimate of distances is pertinent. Obviously the loops and bends of the rivers add a considerable mileage to the distances by water. This is clearly shown in the following table, which has been compiled by an 'Iraqi friend. No attempt is made to give details of intermediate distances, nor would such an analysis have any practical

value, but it does give a clear general picture of comparative distances between the main riverain towns of 'Iraq.

COMPARABLE TABLE OF DISTANCES.

<i>Distances.</i>		<i>By Water.</i>	<i>By Road.</i>	<i>By Rail.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>(Miles.)</i>	<i>(Miles.)</i>	<i>(Miles.)</i>	
Amarah	Basrah	128	112	—	The distances by water are probably underestimated because it is impossible to measure the many deviations caused by sandbanks and other obstructions to navigation.
Amarah	Baghdad	304	224	—	
Baghdad	Mosul	284	271	260	
Qurnah	Fallujah	364	340	—	
Fallujah	Hit	74	68	—	

Amarah is the chief city of the marsh country, and the Tigris southwards from Amarah has fewer violent bends than it has northwards towards Baghdad. Between Baghdad and Mosul the river is most used during the flood season for bringing down up-country produce, including wool and sheepskins; these are loaded on rafts called kelleks, built with inflated skins to give added buoyancy and with timber poles felled in the highlands of Kurdistan. After unloading their cargoes at Baghdad the kelleks are dismantled, the timber is sold and the skins deflated for use again on a subsequent occasion.

This part of the river, especially above Baiji, where it cuts through the Jebel Hamryn by the Fatha Gorge, is particularly dangerous for vessels on account of submerged rocks which have never been charted or buoyed. The development of riverborne traffic between Baghdad and Mosul is a special problem requiring different treatment in which the Kellek traffic must be sympathetically considered.

Some figures are also given for the Euphrates of the distances by river. This river presents yet another sort of transportation problem, and its chief value would be for cheap distribution of bulky and heavy goods, for the distribution of dates for tribal consumption, and for intercommunication between the numerous villages along its banks.

III

These riverain communications are obvious and already exist in primitive forms of transport. Their improvement and development would therefore be the first step in any new plan, but the final and most profitable undertaking should be the development of water communications in the marsh country itself, which would confer great benefits upon its peoples and upon 'Iraq as a whole.

This undertaking is fraught with difficulties as great as its possibilities, and involves the creation of a conservancy service as well as the helpful co-operation of existing services such as railways, public works, irrigation and surveys.

Mr. Loggin's lecture, already mentioned, foreshadowed the need for a conservancy directorate, although he dismissed the subject of water communications in some fifteen lines. But from the foregoing very general analysis it will be appreciated that the subject is a very big one and that something wider than the creation of a conservancy directorate is needed.

The Minister of Communications and Works has already a difficult problem to adjust the rival claims of road, rail and irrigation. To make the problem more difficult, irrigation is not under his jurisdiction, since it is concerned with agriculture, although irrigation plans inevitably affect communications.

The addition of a conservancy directorate, the need for which is undeniable, will not simplify the problem, which is not merely one of reconciling conflicting technical requirements.

Many parts of the area under discussion are marked "Unsurveyed" on the maps, and the 'Iraq Government Survey Department is fully employed in surveying areas where land disputes have arisen or are likely to arise. The British Army has carried out extensive surveys during the years 1941-44, but only with the object of improving their lines of communication to the north. These surveys include a great amount of river surveying and the charting of depths and of flood levels, all of which work will be of value to a future conservancy department.

This article can only be an outline of a most interesting problem, upon the solution of which the future prosperity of 'Iraq largely depends. The solution of it cannot be achieved by any one department of State, nor is it a purely technical problem to be tackled by a conservancy directorate. Probably the best method of approach would be to appoint a Royal Commission, whose members would travel throughout the area and formulate a five-year plan.

A conservancy directorate could be profitably created at once to carry out a great deal of preliminary work, using the vast amount of technical data collected by the British Inland Water Transport and the flood information already in the possession of the Public Works and Irrigation Departments.

The human element is a factor affecting the problem. The inhabitants of the marsh country have lived in isolation for centuries, and, like the legendary Irishman, are inclined to be "agin the Government." This traditional distrust is a legacy of the former Turkish administration of the Ottoman Empire, whose policy was the exploitation rather than the welfare of the local inhabitants.

These mostly belong to the Shiah sect of Islam as opposed to the orthodox Sunni. This is natural, when one considers that the holy cities of Kerbelah and Najf lie upon its western fringes and that Persia, also Shiah, lies to the east.

The marsh Arabs are less fanatical than the Persians and are of more virile stock, but malaria is undermining their constitutional stamina. The Health Service must also play a part in the new scheme.

The ethnological origins of the marsh Arab are obscure, but it is believed by some that they are the descendants of the Babylonians, with

a strong admixture of Arab blood from the neighbouring desert tribes and with Kurdish infiltrations from Luristan.

Fanaticism is not entirely unknown in Great Britain, but British peoples, brought up in an atmosphere of religious tolerance, have little idea of the difficulties which religious differences can arouse.

All these factors will have considerable influence upon the future development of the marsh country, and only by winning the trust of the marsh Arab can this be achieved peaceably. Fortunately many Britons in the service of the 'Iraq Government possess the trust of the peoples of that land, especially those who have taken the trouble to learn the language and thus to become more intimately acquainted with 'Iraqis.

If a Royal Commission is appointed by the 'Iraq Government to investigate the development of waterways, the impartial services of such an Englishman of wide sympathy would probably be of the greatest assistance in smoothing out difficulties.

MODERN TURKISH LITERATURE

By HIS EXCELLENCY RUŞEN EŞREF ÜNAYDIN

Part of a lecture given in French by the Turkish Ambassador at the Turk Halkevi on February 8, 1945.

THE most salient characteristic of the period of Turkish history that is generally known as the Constitutional Era was the rise of a school of letters called "Millî edebiyat," or "National Literature," whose central figure was that great thinker and sociologist Ziya Gök Alp. This school was convinced of the necessity of making the national literature more truly Turkish. Ziya Gök Alp, an inspired poet and passionate nationalist, was also an idealist with a wonderful gift for formulating and expressing moral and social principles. He it was who had promoted the dynamic *Review of Young Pens*. This time he concentrated his energies and his greater prestige on the review which owed its existence to his inspiration—the *Yeni Mecmua*, or *New Review*.

On the one hand this review, and on the other the already existing *Turk Yurdu* (*Turkish Land*), the organ of the "Turk Ocagi," or "Turkish Hearth," a centre of national culture and nationalist feeling, were the two sources from which were derived immense services in the field of cultural studies and of artistic production. Modern authors, whose work has appeared in these two reviews, have helped to rejuvenate and to bring fresh splendour to Turkish poetry and prose. Halide Edib, a woman novelist of great talent and psychological insight; Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, a short-story writer, a novelist, and essayist with a delightful style and a profoundly artistic taste; Refik Halit, writer of short stories and of distinguished prose, with an exceptional gift for description; Omer Seyfettin, a sound commentator on current affairs; Falih Rifke, whose brief and striking phrases gave a new charm to Turkish prose; the historian Ahmet Refik, who, with his vivid pictures of various episodes in the history of the Ottoman Empire, created an entirely new style of writing in the popularization of historical subjects; Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, the eminent Turkish savant with an international reputation, who gave a new trend to the history of Turkish literature, widening and lending depth to its horizons; and Ziya Gök Alp himself, whose sociological writings and almost dogmatic pronouncements on affairs formed the Credo of contemporary youth, while he also produced poems on the subjects of ancient legend—all these were contributors to the *New Review* (*Yeni Mecmua*).

It was in this review, too, that the rare poems of Yahya Kemal the poet used to appear. I call them rare in a quantitative sense, but they were equally rare in the other sense, by virtue of their pre-eminent and extraordinary artistic merit. For Yahya Kemal is to-day considered the greatest Turkish poet of modern times. By his unequalled technical control of the Turkish language he brought the ancient instrument of the *Aruz*, a verse-form ten centuries old, to its highest perfection as a medium

of expression. In the sonorous and gorgeous verse of Yahya Kemal you are made to feel, even to its least details, the greatness and culture of the majestic past. With impeccable taste he gives at once the thrill of lyrical poetry and the measured control of the classical.

A poet of an altogether different texture, whose work dazzles the eyes and captivates the heart, was Ahmet Haşim. The dreaming verse of Ahmet Haşim, in which the gold of the sky and the twilight of the farthest horizons cast the reflections of their thousand delicate hues on the sleeping and enchanted waters of a lake, on whose banks great birds stand musing, yet seems to taste the bitterness of a night that, as it falls, surrounds the spirit with a soft but feverish vision.

I have quoted these two names to bring before you two of the most accomplished masters of modern Turkish poetry during this period, two poets who united in their souls the mystery of both oriental and western culture.

The social life of the Constitutional Era allowing of it, another—but an oral—form of linguistic expression appeared—eloquence. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver was a distinguished poet, a fine prose writer, a former professor of Muslim art at the University of Istanbul, a former President of “Turk Ocagi” (“the Turkish Hearth”), as well as a former Minister of Public Instruction; but he was also much admired and became famous for his brilliant talent as an orator. His speeches, which are marked by a sonorous and compactly built style, have been preserved in two volumes.

Humorous literature was represented both in prose, where Refik Halit made his name by his lively, biting style, and in verse, in particular that of Fazil Ahmet, a gay writer both of verse and of prose, who could use an encyclopædic erudition to the advantage of his wit. Fazil Ahmet created a new fashion by his parodies, producing in the most ingenious way criticisms of the work of other authors each in his own characteristic style. Another well-known and talented humorous poet of this type was Halid Nihad.

Playwrights appeared, who sometimes adapted the works of others and sometimes wrote original dramas. The “Darülbedayi,” a theatrical school, was founded. Beside Reshat Nuri Güntekin, İbnürrefik Ahmet Nurredin, and Musahip Zâde Celal, who have written highly original works, two poets, Halit Fahri and Yusuf Ziya, composed two plays in verse, both of which were received with enthusiasm. And all these plays were produced with success at the new theatre.

Outside the galaxy of stars of this school of authors there are other eminent names, such as that of Mehmet Akif, poet of spiritual life and fire, imbued with the ideals of Islam, whose poetical works appeared under the general title of *Safahat* or *The Aspects*. He painted in flowing verse a series of sharply realistic pictures, which provide not only a criticism of moral and social weakness but have, too, a romantic and religious appeal. To this poet came the honour years later of being called on to recite in public the Hymn of Independence. Another talented poet was Midhat Amal, a warm friend of Mehmet Akif, of whom he wrote a most appreciative biography. More recently, Midhat Amal gave us the novel entitled *The Third Istanbul*, which evokes pictures of a social period in

the ancient capital, with its mingled traditions both of the revolutionary and of the international spirit, the whole intelligently conceived and described in bold relief.

Nevertheless, the outstanding characteristic of this period remains incontestably the trend towards the greater use and development of a Turkish vocabulary in all forms of literary expression that was sponsored by the aforesaid school "Millî edebiyat," or "National Literature." The finest productions of this school appeared between 1914 and 1918, during the first World War. Thus one may say to-day that the decline of the Turkish Empire was the dawn of the national literature.

The result of the World War was unfavourable to the Turkish Empire. She was despoiled of what had been left of her subject territories, and the capital itself was occupied by the Allies after the armistice of Mondoros. Her army reduced by the victors, her people exhausted by a succession of bloody wars and bad methods of administration, her government still swaddled in antiquated conceptions which made it incapable of undertaking any radical reorganization, her sovereign looking only to the safety of his throne; thenceforth her empire had lost all its prestige, and its final hour had struck. But the Turkish nation was full of strength and vitality, and was not prepared to resign itself to share the fate of the Sultan Vahideddin. The breath of patriotism roused the soul of a nation which, in past centuries, has often played so great a rôle in history. There was a determination to be free. And the national feeling in Anatolia found its soul and outward expression under the wise and enlightened guidance of that immortal captain Atatürk.

After the victory of Turkish arms the history of the country began to flow in a new channel. The Turkish Republic, a modern state founded on the principle of national sovereignty, was established in Anatolia with its capital at Ankara. Instead of an empire, Turkey had become a united, homogeneous and free nation in its own independent country.

A new era came into being with the new state. Vast horizons were opening up, and in consequence a series of reforms were introduced to draw up the new contours of the state as a national, democratic, *étatiste*, secular and revolutionary republic. The dynamic inspiration of these changes naturally made itself felt also in intellectual movements, in culture and in art. From the very first, dualism in education was abolished *medresseh* (religious colleges), and later the *tekke* or Dervish foundations, were closed and universal secular education was established.

But by far the most important reform was the alteration in the characters of the Turkish alphabet. This was a fundamental, and indeed in modern times almost unique, change. For the old characters based on the Arabic alphabet were substituted new ones based on the Roman script. This alphabet is much more suited to the genius of the Turkish language, since not only is it so much easier to learn that it contributes to a higher standard of literacy among the general population, but also it facilitates the elimination of a number of Arabo-Persian synonyms that for centuries had been creeping into Turkish, and there formed an alien settlement that one might call a linguistic "foreign concession." Thus phrase-

ology has been freed and is becoming succinct, clear and thoroughly Turkish.

The introduction of the new alphabet had other vital consequences. Atatürk had founded the Turkish Association for Linguistic Research and also the Turkish Association for Historical Research. The scientific efforts of the first of these institutions were directed towards research into the nature of the Turkish language and into its folklore; it developed the necessary technical terms and prepared a new dictionary. Meanwhile, the second body was engaged in enlarging the horizons and conceptions of the nature of Turkish history; a study which, one should explain, had, from Imperial days, not confined itself to the Ottoman period, for though that was a sufficiently remarkable and brilliant epoch, it formed only one chapter in the whole history of the Turkish nation. Both Associations continue their work to-day and enjoy the protection and encouragement of the distinguished head of the state, His Excellency Ismet İnönü.

These efforts were supplemented later by the institution of the "Halkevi," the "People's Houses," which are cultural centres, and by an academy of dramatic art.

Translations from the literature of the world have entered on a new era. The masterpieces of other nations have been rendered into Turkish. André Gidé, André Maurois, Pierre Loti, Anatole France, Emile Zola, Guy de Maupassant, Gustave Flaubert, Balzac, Mérimée, Stendhal, Musset, Lamartine, Baudelaire, Victor Hugo, Bernadin de Saint Pierre, Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Racine, Corneille, Molière, La Fontaine, Schiller, Goethe, Dickens, Edgar Allan Poe, Oscar Wilde, Byron, Shakespeare, Gorki, Tchekoff, Tolstoi, Dostoievsky, Turgenieff, Lermontoff, Pushkin, Gogol, Gabrielle d'Annunzio, Ibsen, and even one work by Zilahy Lajos, can now be read in Turkish.

This work of translation has not been confined only to the work of modern authors and recent masterpieces; it has covered also works of the Renaissance period, such as those of Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccia, and the classics of the ancient world—Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, Herodotus, and certain plays of Æschylus, of Euripides and of Aristophanes, Virgil, Horace, Tacitus and Ovid. This huge and growing library opens wide horizons before Turkish youth, which thus comes into contact with the greatest thought of each country and of all ages, from the moderns to the humanists of the age of the Renaissance, and thence back to the sources of Classical antiquity.

The art of oratory has also gained much. The days of passionate struggle and unshaken faith in an ultimate deliverance, of deep joy over victory and national independence, and then of great social and political reform, brought Turkey two great orators—Kemal Atatürk and Ismet İnönü.

Turkish literature to-day is represented by eminent novelists, essay writers, critics, poets and playwrights, such as Halide Edip, Yakup Kadri, Resat Nuri Güntekin, the last named a younger author than the others, a novelist with a charming and piquant style, a fastidious writer of short stories, which are very popular, and the author of successful plays as well. All three authors have been translated into foreign languages. Among

prose writers of artistic distinction is Falih Rifki Atay, who holds a foremost place for his concise, spirited, brilliant and amazingly colourful style. Another author of exceptional worth is Abdülhak Şinasi Hissar, who has made a name for himself in recent years. He has just published a novel entitled *Fahim Bey and Ourselves*, which is a psychological analysis of a very acute character. The same author quite recently produced another superb study of recollection and of analytical description of the nature of reality. He called it *Moonlight on the Bosphorus*. It describes a pleasure cruise by night of sailing boats, drifting languidly in fleets over the sparkling waters of the Bosphorus, which seems even more wonderful under the magical rays of the moon, and among them, in rowing boats, move slowly the flares of a concert party playing Turkish music. It is a scene of pleasure after the manner, one is tempted to say, of Watteau's "Embarkation for the Isle of Cythera." This multitude, as they give themselves up to the enchantment of the shimmering waters, the languishing whispers of the ripples and the spell of the passionate music, move through a world of rapturous delight, which takes shifting forms like a fairy vision through three hundred pages or more. It is a book which will evoke the appreciation of the most refined and exacting taste.

The field of literary criticism and the essay has been cultivated more deeply and fruitfully of late years. The outstanding personalities here have been Hassan Aali Yücel, Minister of Public Instruction, poet and essayist; Nurullah Ataç, influential literary critic; and İsmail Habib, author of studies in the last century of Turkish writing and of a comparative survey of Turkish and Western literature through the centuries.

The Turkish language and the history of its literature have an eminent exponent in Professor Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, while a large number of valuable studies and monographs on popular poets, legends and folklore have been published by other writers.

Some gallant young poets have appeared, such as Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Kemalettin Kâmi, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Yaşar Nabi, Hamdi Tanpınar, Muhip Dranas, and they promise to develop a new and happy strain of poetry. Thanks to their admirable talent, in Turkish verse to-day you can pass through all the subtle shades of feeling that range from homesickness, the weariness of unsatisfied desire, or the soft melancholy that rises from a sense of the passage of time, to heroic aspirations towards beauty and perfection, the glow of energy and the mystery of the secret dreams of the human soul. This verse is full not only of melody but also of vigour and feeling.

Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Vedat Nedim Tör have written plays, the one in verse, the others in prose, in which fine perceptions are finely expressed.

As the result of the united and powerful effort of all these artists, obstructions to art, which were a source of anxiety to men of letters a generation ago, seem to-day as though they had never even existed, and the ground is cleared. Turkish verse and phrase, disencumbered of their foreign finery, to-day appear fresher and more attractive in their simplicity. This verse and these phrases use a strong and light structure to

bear the true æsthetic sense and the essential meaning of the words, which are no longer over-weighted with borrowed luxuriance. Simple language replaces flowery epithets and metaphors. The abyss which for centuries lay between the intellectual and the popular poet has been to a great extent spanned. The union of the two types seems to be daily achieved in the new national poetry. Turkish prose reaches wider and wider circles of the public, now that it is becoming better adapted to express its message. One is no longer groping in the dark for a path to follow. The path is found, that means through which a living art ought always to keep in contact with the soul of the people, for that contact is the secret of its force and originality.

Enriched by the treasures of its long tradition and by a wide measure of comprehension of the literature of men of other races, Turkish literature to-day is going forward. I have named to you some of the leading authors whose works are the proof of this fact. And the work of youth seems to contain the promise of yet greater successes to come.

With all that, however, modern Turkish literature, far from being content with past achievements, is continually engaged in self-criticism. For in her flight she aspires to the pride of reaching her ideal, of expressing the whole soul and personality of the nation, and of becoming the mirror which faithfully reflects the innermost life of the country, and thus of winning the glory of true and complete originality. Crowned with that shining aureole, she will take her rightful place in the literature of the world.

THE LAWRENCE MEMORIAL MEDAL, 1945

THE Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal has been awarded in 1945 to Miss U. Graham Bower.

Miss Ursula Graham Bower, after a visit to the Manipur area in 1938, in March, 1940, settled at Laisong, a village of the Nzemi Naga tribe, with the intention of collecting material for a monograph. The tribe she selected was so naturally suspicious of strangers that no European had ever won their confidence. But Miss Bower, living entirely alone among them, by sympathy and simple medical treatment, succeeded in converting their antagonism into a loyalty which was to prove invaluable.

In November, 1943, the Japanese threat to Assam and the Naga Hills area became real, and when intelligence from that area was difficult to obtain Miss Graham Bower, on her own initiative, called upon the 14th Army for food, arms and signal facilities to support an intelligence screen already established by her, covering a portion of the approaches to the Naga Hills. Food and arms were provided, and an improvised wireless signal section was despatched forthwith from Army Headquarters. Miss Graham Bower had the unique privilege of having a signal section of Royal Signals named after her.

By means of these military facilities provided for her, she maintained a most efficient "watch and ward" throughout her area. Within six weeks she had established posts of armed Nzemi Nagas on a line fifty miles long, and she passed back to the military authorities much valuable and accurate information. Her intelligence organization also provided guides for military parties operating in the area. She continued to control this organization single-handed with the greatest efficiency, and did invaluable work by preventing the infiltration of enemy agents. To appreciate the tact required for this task, it is necessary to realize that interspersed among the Nzemi Nagas are villages of an entirely different tribe called Kukis. The Kukis and the Nzemis are hereditary enemies, and the arming of Nzemis would have aroused old feuds had it not been for Miss Bower's influence with both tribes.

By April, 1944, the Japanese had penetrated deeply into Manipur and the Naga Hills, and enemy outposts were established only one day's march from Miss Bower's headquarters at Laisong. But Miss Bower declined to fall back, and instead threw out a screen of observation posts and organized a system of warning by beacon and runner in case the enemy should strike at the railway, as it seemed probable they would. This organization proved most valuable during the two months for which it was necessary. The fact that Miss Graham Bower remained in the danger area had a high moral effect on the Nagas, who throughout showed the utmost loyalty and devotion to the British cause. By the autumn of 1944 the need for this organization ceased to exist, and the military authorities made use of Miss Bower's experience and local knowledge in another capacity.

In 1938, Miss Bower gave an account to the Society of her first journey in the Manipur area. To this she alludes in a letter of February 1, 1945: "Had it not been for the encouragement and help given me by the Society in 1938, I should never have dreamed of taking up anthropology and returning to Assam to what has proved to be a very great experience.

"The credit for anything that we did must go, not to me, but to the hillmen who formed the executive staff and the rank and file of the organization. All were illiterate villagers, faced with a war they could hardly understand and arms and weapons against which they had no defence. Knowing the odds against them, afraid for themselves and their families, they made their choice and stayed with us. This particularly applies to the headquarters interpreters and scouts, all of whom knew they would be killed, probably by torture, if captured by the enemy. They did not know that arrangements had been made to evacuate them if the area were overrun, and when the crisis was approaching each man asked for short leave. I did not learn until later that this was to settle their affairs and arrange for the guardianship of their families, as few of them expected to survive. All returned to duty and saw the thing through. It was courage and personal integrity of a high order which kept these men true to what seemed then to be very much the losing side. When the war moved east our organization was disbanded, and a number of the men have come on with me to another war job, in which they are doing excellent work."

ARABIC EDITION OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL MAP OF EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

Scale 1 : 11,000,000. Royal Geographical Society.

The long-delayed appearance of this very convenient size of map will be welcomed. It is, so far as possible, the exact facsimile of the English edition, with Arabic substituted for Roman lettering. Owing to the rather uncommon projection used, the area covered extends from Iceland and Portugal in the west to Honan and Burma in the east, from the North Cape and Outer Mongolia to British Somaliland in the south. This has the advantage of including in one map all the countries contiguous to Arabia and the Middle East, as well as practically the whole of Europe. The map is designed to show physical contours, and the principal railways are shown and the names of cities, which serves to emphasize at a glance the concentrations of population and traffic in certain areas. It is perhaps a pity that the lines of sea and air communications could not have been indicated also; but that would probably have been to detract from the admirable clarity of the map.

The Arabic lettering is a joy to the eye—and Arabic here means Arabic in the strictest sense, since neither the Persian, the old Turkish nor the Urdu alphabets have been drawn on for supplementary consonants. The only criticism possible is one inherent in the use of the same scale for both the English and the Arabic versions of the map. A size of type that is quite clear with Roman lettering becomes hard to decipher when Arabic is substituted. In the smallest place names, for instance, the dots that would distinguish *n* from *b* or *t* are apt at times to try to disappear into the mountains of the background; and to the Arab student Birmingham, Munich or Bolzano may not be at once, and inevitably, themselves. Such, however, is the accuracy of the lettering, that to enlarge the script by using a magnifying glass is instantly to resolve any ambiguity.

So accurate a map, with its authoritative and consistent system of orthography, is an achievement of which the Royal Geographical Society has every reason to be proud, and those who use it have every reason to be grateful.

REVIEWS

Iraq Irrigation Handbook : Part I. Euphrates. Compiled by Ahmed Sousa, under the direction of J. D. Atkinson. Published at Baghdad by the Government of Iraq, 1944. 10" x 7". Pp. 111, with 35 tables, 18 figures and 1 plate, also, in a portfolio 15" x 14", 16 other plates. Price not stated.

During the last quarter-century the contacts of the outside world with Iraq have increased greatly, but for most of that time there has been a serious, although a very natural, lack of accurate and compact factual accounts of the social and economic life of the country, such as could be rapidly digested by, say, a visitor to Baghdad or a financier in Europe who was invited to interest himself in the development of Iraq.

A dozen years ago the admirable British Admiralty Handbook of Mesopotamia, published in 1916, was in parts rapidly becoming out of date, and reference could usefully be made otherwise to a few works only, such as the British Reports on Iraq to the League of Nations, Sir Ernest Dowson's Report on Land Tenure, and the Iraqi Public Works Department's Notes for Motorists. To the list of such publications has now been added one for whose preparation credit must first be given to Mr. J. D. Atkinson, the Director-General of the Irrigation Department, who very fortunately had already undertaken the same task in respect of Egypt, when a member of the Irrigation Service there. Dr. Ahmed Sousa has an unusual record for an engineer, having gained in the U.S.A. degrees in science, art, and philosophy, which fact must have made him an obvious choice for the handling of the material now presented, of which, one assumes, there will be an Arabic version also. Mr. F. S. Hardy has helped in the compilation, and this, to those who know him, adds much to the value of the published work.

The first section of the book is the one that will most interest the general reader. It sets forth what is known of the extent of the cultivable areas, potential and actual, of the kingdom; quotes four estimates of the population; provides statistics of the crops grown and exported; and discusses the climatology of Iraq, using, amongst other data, some provided by the national Meteorological Service.

The rest of the book deals only with the basin of the Euphrates, but we are told that a second volume is to discuss the area drained by the Tigris. We are given hydrological information, and then details of river works of flood-prevention and those to aid navigation and land communications. An account is given of the works for the control of the river, including the unexecuted portion of the Habbaniyah flood-relief scheme. Numerous facts are quoted about the several canal systems. The book ends with an account of the Lower Euphrates, where the river twice ceases to exist as a single channel and instead ramifies, forming on each occasion a delta whose topography still changes from year to year. There are surely few other famous rivers that are easily accessible to European geographers and geologists, where Nature can so clearly be seen at work, remoulding the face of the earth. How fluvial and agricultural conditions in these deltas should be stabilized is a fascinating problem, from the discussion of which the book properly refrains.

A helpful index has been provided.

The Handbook should be of value to many officers of the Government services, especially those concerned with revenue, land settlement, agriculture and communications, as well as irrigation. They will find it an effective first

answer to many of the questions likely to be fired at them by visiting experts, research students, financiers, public works contractors, and other inquirers.

These columns are hardly the place in which to discuss in detail the mass of material in the book, and but few comments will therefore be offered on its text.

Although it deals with nothing but physical facts, we should like to have seen it include a quotation of that part of Article 3 of the Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, which safeguards the established user of Euphrates water in Iraq for agricultural purposes against any ill-effect that might be caused by new works on the same river in Syria.

We are reminded of this Agreement by a statement on page 35 that the minimum gauge-reading ever recorded at Deir-el-Zor is 0.00. This gauge was established at the cost of Iraq, and with the help of Syria and France, to provide for Iraq early warning of flood conditions in the river up-country. Unfortunately it was set with its zero at a level above that to which the river was capable of falling, and the river did in fact eventually so fall, thus yielding minus readings. Should any discussion between Iraq and Syria occur about the Euphrates, it will almost certainly relate to low-stage readings, whose correct observation and recording is therefore of great importance to both countries concerned. At first, perhaps in 1930, these readings of an exceptionally low river were quoted as zero, day after day, presumably because the local gauge-reader held of minus readings that "there ain't no sich thing"! That difficulty was overcome, and a number of minus readings were obtained thereafter. Unless the zero of the gauge has been altered in level, one of these should, one would expect, have appeared on page 35. If the gauge zero has, however, been lowered, then the lowering must have been cut fine, since a reading of 0.00 has apparently occurred, despite the new gauge-setting.

Both Mr. Atkinson and Dr. Sousa in their prefaces appear to reproach their predecessors for not having published before now such information as is contained in the Handbook, although the Director-General admits that he himself spent four years trying to compile a work of the kind but made little progress. However, each section of the book is accompanied by a bibliography whose items include many contributed in one form or another by those predecessors, and one may doubt whether any reproach was in fact intended.

In more than one country the Irrigation Department tends to be known as the Silent Service, and this was almost certainly bound to be the case in Iraq in the conditions of the past twenty-five years. Not only were suitable staff and time for research often lacking, but, more important still, in many directions the material was incomplete or inaccurate. An attempt was, in fact, made in 1928 to produce something like the present Handbook, but was abandoned, as the results were thought unworthy of publication. Even the present book is driven into offering four separate and different estimates of the population. There is, nevertheless, much greater agreement between these than between the two censuses said to have been made recently, which, it is rumoured, showed a population of two million when man-power was in question and fourteen million when sugar-rationing was contemplated!

It is only since 1928, for example, that one has seen adequate topographical and contour surveys made of the irrigable areas, and the hydrological survey systematized and rendered continuous and reasonably comprehensive. Everything that could be uttered on the subject of irrigation had accordingly, for years after 1928, to be issued cautiously and on a limited scale. Nevertheless, the coral insects were active though out of sight, and it is, one suggests, much due to them, the earlier engineers, that the reef has now risen above the waters and exposed itself boldly.

There are a number amongst those who visit Iraq who wish to know all that

can be stated reliably about the numerous remains of ancient irrigation works and their dependent human settlements which are scattered throughout the country. The Handbook gives but half a page (page 10) to the subject, and very suitably stops at that. As the mapping and the photography from the air of the country progress, it may become possible for something useful to be published on the subject. Present evidence inclines one meanwhile to think that at times the works may have been very inefficient ones, and sometimes so much so as to deserve the title of Blank's Folly carried by more than one ambitious structure in the British Isles. When it comes to populations, agricultural yields and tax returns, we have surely emerged from the babel of war propaganda sufficiently recently to be excused any scepticism we feel as to the accuracy of the statistics provided so readily in these respects by the ancient historians.

Happy may be the country that has no history in the past, but happier still will it be if it has some facts about itself in the present. Nevertheless, as Lord Kelvin has reminded us, we never know much about anything until we begin to measure it. The statistics of pumping installations on page 4 are a case in point. The leap in the total between 1927 and 1929 probably represents an energetic verification in those years of the figures supplied, quite as much as the actual rapid increase of the installations which was admittedly then occurring. One recalls a talk at that time with a native of Basrah, who based much argument on the assumed existence of ten thousand pumps, whereas one-fifth of that number was the truth.

L'appétit vient en mangeant. It is to be hoped that the second volume, about the Tigris basin, will become available shortly.

Jenghis Khan. By W. Yan. Hutchinson International Authors, Ltd. 9s. 6d.

Careless binding must cause annoyance to readers of this book. It may be that I was unfortunate in my copy, where pages 129 to 145 run in the following sequence: 129, 132, 129, 132, 133, 136, 133, 136, 137, 140, 137, 140, 141, 144, 141, 144, 145. But such workmanship does not predispose the reader in the book's favour. As a matter of fact, the consecutive pages tell an excellent story, packed with history, which can only be the result of deep research. A living picture is presented of the red-bearded Khan, of his sons and the military leaders, whose armies were defeated by the Golden Horde. A thin thread of romance runs through the story in the love affair of Gul Jamil and Kara Kouchar, the Black Horseman of the plains, but the book's chief attraction is the careful and historically correct description of the various campaigns of Jenghis Khan. There seems little doubt that his policy of terrorism inspired the late (?) and unlamented Adolf Hitler. The Polish campaign was the lineal and mechanized descendant of the Kaghan's war against the Muhammadan power at Bukhara and Samarkand. The astounding speed of movement and scorched earth policy were the inventions of Jenghis Khan.

His code of laws, represented today only fragmentally in the Dzazak (or great Yassa), are quoted, but incompletely, as a larger portion of this code of laws is in existence than is acknowledged in the book.

The Khoresm Shah received an envoy from the Mongols, who is asked, "Does the law of Jenghis Khan permit the Tatars to rob and cheat the peoples of other non-Tatar tribes?" "Of course," he replied, "it is indeed considered by them an act of virtue and valour to rob or kill a man belonging to a tribe other than those of the Tatars." True Nazi doctrine. With all the brutality and despotism which distinguished the Mongol people a strain of poetry is evident in their lives. Messages to the great Khan were not sent written on parchment, but committed to verse and music to be sung to the Imperial recipient. An example of this poetic strain is a translation from the Mongol where three travellers "hold on to each other by the girdle of friendship."

This book may be put into the same class as *The Earth is the Lord's* (Caldwell), and undoubtedly presents a true picture of that devastation which is epitomized in Jenghis Khan and his Mongol hordes.

H. ST. C. S.

From Tunisia to Normandy. By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Hutchinson.

The author of this work has a record of war service—he was wounded on more than one occasion—that few of us can rival. Added to this, the books he has written prove that he is a master of the subjects with which he deals. Accordingly we can give a warm welcome to his latest work, *From Tunisia to Normandy*, albeit it will only be possible to pick out a few of the many campaigns in this brief review.

To start with the *Second German Offensive*, we read of the great drama of Stalingrad, the key city on the holy Volga, which won immortal fame for the defenders. To those of us who know the Caucasus and the priceless oilfields of Baku, it seemed to be a great feat of arms, ranking indeed among the greatest of this global contest, that a relatively small Russian garrison, supported by very brave factory hands, could defeat and finally, with outside help, capture large German forces. To quote: "The city had to suffer a terrific bombardment . . . but in the process grew stronger and stronger . . . a house reduced to rubble is more highly resistant." Actually when matters had reached a critical stage, the Red Army from the north-west turned the tables on the Germans, who on January 31, 1943, surrendered. The sword of honour presented by His Majesty King George to Stalingrad was nobly won.

It is perhaps worth noting that the capture of that city would not necessarily have opened the way to the oilfields of Baku. The great Caucasus range actually reaches the Caspian Sea at Derbent, which is suitably named "Shut Door." Lacking a fleet, which Russia fortunately possessed, the Germans could not have passed. When I visited this town, which has been famous down the ages for its strategical strength, I realized its great importance.

We now turn to Burma, where Brigadier Orde Wingate, who had greatly distinguished himself as a guerilla leader in Abyssinia, was suddenly summoned to India by Lord Wavell. There he was given instructions to organize a commando for jungle warfare in the forests of Burma. In his first expedition he covered 1,200 miles in 58 days. Not only did he secure valuable information and make useful contacts with the native tribesmen, but he spread alarm among the Japanese, hundreds of whom were killed, while 15,000 of their troops wasted their energies in making fruitless attempts to capture the Chindits, as they were termed. Throughout, the force was fed and supplied with munitions, etc., by air. Nor was reconnaissance the only military operation. Far from it, many miles of railway and important bridges near Mogaung were destroyed, and local levies were enrolled. Major-General Orde Wingate was killed in a flying accident in the course of operations, but the officers and men whom he had trained continued to inflict serious losses on the enemy.

Colonel Bernard Fergusson, who worked under Wingate, clearly showed his admiration for his dead leader in his remarkable work *Beyond the Chindwin*, where his heartwhole appreciation is summed up in glowing sentences. It is sad when great men like the late Sir Mortimer Durand and Sir Percy Cox have no living descendants in the third generation, so that we may warmly congratulate Mrs. Orde Wingate as being the mother of a son who, we hope, has inherited the outstanding abilities of his father.

On July 10, 1943, following upon the great victory in North Africa, with the surrender of a quarter of a million of enemy troops, a formidable Anglo-

American armada landed in Sicily, preceded by aerial attacks on Italy, Sardinia, and, more especially, on Pantellaria, which latter island with its garrison of 15,000 men surrendered. It "remains the only victory achieved by air forces alone." But we must not forget that it was officially recognized that, without the work of the Malta Air Force, Sicily would not have been captured. Indeed, the war record of Malta has never been surpassed.

The carefully organized scheme of making several landings was, generally speaking, successful, and Sicily's conquest caused the overthrow of Mussolini on July 25. It also led to the withdrawal of the important German force from Sicily. To conclude this brief account, in less than six weeks the Germans had been driven from the island after incurring very heavy losses, while much credit is due to the British and American troops who, in spite of the difficulties of the terrain and the stubborn defence of the enemy, won complete success. On September 3, the day on which the Allies landed in Italy, an armistice with that country was secretly signed.

With the very limited space available for this review I have perforce only referred to a few outstanding campaigns in different sections of this work. I can, however, strongly recommend it to members of the Royal Central Asian Society, since everywhere General Rowan-Robinson has proved his mastery of the many campaigns with which he has dealt. The maps are both numerous and helpful.

P. M. SYKES.

Defence is Our Business. By Brigadier J. G. Smyth, V.C., M.C. Hutchinson and Co. 10s. 6d.

Brigadier Smyth is right: Defence *is* our business, the business of every man and woman in this country. It is the need paramount. Without its sure shield all our plans for moral uplift, social security, even for survival, fall to the ground. It is an idle ploy for Party to belabour Party for failure to furnish this protection. It is for us—the people—to see that it is provided. But the people cannot act in this sense unless they have some understanding of our military problems; and this the book under review, if they would but read it, would ensure for them, for it is couched in clear and not too technical terms. At least it would afford them the necessary foundation for thought and judgment.

The author deals with such matters as the main lessons of the present war, the post-war defence policy of Britain and the Empire, leaders and leadership and weapons and research; and he succeeds in giving them adequate attention in the narrow compass of 91 pages.

First of the military measures he recommends is the establishment of a Ministry of Defence.

"The main alteration I would advocate," he writes, "is the introduction of the principle of combined staffs. And by that I do not mean officers of one Service merely attached to another for advice and liaison, but in all important areas, permanent combined staffs with a supreme commander appointed from one of the three Services. It is this same principle which should be introduced from the very top of our defence organization if we would bring the three Services into closer co-operation, eliminate inter-Service competition and overlapping—and save money.

At the head of affairs we must have a Minister of Defence with a strong Defence Council. The most important member of this Defence Council will be the Chief of the Combined Defence Staff, who will be selected from one of the three Services. The Combined Defence Staff, under the general direction of the Minister of Defence, will direct and control all our armed forces as one National Defence Force.

It is quite impossible to plan for war, and organize for war, on a basis of three co-equal war ministers and three co-equal Chiefs of Staff. We have tried it—and into what a mess it landed us before the present war!"

The correctness of this view may be gauged from the all-pervasive anxiety dis-

played by the nation during Mr. Churchill's dangerous illnesses. In him, as a leader versed in war, we were singularly fortunate. Behind him there was neither a man nor an organization fitted for the expert, concerted and impartial direction of the three Services in the greatest conflict of all time. And, equally in peace, is such direction a vital need.

Of the size and nature of our post-war fighting Services, Brigadier Smyth has much of interest to say. In general, he would have a considerable decentralization of authority and a high flexibility of force. He realizes that speed in a stroke is often more valuable than weight and, to this end, he would like to see large airborne forces in England and in the Middle-East and secondary forces of similar nature in Ceylon and Singapore.

His chapter on our military leaders is not easily condensed. It will meet with a varied reception according to taste and experience. At the top, he places Sir Alan Brooke; and that view is steadily gaining ground.

Of weapons, he says: "So far as the tank is concerned (and the same may be said of other weapons) the great lesson for us is the difficulty which a nation experiences in catching up in experiment and design once it has dropped behind, as we did between wars. There is a time-lag of years between getting an efficient design off the drawing board and into mass production."

He would like conscription, but the plans he suggests could be applied without it; and he rightly points out that conscription alone will not save us any more than it saved France, unless the nation takes its defences seriously to heart. H. R.-R.

Anna and the King of Siam. By Margaret Landon. Illustrated by Margaret Ayer. John Day Co., New York. Pp. 391.

This book is not precisely an original work. The authoress, who spent ten years in Siam, explains that it is based on the two books written by Mrs. Anna Leonowens: *The English Governess at the Siamese Court* and *The Romance of the Harem*; both published in the United States. The publication of the first book apparently gave deep offence to the Siamese Government. Both books were extremely diffuse, and Mrs. Landon has condensed the contents into a concise narrative, adding much information that she obtained from an old American lady who met Mrs. Leonowens on her arrival in the U.S.A. She was also supplied with copies of letters and other material by Mrs. Leonowens' granddaughter, and she found the first volume of King Mongkut's letters among the unlisted Siamese texts in the Library of Congress. The present volume is thus, as she says herself, "75 per cent. fact and 25 per cent. fiction based on fact." The general result is excellent. She has produced a most interesting and vivid narrative. It describes the penultimate phase in the history of feudal Siam—a world which has disappeared so completely that it is difficult to believe that it existed in the sixties of the last century, and continued in a modified form for thirty years longer, under King Chulalongkorn, the greatest monarch of the Mahachakri dynasty.

Mrs. Leonowens' career was unusual. Her parents sailed to India from England in 1840. Her father, an officer in the British Army, was killed in action shortly after his arrival, and her mother remarried out there. She arrived in India in November, 1849, and two years later, at the age of seventeen, she fell in love with and married an officer in the Commissariat Dept. They were transferred to Singapore in 1856, just before the Indian Mutiny. About a year later her husband died suddenly, leaving her in very straitened circumstances. To support herself and her two young children, she started a small school, which attracted the attention of the Siamese Consul in Singapore. He wrote to King Mongkut of Siam, with the result that she received a letter written by the King in his curious English style, offering her the post of governess to the Royal children in Bangkok, who at that time were sixty-four in number! Although the salary was meagre, she accepted the offer and arrived in March, 1862.

The narrative gives a most realistic picture of conditions in the Royal Palace, which covered an area of more than one square mile, and was, in reality, a small town. Within the inner portion, known as the Inside, dwelt King Mongkut, sur-

rounded by 9,000 women—wives, concubines, women judges, and policewomen, amazon guards and female slaves. The general conditions of the country are also indicated, though Mrs. Leonowens had few opportunities of travelling in the interior. The country was controlled by princes and feudal lords owning vast numbers of branded slaves; respect for rank was extreme and was manifested by abject prostration and crawling on the ground. Mrs. Leonowens saw and described the picturesque and gorgeous Court ceremonial, and the solemn Buddhist religious ceremonies. She noted the curious Brahman soothsayers and astrologers, who played an important part in Court life down to the present day. She also saw the darker side—jealousy, intrigues, spying, poisoning, and the frightful cruelties perpetrated by Royal command on officials acting in the monarch's name.

Mrs. Leonowens was in intimate contact with King Mongkut, as she not only taught his numerous children and some of his wives and consorts, but she also acted as his confidential secretary for foreign correspondence. These tasks proved so exacting that her health was finally undermined. She was often in conflict with the King's will and temperament, sometimes on account of her humanitarian zeal. The character of this Oriental despot was very complex, but the general portrait given in this book can hardly fail to be repellent to most readers; he had, however, a remarkable career. In 1824 his half-brother more or less usurped the Siamese throne; Mongkut then left his wife and two children and retired into the Buddhist priesthood until 1851. During this period he studied deeply and became a fine Oriental scholar, absorbing also a great deal of European science and literature. After his accession, in spite of the opposition of reactionary elements, he laid the foundation of modern Siam, and, as described in this book, he assured the independence of his country against the aggressions of the French in Cambodia. At certain periods the British incursions into the Malay States were also a source of trouble and anxiety to him. Like Japan, Siam stepped direct from the Middle Ages into the modern world. We should remember the severity of criminal law in Western Europe even down to the early part of the nineteenth century, and also that slavery was still existing in the United States and in Russia when Mrs. Leonowens arrived in Siam.

Her happiest hours were spent in school with her young Royal pupils. Here she strove not only to teach them English, but also to implant in their minds the principles of justice, humanity and progress. Twenty years after her departure from Siam, it was a source of pride to her to learn that the great reformer, King Chulalongkorn, son and successor of King Mongkut, declared that all that he ever learnt of good in his life was due to her teaching.

A peculiar feature in Siamese Royal circles was to be found in the establishment of a second king, who was a gifted and popular member of the Royal Family. Owing to the jealousy of his brother Mongkut, he was kept in a state of semi-imprisonment and neglect for many years. His death under mysterious circumstances is described.

Mrs. Leonowens left Siam with her young son Louis in 1867. In spite of various differences and misunderstandings, the Siamese King appeared to place implicit trust in her integrity and judgment, and was most unwilling to let her depart. King Mongkut himself died very suddenly in October of the following year. Her son Louis eventually returned to serve as a cavalry officer in the Siamese Army under King Chulalongkorn. At the end of his career the grateful King bestowed on him considerable teak concessions in Northern Siam, from which eventually the well-known British teak company of L. T. Leonowens was formed.

This attractive book is illustrated with delightful and accurate pen and ink drawings by Margaret Ayer.

D. B-B.

The Modern Prison System of India. By Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Barker, C.I.E., O.B.E., M.A., M.D., B.C., I.M.S. (Retd.).

The Department of Criminal Science, of Cambridge University, gave India first place in their plan for the comparative study of Criminal Justice in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Colonel Barker brings to the subject not only some thirty years' experience of jail administration and penal reform, but also an understanding of the special problems of that great sub-continent, with the differences of race, creed,

language and social customs in its teeming population, and the handicaps of financial stringency and political unrest. With a foreword by Lord Hailey, a Preface by Professor Winfield, and an Editorial Note, the book teems with interest from first page to last. Its main object is to study the report of the India Jails Commission of 1919-20, and the measures taken to implement it.

This committee—of officials and non-officials—first visited prisons in other lands, including England, Scotland and the United States; in January, 1920, it began its work in India, visiting the Presidencies, most of the Provinces, Burma and the Andaman Islands. It defined the aim of prison administration as “the prevention of further crime, and the restoration of the criminal to society as a reformed character.”

A summary of the recommendations is given. They are far-reaching. Every aspect of jail life, every means of making prisons what they should be, true “reformatories,” is considered.

Colonel Barker gives a history of reforms carried out in the twenty years following the publication of the Report, and in particular in 1939-1940. His remarks deserve study. Child offenders rightly have special consideration; they are the men and women of tomorrow—are they to be a credit or a debit to their country? “Children Acts,” Children’s Courts, Remand Homes, probation: all need further development. For the mentally defective and for adolescent criminals there should be special institutions, but for the latter (we note with pleasure) “if found incorrigible, or to be exercising a bad influence,” transfer to a juvenile jail should be possible. The length of sentence actually served should depend more on the likelihood of “making good” than on the offence committed.

There is criticism of the fact that in India persons sentenced to simple imprisonment “shall not be required to do any labour: though permitted to work, very few elect to do so. Many will support Colonel Barker’s contention that all forms of imprisonment should carry liability to do some form of labour, and that “a period of detention spent in complete idleness not only does no moral or physical good to the prisoner—it is definitely harmful.” Another noteworthy remark is that “a physical defect, sometimes remediable, often leads an individual to be anti-social.”

Among the bright spots in the picture is the account of the Lahore Borstal Institution, where 80-100 Boy Scouts, allowed to join in the annual Scout camp in the Himalayan foothills for a fortnight’s training, hold pride of place as “the cleanest and neatest on parade and in their tents,” and have on no single occasion abused their privilege. Then, in one female jail, the pupil teachers from a Women’s College voluntarily undertake to teach drill and games, and the women have training, not only in spinning, weaving and needlework, but also in first aid, mothercraft and child welfare; for the adolescents there is modified Borstal training, and they are keen Girl Guides. In Bengal, Women’s Social Service Institutes began to instruct female prisoners in suitable arts and crafts; education and outdoor games have been introduced. The Jails Committee recommended that all females save those with very short sentences should be concentrated in a special female jail in each Province, there to be separated according to classification, and (we hope) to receive instruction in arts and crafts.

Sir Louis Stuart, speaking for the United Provinces, contributes an interesting if grim note on murders of every type: murders for gain (perhaps of a few rupees), Agrarian murders, murders from jealousy, murders by paid assassins (in a case quoted the charge was strictly moderate—15s. each for four men, to be paid in advance, and the same sum on completion of their task).

Among matters calling for attention is the appointment of full-time superintendents for not only all central jails, but also for district jails with a population of over 300.

The important subject of Aid to Prisoners on Release is discussed. Among cases cited is that of a little lad of 8, turned out of the house by the grandfather who was his only relative. Being hungry, he took a few sweets from a barrow. No bail was forthcoming, and he had spent some weeks in jail under trial. Thanks to Colonel Barker, he was found a happy home. It would be interesting to know whether the grandfather was appropriately dealt with!

Colonel Barker concludes by saying that “there should be no conclusion to a

book on prison reform any more than to prison reform itself." Let us hope that those who in the near future preside over the destinies of India may share this view and carry it into effect. It is an uphill task, but well worth while.

M. G. A.

Fabian Colonial Essays. With an Introduction by A. Creech Jones, M.P., and edited by Dr. Rita Hinden. Geo. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 261. 8s. 6d. 1945.

The war has wrought immense changes of outlook in many fields of thought and action: in none, perhaps, more than in the inter-relationships of the peoples of the world. It is now widely realized that the security, economic well-being and happiness of the man whose contribution to the world-wide effort to save civilization is the production in some far corner of the earth of one of the raw materials for munitions, or as porter to the fighting forces ridding an island of the Pacific from Japanese domination, are intimately bound up with and affect those of the soldier or munition worker in a country of which he is completely ignorant. The growing public consciousness of the interdependence of man throughout the world, in the future as well as during the war, stressed by the well-nigh incredible speeding-up of communications in every quarter of the globe, urges the necessity for a thorough overhaul of the British colonial system. At this juncture the appearance of this little book of essays on various colonial problems by a dozen writers of known authority and first-hand experience is most felicitous. As stated in the Foreword, no attempt has been made to integrate the writers' views into any agreed approach to the problems under discussion: each essay stands alone. But the effect is to bring home to the reader the vastness of the field of effort to be faced for the right development of colonial dependencies, and he is prompted to face it with faith and courage. No longer is he who interests himself in colonial well-being a voice crying in the wilderness—and to be ignored as such: these essays are much less doctrinaire than earlier writings on colonial subjects, they are practical and to the point. In those of Sir Drummond Shiels, formerly Under-Secretary of State for India and for the Colonies, and of the widely experienced anthropologist Dr. Fortes, the reader is not only brought face to face with the difficulties to be surmounted, he is reminded, with intent, of the mistakes, even though well-meant, of the past.

A fundamental consideration in tackling the problems of the future of the colonies, to be faced by both public opinion and the Government, is that the whole basis of British financial relationships with other countries has been drastically changed. Britain is no longer a great creditor nation; to obtain the materials for a prodigious war equipment she has had to sell a large part of her foreign investments, with a consequent decline in interest due; her exports, both visible and invisible, have simultaneously fallen off. Obligated to purchase abroad what cannot be produced at home, Britain must export; and if the colonies are to be among her markets, their standard of living must needs be raised to enable them to purchase the goods available from the home country. But, as things are, the standard of living of the colonial empire is miserably low. The first part of the essay by Dr. Rita Hinden on "The Challenge of African Poverty" is heartrending, but there is a sense of fairness, and absence of prejudice on the part of the writer, implicit throughout that sets the reader's mind working without discouragement on the various remedies discussed. There is also a refreshing forthrightness and practicality about the statement in A. Creech Jones' Introduction: "The days are passing when policies can be made independent of the colonial peoples. If there are grave responsibilities on us there are responsibilities no less burdensome on the peoples concerned. . . . It is important that the people through their own free organizations should learn (from experience) and themselves work and plan for change."

Of other essays, J. F. Horrabin's "Geography and the British Empire" is an illuminating study of the growth of the Empire with a challenging conclusion. In "Some Problems of Tropical Economy" J. S. Furnivall writes chiefly from his experience as a Civil Servant in Burma, and discusses the means by which better education, better health and better agriculture can best be introduced to backward peoples. But he does not blink the immensity of the problems involved. "Their

solution will demand a sympathetic understanding, taxing to the utmost human knowledge and goodwill and calling for wide co-operative endeavour."

D. M. M.

Modern Exploration. F. Kingdon Ward. 124 pp. Published by Jonathan Cape at 6s.

The publishers state that the author's aim in writing this book "is to encourage the genuine young explorer," so I have tried to assess it from this point of view.

It was to me a disappointing book; it seemed that the author either says too much or too little, while in some places he tends to talk over the heads of his readers and in others to talk down to them in the manner of a master to his pupils. This is, I think, due to a wish to include as much as possible in a small space, and an emphasis on the "young" explorer rather than the needs of the general reader.

The book is divided into seven parts, dealing with all aspects of exploration and in all three dimensions.

In Part I, "Knowing the World," we are given a brief and interesting history of exploration from the earliest times. Emphasis is laid on the fact that exploration means travel plus observation and scientific record and not just travel alone. Gone are the days of the pioneer and the blazing of trails; to-day is the age of specialist and intensive study.

Part II, "The Land Surface," is the most interesting in the book, as the author is obviously at his ease and dealing with his own subject. He tells us how little of the world remains "unexplored," and yet how much can still be done by the specialist in adding to our knowledge of little known areas. It is no longer a question of being "the first white man" to make a certain journey (a phrase which the author condemns), but of being a painstaking observer of detail and a compiler of information acquired by travel. In the chapter on "Mountaineering" the author draws a firm line between climbing mountains and exploring them, and here makes special reference to the Everest expeditions. In this chapter he mentions Trisul (here spelt Trissul) as being in the Karakorum, when surely it is in Garhwal in the Central Himalayas.

Part III, "The Lithosphere," is an attempt to arouse enthusiasm in the exploration of the crust of the earth, but in such a short space this is difficult, and the treatment of the subject is such as either to arouse irritation in one who is at home in it or bewilderment in the mind of one who is not. It is too much a hotch-potch of knowledge really to be effective.

Parts IV and V, "The Hydrosphere" and "The Atmosphere," are again attempts to compress a large subject into a small space. However, in so far as they give an idea of what exploration in these elements can lead up to they do serve to fulfil the purpose of the book.

Part VI, "The World's Contents," again shows the author in his own element and one would gladly have had more of it. The single chapter of which this part is composed is called "Collecting," and shows how much the modern explorer still has to do to complete our knowledge of what the world contains. Again, however, there is the emphasis on the necessity for specialized knowledge.

Part VII takes us to archæology and shows how the explorer and archæologist can indeed be one, but again it is impressed upon us that it is rather a matter of detailed study than mere travel, and that the days of thrilling discoveries of new ancient sites are past. It is exploration in detail of known areas rather than the search for unknown ancient cities.

In conclusion, it is, I think, fair to say that the author has set out to discourage the "young explorer" who merely has the wanderlust, and to show that he must have chosen his subject and studied it in detail before ever he embarks on his travels. This book must crush the aspirations of the young free lance who hoped to win fame through exploration, and drives home the moral that the modern explorer must equip himself not only with elaborate material aids but also with the most detailed and specialized mental qualifications before he can hope to play his part in the field of modern exploration.

J. E. F. G.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE FRONTIER PROBLEM

A COMMENT ON "A SUGGESTED SOLUTION"

By LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR KERR FRASER-TYTLER, K.B.E., C.M.G., M.C.

In the January number of the *ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL* an anonymous writer puts forward a suggested solution of the Frontier Problem. The article came as something of a shock. So many things have happened since one last considered the frontier problem; one had almost forgotten that there still remains the vexed question of how to settle the tribes of the North-West Frontier of India. The majestic march of world events had temporarily obscured the fact that there still exists on the Indian border this scandalous anachronism of several hundred thousand armed men, some of whom owe a shadowy allegiance to the Afghan crown, but none of whom is subject, save in a remote degree, to any law but his own. It is high time that this blot on our Indian escutcheon was removed, but the removing of it is by no means easy.

The writer of the article expounds the problem in the following terms: "It is the problem of assimilating into one civilization a people who are alien to it in manners, customs, speech, and in everything else which distinguishes one civilization from another."

This exposition is in itself doubtful. "Civilization" is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as an "advanced stage of social development." It is difficult, if not impossible, to include the Pathan tribesman in such a definition. It is not always easy to say what is included in the term "civilization," but it is usually fairly easy to say what is not. It is not civilized to maintain for generations a blood feud with one's neighbours, thereby causing both sides to live and work in immediate fear of sudden death; it is not civilized to raid one's peaceful neighbours and hold up members of their families to ransom on pain of mutilation or death. It is not civilized . . . but the list is endless. The fact is not that the Pathan tribes have a different civilization from the rest of India; the fact is that they have no civilization at all. They have made no progress in historical times towards a more civilized way of life. That great traveller, Ibn Batuta, who passed through South-Eastern Afghanistan in the early fourteenth century, suffered somewhat at their hands, and thus briefly describes them as a race who "hold mountains and defiles, possess considerable strength, and are mostly highwaymen." This terse definition holds good today, nearly 600 years later, so far as the tribes on both sides of the Durand line are concerned.

Mark the word "both." The tribal problem on the Afghan side of the line is quite as difficult as, and infinitely more dangerous to the State than, the similar problem on the Indian side. But it is fundamentally the same problem on either side of the border. The main difference is that, whereas the Government of India have, or will have when they have finished with Japan, ample force to disarm and so render innocuous the tribes on the Indian side of the Durand line, similar coercive power is not possessed by the Afghan Government. The consequence is that should the Indian Government take unilateral action to this end the only result would be to endanger the peace of both sides of the border, thereby causing serious embarrassment to, and possibly endangering the stability of, the Afghan Government.

The reason for this is inherent in the structure of the Durand line itself. The primary object of the second Afghan war of 1879 was to safeguard the frontiers of India from Russian aggression. At the close of this war it would have been quite possible for the British Government to push forward their frontiers to the Hindu Kush, which is and always has been the natural North-West Frontier of India. They preferred, however, to retire from Afghanistan and to entrust the custody of the North-Western Frontier of India to the Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan. He

proved a staunch ally but an uncomfortable neighbour, so much so that ten years or so later, in 1893, the Government of India, disturbed by his contumacy and uneasy at his growing encroachments in the tribal areas adjacent to the settled districts, found it imperative to induce him to accept a line of demarcation between himself and India known as the Durand line, beyond which his authority was not to extend.

But it is one thing to draw a line on a map, and quite another to get a wily old fox like Abdur Rahman to accept it either on the ground or in fact. The line itself is a thoroughly bad line; it divides a nation in two, and even severs one portion of a tribe from another. It has no virtue save that of necessity. A considerable portion of it is still undemarcated on the ground, a large part of it is normally inaccessible to officials of the Government of India, and, in spite of all our efforts, the eyes of the majority of the so-called Indian tribesmen are still directed towards Kabul and not towards Peshawar, save when they come in for their allowances.

The line itself is, in fact, not an international boundary at all in the strict sense of the term. It is traversed by only two motorable roads throughout its six or seven hundred miles of length. Tribesmen pass freely across it on their lawful, or often unlawful, occasions, and the nationality of many of them is doubtful. In the case of trouble, well-armed tribesmen from either side of the border will hurry off to support their co-religionists, quite undeterred by the fact that they are British or Afghan subjects, as the case may be, and consequently debarred from joining in hostilities against the forces of a friendly power.

There are a number of ways of solving a problem which consists in how to tame an irreconcilable minority. One is by direct coercion, in accordance with which the forces of the two countries concerned would be employed in occupying the tribal areas and disarming the tribes. Another is by cutting off the ammunition supply which alone renders the tribesman a menace to his neighbours. This sounds simple enough in the case of an area surrounded for all practical purposes by two peaceful neighbours, each of whom possesses sovereign rights over his own half of the area concerned, and neither of whom desires to perpetuate the present state of affairs; but for various reasons it is not so easy as it sounds.

Yet another method is to trust to the present so-called peaceful penetration, to try to raise the standard of living where possible, and to endeavour gradually to educate the tribesmen to a more rational attitude to life.

If this third method is to be adopted, or rather pursued, it would not be a bad thing to find out how the Afghans deal with the similar problem on their side of the line. I remember getting into hot water not so very many years ago for suggesting that the Afghan Government understood the tribal problem rather better than we did. I am sufficiently unrepentant to suggest it again. (In parenthesis it would be an interesting study to estimate the effect of great land masses in inculcating into their rulers a supreme contempt for the methods of other countries. The various forms of isolationism to be found in Delhi, Moscow and Washington are cases in point. Chungking is probably in the same category, but the war has no doubt had an effect in all these capitals of broadening men's minds.)

In respect to the tribal problem we, with our traditional weakness for the free and untrammelled, if rather insanitary, savage, are inclined to preserve him intact on the North-West Frontier of India, complete with beard and puggri, baggy breeks and knife, rather than persuade him to discard his mediæval trappings for a suit of dittoes and a squash hat. And with him we preserve his tribe, because it is easier to deal with, and rather primitive and romantic, and his tribal laws, so that the King's writ does not run in the tribal areas, and the tribesman is encouraged to consider himself a law unto himself.

The Afghans, on the other hand, are inclined, so far as their limited resources permit, to persuade the tribesman to discard his old-fashioned habits and dress. They endeavour to penetrate peacefully not so much into the tribal territory as into the tribal mind, with the object of substituting for tribal law and custom the laws and customs of the State. The process is inevitably slow, but possibly it is sounder than ours.

The question resolves itself into a consideration as to our real objective. Is it our object to preserve the people of the tribal areas in their present physical and moral condition, to keep portions of these areas as a sort of human Whipsnade, into which

tourists may be allowed to venture and enjoy the spectacle of really wild men in a nearly wild state, and to keep other portions as a perpetual training ground for the Army of India in tribal warfare? Or is it our object to absorb the tribesmen of these areas as speedily as possible into the body politic of India?

If it is the latter we might perhaps learn something from the Afghans as to the best method to set about it. We might perhaps also work out with them a programme of road construction so that the two countries were linked not by two strategic roads but by four or five good honest commercial highways, for there is nothing so civilizing as the high roads of commerce wending their way through the countryside. Co-operation might also be possible in such matters as the payment of allowances, the settlement of tribal disputes, and kindred subjects. If such co-operation between the two countries could be secured the tribal problem would very soon cease to be a problem at all, and peace would reign in the tribal areas for the first time for perhaps a thousand years.

On the other hand, it might be simpler to do nothing much about it, and leave it to the future rulers of Pakistan to settle the tribal question.

TO THE EDITOR,
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SIR,

I feel that your recent paper on "The Frontier Problem: A Suggested Solution" requires a few comments. Generalizations are always dangerous; the simpler they seem the greater the danger. The North-West Frontier is not simple. Indeed, your well-written and well-deserved obituary of the late Colonel Robinson confesses as much. "Robbie" owed his efficiency to his realization of the complexity of the area to which he devoted his life. No problem can be solved unless its terms are clearly envisaged and set out.

Your author writes of the Pathans' "easygoing variant of Islam." It is easy to write of "Arab" countries or "Muslim" countries. How many of these countries are really Arab or fundamentally Muslim? Afghanistan, which is the Pathan State, is one of the few countries where the Muslim law and traditions are fundamental. It is not at all "easygoing"; it is an orthodox Muslim State, and as such ranks with Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the Pathan regards India, which is largely Shi'ah, as liberal, if not unorthodox, in mind and manners. It is the duty of Muslims to uphold Muslim States. Anyone who takes the trouble to turn up the passages in the Qurân dealing with these matters must realize how much emotion is concentrated on this point alone. History proves its significance. It is still the basis of strictly Muslim politics.

Your author writes of the Frontier as bearing marked resemblances, geographically, to Afghanistan. In a way he admits Pathan nationality, for he envisages the forced emigration of the "non-Pathan" minority of the Hazara District, thus claiming this trans-Indus area as "Pathan." But the independent State of Afghanistan is Pathan, though, like the British Isles, it has more languages than one. Its ruling family is Pathan. Its official language is Pushtu. Its manners are based upon the traditional Pushtunwali. Reference to the map will show that all the Pushtu-speaking peoples are divided into three parts. The old Sikh limit, following the skirts of the hills, still persists as the boundary of British India. Beyond it lie the Tribal Agencies, which are external to British India and the writ of its courts. The Durand line runs between the Agencies and Afghanistan. Three Pushtu-speaking areas are therefore implicated—the North-West Frontier Province of British India, the Agencies, ranking as British protectorates of some kind or other, and independent Afghanistan.

A "solution" which overrides the claims to consideration of an independent State, justly described as "a friendly neutral neighbour," as well as Indian politics *in toto*, is likely to be misconstrued, to put it mildly.

In writing "Afghanistan might once more wish to re-enter the British realm" your author opens himself to the challenge of history. Afghanistan was never part ranking as British protectorates of some kind or other, and independent Afghanistan.

wishes to remain Afghanistan. Having accepted the Durand line, she only wishes to develop her own resources, with, it is hoped, the friendly co-operation of her neighbours. Above all, she wishes to maintain the boundaries of the Faith as an independent Muslim State.

In putting forward his proposed "frontier colony" your author makes an appeal for the maintenance of Pathan traditions, of *Rawaj* and the machinery of the Jirga. But surely this is the avowed policy of the Government of India, as far as the Agencies go? The writer is apparently not satisfied with the way it works, although he makes no constructive criticism. It is significant that Holdich in his later works was also pessimistic with regard to the relations between British India and the Pathan tribes. Long ago, in his poignant letter to the Viceroy, the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan had warned the Government of India that the Pathan tribes, divided against themselves, would be of little use either to Afghanistan or to India.

The standard of colonial administration is now high. It might be possible to introduce much-needed educational and health services throughout the Agencies; the Afghan Government are doing their best on their side of the line. But the country is far from rich. Casings, hides, a few carpets and a little dried fruit do not promise much of a Budget. Who is to pay for your author's Frontier Colony? More pertinently still, who is to colonize it?

Yours faithfully,
K. DE B. CODRINGTON.

THE EDITOR,
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

SIR,

In the review of *Long Range Desert Group* by Major Kennedy Shaw, Major Jarvis's comments on "the almost criminal lack of preparedness and foresight displayed, not only by our various Governments, but also by the Army staffs on the spot." I am with him as far as our Government is concerned, but he does an injustice to the British troops in Egypt when he includes the Army staff in his accusation.

Later on he says that after the Light Car Patrols were disbanded in 1920 "the Army withdrew from the desert, and interest in it was maintained only by a small fraternity of officers, led by Bagnold, from the Royal Corps of Signals, the Royal Engineers and the R.T.R., who, at their own expense, in their annual leaves, and with no encouragement whatsoever from Higher Command, explored the Libyan Desert for the ten years before the War." This statement is as unfair as it is sweeping. I can only speak from personal knowledge for the three years from 1930 to 1933, but I can assure you that throughout those three years the British troops in Egypt were thoroughly desert-minded. There was little of the Libyan desert, within the limits of their petrol and of the Italian wire, with which the armoured cars of the 12th Lancers were not familiar; a long-range trek, under the ægis of the War Office and led by Major Paris, was staged to Khartoum and back by desert routes, to try out different types of vehicles. I myself one hot June, with a party from Headquarters, did a trip to Siwa and back by the southern route, lasting a fortnight or more, and great fun it was; and finally, annual manœuvres each year were held well out into the desert.

Every encouragement was given to officers to motor and fly over the desert whenever they could. The limiting factors were our meagre allowance of petrol, and the extreme old age of our vehicles and tanks. But to say that the British troops in Egypt and the Staff were not thoroughly alive to the significance of the desert as a battleground, or that they failed to circulate in it freely, is neither fair nor true.

J. BURNETT-STUART, OF CRICHEL,
General.

THE EDITOR,
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

DEAR SIR,

My comment in the review of the *Long Range Desert Group* on "the criminal lack of preparedness and foresight displayed by the Army Staff on the spot" refers more particularly to the failure to form the Group until Italy actually declared war in 1940. It is not unreasonable to think that it should have been organized on September 3, 1939, at the latest; and that the various desert expert officers should have been ear-marked for the job prior to that date.

Sir John Burnett-Stuart states that every encouragement was given to officers to motor over the desert when they could. I do not know quite what form this encouragement took, beyond: "Good-bye, and I hope you have a good time." Bagnold and his companions on their desert explorations used their own private cars, provided their own petrol and spare parts, and made their various expeditions in their annual leaves; and one of his great difficulties was not so much finding suitable men who would accompany him, but rather finding those who could get leave from their units to fit in with his expeditions.

I was in the deserts of Egypt from 1918 until 1936, and although I came in contact with Bagnold on many occasions, I only saw a patrol of mechanized cavalry operating more than fifty miles from the Nile Valley once in all those eighteen years. This no doubt was due to the shortage of petrol and the age of the cars which General Burnett-Stuart mentions.

C. S. JARVIS.